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Abstract 
This thesis seeks to assess the relevance of existing theories about the origins of 
nationalism and investigate more specifically the claixn that nationalism is rooted in 
ethnicity. It does so by examining the cases of Eritrea and Somaliland, which 
proclaimed their independence in May 1991 after seceding from the states to which 
they were formerly united. Having explained in the introduction why International 
Relations needs to take a closer look at the causes of nationalism, the second chapter 
proceeds to review some of the main theories about the origins of nationalism. It 
retraces the history of the primordialist-modernist debate, discusses the main 
contentions of the ethnonationalist approach and presents some of the factors 
singled-out by recent scholarship as propitious for the emergence of nationalism. 
Given that most of the theories about the origins of nationalism presented in chapter 
two centre on Europe, chapter three surveys the literature on the rise of nationalism 
in Africa in order to determine whether any additional factors need to be considered 
before analysing Eritrea and Somaliland. Chapter three also includes a discussion of 
the anthropological literature on ethnicity in Africa and questions the 
ethnonationalist claim that ethnie groups are pre-modern. Using as a framework the 
factors identified previously, chapter four offers a historical account of the 
emergence of nationalism in Eritrea. Chapter five does the same for the case of 
Somaliland. As the analysis provided in chapters four and five illustrate, the claim 
that nationàlism and secession have ethnie roots is not empirically substantiated by 
the cases of Eritrea and Somaliland. The thesis concludes by discussing the practical 
implications of these findings with regard to the righi of secession and proposais for 
boundary adjustment in Africa. It also highlights the ways International Relations 
may contribute to our understanding of the causes of nationalism. 
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
In May 1991, Eritrea and Somaliland proclaimed their independence after seceding 
from the states to which they were formerly united.1 In the wake of events that 
accompanied the end of the Cold War, the birth of these two new states may have 
gone somewhat unnoticed. Yet this was a momentous event, not only for Africa, but 
also for international society more broadly. At décolonisation, African states had 
pledged their commitment to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the states 
inherited upon achieving independence.2 In doing so, they were reaffirming the 
prevailing interprétation of national self-determination that had granted them their 
independence and which was understood to apply only to overseas possessions.3 In 
accordance with this interprétation, and as tragically illustrated by the failed attempts 
of Katanga and Biafra, secessionist movements were forcefully quelled. And, with 
the exception of Bangladesh in 1971, no clear-cut example of state création by 
secession occurred during the Cold War period.4 Such intransigence stemmed from 
the fear that granting récognition to secessionist movements would prompt similar 
demands elsewhere and would thus eventually lead to the disintegration of states. 
1 While Eritrea's secession from Ethiopia was formally acknowledged in 1993, Somaliland's 
secession from Somalia has not been recognised by the international Community of states. Eritrea and 
Somaliland are considered here as secessions because they conform to the definition given below. 
2 This was formally enshrined in article 3.3 of the Organisation for African Unity's Charter and was 
more forcefully reiterated at the Cairo Summit of 1964. See: Brownlie, Ian (ed.), Basic Documents on 
African Äffairs, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1971, pp. 3 and 360. 
3 As expressed in the United Nations General Assembly Resolutions 1514 (XV) and 1541 (XV). For 
the füll text of Resolution 1514 (XV), see: Brownlie, Ian (ed.), Basic Documents in International Law, 
3rd Edition, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1989, pp. 298-301; and for Resolution 1541 (XV), see: 
Brownlie, 1971, op. cit., pp. 368-71. 
4 Mayall, James, Nationalism and International Society, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
1990, p. 61. 
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It is against this background that the watershed events of the early 1990s must 
be considered. Since the end of the Cold War, a number of new states have been 
created as a resuit of the dismemberment of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, 
Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia and Somalia. Does this new surge of state création indicate 
that international society is now succumbing to the pressures of ethnie separatisi 
movements? Are these expressions of the ethnie tidal wave that is said to be 
sweeping the world? These are the underlying questions this thesis seeks to address 
by examining more specifically the cases of Eritrea and Somaliland. Insofar as 
secession is considered to be the 'logicai conclusion' and 'purest expression5 of 
nationalism, closer investigation of these two cases should indeed yield valuable 
insights as to the causes of a phenomenon that is forecast to become 'the most 
common reason for war in the post-Cold War era'.5 Given their implications for 
international order and stability, it only seems appropriate, for International Relations 
scholars in particular, to under stand what motivâtes nationalist demands and prompts 
a people to secede. 
1.1 — Focus and scope of the thesis 
Strictly defïned, secession is the formal act by which a territory and its inhabitants 
withdraw or separate from an already existing state with the aim of establishing 
themselves as a distinct, independent and sovereign state.6 Several attempts have 
been made to identify the circumstances under which secession is more likely to 
5 Mandelbaum, Michael, 'Is Major War Obsolete?' Survival, Vol. 40, No. 3, Winter 1998-99, p. 31. 
6 For similar définitions see, Heraclides, Alexis, The Self-determination of Minorities in International 
Politics, Frank Cass & Company Limited, London, 1991, p. 1; von Hippel, Karen, "The Resurgence of 
Nationalism and Its International Implications,' The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 17, No. 4, Autumn 
1994, p. 186. 
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occur.7 But, as Allen Buchanan remarks, there is 'no positive theory of secession at 
present'.8 One reason for this may be that many of those investigating this 
phenomenon, although by no means ail, assume ethnicity to be a necessary if not a 
sufficient condition for secession.9 Indeed, according to Donald Horowitz, secession 
should be regarded 'as a special species of ethnie conflict.'10 
The interprétation of secession as the expression of ethnie demands dérivés 
from the conception, best expressed by Walker Connor and Anthony Smith, that 
nationalism is rooted in ethnicity and that 'true' nations are ethnie-nations.11 This 
view, which we have chosen to label the ethnonationalist approach, has informed 
much of the study of nationalism and secession since the so-called 'ethnie revival' of 
the 1960s and 1970s. Its influence in the context of Africa is illustrated by proposais 
for the 'ethno-national adjustment' of the boundaries of states.12 According to such 
7 For a discussion of these see: Heraclides, 1991, op. cit., pp. 3-20; and Premdas, Ralph R., 
'Secessionistmovements in comparative perspective', in: Premdas, Ralph, S.W.R. de A. Samarasingle 
and Alan B. Anderson (eds), Secessionist Movements in Comparative Perspective, Pinter Publishers, 
London, 1990. 
8 Buchanan, Allen, Secession. The Morality of Political Divorce from Fort Sumter to Lithuania and 
Quebec. Westview Press, Boulder, San Francisco and Oxford, 1991, p. 3. 
9 See for example: Horowitz, Donald, 'Patterns ofEthnic Separatism,' Comparative Study of Society 
and History, Vol. 23, No. 2, April 1981, pp. 165-95; Horowitz, Donald, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, 
University of California Press, Berkeley, CA., 1985; Mayall, James, and Simpson, Mark, 'Ethnicity is 
not Enough: Reflections on Protracted Secessionism in the Third World,' International Journal of 
Comparative Sociology, Vol. 33, Nos 1-2, 1992, pp. 5-25; Shehadi, Kamal S., Ethnic Seif-
determination and the Break-up of States, Adelphi Paper No. 283, Brassey's Ltd for the International 
Institute for Strategie Studies, December 1993; Levine, Alice, 'Political Accommodation and the 
Prevention of Secessionist Violence,' in: Brown, Michael (ed.), The International Dimensions of 
Internal Conflict, MIT Press, Cambridge Mass., 1996, pp. 311-40; and Van Evera, Stephen, 
'Hypothesis on nationalism and war,' in: Brown, Michael et al., Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict. An 
International Security Reader. The MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1997, pp. 26-60. 
10 Horowitz, 1985, op. cit., p. 230. 
11 Connor, Walker, Ethnonationalism. The Quest for Understanding. Princeton University Press, 
Princeton, New Jersey, 1994; Smith, Anthony D., The Ethnic Revival in the Modern World, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1981; Smith, Anthony D., The Ethnic Origins ofNations, 
Blackwell, Oxford, 1986. 
12 The need to redraw Africa's boundaries according to ethnicity has been argued by: Amadife, 
Emmanuel N., and Warhola, James, W., 'Africa's Political Boundaries: Colonial Cartography, The 
OAU, and the Advisability of Ethno-National Adjustment,' International Journal of Politics, Culture 
and Society, Vol. 6, No. 4, 1993, pp. 533-54; Davidson, Basil, The Black Man''s Bürden: Africa and 
the Curse of the Nation-State, Currey, London, 1992; Jackson, Robert H., and Rosberg, Carl L., 
'Populär Legitimacy in African Multi-Ethnic States,' The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 22, 
8 
proposais, the crises that have plagued Africa since independence will only be 
resolved once the 'artificial' boundaries of its states are redrawn to reflect Africa's 
'traditional' ethnie communities. While it is trae that Africa's states were initially 
carved up by the Western colonial powers 'with little regard for ethnie or national 
Settlements',13 to what extent is this the real source of Africa's problems? Is it the 
case that the main challenges to Africa's colonial boundaries have been motivated by 
the need to rectify 'the historical accidents resulting from the manner in which the 
state system was built - a manner which until recently took scant notice of ethnie ties 
and national susceptibilities'?14 Is it right to portray Eritrea as an 'ethnie 
movement',15 or as a case of 'ethnie separatism'?16 Is it accurate to describe the 
collapse of the state of Somalia in the early 1990s and Somaliland's subséquent 
secession as the products of'ethnie war'?17 
To answer these questions, this thesis proposes to reverse the conventional 
causal chain, ethnie group/nation —» nationalisai —• secession, that informs much of 
the literature on nationalism and secession, and which was expressed by Smith as 
folio ws: 
Nationalism dérivés its force (...) from the inner resources of specific ethnie 
communities, as well as the perceptions and sentiments that they inspire. 
History and culture are the wellsprings of these inner resources, for they can 
No. 2, 1984, pp. 177-98; Zartman, William, 'The Politics of Boundaries in North and West Africa,' 
Journal of Modem African Studies, Vol. 3, No. 2, 1965, pp. 55-73. 
13 Herbst, Jeffrey, 'Challenges to Africa's Boundaries in the New World Order,5 Journal of 
International Affairs, Vol. 46, No. 1, Summer 1992. 
14 Smith, Anthony, 'Ethnie and Nation in the Modem World,' Millennium, Vol. 14, No. 2, Summer, 
1985, p. 139. 
15 Connor, 1994, op. cit., p. 17. 
16 Smith, Anthony D., National Identity, Penguin books, 1991, p. 104. 
17 Schultz, R.H. Jr, 'State disintegration and ethnie conflict: a framework for analysis, Annals of the 
American Academy of Politicai and Social Science, Vol. 541, September 1995, pp. 75-88; Horowitz, 
Donald, 'Democracy in Divided Societies. The Challenge of Ethnie Conflict,' Journal of Democracy, 
Vol. 4, No. 4, October 1993, p. 22. 
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indicate much about the likelihood of ethnie consciousness developing into 
ethnie nationalism and, hence, into secessionist movement.18 
Rather than assuming what causes secession this thesis will investigate instead what 
secession has to tell us about nationalism and the nation. Specifically, it will try to 
answer the following question: 
(1) Are Eritrea and Somaliland's respective claims for national self-determination 
rooted in age-old feelings of ethnie belonging, or do they instead corroborate the 
view that nations are modem créations? 
Answer to this question is not only of academic or theoretical interest but also has 
practical implications. In addition to the above, two subsidiary questions will guide 
our enquiry: 
(2) To what extent do the cases of Eritrea and Somaliland challenge the conventional 
interprétation of the right of self-determination and thus confirm the need to 
redraw Africa's artificial boundaries so that they may more appropriately reflect 
'traditional' identities? 
(3) And, how, if at ali, can International Relations contribute to our understanding of 
nationalism? 
Indeed, as will be shown in the following chapter, most of the theories of nationalism 
have been developed by historians, sociologists and politicai scientists, and have 
tended to assume that the causes of nationalism are essentially domestic. But is that 
really the case? And why has International Relations offered so little in the way of an 
explanation of nationalism? 
18 Smith, Anthony D., 'The Ethnic sources of Nationalism', in: Brown, Michael (ed.), Ethnic Conflict 
and International Security, Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J., 1993, p. 28. Our italics. 
10 
1.2 — Nationalism and International Relations 
Nationalism has always occupied an ambiguous position in International Relations. 
The terms 'nation' or 'national' prevail in many of the discipline's key-concepts -
the nation-state, transnational relations, the national interest or the principle of 
national self-determination - and even in its own name. Wars, crises, economic 
compétition or co-operation have often been put down to nationalism. Yet in spite of 
its apparent terminological prevalence and its impact on world politics, nationalism, 
it has been claimed, remains, if not all together outside, at least in the periphery of 
International Relations.19 The reason for this is frequently explained by reference to 
the discipline's traditional concern with inter-state relations and its tendency to 
equate 'nation' with 'state'. International Relations' state-centric focus has thus 
regularly prompted accusations of 'terminological négligence' and suggestions that 
the discipline might more aptly be renamed: Inter-State relations. One of the most 
virulent denunciations of this 'terminological chaos' was formulated by Walker 
Connor in 1978. 
The error of improperly equating nationalism with loyalty to the state is the 
conséquence of a much broader terminological disease that plagues the study 
of global politics. It would be difficult to name four words more essential to 
global politics than are state, nation, nation-state, and nationalism. But despite 
their centrality, ail four terms are shrouded in ambiguity due to their imprecise, 
inconsistent, and often totally erroneous usage.20 
19 IR's lack of concern with nationalism has been noted by: Mayall, James, 'Nationalism in the study 
of international relations', in: Groom, A.J.R. and Light, Margot (eds), Contemporary International 
Relations: A Guide to Theory, Pinter, London, 1994, p. 182. Lapid, Yosef and Kratochwil, Friedrich, 
'Revisiting the National: Toward an Identity Agenda in Neorealism,' in: Lapid, Yosef and Kratochwil, 
Friedrich (eds), The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory, Lynne Rienner, London and Boulder, 
1996; Griffiths, Martin and Michael Sullivan, 'Nationalism and International Relations Theory,' 
Australian Journal of Politics and History, Vol. 43, No. 1, 1997, pp. 53-66. Pettman, Jan Jindy, 
'Nationalism and After,' Review of International Studies, Vol. 24, Special Issue, December 1998, pp. 
149-164. 
20 See, Connor, Walker, 'A Nation, Is a Nation, Is a State, Is an Ethnie Group, Is a... ' reprinted in: 
Connor, 1994, op. cit., p. 91. This article was first published in Ethnie and Racial Studies, Vol. 1, No. 
1, October 1978. 
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Before discussing whether International Relations' disregard for nationalism can be 
attributed to its traditional concern with inter-state relations and its tendency to 
equate state and nation, it is necessary first to examine more closely the claim that 
'mainstream IR' has excluded the 'national problematique' from its research 
agenda21 and that by doing so it has 'missed nationalism' altogether.22 
a) The study of nationalism in International Relations 
To adequately appraise such assertions, one would first need to determine which 
scholars are to be considered as representative of 'mainstream' IR. A first year IR 
student or a non-IR scholar could easily be forgiven for assuming, on the basis of the 
more recent publications in the discipline, that Kenneth Waltz is mainstream IR. Any 
list will no doubt be determined by one's own theoretical inclinations, generation, or 
even one's own national, if not institutional, affiliation, and could thus be criticised 
for being partial, incomplete or too-encompassing. While acknowledging how 
difficult it may be to come up with an agreed list of whom is to be considered as 
'belonging' to IR, let alone mainstream IR, there surely must be more to realism, 
neo- or classical, than Kenneth Waltz. 
Among those who lament orthodox IR's neglect of nationalism, many will 
nonetheless duly acknowledge E.H. Carr's contribution to the topic.23 In fact, as 
Mayall notes, Carr has done more than merely contribute to the study of the subject. 
Indeed, it was under his chairmanship that the Chatham House Study Group 
undertook one of the first systematic studies on the international problems posed by 
21 Lapid and Kratochwil, 1996, op. cit., p. 105. 
22 Pettman, 1998, op. cit., p. 149. 
23 Carr, E.H., Nationalism and After, Macmillan, London, 1968. First published in 1945. 
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nationalism during the inter-war period.24 Therefore, while the academic study of 
nationalism may generally be said to have begun with the pioneering works of 
historians such as Carlton Hayes25 and Hans Kohn,26 International Relations was by 
no means lagging far behind. Few, on the other hand, will mention Hans 
Mergenthau''s treatment of nationalism in Politics Among Nations or more 
specifically in 'The Paradoxes of Nationalism.'27 Conscious of the threat nationalism 
posed to world order, and criticai of its capacity to bring about a more peaceful 
change, Morgenthau sought to understand its prevalence, its contradictions and the 
role played by power politics in this process. Nationalism, he wrote, is both in its 
logie and experience, 
a principle of disintegration and fragmentation, which is prevented from 
ensuing anarchy not by its own logie but by the politicai power which either 
puts a halt to its realization at a certain point, as did the peace settlement of 
1919, or else uses it for its purposes up to a certain point, as did the unifiers of 
Germany and Italy in the nineteenth Century.28 
Rather than a means towards a just order, the application of the principle of 
nationalism or national self-determination, Morgenthau argued, only brought about a 
situation where yesterday's oppressed became today's oppressors. Raymond Aron, 
another of the discipline's forefathers, also dealt extensively with nationalism, its 
relationship to industrialisation and to the global inequality of progress.29 But, 
whereas for Morgenthau nationalism was an idea intrinsically bound to the triumph 
24 Mayall, 1994, op. cit., p. 182. Mayall is here referring to Carr, E.H., (ed.,), Nationalism. A Report by 
a Study Group of Members of the Royal Institute of International Ajfairs, Oxford University Press for 
the RIIA, London, 1939. 
25 See for example, Hayes, Carlton, Essays on Nationalism, New York, 1926, and The Historical 
Evolution of Modem Nationalism, Macmillan, New York, 1948 (first published in 1931). 
26 Kohn, Hans, The Idea of Nationalism: A Study of its Origins and Background, Macmillan, New 
York, 1945 (first published in 1922), and The Age of Nationalism, Harper, New York, 1962. 
27 Morgenthau, Hans, 'The Paradoxes of Nationalism,' The Yale Review, Vol. 46, No. 4, June 1957, 
pp. 481-96. 
28 Morgenthau, 1957, op. cit., pp. 484-5. 
29 Aron, Raymond, Progress and Disillusion. The Dialectics of Modem Society, Pali Mall Press, 
London, 1968, in particular chapter 3 - Racism and Nationalism. 
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of individuai liberty and whose origins lay in the French King's betrayal of his nation 
in 1791, for Aron, it was associated with 'both democratic ideology and industriai 
modernization. '30 
Also, and not merely beeause he occupied the Aaron L. Binenkorb 
Professorship of International Studies, but mainly for the approach he developed, 
Benedict Anderson might also be included here as one IR scholar who has clearly not 
neglected nationalisai.31 By looking at the way nationalism was modularised and 
spread throughout the world, Anderson provides a theory of nationalism which may 
easily be seen to fît within the expansion of international society model.32 Also 
concerned with the processes that underlay the expansion of states, Fred Northedge 
analysed the relationship between imperialism and the principle of nationality, whose 
contradictory forces, he wrote, were responsible for the disequilibrium built into the 
international system.33 In an era when international organisations are once again 
considering the codification of national minorities' rights,34 it may be appropriate to 
recali here Inis Claude's National Minorities. An International Problem?5 and Alexis 
Heraclides' The Self-détermination of Minorities in International Polrtics.36 While 
references to national character have fallen into disrepute, there have been a number 
of studies which examine the rôle played by ethnie interest groups in the foreign 
j 0 Aron, 1968, op. cit., p. 45. The similarities between Aron and Gellner's analysis are striking, yet 
neither makes any reference to the other. 
31 Anderson, Benedict, Imagined Commimities, Verso, London, 1991. The first edition was published 
in 1983. 
32 Bull, Hedley, and Watson, Adam (eds), The Expansion of International Society, Clarendon Press, 
Oxford, 1984. 
33 Northedge, F.S., The International Political System, Faber and Faber, London, 1976. 
34 Jackson Preece, Jennifer, 'National minority rights vs. State sovereignty in Europe: changing norms 
in international relations?' Nations and Nationalism, Vol. 3, No. 3, November 1997, pp. 345-64. 
35 Claude, Inis, National Minorities. An International Problem. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 
Mass., 1955. 
36 Heraclides, op. cit, 1991. 
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policy decision-making process.37 In a somewhat related area, the recent prolifération 
of studies on ethnie conflicts may also be seen as a testimony that nationalism and 
ethnicity are being seriously considered by the discipline.38 Another barometer of the 
phenomenon's increasing topicality, Millennium, Journal of International Studies, 
devoted two special issues to the topic of nationalism, in 1985 and in 1991.39 More 
recently, and also irò m within IR, William Bloom's analysis of nationalism in 
international relations seeks to bridge the levels of analysis by drawing fiora the 
insights of psychoanalytical theory about identity formation and mass psychology.40 
Due mention should finally be made of F.H. Hinsley's important work on 
nationalism and the international system,41 a project which was further elaborated by 
James Mayall in his analysis of the impact of nationalism on international society.42 
As this cùrsory review illustrâtes, it is unfair to suggest that the discipline of 
International Relations has 'missed' nationalism as such. Nevertheless, while the 
effects of nationalism on international relations have regularly been considered and 
studied, few of the aforementioned scholars were able to foresee,43 as Aron 
cautiously yet presciently did, nationalism's continued importance in the late 
twentieth Century. 
37 See for example, Halley, Lawrence, Ancient Affections: Ethnic Groups and Foreign Policy, Praeger, 
New York, 1985; and Goldberg, David H., Foreign Policy and Ethnic Interest Groups: American and 
Canadiern. Jews Lobby for Israel, Greenwood Press, New York and London, 1990. 
38 See, for example, Shurke, Astri and Noble, Lela Garner (eds), Ethnic Conflict in International 
Relations, Praeger Publishers, New York and London, 1977; Brown, Michael (ed.), Ethnic Conflict 
and International Security, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1993; Moynihan, 
Patrick Pandemonium. Ethnicity and International Politics, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1993; 
and Esman, Milton J., and Telhami, Shibley (eds), International Organization and Ethnic Conflict, 
Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London, 1995. 
39 Special Issue: The Nationalist Challenge, Millennium, Vol. 14, No. 2, Summer 1985; and Special 
Issue: Reimagining the Nation, Millennium, Vol. 20, No. 3, Winter 1991. 
40 Bloom, William, Personal Identity, National Identity and International Relations, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1990. 
41 Hinsley, F.H., Nationalism and the International System, Hodder & Stoughton, London, 1973. 
42 Mayall, op. cit., 1990. 
43 Mayall being a notable exception. 
15 
During the final third of the 20th century, ethnie conflicts over social, politicai 
or racial dominance - in turn or simultaneously - appear to be more likely than 
the continuation of the class struggle in the Marxist sense.44 
Instead, Carr predicted that the nation as a politicai organisation would become 
obsolete in the era of industriai world economy, and Morgenthau saw nationalism as 
'having had its day' in the atomic âge. Neglected, perhaps not, but nationalism was 
seen by many IR scholars, as a phenomenon whose impact on the world would 
progressively diminish. This belief, according to Mayall, was not so much due to 
International Relations scholars' state-centric focus, but rather the resuit of their 
commitment to the 'concept of universal rationality' which hampered both Libérais 
and Realists in their analysis of nationalism.45 
While this assessment is corroborated by Carr and Morgenthau's analysis, 
there appears nevertheless to be another reason for International Relations' failure to 
foresee nationalism's pervasiveness. That is, its tendency to consider the domestic 
and international realms as separate and independent from one another. And this is 
illustrated by International Relations' implicit or explicit acceptance of a certain 
division of labour whereby the discipline focuses on the conséquences of nationalism 
and its rôle in contemporary international politics, leaving to others the task of 
identifying its causes.46 This, more than any other factor, would explain why 
International Relations has offered little in the way of an explanation of what 
nationalism is and why it arises. But can IR contribute to our understanding of 
nationalism, a phenomenon deemed to be quintessentially domestic? For even those 
who lament IR's neglect of nationalism, and cali for its study in IR, assume that the 
origins of nationalism are internai and do not, therefore, provide any clues as to the 
44 Aron, 1968, op. cit., p. 46. 
45 Mayall, 1994, op. cit., p. 184. 
46 For a 'pragmatic'justification ofthis division of labour, see: Mayall, 1994, op. cit., p. 183. 
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study of its causes might be approached from an International Relations 
perspective.47 What this thesis suggests is that IR not only can but should do so, and 
this by revealing the international dimensions of nationalism. Since, as was stated 
earlier, secession is the logicai outcome nationalist Claims to self-determination, and 
given that it results is the création of a new state (one of IR's foremost unit of 
analysis), it may be considered as a good starting point for IR's investigation of the 
causes of nationalism. To do so, it necessary to consider what the principle of self-
determination entails and what its relationship to nationalism and secession is. 
1.3 — Secession and national self-determination 
The fact that secession is such a rare occurrence has frequently been interpreted as 
indicative of the fact that the principle of sovereign territorial integrity prevails over 
that of national self-determination, and that justice in the international system is 
therefore subordinate to order. Frequently used to describe any attempi by a national 
minority to exercise its right to self-determination, secession, it is argued, challenges 
the Westphalian normalisation of state sovereignty.48 Yet, insofar as it is the 
expression of a desire to establish an independent state, secession does not as such 
challenge the statisi foundation of the current world order. Indeed quite the opposite, 
secession reasserts the continuing centrality of the sovereign state as an international 
actor. On the other hand, because secessionist movements directly imperii the 
integrity if not the existence of the state from which they seek to break away, they 
tend to be viewed with hostility. Since a successful secession may set a precedent 
that in turn may inspire similar secessionist movements elsewhere, even the most 
47 In addition to the authors mentioned in footnote 16, see: Haas, Ernst, 'What is nationalism and why 
should we study it?' International Organization, Vol. 40, No. 3, Summer 1986, pp. 707-44. 
48 Pettman, 1998, op. cit., p. 150. 
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isolated case risks posing a threat not only to the existing territorial status quo but 
more broadly to international order. Given that such fears are founded on the 
assumption that claims for national self-determination and secession are ultimately 
made by ethnie groups and given the multi-ethnic composition of most states, 
flxlfìlling such demands would indeed seem suicidai.49 Hence the reluctance of 
estabhshed states to support secessionist claims. 
While demands for self-determination are understood to be motivated by 
nationalist concerns, nationalism and secession are also ofìen seen to be the resuit of 
the principle of self-determination. 
Without a recognised and widely accepted doctrine of self-determination, few 
secessionist movements would arise. It is the availability of this doctrine and 
its enshrinement in the international moral order as a right that has facilitated, 
if not.created, many separatisi movements.50 
Elie Kedourie, who argued in 1960 that nationalism was itself 'largely a doctrine of 
national self-determination', more famously expressed this view.51 Yet the 
relationship between nationalism, secession and self-determination is fraught with 
ambiguities. Often understood to be the only internationally 'sanctioned' option 
allowing a people 'legally' to justify séparation, the principle of self-determination of 
peoples is doubly problematic. First, debate as to what exactly is understood by self-
determination has led to it being interpreted to mean anything from complete 
sovereignty to relative autonomy. Second, by referring to peoples, not individuals, the 
principle while seemingly giving moral-legal récognition to a community fails to define 
49 Many discussions of nationalism and secession stress the fact that most of today's states are multi-
ethnic and provide figures of the numbers of ethnic/linguistic groups that may one day make 
secessionist demands, thus showing the high potential for disruption. See, for example: Johnston, R.J., 
Knight, David B., and Eleonore Kofinan, National Self-Determination and Politicai Geography, 
Croom Helm, London, New York and Sydney, 1988, pp. 6-7; Shehadi, 1993, op. cit., p. 3; Van Evera, 
1994, p. 32; Levine, 1996, op. cit., p. 313. 
50 Premdas, 1990, op. cit., p. 16. 
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it. This ambiguity is perhaps best reflected in the way the meaning and implication 
attributed to the principle of self-determination have evolved since its inception. As 
Tom Franck notes, 
the normative structure inevitably changed as the context within which the 
secessionist issue arose underwent profound historié change. These contexts, in 
brief, were the disintegration of the Spanish-American empire, the defeat of 
Imperial Germany, Austro-Hungary and the Sublime Porte, the rise of anti-
colonialism and nationalism in Africa, Asia and the Caribbean, and the 
disintegration of the Soviet Union and its system of satellites. Each context 
came at a différent time and place and posed quite différent politicai, cultural 
and social problems. Each context, perceived as a crisis of international order, 
gave rise to a topical prescription one specifically conceived as a response to 
that particular crisis, yet employing broadly normative terms.52 
Before discussing how self-determination was interpreted in response to these four 
momentous occasions, which have been described as the great waves of state 
création,53 it may be necessary briefly to recali the origins of the notion of self-
determination. 
a) The origins of self-determination 
Both Kedourie and Isaiah Berlin attribute the birth of national self-determination to 
Kant's principle of self-determination. Whether such paternity was inévitable, as 
argued by Kedourie,54 or a misfortunate accident, as argued by Berlin,55 self-
determination came to mean for the collectivity what it meant for the individuai: 
liberty. The doctrine of self-determination appeared in the eighteenth century as the 
basis upon which a new order, following the demise of the great empires, would 
51 Kedourie, Elie, Nationalism, Fourth Expanded Edition, Blackwell Publishers, Oxford and 
Cambridge, Mass., 1993, p. 23. 
52 Franck, 'Postmodern Tribalismi and the Right to Secessioni in: Brölmann, Catherine, Lefeber, 
René, and Zieck, Marjoleine, Peoples and Minorities in International Law, Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, Dordrecht, Boston, London, 1993, pp. 4-5. 
53 Mayall, 1990, op. cit., p. 64. 
54 Kedourie, op. cit., 1993. 
55 Berlin, Isaiah, 'Kant as an Unfamiliar Source of Nationalism,' Berlin, Isaiah, The Sense ofReality. 
Studies in Ideas and their History. Chatto & Windus, London 1996, pp. 232-48. 
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eventually emerge. Intrinsically linked with the idea of democracy, self-
determination was to correct the arbitrariness and injustices of dynastie rule. In 
theory, self-determination could be said to refer to the practice by which individuals 
freely express their politicai will by choosing their own government and, at this 
stage, reference to nationalisai appears by no means necessary. The problem arises 
when the principle of self-determination is put into practice. 
The French Revolution, by claiming that sovereignty lay ultimately in the 
nation, linked the expression of politicai free will to that of a collective entity: the 
nation. Yet, what was then understood as the nation did not entail a culturally or 
linguistically defined community. According to Connor Cruise O'Brien, the French 
Revolutionaries' use of la nation or la patrie ought to be compared with Spinoza's 
use of the concept of state, in both cases these are meant to refer to 'a system of 
government of a people.'56 Reference to a cultural conception of the nation was 
irrelevant at this stage, as the French Revolution was not aimed at overthrowing a 
foreign rule but one that was deemed to be illegitimate. The nation stood here in 
opposition not to another nation but to l'Etat or les Etats in power. Moreover, as 
historians have shown, France had not achieved at the time of the Revolution the 
degree of cultural homogeneity often attributed to it.57 Hobsbawm, for example, 
notes that at the time of the French Revolution, only half of French Citizens spoke 
French, and only 12-13% spoke it 'correctly'.58 The association between self-
56 O'Brien, Connor Cruise, 'Nationalism and the French Revolution', in: Geoffrey Best (ed.), The 
Permanent Revolution. The French Revolution and its Legacy, 1789-1989, Fontana Press, London, 
1988, p. 22. 
57 Weber, Eugene, Peasants into Frenchmen. The Modernization of Rural France. 1870-1914. 
Stanford University Press, Stanford CA, 1978; and Braudel, Fernand, The Identity of France, vol. I: 
History and Environment, Collins, London, 1988. 
58 Hobsbawm, Eric, J., Nations and Nationalism since 1780, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
1990, p. 60. 
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détermination and nationalism, understood in cultural terms, would appear later, as 
the resuit of the internationalisation of the Revolution.59 
When the Revolution shifted into its expansionist phase, culminating with the 
Napoleonic conquests, self-determination in the conquered territories and more 
evidently in the German territories, became associated with cultural nationalism.60 
Self-determination meant not so much the acquisition of democratic rights as it 
entailed the overthrow of French foreign rule. 
What appeared to the donors as a liberating universalisai was seen by the 
recipients as an alien imperialism, evoking counter-nationalism. By the end of 
the nineteenth Century such nationalism had spread throughout Europe.61 
Understood as 'libération' from aa aliea rule, self-determination was thus equated 
with nationalism. And, while remaining essential to the définition of self-
deteraiinatioa, the acquisitioa of democracy was after the Napoleonic era to become 
a by-product of nationalism. Henceforth, democracy was perceived to be achievable 
only under conditions where foreign rule no longer prevailed and only among people 
who belonged to the same nation. Nowhere, was this more strongly expounded than 
in John Stuart Mill's writings on nationalism and représentative government in 1861. 
For Mill, democracy was dépendent upon common nationality, whether defined by 
race, language or shared history: '...it is in general a necessary condition of free 
institutions that the boundaries of governments should coincide in the main with 
those of nationalises.'62 Advocating what could be defined as a right to secession, he 
59 Morgenthau traces nationalism's birth to 1791, the year the King of France betrayed his own 
country by plotting against it with foreign monarchs. In so doing, 'the absolute monarchy failed the 
test as defender of the nation and its territory,' and nationalism became 'an integral part of individuai 
liberty.' Morgenthau, 1957, op. cit., p. 482. 
60 Berlin, Isaiah, 'The bent twig: one the rise of nationalism,' in: Berlin, Isaiah, The Crooked Timber 
of Humanity. Chapters in the History of Ideas. John Murray, London, 1990, p. 246. 
61 Howard, Michael, The Causes ofWar, Unwin paperbacks, London, 1983, p. 26. 
62 Mill, John Stuart, 'Of nationality, as connected with représentative government', Représentative 
Government, Chapter XVI - in: Utilitarianism, On Liberty and Considérations on Représentative 
Government, J.M. Dent & Sons M , 1972, p. 362. 
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further stated: 'Where the sentiment of nationality exists in any force, there is a 
prima facie case for uniting all the members of the nationality under the same 
government, and a government to themselves apart.'63 Since most of the plebiscites 
that were conducted in the nineteenth century were aimed at achieving self-
determination from an autocratic rule, which often also happened to be a foreign rule, 
nationalism and democracy became increasingly intermingled. In the words of 
Cobban: 
we are bound to conclude that the association between nationalism and 
democracy, and therefore the theory of self-determination itself, may have been 
the result, not of their innate interdependence, but of historical accident.64 
b) Secession: uti possidetis or self-determination of minorities? 
Despite its ascendancy as the legitimising principle for political organisation, the 
principle of national self-determination was not as such invoked when the former 
Latin-American colonies of the Spanish Empire were granted their independence. 
Instead, the dissolution of the Spanish Empire was conducted along, and gave rise to, 
the other cardinal principle of international relations, territorial integrity or the 
entitlement to uti possidetis.65 
Uti possidetis is derived from a Roman private law concept, which holds that 
pending litigation, the existing state of possession of immovable property is 
retained. Translated into international law, the phrase means that irrespective of 
the legitimacy of the original acquisition of territory, the existing disposition of 
the territory remains in effect until altered by a freely negotiated treaty.66 
63 Ibid., pp. 360-1. 
64 Cobban, Alfred, National Self-Determination, Oxford University Press, London, 1945, p. 7. It could 
be further hypothesized that it is this accidental collusion between foreign and autocratic rule which 
was to lend to nationalism its meaning as a liberation struggle against a foreign rule, whereas 
revolution would be used for those cases of liberation struggle against a non-foreign rule. 
65 Franck, 1993, op. cit., 6. 
66 Young, Crawford, 'The Heritage of Colonialism,' in: flaberson, John W., and Rothchild, Donald, 
(eds), Africa in World Politics. Post-Cold War Challenges, 2nd Edition, Westview Press, Boulder, 
Colorado and Oxford, 1995, footnote 12, p. 38. 
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Following the norm of uti possidetis, the Latin-American colonies thus achieved 
their independence and sovereignty within the former administrative boundaries 
established by Spain, and renounced any territorial claims outside their own 
territorial jurisdiction. The adoption and application of the norm was made possible 
by the fact that these newly independent territories formerly belonged to the same 
empire and by the fact that most of their inhabitants, at least those who had a voice in 
the process, were all ultimately descendants of the same culture. In that respect, there 
was no reason to appeal to culture to justify the claim to national self-determination. 
By contrast to this period, the second wave of state creation, which resulted 
from the dissolution of the German, Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires was, at 
least originally, premised on a cultural conception of the right to national self-
determination. President Wilson's proposition, in his fourteen points and four 
principles, that the principle of self-determination ought to be enshrined in 
international law, reflected an increased belief in the democratic legitimacy of the 
principle and a firm conviction that it provided the basis upon which peace would 
ultimately be achieved.67 Self-determination had indeed acquired a new impetus in 
the wake of World War One and the Russian Revolution, when reference to self-
determination of peoples became the foremost legitimising principle. Although the 
Western Powers were reluctant to introduce any right of national self-determination 
as part of the Peace Treaty, they had cornered themselves into accepting it. 
The Western powers had not called the force of nationality into being: they had 
rather reluctantly recognized it when it appeared and used it, not to win the 
war, but to hasten its last stages. In so doing, and in the propaganda they 
poured forth, they had committed themselves to the principle of self-
67 This belief was already very much present in the minds of Mazzini and other nationalists in the 
early XTXth Century. 
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détermination. Under pressure from Woodrow Wilson they had, perhaps, gone 
farther then they intended.68 
While the prineiple of self-determination was perceived to be central to the Peace 
Conference, it is remarkable how little the prineiple was in fact applied on the 
ground. First, it should be noted that the prineiple of national self-determination was 
never considered with regards to the colonies. Moreover, in Europe itself, it quickly 
became clear that the prineiple of self-determination was more difficult to implement 
than originally anticipated. Language, which had been hitherto considered as the 
obvious indicator of nationality, revealed its limits on closer investigation as too 
many exceptions came to challenge its validity as a reliable criterion. In addition to 
these technical difficulties, there were fears of further 'balkanisation' that could 
threaten security in Europe. While Great power interest can thus be invoked, as 
Morgenthau does, it is important to note that the relatively restricted application of 
the prineiple of national self-determination owed much to the ambiguous meaning of 
the nation itself. 
The exact implications of national self-determination - relative sovereignty 
within a state or outright secession - were resolved only a year after the end of 
World War one, in a statement which clearly established the relative unimportance of 
the right in international law. The committee of Jurists explicitly indicated in 1920 
that Positive International Law 
did not recognize the right of national groups, as such, to separate themselves 
from the state of which they form part by the simple expression of that wish, 
anymore than it recognizes the right of other states to claim such a séparation.69 
68 Cobban, 1945, op. cit., p. 15. 
69 'Report of the International Committee of Jurists...upon the Legai aspects of the Aaland Islands 
Question', League of Nations Officiai Journal, Special Supplement, No. 3, October 1920, pp. 5-6; 
quoted in Cobban, 1945, op. cit., p. 37. 
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Self-determination as secession was a principle to be applied in times of crisis, but in 
ordinary times its relevance was to be limited. The overriding prevalence of state 
sovereignty and territorial integrity was thus further asserted and reinforced, not 
merely for power political reasons, but also because of the sheer impracticality of the 
principle thus defined and the injustices it risked creating in turn. The clause that was 
included in Woodrow Wilson's original draft of the Covenant of the League of 
Nations and which provided for the possibility of territorial adjustment, 'pursuant to 
the principle of self-determination,' never found its way in the Covenant's final draft 
and was instead reduced to the non-committal form of Article X.70 
During the inter-war period, national self-determination was not totally 
dismissed and did find some form of expression in a number of treaties, which 
included provisions for the protection of minorities.71 Yet again, no general article 
ensuring the rights of all minorities in all member states was ever incorporated into 
the League's Covenant.72 Several years later, Hitler's appeal to the rights of German-
speaking minorities to justify his invasion of Austria and Czechoslovakia 
demonstrated how minority rights could be invoked by a belligerent state to lay 
irredentist claims on its neighbours.73 Following WWII, reference to minority rights 
within international law was dropped altogether and no provisions for it were to be 
made in the United Nations Charter. And, it was only with the adoption of Article 27 
of the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, that minority rights 
were once again formally reintroduced in international law.74 As will be discussed 
70 Cobban, 1945, op. cit., pp. 27-28. 
71 For listing, see F. Caporoti, Study on the rights of Persons Belonging to Ethnic, Religious, and 
Linguistic Minorities, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1979/3 84/rev. I. 
72 Lerner, N., 'The Evolution of Minority Rights in International Law', in: Brölmann et al., 1993, op. 
cit., p. 83. 
73 Mayall, 1990, op. cit., p. 55. 
74 The article stipulates that: 'In those states in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, 
persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with other members 
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further, below, subsequent developments in international law on minority rights have 
attempted to further guarantee their protection but always within the state where they 
reside and hence with no mention of any right of self-determination. 
c) Decolonisation: self-determination as uti possidetis 
The principle of self-determination acquired a new meaning and impetus after WWII 
with the movement for decolonisation. Indeed, in the 1960s and 1970s, nationalist 
movements world wide (and Eritrea represented one such example) framed then-
struggle for national liberation in anti-colonial terms, for it was seen as providing the 
necessary international legitimacy and legality to their claims for self-determination 
and independence. It is again necessary to note that no such provision was originally 
made in the UN charter, even within the Trusteeship system: 
the concept of self-determination, as envisaged by the drafters of the Charter, 
did not refer to the right of dependent peoples to be independent, or indeed 
even to vote.75 
Moreover, as article 77 of the UN Charter illustrates, the provisions included in the 
trusteeship system only applied to three categories of territories. The first category, 
which was to comprise the great majority of the Trust's territories, included those 
already held under mandate, i.e., territories taken from the defeated powers after 
WWI. The second category included those territories which were detached from 
enemy states as a result of the Second World War.76 The third category included 
territories voluntarily placed under the trusteeship system by states responsible for 
of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise theirs own religion, and to use their 
own language.' See: Brownlie, 1989, op. cit., p. 281. 
75 Higgins, Rosalyn, 'Comments on: Post-modern tribalism and the right to secession,' in: Brolmann, 
Catherine, Lefeber, René, and Zieck, Marjoleine (eds), Peoples and Minorities in International Law, 
Martin Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht, Boston, London, 1993, p. 29. 
76 It may be here appropriate to note an important anomaly to this clause. The Italian colony of 
Somalia, which had been granted the status of trusteeship under this category, was nevertheless 
entrusted to its former colonial over ruler, Italy. 
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their administration. Suffice it to say that no such case was ever considered. Even 
Chapter XI, which referred to all those colonies and non self-governing territories not 
placed under the Trusteeship system, and whose inclusion in the Charter was the 
result of the growing anti-colonial movement, remained cautious, invoking a right to 
self-government but not to self-determination. 
The interpretation of self-determination as independence from colonial rule 
was in effect a subsequent development unsupported by any pre-existing legal 
framework. It emerged with the adoption in December 1960 by the United Nations 
General Assembly of resolution 1514 (XV), also know as the Declaration on the 
Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, and resolution 
1541(XV), frequently referred to as the 'salt-water principle'. Resolution 1541(XV) 
declared that self-determination was applicable only 
in respect of a territory which is geographically separate and is distinct 
ethnically and/or culturally from the country administering it.77 
It further specified that self-determination was applicable specifically to the 
'relationship between the metropolitan State and the territory concerned.'78 The right 
of self-determination was thus applied in much the same way as it had been during 
the decolonisation of Latin-America and independence was granted only within the 
boundaries of those territories inherited upon achieving independence. As a result, 
the principles of national self-determination and of territorial integrity/Wz possidetis 
were incorporated alongside one another. Defined as de-colonisation from European 
control, the right of self-determination was thus confined in its expression and 
secession appeared to be henceforth restricted. Has anything changed since then? 
77 Reprinted in: Brownlie, 1971, op. cit., p. 369. 
78 Ibid. 
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Who is entitled to the right of self-determination? And what does self-determination 
entail? 
d) Self-determination today 
On the face of it, it would seem that not much has changed since the 1960s. Indeed, 
contrary to what might at first seem to be implied by the inclusion of a principle of 
self-determination in the UN Charter, there are in fact no provisions for secession in 
current international law whether in the Charter or in the Human Rights 
Conventions.79 While mention is made, in articles 1(2) and 55 of the UN Charter, to 
self-determination, this is not done with reference to independence or secession. 
Neither does the tendency to equate minorities and peoples, thereby allowing the 
right of self-determination of peoples to refer also to minorities, appear to be 
supported or sanctioned in any international legal framework. While provisions for 
the rights of minorities exist, they are distinct and independent from those addressing 
the rights of peoples to self-determination. Indeed, according to Rosalyn Higgins, the 
right of self-determination is nowhere juxtaposed to the concept of minorities: 
Minorities as such do not have a right of self-determination. That means, in 
effect, that they have no right of secession, to independence, or to join with 
comparable groups in other states.80 
Although from this we may deduce that the peoples who are entitled to self-
determination are not minorities, it remains unclear who the said people are. As for 
the notion of self-determination itself, there is a debate amongst international 
lawyers. Some have suggested that a distinction be made between external and 
79 Higgins, Rosalyn, Problems and Process. International Law and How We Use it. Clarendon Press, 
Oxford, 1994, pp. 111-28. The same point is made by Franck, 1993, op. cit., p. 11. 
80 Higgins, 1994, op. cit., p. 124. 
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internal self-determination.81 While the former would include the right to secession 
and irredentism, the latter would refer to the right to exercise self-determination 
within the boundaries of an existing state, i.e., the right to democratic representation. 
As far as its application is concerned, the right of self-determination, while no longer 
confined to the 'salt water' principle, appears nevertheless to remain bound to the 
norm of uti possidetis. The dismantling of the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and 
Yugoslavia all took place within the same guidelines which governed the 
decolonisation of the Spanish Latin-American Empire. The international 
community's intent to restrict any new state formation to this principle was explicitly 
expressed in its response to the dismemberment of the former Yugoslavia and its 
desire to see the new successor states emerge within the boundaries of the former 
administrative boundaries of their constituent units.82 
The resurgence of ethnic conflicts throughout the world has reopened the 
debate as to whether there ought to be a right of secession enshrined within 
international law so as to hamper the violence which generally accompanies the birth 
of new states.83 Should secession be internationally regulated so that it is not left at 
the mercy of haphazard power struggles? The problem with this, is that rather than 
avoiding taking a position on the matter, it sanctions violence and successful warfare 
as the criterion for sovereignty. For 'even if international law does not authorise 
secession, it will eventually recognise the reality once it has occurred and been made 
81 See, for example: Klabbers, Jari, and Lefeber, René, 'Africa: Lost Between Self-Determination and 
Uti Possidetis,' in: Brolmann, et al., 1993, op. cit., p. 42. 
82 Weller, Mark, "The International Response to the Dissolution of Yugoslavia, ' American Journal of 
International Law, Vol. 86, 1992, pp. 569-607. 
83 For a discussion of the ethical questions raised by this issue, see, Bucheit, Lee C., Secession: The 
Legitimacy of Self-determination, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1978; Buchanan, 1991, op. cit.-, 
and Mayall, James, 'Self-determination Reconsidered: Should there be a Right to Secede?' The 
Oxford International Review, Vol. IV, No. 1, Winter 1993, pp. 4-6. 
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effective.'84 If indeed we are to lay the basis for a restrictive international right to 
secede, i.e., one that does not merely grant independence to ail those seeking it, how 
are we to distinguish those cases warranting independence from those which do not? 
As was the case with the issue of self-determination in the pre-WWI period, there is 
currently a belief that secession can be attributed to an identifiable 'people'. While 
'language' was the déterminant criterion then, today it is 1 ethnic ity', as illustrated by 
existing proposais for Yugoslavia's ethnie partition.85 But are such proposais 
justifïed? 
1.4 -Argument and structure of the thesis 
As its sub-title indicates, this thesis takes issue with the ethnie interprétation of 
nationalism and secession. It does so by presenting a three-pronged critique of the 
ethnonationalist approach. First, it highlights in chapter two, the internal 
inconsistencies in the works of Walker Connor and Anthony Smith, two of the most 
prominent représentatives of the ethnonationalist approach. Chapter three's 
discussion of the anthropological literature on ethnicity in Africa leads us in turn to 
question the assumption that ethnie groups are pre-modern, an assumption upon 
which the ethnonationalist model is founded. Finally, by showing why the ethnie 
interprétation is not substantiated by the cases of Eritrea and Somaliland, chapters 
four and five challenge the ethnonationalist approach's empirical contention. 
84 Higgins, 1993, op. cit., p. 33. 
85 Kaufman, Chaim, 'Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars', in: Brown, Michael, 
Cote, Owen R., Lynn-Jones, Sean M., and Steven E. Miller, (eds), Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict, 
The MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass. and London, 1997; Mearsheimer, John, 'Shrink Bosnia to save it', 
New York Times, March 31, 1993; Mearsheimer, John J. and Pape, Robert, 'The Answer: A partition 
Plan for Bosnia,' The New Republic, June 14, 1993, pp. 22-28; and Mearsheimer, John and Stephen 
Van Evera, 'Autonomy for Kosovars is No Longer an Option', International Herald Tribüne, 
Tuesday, April 20, 1999. 
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In arguing that excessive reliance on ethnicity as an independent variable is 
misguided, this thesis seeks to illustrate how International Relations may contribute 
to the study of nationalism, in terms not just of its conséquences, but also of its 
causes. Rather than seeing nationalism as a paradoxical trend in an era of increased 
globalisation, as the ethnie interprétation assumes, it follows James Mayall when he 
writes: 
the two trends [nationalism and globalization] are not contradictory but 
symbiotic, appearing in the world together and constantly reinforcing one 
another ever since.86 
If nationalism is thus seen, not as antithetical but as concomitant to 
internationalisation, then it should be investigated as a phenomenon whose sources 
are not only internai but also international. The argument is that, if International 
Relations has anything to contribute to the study of nationalism, it is precisely 
through the use of its traditional objects of enquiry such as the state, international 
society, transnational movements and war. 
While the approach adopted here is not state-centric, in the sense of the 
notorious billiard-ball model, it will nevertheless focus on the state, and more 
specifically on what Anderson has named the 'modular nation-state.' Anderson"s 
notion of the modular nation-state enables us to view nationalism's world-wide 
prevalence, not as a fortuitous, haphazard collection of isolated domestic events, but 
as the resuit of the diffusion and internationalisation of an idea that first emerged in 
the Americas and in Europe, and was then imitated elsewhere. The objective will 
therefore be to highlight the ways in which nationalism and secession may 
themselves be defined and constituted by the state which, once 'modularised' as the 
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nation-state, was exported throughout the world through the expansion of the society 
of states. Although the spread of nationalism is described here as a purely uni-
directional process, it is by no means assumed to be so. Indeed, the 'resurgence' of 
nationalisms in the West in the late 1960s and 1970s can be explained as an imitation 
of the décolonisation process in Africa and Asia. An illustration of this is provided 
by the title given to one of the first pamphlets advocating Quebec's secession from 
Canada: Nègres blancs d'Amérique.87 
The following chapter will review the theoretical literature on the origins of 
nationalism and thus explain the nature of our main question - i.e., whether the 
sécessions of Eritrea and Somaliland confirmthe ethnie interprétation or corroborate 
instead the view that nations are modem créations. It will present the primordialist-
modernist debate that has come to characterise this field of enquiry, it will outline the 
main contentions of the ethnonationalist approach, and it will identify the factors 
singled-out by 'modernists' scholars as propitious for the emergence of nationalism. 
As will be shown, most of the theories on the origins of nationalism presented in this 
chapter tend to focus on Europe. In order to determine whether or not any additional 
factors need to be considered when analysing the cases of Eritrea and Somaliland, 
chapter three will review the literature on the rise of nationalism in Africa. Given the 
centrality of the concept of ethnicity, not only theoretically but also with regard to 
proposai for boundary adjustments, this chapter will also include a discussion of the 
anthropological literature on ethnicity in Africa. Indeed, many of the theoretical 
86 Mayall, James, 'Globalization and the Future of Nationalism,' in: the Japan Foundation Center for 
Global Partnership, The End of the Century. The Future in the Past. Kodansha International, Tokyo, 
New York and London, 1995, p. 447. 
87 Vallières, Pierre, Nègres blancs d'Amérique: autobiographie précoce d'un "terroriste " québécois, 
Éditions Parti pris, Montréal, 1968. 
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breakthroughs in the study of ethnicity have been made by anthropologists 
investigating its meaning in the African context. 
Equipped with the theoretieal frameworks outlined in the two aforementioned 
ehapters, chapters four and five will proceed to examine the cases of Eritrea and 
Somaliland. These chapters will attempt to provide comprehensive historical 
accounts of the emergence of nationalism in Eritrea and Somaliland and assess the 
relevance of the theoretieal models previously identifïed. The conclusion will then 
return to the three questions raised at the outset of the thesis. It will first explain why 
ethnicity is of little heuristic value when it cornes to understanding the sécessions of 
Eritrea and Somaliland and will evaluate the relative merits and shorteommings of 
the modernist approach. Second, it will discuss whether or not these two cases 
challenge the existing interprétation of self-determination and justify the need to 
redraw Africa's boundaries. Third, it will suggest how International Relations may 
contribute to our understanding of the causes of nationalism by highlighting the 
international dimensions of nationalism. Finally, it will discuss some of the 
implications of the thesis' critique of the ethnie interprétation. 
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Chapter 2 — Theories of nationalism 
This chapter reviews the main theories about the origins of nations and nationalism 
against which the cases of Eritrea and Somaliland will later be examined. More 
specifìcally, it introduces the main debate that has come to characterise this field of 
enquiry. Indeed, much of the literature on the origins of nationalism is of a polemical 
nature and positions have tended to polarise around what has come to be defined as 
the primordialist-modernist debate.1 The question posed at the onset, as to whether 
Eritrea and Somaliland corroborate the views that nations are ethnically rooted or 
modem créations, reflects this debate. 
The first section of this chapter begins by presenting the history of the 
modernist-primordialist debate, retracing its origins and the main points of 
contention. The second section then turns to the ethnonationalist approach. This 
approach emerged in reaction to the modernist position which dominated the study of 
nationalism until the nationalist 'revival' ofthe 1960s and 1970s. Althoughthe main 
proponents of the ethnonationalist approach claim to endorse a modernist stance on 
the origins of nationalism, it will be argued that given their understanding of 
ethnicity their position is ultimately a reformulation of the primordialist position. The 
third section introduces some of the more recent research on nationalism. It examines 
more specifìcally three of the factors singled-out as propitious for the formation of 
nations: written language, the state and war. 
1 For a comprehensive review of the works published before 1970, see: Smith, Anthony D., Theories 
of Nationalism, 2nd édition, Duckworth, London, 1983, first published in 1971. Recent reviews 
include: Smith, Anthony D., Nationalism and Modernism. A criticai survey of recent theories of 
nations and nationalism, Routledge, London and New York, 1998; McCcrone, David, The Sociology 
of Nationalism, Routledge, London and New York, 1998, and Ericksen, Thomas Hylland, Ethnicity 
and Nationalism, Pluto Press, London and Boulder, Colorado, 1993. 
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2.1 — The primordialist-modernist debate 
Despite the vast number of publications devoted to the study of nationalism, 
theoretically and empirically, there is no agreed définition of what the nation is. Is 
the nation identifiable through objective criteria and if so, what distinguishes it from 
other social groupings? Is it instead a social contract that is constantly re-negotiated 
through daily plébiscité and which thus expresses the will of individuals?2 The 
tension between these two conceptions of the nation - organic and voluntaristic -
was more recently translated into the debate as to whether nations are expressions of 
âge old feelings of belonging, rooted in language, ethnicity, or territory, or are 
instead modem constructs, inventions or imaginations. These contrasting views of 
the nation have been reflected in the scholarly literature on nationalism and have 
developed into what has been commonly referred to as the primordialist - modernist 
debate.3 
The implications of the debate as to whether nations are a modem construction 
or the émanation of a perennial ethnicity are not merely academic. One of the most 
frequent ways nationalists attempt to discrédit their 'opponents' claims to 
nationhood, and hence to pohtical sovereignty or independence, is by challenging 
their historical foundations. Indeed, and somewhat inexplicably, there has been a 
2 This position, advocated by those who adopt a more 'subjective' or voluntaristic view of the nation, 
was first formulated by Ernest Renan in 1882. Renan, Ernest, Qu'est-ce qu'une nation? Calmann-
Levy, Paris, 1882. 
3 This debate has sometimes also been referred to as the essentialist - instrumentalist or constructivist 
debate. While the adjective essentialist is to some extent accurate, the équation implied between 
modernism and instrumentalism is somewhat more problematic. One could very well endorse a 
primordialist view of nations yet resort to an instrumentalist explanation. In this respect eûtes or 
politicians would be instrumental in awakening the slumbering nation. As for the word 
constructivism, although it appropriately depicts the intellectual position of those modernist who 
argue that nationalism précédés the nation (Gellner and Hobsbawm, for example), it is problematic 
because of the recent post-modern connotation this concept has acquired. Smith has also portrayed 
this debate as the archaeological Vs gastronomical views. See: Smith, Anthony D., 'Gastronomy or 
Geology? The rôle of Nationalism in the Construction of Nations,' Nations and Nationalism, Vol. 1, 
No. 1,1995, pp. 3-23. 
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tendency to equate antiquity with authenticity. The genuineness of one's claim to 
independent nation-statehood will thus tend to be measured with respect to its 
historicity. Thus, in the same way that opposing groups contest the validity of each 
other's historical claims to nationhood, theorists of nationalism debate the historical 
reality or authenticity of nations. 
Primordialists insist that nations have existed since time immémorial. They are 
accredited with the "sleeping beauty" thesis according to which each nation that has 
not yet manifested itself is only awaiting for the appropriate leader, or circumstance, 
to re-awaken. This organic view of nationalism holds that peoples are naturally 
divided into nations. It was first articulated by the German Romantics, namely, Johan 
Gottiried von Herder (1744-1803), generally described as the first European writer to 
develop a comprehensive philosophy of nationalism, and Johan Gottlieb Fichte 
(1762-1814), most famously remembered for his fourteen Addresses to the German 
Nation.4 Among those who uphold a primordialist conception of the nation are many 
nationalists themselves and a number of socio-biologists, historians and social 
scientists; although, as we will later see, few scholars now uphold such an extreme 
essentialist conception of nationalism. 
The modernist position emerged in reaction to the organic and atavistic 
conception of the nation put forth by nationalists and primordialists. They argued 
instead that nationalism was a recent phenomenon rooted in the ideals of the 
Enlightenment. The French and American révolutions, where the notions of 
citizenship, popular participation, democracy and liberalism were for the first time 
explicitly put forth, are seen as landmarks in the establishment of the nation as the 
sole legitimate structuring feature in modem politics. The shift from agrarian or 
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feudal to industriai or capitalist societies is also considered to be of foremost 
importance as the dynamic factor responsible for the advent of nations and 
nationalism. Industrialisation entailed greater social mobility and rationalisation 
which, in turn, allowed for the expression of the enlightenment ideals. 
a) Early modernists 
In order to understand why the study of nationalism has become polarised around the 
primordialist and modernist positions, it is necessary to briefly review its history. 
Nationalism was first introduced as a subject of academic inquiry by Carlton Hayes 
(1882-1964) and Hans Kohn (1891-1971). Hayes and Kohn analysed nationalism as 
it crystallised following World War I and formulated the main tenets of the 
modernist position. Kohn conceived of nationalism as having arisen from a 
dialectical relation with the modem state, the politicai form to which it gave a 
meaning. 
"Nationality is a state of mind corresponding to a politicai fact", or striving to 
correspond to a politicai fact. This définition reflects the genesis of nationalism 
and modem nationality, which was bom in the fusion of a certain state of mind 
with a given politicai form. The state of mind, the idea of nationalism, imbued 
the form with a new content and meaning; the form provided the idea with 
implements for the organized expression of its manifestations and aspirations.5 
According to Kohn, the emergence of nationalism in the West was preceded by the 
formation of the state and was essentially a politicai process instigated by the 
bourgeoisie's need for a territorially based centralised market. Nationalism, as it 
originated in Western Europe, was imbued with contractual and voluntaristic notions 
of populär sovereignty and citizenship as expressed during the French Revolution. 
4 Snyder, Louis, L., Encyclopedia of Nationalism, St James Press, Chicago and London, 1990. 
5 Kohn, Hans, The Idea of Nationalism, Macmillan, New York, 1945, p. 18. 
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This territorial and eivie conception of politicai association contrasted with the form 
of nationalism that subsequently emerged in Eastern Europe, or more specifically in 
Germany; a nationalism possessing a more ethnie content, as expressed in the 
Romanticist vision of the German nationIvolk of Fichte and Herder.6 This latter form 
of nationalism, which according to Kohn, was more authoritarian, collectivist and 
organic, appears in largely agrarian societies. Here, it was not the bourgeoisie which 
was responsible for igniting the nationalist trend, as only a few traders composed the 
bourgeoisie of these mainly peasant societies. Nationalism, as it emerged east of the 
Rhine, was instead the création of an intelligentsia which forged the conception and 
content of the nation. 
Kohn's distinction between western and eastern nationalism is important for 
it has inspired the now commonly used dichotomy: ethnie vs. civic nationalism. It 
was also the first to highlight the différent forms nationalism took in différent parts 
of Europe.7 By contrast to Kohn's spatial dichotomy, Hayes provided an 
evolutionary typology of nationalism. Hayes' main argument was that nationalism 
had moved from initially being a positive force to becoming a negative and exclusive 
doctrine, from ka blessing to a curse'.8 He thus distinguished the liberal and 
humanitarian forms of nationalism developed in the eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries, with the integrai nationalism that arose with imperialism.9 Despite their 
différences, both historians concurred: nationalism was modem and had originated in 
Europe. In so claiming, Kohn and Hayes laid the basis for what was to become 
known as the modernist paradigm. 
6 Ibid. 
1 Gellner was to push this distinction further in his model of "time-zones" in Europe. See: Gellner, 
Ernest, Conditions of Liberty: Civil Society and its Rivais, Hamish Hamilton, London, 1994. 
8 Hayes, Carlton, Essays on Nationalism, New York, 1926. 
9 Hayes, Carlton, The Historical Evolution of modem Nationalism, New York, 1931. 
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Following Kohn and Hayes pioneering efforts, it seemed that nationalism, 
both as a social phenomenon and as the subject of academic inquiry, had receded to 
the backdrop of most people's concern. While nationalism had indeed been relegated 
to the bottom of many university syllabi, it would nevertheless be inaccurate, as 
Hobsbawm contends, to claim that there is little need to examine the literature that 
appeared prior to the theoretical watershed of the 1980s.10 On the contrary, it is 
necessary to revert to some of the works published in the 1950s and 1960s, in order 
to understand where the present positions emerged from, as some of the most 
influential works on the topic were published in that period. 
b) Classical modernism 
In 1953, Karl Deutsch set out to develop a theory of nationalism that would expand 
on the more qualitative accounts hitherto provided, by devising testable and 
quantifiable hypotheses. By claiming that cultures were rooted and sustained by 
communication,11 Deutsch argued that nationality was more than a mere 'sentiment' 
or 'frame of mind' without any tangible causes, but was predicated upon the 
development of effective communication networks which allowed members of a 
community to feel a sense of commonality.12 By analysing and measuring a number 
of indicators (such as the development of the communications networks, 
urbanisation, student population), one could ascertain a society's degree of cultural 
cohésion. Smith dismissed the pertinence of Deutsch's theorising for our 
understanding of nationalism on the grounds that the latter was mostly concerned 
10 Hobsbawm, Eric J., Nations and Nationalism sirice 1780, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
1990, pp. 1-6. 
11 Deutsch, Karl, Nationalism and Social Communication: An inquiry into the foundations of 
nationality, MIT Press, New York, 2nd ed., 1966 [1953], 
12 Deutsch, 1966, op. cit., p. 16. 
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with the problem of nationality rather than with nationalism per se.13 Yet this 
exclusion seems somewhat unwarranted given that most of the present debate is 
premised on the answer that is given to the question: what is the nation? 
Furthermore, Deutsches insights led to the publication of an important body of 
literature often referred as the 'nation-building' school of nationalism.14 Analysing 
the process of 'nation-building' in the newly independent countries, these scholars 
saw here evidence that nations were not only modem, but also that they could be 
constructed by politicai elites and with adequate means of communications to 
mobilise the mass. 
Another landmark of 'classical modernism' is Elie Kedourie's 1960 
publication, Nationalism. Kedourie asserted that nationalism was not 'some 
inarticulate and powerful feeling which is present always and everywhere.'15 Rather, 
he contended, nationalism was a 'doctrine invented in Europe at the beginning of the 
nineteenth Century'.16 He sought to demonstrate this by retracing the emergence of 
this particular way of conceiving politics in the history of ideas and, more 
specifically, in Kant's notion of self-determination.17 In doing so, Kedourie was 
formalising and further substantiating the assumption that had guided much of the 
earlier works of historians of nationalism for whom nationalism was a product of the 
French Revolution. As regard to the spread of the nationalism outside Europe, 
Kedourie demonstrated how dissatisfïed and alienated third world westem-educated 
13 Smith, 1971, op. crt.,footnote 17, p. 304. 
14 Deutsch, Karl, and Foltz, William (eds), Nation-Building, Atherton press, Chicago, 1963. 
15 Kedourie, 1994, op. cit., p. 136. 
16 Ibid, p. 1. 
17 As was noted in the introduction, Isaiah Berlin also traced the idea of national self-determination to 
Kant. For a comprehensive and illuminating présentation of the transition from Enlightenment to 
Romanticism and its implications for future conceptions of the nation, see: Thom, Martin, Republics, 
Nations and Tribes, Verso, London and New York, 1995. 
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elites imported the doctrine to their respective countries.18 It was in response to 
Kedourie's analysis of nationalism that Ernest Gellner was to provide the modernist 
position with its most radical and systematic formulation in 1964.19 
Gellner agreed with Kedourie that nationalism was llogically contingent, i.e., 
that it had none of the naturalness attributed to it'.20 Yet he disagreed with the 
implication that it was therefore sociologically contingent. Gellner believed that 
Kedourie had overemphasised the role of ideas and from this, he provided an account 
of the emergence of nationalism grounded in the revolutionary socio-economic 
transformations that occurred through industrialisation.21 Nationalism, he argued, 
was a functional response to the shift from agrarian to industriai societies and was 
the result of industriai society's need for a socially mobile, substitutable and literate 
working force. Workers' mobility could only be insured through the development 
and dissémination of a common, context-free, standardised language. And the 
development of a common language in turn, provided industriai society with its main 
cultural attribute, a culture which Gellner argued became 'exo-socialised' modem 
man's main object of loyalty.22 
Nationalism, therefore, was not the product and expression of a pre-existing 
nation, for it was nationalism which engendered the nation. The cultures nationalism 
'claims to revive are often its own inventions, or are modified out of ali 
récognition'23 and are necessary to satisiy the needs of industrialisation. Contrary to 
what had hitherto been maintained by Liberais and Marxists, increased industrialism 
18 Kedourie, Elie, 'Introduction,' in: Kedourie, Elie (ed.), Nationalism in Asia and Africa, Frank Cass, 
London, 1971. 
19 Gellner, Ernest, 'Nationalism' in: Thought and Change, Weidefeld and Nicholson, London, 1964. 
20 Ibid, p. 151. 
21 This theoiy was further developed in: Gellner, Ernest, Nations and Nationalism, Cornell University 
Press, Ithaca, 1983. 
22 Gellner, 1983, op. cit., p. 36. 
23 Ibid, p. 55. 
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could therefore not be expected to induce the demise of nationalism for it was 
industrialism itself which had been responsible for its advent. Nationalism, in short, 
was a socio logicai necessity in the age of industrialism. 
While they approach nationalism from différent angles and disciplines -
Deutsch's focus on communications theory, Kedourie on the history of ideas, and 
Gellner on industrialisation - these authors ali agree that nations and nationalism are 
neither organic nor primordial and are instead the products of transformations that 
occurred during the eighteenth century. For this reason they are generally grouped 
together as belonging to the modernist school. Modernist accounts dominated the 
theoretical literature on nationalism until the 1970s, that is until the nationalist 
revival brought about the return of the primordialist position. This is not to say that 
modernism fell into disrepute, quite the contrary. As will be seen later, the early 
1980s saw the publication of some of the most influential works on nationalism, ali 
of which embraced the modernist paradigm but sought to either temper it or push 
further some of its claims. 
c) The 'primordialist' critique 
The so-called resurgence of nationalisms in the 1970s, which modernist theorists 
had, according to their critics, failed to foresee, brought about a return of 
primordialist theories of nationalism, albeit in a somewhat modified form. Rather 
than speaking about the primordiality of nations, these critics of modernism argue 
instead either that some nations have pre-modern historical roots, this group being 
referred to as the perennialists, or that they have ethnie roots. Among the latter, that 
is those who uphold the ethnie roots of nationalism thesis, one can distinguish 
between those who define ethnicity in biological terms and those who define it in 
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cultural terms.24 The most prominent advocates of the ethnie roots of nationalism 
thesis, namely Walker Connor and Anthony Smith, reject biological conceptions of 
ethnicity. While they concede that nationalism and nations are modern,25 they 
nevertheless challenge the fact that nations are created or invented by modernity ex 
nihilo. Modernity for them is not a constitutive factor, but a catalyst which 
transforms existing pre-modern ethnie communities into nations. Because they 
uphold a modernist view of nations and nationalism, scholars such as Connor and 
Smith do not consider themselves to be primordialists. Smith could to some extent be 
considered as a perennialist, but to avoid fiirther confusion and because of his focus 
on ethnicity, he alongside Connor, are best described as ethnonatìonalists. Given that 
scholars trying to come to terms with nationalism, namely in the field of 
International Relations, have irequently endorsed their views, it is necessary to 
discuss their position in greater detail.26 But before we turn to these two authors and 
expound the main contentions of the ethnonationalist approach, let us briefly 
consider the perennialist critique of modernism. 
24 van den Berghe, Pierre, 'Race and ethnicity: a sociobiological perspective, Ethnie and Racial 
Studies, Vol. 1, No. 4, 1978, pp. 401-11; van den Berghe, Pierre, 'Ethnicity and the sociobiology 
debate,' in: Rex, John, and Mason, David (eds), Theories of Ethnie and Race Relations, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1988, pp. 246-63. The best known exponent of cultural primordialism is 
Clifford Geertz. Geertz, Clifford (ed.), Old Societies and New States, Free Press, New York, 1963, 
Geertz, Clifford, The Interpretation of Cultures, Fontana Press, London, 1973; see also: Shils, 
Edward, 'Primordial, personal, sacred and civil ties,' British Journal of Sociology, No. 7, 1957 pp. 13-
45; and Fishman, Joshua, Language and Nationalism: Two Integrative Essays, Newbury House, 
Rowley, MA, 1972. 
25 According to Connor, national consciousness is modem and made possible by the increased 
communications networks (their nature and density) but also, and more importantly, by the 
popularisation of the notion of self-determination of nations, whose origins he traces to 1865, date at 
which the expression appeared as part of the Proclamation on the Polish Question. See Connor, 1994, 
op. cit., p. 38 and footnote 27, p. 60. Connor reiterates this view when he concludes in an article 
originally published in 1991: 'In any event, claims that a nation existed prior to the late nineteenth 
Century should be treated cautiously.' Connor, 1994, op. cit., p. 224. Smith, Anthony D., The Ethnie 
Revival in the Modern World, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1981; and The Ethnie Origins 
of Nations, Blackwell, Oxford, 1986. 
26 Most of the articles published on nationalism or ethnicity in World Politics or in International 
Security refer to these two authors more than any other scholar of nationalism. 
43 
Perennialists may be defined as those scholars, mainly historians, who trace 
the origins of some nations not to eighteenth century modernity but earlier, either to 
the Middle Ages or Antiquity.27 Seton-Watson's division between old and new 
nations, that is between pre-1789 and post-1789 nations, best illustrates this view.28 
Perennialists tend to agree that nationalism, as an ideology is the product of 
eighteenth century political history, but uphold that nationalism as a sentiment 
predates it. The argument is that nations have in certain cases existed before the 
emergence of nationalism as an ideology and can therefore not have been created by 
it, as Gellner contends. Perennialists aim not so much to provide an alternative theory 
of nationalism, but show exceptions to the modernist paradigm. Insofar as they are 
able to do so convincingly, then it can be said that they do challenge the assumption 
that nationalism created the nation. 
Although intuitively attractive, there are nevertheless several problems with 
this position. First, there is the question as to whether these authors are not 
retrospectively reading into history, and misrepresenting and thus mislabelling pre-
modern communities by calling them nations.29 This in turn raises the question as to 
when is a nation? Indeed, some perennialists have suggested that nationalism as a 
sentiment could be said to exist even if confined to a portion of the nation's 
population. Hastings, for instance, argues that one can speak of nation even when the 
majority of its population, namely the peasants, do not share a felling of belonging to 
it, as long as a portion of the elite that goes beyond the ruling-class believe it.30 The 
27 See for example: Armstrong, John, Nations Before Nationalism, University of North Carolina Press, 
Chapell Hill, 1982; and Hastings, Adrian, The Construction of Nationhood: Ethnicity, Religion and 
Nationalism, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1997. 
28 Seton-Watson, Hugh, Nations and States, Methuen, London, 1977, pp. 6-13. 
29 This is the critique Susan Reynolds addresses to Seton-Watson. Reynolds, Susan, Kingdoms and 
Communities in Western Europe, 900-1300. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1984. 
30 Hastings, 1997, op. cit, p. 26. 
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fact that nationalism as a sentiment is not shared or felt by the majority of the people 
who are encompassed within the said nation, namely the peasants, is not seen as 
invalidating his thesis. But can one then really speak of a nation? Is nationalism after 
ali not a mass phenomenon? As we can see, the perennialists raise more questions 
than they provide answers. 
To summarise the positions thus far presented we can say that primordialists 
claim that humanity is naturally divided into nations and that the nation is an organic 
community and nationalism its expression. Modernists argue instead that nations and 
nationalism are products of modernity. Ethnicists agree with modernists to say that 
nationalism and nations are modem, but disagree with the statement that nationalism 
creates the nation. Finally, perennialists say that some Western nations emerged prior 
to the eighteenth century socio-economic and ideological révolutions even though 
the nationalist sentiment might have been restricted to a small part of the nation's 
population. 
2.2 - The ethnie roots of nationalism31 
The way in which contemporary discussions of nationalism have been affected by 
the study of ethnicity is noteworthy. Kohn's western/eastern dichotomy has been 
resuscitated in the civic/ethnic diad, Connor speaks of ethnonationalism and Smith 
assigns to the ethnie a determining rôle in the emergence and formation of the 
national project. But why the need to introduce an additional concept to our 
understanding of nationalism? Why ethnicity? 
31 The author had the privilege of being able to discuss these issues with Professors Connor and Smith 
during the academic year 1994/95. Although I have included references to the relevant sources, much 
of the discussion that follows is based on these interviews. 
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There seem to be at least two explanations for this: first, is the popularisation of 
the concept of ethnicity, notably in the social sciences,32 second, is the need to find 
an explanation for nationalism's emotional appeal, the passion it fosters. This 
passion, it is believed by ethnicists, cannot be aroused by inventions or créations. If 
such was the case why would other forms of associations or 'identifies', which are so 
evidently constructed not be able to generate similar emotional loyalty and 
dedication? Simply stated why is one Willing to die for one's nation but not for one's 
class? The answer is that there must be something particular about nations if 
individuals are ready for such sacrifice. 
a) Nationalism 's emotional appeal 
Published in 1972, Walker Connor's article 'Nation-Building or Nation-Destroying' 
set out to diagnose the failures of American academia with regard to the study of 
nationalism.33 As the title indicates this was a critique explicitly addressed to 
Deutsch and his followers and their incapacity to predici the resurgence of 
nationalism in the 1970s. According to Connor, the 'nation-building school' was 
plagued by a sériés of theoretical misassumptions, namely their belief that 
modernisation leads to assimilation, which culminated in their refusai to contend 
with the 'true nationalism5, i.e., ethnonationalism. By not acknowledging 
nationalism's ethnie roots, modernists had underrated the emotional appeal of 
32 Because the academic history of ethnicity is intimately bound up with the évolution of anthropology 
in Africa, it will be discussed in the next chapter. For descriptions of the popularisation of the concept 
of ethnicity, see Glazer, Nathan, and Moynihan, Daniel, Ethnicity: Theory and Expérience, Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1975; Chapman, Malcolm, McDonald, Maryon, and Elizabeth 
Tonkin, 'Introduction,' in: Chapman, Malcolm, McDonald, Maryon, and Elizabeth Tonkin (eds), 
History and Ethnicity, ASA monograph 27, Routledge, 1989, pp. 1-21; Amselle, Jean-Loup et 
M'Bokolo, Au coeur de l'ethnie. Ethnie, tribalisme et Etat en Afrique, Editions la Découverte, Paris, 
1985, and Ericksen, 1993, op. cit., p. 4. 
33 Connor, 'Nation-Building or Nation-Destroying?' in: Ethnonationalism. The Quest for 
Understanding. Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1994, pp. 29-66. This article was originally 
published in World Politics in 1972. 
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nationalism and thus failed to foresee and explain its re-emergence. Smith opposed 
modernist accounts of the origins of nations and nationalism for reasons similar to 
those of Connor. He pointed to the fact that nationalism, rather than waning under 
the pressures of economic modernisation, had on the contrary gained a new 
impetus.34 Top-down nation-building had not stifled bottom-up ethnie nationalism. 
Moreover, if nations, as argued by modernists, were merely a produci of 
industrialisation's needs and were created by politicai or intellectual elites, how 
could one explain that the masses respond so readily and so emotionally to the 
nationalist appeal? 
Both Connor and Smith emphasise nationalism's emotional strength, a strength 
which it is assumed cannot be conveyed by 'something' that is 'merely' politicai and 
quite recent. Thus, while nations and nationalism are, they agree, modern, their 
emotional appeal cannot be explained if they are considered to have been constructed 
ex nihilo by modernity. In order to reconcile their modernist understanding of 
nationalism (as politicai consciousness) with their primordial conception of 
nationalism (as a cultural sentiment), they introduce the notion of ethnicity. Ethnicity 
is thus seen as a pre-modern cultural community which provides the modem nation 
with its foundations, or as Gellner would later say, a navel.35 A pre-modern ethnie 
substratum, or ethnie, must, according to Smith, be present if a nation is to have any 
chances of success, any emotional resonance or magnetism. Underlying the 
arguments put forward by Connor and Smith is the assumption that if something is 
34 This critique would of course not apply to Gellner. 
35 Gellner, Ernest, 'Reply: Do nations have navels?' Nations and Nationalism, Vol. 2, No. 3, 
November 1996, pp. 366-70. 
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capable of generating such passions it must not only be deeply rooted, but also 
'tangible'.36 
The argument according to which nations are premised on ethnie groups ean 
therefore be seen as an attempi to provide an objective foundation to the concept of 
nation, and thus réfuté the argument that nations are mere inventions. By referring to 
the concept of ethnie group, Connor is attempting to ground a subjectivist définition 
of the nation, to what he perceives to be a 'scientifically' accepted notion of 
ethnicity, hence his appeal to the 'pristine usage' of the term by anthropologists and 
ethnologists.37 His définition of the nation must be subjective since Connor 
acknowledges that no objective criteria enables one to define the nation. Indeed, 
according to Connor it is the 'self-view of one's group, rather than the tangible 
characteristics, that is of essence in determining the existence or non-existence of a 
nation.'38 Self-consciousness is what therefore defines a nation. And, 'in the absence 
of such popularly held conviction [that one constitutes a nation], there is only an 
ethnie group.'39 
b) Ethnie groups and nations 
But what is an ethnie group? After ail, this question is of some importance if, 
following Connor, the purpose is to predict which groups are more likely to voice 
nationalist claims, or at least resist complete 'psychological' assimilation.40 Or, if 
36 Smith's reference to Europe's inability to stir up passions is tìius explained: 'the abstraction of 
"Europe" competes on unequal terms with the tangibility and "rootedness" of each nation.' Smith, 
Anthony D., Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1995, p. 13, our 
italics. Connor and Smith cautiously, and perhaps wisely, avoid using the term 'real', preferring that 
of 'tangible'. Yet this might only underscore their view that ethnie groups and nations are ultimately 
objectively definable. 
37 Connor, 1994, op. cit, p. 102. 
38 Ibid, p. 43. 
39 Ibid, p. 42. 
40 Ibid, p. 46. 
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following Smith, we are to explain 'why and where particular nations are formed.'41 
In his 1972 article, in which he attacks the nation-building approach,42 Connor fails 
to provide a clear définition of what he understands by an ethnie group, except as we 
have seen, to say that it is a nation that has not achieved self-consciousness. Such a 
définition risks becoming tautological unless, the ethnie group, upon which the 'trae' 
nation is founded, is clearly defined. 
Although he refuses to openly acknowledge it, we must assume that Connor 
nevertheless believes that ethnie groups do possess 'tangible' characteristics since 
they are 'very apparent to the anthropologist or even the untrained observer.'43 This 
définition, which indirectly introduces the idea that ethnie groups are after ail 
objectively identifiable, is evidently problematic. It assumes that certain enlightened 
observers have the capacity to identify such ethnie groups, even when the groups 
themselves are incapable of doing so, or at least not in those terms (since they have 
not achieved self-consciousness). Connor moreover, does not consider the possibility 
that these observers might be wrong, or that, as anthropologists have themselves 
suggested, that this identification process has itself given a community an ethnie 
identity.44 
Responding perhaps to earlier criticisms, and conscious of the need to define a 
concept which is central to his whole edifice, Connor proceeds in a later article, 
published first in 1978, to provide a clearer définition of the ethnie group.45 In his 
characteristic manner, he begins by criticising sociologists for 'violating' and thus 
41 Smith, 1998, op. cit., p. 191. 
42 Connor, 1994, op. cit., pp. 31-66. 
43 Ibid, p. 43. 
44 As will be seen in chapter three's discussion of ethnicity in Africa. 
45 Connor, 1994, op. cit., pp. 90-117. 
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diluting the original meaning of the ethnic group by including all sorts of minorities, 
politicai or religious communities. 
One should instead follow 'anthropologists, ethnologists, and scholars 
concerned with global comparisons [who] have been more prone to use 
ethnicity and ethnic groups in their pristine sense involving a sense of common 
ancestry.46 
Yet, Connor once again carefully refuses to give a definition which rests on what he 
terms 'tangible differences,' that is, one that is based on an enumeration of criteria 
such as language, religion, territory or mode of life. Instead, he prefers to speak of a 
sense of common ancestry, a reference which could either be understood as a covert 
biologicai reference or, on the contrary, as a subjective feeling. 
Notwithstanding the fact that this definition, contrary to what he asserts and 
as will be more amply discussed in the next chapter, is not upheld by the majority of 
anthropologists or ethnologists, Connor more significantly avoids to fully contend 
with the definition he is appealing to and which is left in the footnote. Here, the 
ethnic group is defined as being composed of 
those who conceive themselves as being alike by virtue of their common 
ancestry, real or fictitious, and who are regarded as such by others.47 
To begin with, it is difficult to see how this definition is in practice less-
encompassing than that which he accuses 'sociologists' of using. Moreover, the 
distinction between self-defined and other-defined, which Connor posits as being the 
main difference between a nation and ethnic group, appears to be overridden by this 
definition. Indeed, if one were to fully endorse the 'ethnologists' pristine usage' of 
the term, one would have to conclude that a nation is a subjectively defined 
community grounded on an ethnic group, that is also subjectively defined. Connor's 
46 Ibid., p. 102. 
47 Ibid., in footnote 24, p. 115, our italics. 
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attempi to demónstrate the 'reality' of ethnonationalism would thus be somewhat 
hampered. If the 'ethnie roots of nationalism' thesis is to have any predietive 
capacity, it must postulate the existence of objective criteria, if not it risks being 
tautological. Thus, rather than elucidating the termino logicai chaos he décriés, 
Connor seems to only fiirther contribute to it. 
Influenced by the work of Connor, but conscious of its limitations, Smith 
attempted to provide a clearer définition of ethnie communities, or as he calis them 
ethnies. Ethnies are 'named populations with shared ancestry myths, histories and 
cultures, having an association with a specific territory, and a sense of solidarity.'48 
We see here that Smith, like Connor, is also appealing to the notion of common 
ancestry, but he goes beyond by providing a définition that seeks to combine both 
objective and subjective elements. It is important to note that Smith wishes to purge 
any biologicai reference from his conception of the ethnie and distinguish it from the 
category of race, henee the stress on its cultural dimension. In so doing, Smith is 
trying to provide nationalism with a more honourable face and further substantiate 
the argument that Nazism is not the logicai extension of nationalism.49 Yet he fails to 
acknowledge the history of the concept of ethnicity itself and its close association 
with that of race.50 
Not surprisingly, the term 'ethnie', in its modem usage became more 
widespread after the Second World War, when references to race or racial attributes 
became historically loaded and the term 'ethnie' seemed more acceptable. Yet, 
48 Smith, 1986, op. cit., p. 32. 
49 It is Smith's contention that contrary to what is often upheld, notably by modernists, nationalism 
does not necessarily entail intolerance, exclusion and ultimately genocide. On the relationship 
between Racism and nationalism, see, Smith, 1983, op. cit., notably chapters 3 and 4. 
50 The word ethnie, 'is derived £rom the Greek term ethnos (which in turn is derived from the word 
ethnikos), which originally meant heathen or pagan. It was used in this sense in English from the mid-
fourteenth Century until the mid-nineteenth Century, when it gradually began to refer to 'racial' 
51 
whether one uses race or ethnie group, the reference to either is often made to 
establish exclusive criteria. Given their potential implications (ethnie cleansing 
and/or genocide), it is important to emphasise that, in the same way that geneticists 
and anthropologists showed the scientific precariousness of racial catégories, 
ethnicity is a far more ambiguous and fluid category than previously alleged and that 
it is also susceptible to history. To be fair, Smith does acknowledge that the ethnie is 
itself subject to historical changes, yet as his distinction between ethnie catégories 
and communities indicates, he ultimately upholds the existence of 'some visible 
cultural différences or "markers", which might help to divide populations into fairly 
well-defined groupings or ethnie catégories.'51 Indeed, in a manner reminiscent of 
Connor's, he speaks of a 'perceptive observer' capable of distinguishing an ethnie 
category from another. 
Ethnicists such as Smith and Connor acknowledge the modernity of 
nationalism - as a specific politicai ideology - and thus départ from the more radical 
primordialists in this regard. Yet their conception of the nation nevertheless appears 
to rest on a primordial conception of the ethnie group, especially in the case of 
Connor for whom the ethnie group is taken as an ahistorical socio-psycho logicai 
given. Smith's position is somewhat more complex, insofar as he acknowledges that 
ethnie groups are also subject to historical transformations, his position may arguably 
be said to be closer to that of the perennialist than Connor's. On the other hand, 
Smith's définition, despite its merits, fails to clearly establish a distinction between 
ethnies, casts, religious sects, clans or tribes, ail of whom could be said to uphold 
myths of common descent. As will be discussed with reference to Somalia, the 
characteristics.' Ericksen, 1993, op. cit., p. 4. See also: Chapman, Malcolm, (ed.), Social and 
Biological Aspects of Ethnicity, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1993, p. 15. 
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ambiguity of the concept thus defined impairs the heuristic value of the ethnie 
interprétation. More importantly, Smith's définition fails to clearly identify the 
différence between the nation and the ethnie, and thus to fully account for the 
specificity of the nation with regard to the ethnie. 
Ultimately, the 'ethnie roots of nationalism thesis' is a reformulation of the 
nationalist's 'sleeping beauty thesis,' the only différence being that the term nation is 
replaced with that of ethnie group. A nation is an ethnie group that has been awoken. 
c) Ethnieity and cultural authenticity 
Fundamentally, what is at stake here is the issue of cultural authenticity, as illustrated 
by Connor's reference to the 'trae' nationalism. Enshrined in Connor and Smith's 
critique of the modernist position is their belief that 'modernists' do not take 
nationalism seriously. Smith's critique of the modernist-instrumentalist approach was 
triggered by Gellner's comment that nations are mere inventions: 'Nationalism is not 
the awakening of nations to self-consciousness: it invents nations where they do not 
exist.'52 This was understood as implying that there was something 'false' about 
them and it is precisely on this issue - whether nations are invented, constructed or 
fabricated - that the current debate is predicated.53 
The recourse to the ethnie group or the ethnie is an attempi to demonstrate that 
nations are not artificial créations, that they are actually grounded in authentic, 
genuine, cultural communities which pre-date the era of nationalism.54 Yet, as 
51 Smith, Anthony D., 'War and ethnieity: the role of warfare in the formation, self-images and 
cohésion of ethnie communities,' Ethnie and Racial Studies, Vol. 4, No. 4, October 1981, p. 379. 
52 Gellner, 1964, op. cit., p. 168. 
53 Smith, Anthony D., 'The Nation: Invented, Imagined, Reconstructed,' Millennium, Voi. 20, No. 3, 
Winter 1991, pp. 353-68. 
54 As will be seen in the next chapter, this question of authenticity is at the core of many proposais for 
territorial revision in Africa. Indeed, the failures of many African states are frequently attributed to the 
53 
Anderson remarked 'communities are to be distinguished, not by their 
falsity/genuineness, but by the style in which they are imagined.'55 The nation's 
specifìeity is that it is imagined (in the sense that members of a nation will never 
meet most of their fellow-members), it is imagined as limited, as sovereign and as a 
community. To this last characteristic we may add that it is imagined as cultural, and 
this is what makes according to Gellner, modern society so différent from its 
predecessors, this is nationalism's specificity. In industriai society, man 
is obliged to carry his identity with him, in his whole style of conduci and 
expression: in other words, his 'culture' becomes his 'identity'. And the 
classification of men by 'culture' is of course the classification by 
"nationality'.56 
Contrary to what Smith and Connor suggest, modernists do not deny the existence of 
human cultural groupings prior to the advent of modernisation, nor even that in some 
cases cultural and politicai units might have even converged. What they seek to 
explain is why it has become necessary for all politicai units to be grounded in a 
specific culture. What they contest is the fact that such groupings would be self-
consciously formed around cultural criteria prior to the age of nationalism. As 
Gellner remarked: 
The modern nationalist consciously wills his identification with a culture. His 
overt consciousness of his own culture is already, in historical perspective, an 
interesting oddity.57 
The modernists' objective is therefore to understand why and when the fact of 
belonging to a nation, or any culturally defined homogeneous community, became 
feit as an imperative and obvious support of one's own sense of identity, and to 
artificiality of the colonially-drawn boundaries, that is their lack of congruence with what are seen as 
traditional, and hence authentic, ethnie communities. 
55 Anderson, 1991, op. cit., p. 6. 
56 Gellner, 1964, op. cit., p. 157. 
57 Gellner, Ernest, 'Nationalism and the two forms of cohésion in complex societies', in: Culture, 
Identity and Politics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1987, p. 10. 
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unmask the reasons and processes which have led to the saüency of culture as the 
universal socio-political organiser. In other words, how belonging to a culture 
became to be seen as inherent attribute of humanity. As will be argued in the 
following chapter, the history of ethnicity reveáis that ethnie groups, like nations, are 
themselves producís of this new way of thinking and thus of modernity.58 Again, this 
is not to suggest that distinct communities did not exist before the age of nationalism, 
the argument rather is that it is only then that they came to conceive themselves in 
such terms and with the politicai implications it entails. 
While Smith is right to point to the fact that some of the grand theories 
developed by modernists do not enable us to predici which nations will emerge and 
on what basis, it may perhaps be fair to say that such was not their objective. Instead 
they attempted to explain how nationalism, as a universal idea, had emerged from 
modernity and imposed itself as the norm. Moreover, as the above critique suggested, 
ethnicists in our view also fail to come up with a valid framework for prédiction. 
While not suggesting that this is an inherent flaw, predictability may after all not be 
the best test of a theory's validity, it is nevertheless problematic in so far as this was 
the point of departure of the ethnicist critique of modernism. 
2.3 — What makes a nation? 
As the ethnicists were mounting their critique of the modernist approach, the early 
1980s saw the publication of what were to become some of the most influential 
works in the study of nationalism. Gellner's Nations and Nationalism, Benedict 
Anderson's Imagined Communities, and Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger's The 
58 Or as Sami Zubaida states, that ethnicity is a product not the cause of nation-ness. See: Zubaida, 
Sami, 'Nations: old and new. Comments on Anthony D. Smith's "The myth of the 'modern nation' 
and the myth of nations,' Ethnie and Racial Studies, Vol. 12, No. 3, p. 330. 
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Invention of Tradition were all published in 1983.59 It is also in this period that what 
Smith refers to as the 'state-to-nation' perspective began to crystallise as illustrated 
by John Breuilly's Nationalism and the State (1982), Anthony Giddens' Nation-State 
and Violence (1985) and Michael Mann's The Social Sources of Power (1986).60 
These two groups of scholars elaborated some of the themes developed by classical 
modernists and attemptedto explain nationalism's geographical spread.61 
By contrast to earlier modernist accounts which were mostly concerned with the 
emergence of nationalism as a universal phenomena, later studies attempted to 
identify what factors were responsible for the emergence oß. particular nations, 
something the 'ethnicists' sought to do, although as we have argued, somewhat 
unsatisfactorily. This section discusses two of the factors more frequently cited by 
these scholars as necessary for the emergence of nationalism: language and the state. 
Given that war is introduced by some ofthose scholars who examine the relationship 
between state and nationalism, this section also assesses the rôle played by war in 
nation-formation. More importantly, although the impact of war on nation-formation 
remains somewhat understudied in the literature on nationalism, its relevance with 
respect to the cases examined, Eritrea and Somaliland, and for International 
Relations more broadly warrants its inclusion here.62 
59 Gellner, op. cit., 1983; Anderson, op. cit., 1983; and Hobsbawm Eric and Ranger, Terence, The 
Invention of Tradition, Cambridge university Press, Cambridge, 1983. 
60 Breuilly, John, Nationalism and the State, Manchester University Press, 2nd édition, 1993; Giddens, 
Anthony, The Nation-State and Violence, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1985; Mann, Michael, The Sources 
of Social Power, Vol. 1, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1986. 
61 Anderson's description ofthe origins of nationalism somewhat diverges from mainstream modernist 
accounts, in that he traces nationalism's origins not so much to Europe as to the Americas. 
62 It is necessary to note here that many of the authors considered speak ofthe rôle played by educated 
elites. This is an attempi to integrate agency into what are fundamentally structural accounts. Since the 
rôle played by elites is best studied with référencé to a particular context, it will be discussed in the 
following chapter. 
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a) Written language 
Language has always occupied a prominent place in discussions about nations and 
nationalism. Max Weber, for instance, while recognising the importance of other 
factors such as religion, traditions or customs, regarded language as the strengest 
source of national consciousness.63 The German Romantics, Herder and more 
importantly Fichte, were the first to attribute to language a central rôle in the 
définition and self-expression of the Volksgeist. More than a mere characteristic 
among others, language, specifically written language, was understood to be not only 
the vehicle of the nation but its actualisation. In the first of his fourteen Addresses to 
the German Nation, Fichte argued that the Germans constituted a distinct people by 
the mere fact that their language had not been latinised and had thus conserved its 
primordial thinking. Language was believed to reveal the essence, the inner self of 
the nation. The German Romantics thus saw the world as divided into various 
nations, or more precisely, language groups, a division which they perceived as 
natural and organic. Community of language, particularly when incarnated and 
elevated through literature, in turn defined the nation.64 
This was very much the view that informed earlier understandings of nations. 
As was recounted in the introduction, the application of the principle of national self-
détermination following WWI was initially conceived of with référencé to language. 
Language was indeed thought to provide the criterion, or marker, that enabled one to 
identify and distinguish nations. Yet the validity of the principle of 'one language, 
one nation' proved inadequate when subjected to closer scrutiny. As historical 
63 Beetham, David, Max Weber and the Theory of Modem Politics, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1985, p. 
128. 
64 On the centrality of language in the German Romanticist movement see: Kedourie, 1993, op. cit., 
chapters 4 and 5. 
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research on medieval Europe indicates, the nature of the 'link' between language and 
nationality is 'ill-defined'.65 Nevertheless, it appears that at some point some 
languages and cultural identities became crystallised and provided the nation with its 
apparent 'naturalness'. The process by which this came about is what Gellner and 
Anderson sought to explain. 
The démocratisation and universalisation of literacy constitutes for Gellner one 
of the primary conditions 'in which nationalism becomes the natural form of political 
loyalty.'66 But by contrast to the views propounded by the German Romantics, 
language for Gellner does not constitute an innate attribute of the nation or a pre-
existing independent variable from which one can proceed to explain why the world 
is divided into nations. After all, as Gellner noted: 
[t]he linguistic distinctiveness of the Scottish Highlands within Scotland is, of 
course, incomparably greater than the cultural distinctiveness of Scotland 
within the UK; but there is no Highland nationalism. Much the same is true of 
Moroccan Berbers. Dialectical and cultural differences within Germany or Italy 
are as great as those between recognized Teutonic or Romance languages.67 
The crystallisation of certain languages, for many disappeared in the process, must 
instead be understood as the result of industrialisation's need for a homogeneous 
literate population. Industrial society's reliance on a mobile and interchangeable 
workforce for its perpetuation generates the need for a standardised written medium, 
'a context-free' means of communicating, a task that is undertaken by the 
educational system Indeed, the educational system ensures that the language is not 
only 'standardised' and recorded but that it also is transmitted throughout all 
members of society. This is why, Gellner concludes: 
65 Schultze, States, Nations and Nationalism. From the Middle Ages to the Present, Blackwell 
Publishers, Cambridge, Ma, and London, 1996, p. 105. Asking an ethno-linguist what the difference 
between a language and a dialect was, I was told: a language is a dialect with an army! 
66 Gellner, 1964, op. cit., p. 160. 
67 Gellner, 1983, op. cit., p. 47. 
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in general (abstraeting from local complications) modem loyalties are centred 
on politicai units whose boundaries are defined by the language (in the wider 
or in the literal sense) of an educational system.68 
The development of written language is also centrai to Anderson's account of the 
emergence of nationalism; although for him it is the logie of capitalism, rather than 
functional needs of industriai society, which is responsible for the emergence and 
spread of written vernaculars. Technological innovation, that is the invention of the 
printing press, and the emergence of capitalism combined and provided the Ímpetus 
for the expansion of print languages. As was the case of many other sectors and 
produets, the book became under the thrust of capitalism a standardised product for 
mass consumption. To be profìt-earning, print capitalism could not exploit every orai 
vernacular, of which there was a considerable number. Economie rationality dictated 
a lower limit as 'these various idiolects were capable of being assembled, within 
definite limits, into print languages far fewer in number.'69 
By encoding languages within a fixed script, print not only enabled their 
diffusion outside their previous individuai carriers but led by the same token to the 
crystallisation of cultures, 'which in the long run helped to build that image of 
antiquity so centrai to the subjective idea of the nation.'70 Once established, print-
languages laid the bases for national consciousness by: (1) creating particular and 
distinct 'language-fields', (2) giving a new 'fixity' to language, and (3) creating 
'languages of power'. 
Both Gellner and Anderson thus consider the standardisation of common 
languages and the development of literacy to be a product of modernity and an 
essential ingrédient for the development of nationalism. But while they are 
68 Gellner, 1964, op. cit., p. 163. 
69 Anderson, 1991, op. cit., p. 43. 
70 Ibid., p.44. 
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essentially concerned with refuting the Romanticists' claim that language is a 
'primordial' given, they nevertheless seem to assume that it is an essential ingredient 
of the nation. Yet to what extent is this really so? What about those cases which do 
not conform to the monolingual model? Discussing the cases of Switzerland and 
Canada, Warburton has shown how it is possible for a nation to be in the absence of 
a common national language.71 While the Canadian case presents some difficulties, 
and the Swiss case can be seen as exceptional, they nevertheless illustrate how 
nations may arise from multi-lingual societies. Thus, while language may facilitate 
the emergence of nationalism in many cases, it would appear that linguistic 
homogeneity is not always a necessary component of nations.72 
If, notwithstanding the above comment, linguistic homogeneity is nevertheless 
seen as an important condition for the nation, how is this homogeneity achieved? 
And more importantly how is mass literacy realised? We indicated earlier how for 
Gellner, the standardisation of language arose out of industrial society's need for a 
mobile working force and how the educational system was instrumental in this 
process. Indeed, the most important unit for the diffusion of literacy is the 
educational system, and it is through this educational system that men are made 
citizens.73 This educational system, to be functional, has to be set up and sustained by 
an important institutional agency, a task, argued Gellner, that can only be fulfilled by 
the state, for 'only the state can do this.'74 But while Gellner highlights here the role 
of the state in the diffusion of language and hence on nationalism, his theory fails to 
71 Warburton, T. Rennie, 'Nationalism and Language in Switzerland and Canada,' in : Smith, Anthony 
D. (ed.), Nationalist Movements, Macmillan, London and Basingstoke, 1976, pp. 88-109. 
72 This point was to some extent acknowledged by Anderson, as he turned to consider the emergence 
of nationalism outside Europe, and will be discussed shortly. 
73 Gellner, 1964, op. cit., p. 162. 
74 Gellner, 1983, op. cit., p. 38. 
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consider its significance in more detail. In order to understand the centrality of the 
state in relation to nationalism, we must turn to another group of scholars. 
b) States and administrative units 
Gellner remarked that nationalism, by upholding that the boundaries of the state 
ought to be congruent with those of the nation, présumés the a priori existence of the 
state. Nationalism, he wrote, 'emerges in a milieu in which the existence of the state 
is very much taken for granted.'75 It must not be deduced from this that Gellner is 
implying that the state creates the nation, a claim Hobsbawm seems more ready to 
make when he writes: 'Nations do not make states and nationalism but the other way 
around,' although he fails to develop this idea fùrther.76 Gellner indeed, consider s 
state and nation to be two distinct phenomena: 
In fact, nations, like states, are a contingency, and not a universal necessity. 
Neither nations nor states exist at all times and in ail circumstances. Moreover, 
nations and states are not the same contingency. Nationalism holds that they 
were destined for each other; that either without the other is incomplete, and 
constitutes a tragedy. But before they could become intended for each other, 
each of them had to emerge, and their emergence was independent and 
contingent.77 
That said, Gellner does open the question as to whether 'the normative idea of the 
nation, in its modem sense, did not presuppose the prior existence of the state.'78 We 
will recali that Kohn had similarly argued that the origins of nationalism were 
intrinsically bound with that of the modem states. If this is indeed the case, then it 
appears that we must tum to the state, the modem state, in order to understand the 
specificity of such a phenomenon. 
75 Ibid., p. 4. 
76 Hobsbawm, 1990, op. cit., p. 10. 
77 Gellner, 1983, op. cit., p. 6. 
78 Ibid., p. 6. 
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A particular strand within the modernist approach has investigated the 
centrality of the state in its relation to nations and nationalism. Represented by such 
scholars as Breuilly and Mann, this approach sees the emergence of nationalism as a 
result or as a characteristic of the modern state and political action.79 Rather than 
invoking socio-economic processes such as industrialisation and capitalism, these 
authors focus on the political dimension of nationalism. Discontent with the state, or 
the growing chasm between state and society, constitutes Breuilly's analytical point 
of departure. Nationalism, for him, must be treated as a form of politics whose 
apparition and shape is determined by the modern state: 'the key to an understanding 
of nationalism lies in the character of the modern state, which nationalism both 
opposes and claims as its own.'80 
To illustrate how the modern state gives rise to nationalist politics, Breuilly 
delineates what he considers to be the modern state's main characteristics. These 
features are articulated around the notion of sovereignty, defined both internally and 
externally. Internal sovereignty depends on a negotiation between the rulers and the 
ruled, whereby the latter accept to give up some of their liberties. This can be 
understood as a form of contract where the transfer of sovereignty is itself premised 
on the development of a modern state system based on the notion of territoriality. 
Historically, the changing character of the state is attributable to the growth of the 
modern European monarchies, their centralising tendencies and international 
rivalries: 
By the early modern period a few monarchies had acquired enough control 
over matter such as taxation, the church and justice as to be able to conceive of 
themselves as sovereign in something like the modern sense.(...) Such powers 
had only been achieved through a process of negotiation between the ruler and 
79 Smith, 1998, op. cit., pp- 7-77. 
80 Breuilly, 1993, op. cit., p. 15. 
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the politicai community of the core territory under his sway. Only on the basis 
of some consent irò m that community, to which various rights and Überties 
were conceded, was the monarch able to establish and enforce some kind of 
sovereign power. One of the reasons why consent was forthcoming was the 
need to defend the territory against the rise of similar states.81 
The universalisation and territorialisation of the state allowed for the idea of external 
sovereignty to crystallise and, consequently, the notion of internai sovereignty 
evolved. Three elements needed to be present for opposition to the state to be framed 
in nationalistic terms: the sovereign territorial state, a world made up of such states in 
compétition with one another, and the idea of a civil society or private sphere, which 
would in turn be defined in terms of its culture. On this last point Breuilly reverts to 
socio-economic explanations as they provide an account of how national identities 
crystallised. And while his account can be said to provide a politicai theory of 
nationalism it would be inaccurate to say that he provides a politicai account of the 
origin of the nation. 
Mann on the other hand, argues that both 'nations and nationalism have 
primarily developed in response to the development of the modem state.'82 
Analysing the 'state-subverting' nationalisms which emerged in the Habsburg 
empire, he points to the fact that the two main challenges to the centrai state came 
from those régions which shared the 'most powerful provincial politicai 
organisation' i.e., the Austrian Netherlands and Hungary. That each possessed at 
least one of the cultural attributes such as language or religion is not denied. Yet 
what is more telling is the fact that 
81 Ibid., pp. 373-74. 
82 Mann, Michael, 'A political theory of nationalism and its excesses,' in: Periwal, Sukumar, (ed.), 
Notions of Nationalism, Central European University Press, Budapest, 1995, p. 44. 
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virtually everywhere, nationalist movements focused on existing politicai units, 
provinces with distinct assemblies or administrations centred on old politicai 
units.83 
Thus, he conciudes, more than language, economic development or ethnicity, 'the 
presence or absence of regional administration offers a much better predictor. This 
suggests a predominantly politicai explanation'.84 
Mann's conclusion would thus appear to represent an important challenge to 
the ethnonationalist approach insofar as predictability is concerned. Yet, on 
numerous occasions, Mann punctuates his argument by cautioning the reader that his 
is not a 'single-factor explanation' and invoking the existence of 'local-regional 
ethnie communities'. And, it would therefore seem that Mann's argument in fact 
compléments rather than challenges Smith's suggestion that nations have a pre-
modern ethnie core. Yet such is not exactly the case. By contrast to Smith, Mann 
traces the emergence of these 'local-regional ethnie communities' to what he terms 
the religious proto-nationalist phase. Since, according to Mann, this phase began in 
the sixteenth Century and was triggered by processes similar to those highlighted by 
Gellner and Anderson, it is not as such pre-modern. Yet, insofar as Mann needs to 
appeal to socio-economic factors to explain this proto-nationalist phase, his 
explanation of the emergence of nationalism is not entirely politicai. 
Mann's emphasis on the rôle of provinces or regional administrations as a 
propitious condition for the emergence of nationalism brings us back to Anderson. If 
'the convergence of capitalism and print technology on the fatal diversity of human 
language created the possibility of a new form of imagined community, which in its 
basic morphology set the stage for the modem nation,'85 this was for Anderson still 
83 Mann, 1995, op. cit., p. 49. 
84 Ibid., p. 50. 
85 Anderson, 1991, op. cit., p. 46. 
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insuffîcient for nationalism to emerge. After all, the lack of isomorphism between 
particular print-languages and the formation of nation-states, namely in the Americas 
and in Africa, indicated that language in itself did not a nation make. Here, 
Anderson's theory somewhat départs from other conventional accounts of the origins 
of nationalism which focus on Europe. Indeed, according to Anderson, if one is to 
widerstand the specificity of nationalism, it is necessary to turn to the Americas. In a 
way that foreshadowed the emergence of new states in Africa and Asia, the new 
South American Republics achieved their independence within the former 
administrative units established by the Spanish Empire from the sixteenth to the 
eighteenth Century. 
The originai shaping of the American administrative units was to some extent 
arbitrary and fortuitous, marking the spatial limits of particular military 
conquests. But, over time, they developed a firmer reality under the influence 
of géographie, politicai and economic factors. The very vastness of the Spanish 
American Empire, the enormous variety of its soils and climates, and above ali, 
the immense difficulty of communications in a pre-industrial age, tended to 
give these units a self-contained character. (...) In addition, Madrid's 
commercial policies had the effect of turning administrative units into separate 
economic zones.86 
But how did these 'artificial' administrative units come to be conceived as 
fatherlands? 
Answering this question led Anderson to discuss the decisive role played by 
the dissatisfied 'Creole functionaries5 and by the locai 'print-journalists'. These 
Creole functionaries, recruited on the basis of talent rather than of birth, encountered 
fellow travelling-companions during their 'pilgrimage' throughout, but also only 
within, the administration's territory. Because of the metropole's discriminatory 
poheies, their ascending 'pilgrimage' was inhibited. Subordination and exclusion 
thus triggered the request for national independence. The print-journalists for their 
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part provided the means by which these administrative units could be imagined as 
communities. Indeed, aeeording to Anderson, the development of the press, like the 
development of populär fiction, dramatically contributed to the sense of belonging to 
an imagined community. 
[T]he newspaper reader, observing exact replicas of his own paper being 
consumed by his subway, barbershop, or residential neighbours, is continually 
reassured that the imagined world is visibly rooted in everyday life. As with 
Noli Me Tangere, fiction seeps quietly and continuously into reality, creating 
that remarkable confidence of community in anonymity which is the hallmark 
of modem nations.87 
As we can see here, Anderson's focus on print-capitalism, and more specifically on 
the development of the press, is congruent with Deutsch's emphasis on the expansion 
of a communication's infrastructure and mass literacy as a necessary basis for 
nationalism. 
Print-capitalism had an additional and important impact on the capacity for the 
nation to become an 'imagined community': the reproduction and diffusion of the 
geographical map. 
Much has been said about the impact of the invention of printing on literacy 
and ways of reading, but less has been written about the equally momentous 
impact of print upon the circulation and communication of visual information 
within areas such as science, engineering, botany and, of course, geography.88 
86 Ibid., p. 52. 
87 Ibid, p. 36. Anonymity of membership as a key feature of the nation is also discusseci by Gellner: 
'[Renan] correctly singled out one, perhaps the crucial trait of a nation: the anonymity of membership. 
A nation is a large collection of men such that its members identify with the collectivity without being 
acquainted with its other members, and without identifying in any important way with sub-groups of 
that collectivity. Gellner, 1987, op. cit., p. 6. 
88 Brotton, Jerry, Trading Territories. Mapping the early modem world. Reaktion books, London, 
1997, p. 35. Mercator's wall map of Europe was printed in 1544 and was subsequently reproduced 
and distributed throughout the continent. His world map was published in 1569. Ortelius's Theatrum 
Orbis Terrarum, a comprehensive Atlas of the World, containing a total of seventy maps, depicting 
the régions of America, Asia, Africa and Europe was published in 1570. It was 'without doubt the 
most comprehensive and up to-date geographical text to emerge within the sixteenth century.' Its 
novel format thus made the earth 'portable'. Brotton, 1997, op. cit., p. 171. See also, Throwers, 
Norman, Maps and Civilisation. Cartography in Culture and Society. University of Chicago Press, 
Chicago, 1996. 
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In the second edition to Imagined Communities, Anderson added a chapter which 
further explored the way three institutions of the colonial state contributed to the 
imagining process: the census, the map and the museum. These three elements 
shaped the grammar of nationalism, and provided a totalising classificatory grid. The 
effect of this grid was, in Anderson's words, to make everything 'bounded, 
determínate, and therefore - in principie - countable'.89 The census created a new 
demographic topography, upon which the state relied to organise education, the law 
and the pólice, the bureaucracy and the organs of the state. Of particular importance 
for our present discussion is the role he attributes to the mercatorian map which by 
fixing previously fluid borders enabled the country to be imagined as territorially 
bounded. 
Instantly recognizable, everywhere visible, the logo-map penetrated deep into 
the popular imagination, forming a powerful emblem for the anticolonial 
nationalisms being born.90 
The 'map as logo' can thus be described as a symbol of the nation, providing the 
geo-political body with a visual support and a seemingly tangible representation 
around which the nation's members rally. 
The fact that each of the new South American republics achieved independence 
with the administrative limits traced by the Spanish Empire suggests that it may after 
all not be necessary to appeal to atavistic feelings of belonging, to account for the 
existence of nationalistic feelings. If nationalism can thus stem from political or 
institutional arrangements, then, contrary to what is asserted by those who adopt a 
more pre-modernist line, it may not be necessary for a nation to be grounded in 
antiquity for its members to feel a sense of common belonging. Following Max 
89 Anderson, Imagined Communities, 1996, Revised Edition, Verso, London, p. 254. 
90 Anderson, 1991, op. cit., p. 175. 
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Weber one could therefore conclude: 'It is primarily the politicai community, no 
matter how artifícially organised, that inspires the belief in common ethnicity.'91 But 
how can a state or an administrative unit generate the level of passion necessary for 
its Citizens to feel a sense of attachment of such magnitude that they may be Willing 
to sacrifice their lives for it? Although by no means a sufficient or even necessary 
condition, war, it would seem, can be an important catalyst in this process. 
c) War and nationalism 
The study of nationalism and war, notably in International Relations, frequently 
assumes that nationalism is the independent variable, in other words, that nationalism 
causes or is one of the causes of war.92 Yet, as some historians have suggested, the 
inverse relationship might also be considered.93 War does indeed frequently appear 
to be an important factor in the process by which a nation is formed.94 This should 
perhaps not be altogether surprising, after all, as Michael Howard notes, 
Self-consciousness as a nation implies, by definition, a sense of differentiation 
ftom other communities, and the most memorable incidents in the group 
memory usually are of conflict with, and triumph over, other communities. It is 
in fact very difficult to create national self-consciousness without war.95 
Few scholars of nationalism, with the notable exception of Smith, have studied the 
impact of war on the formation of national identity. Nevertheless, there has been a 
growing interest in the way war contributed to the emergence of the modern 
91 Weber, Max, 'Ethnic Groups', in: Economy and Society, Vol. I, Chap. 5, edited by Roth and 
Wittich, Bedminster Press, New York, 1968. 
92 See, for example: Van Evera, Stephen, 'Hypothesis on nationalism and war,' International Security, 
Vol. 18, No. 4, 1994, pp. 5-39; and Coker, Christopher, War and the illiberal conscience, Westview 
Press, Boulder, Colorado, 1998, p. 93. 
93 See for example: Johnson, Douglas, 'The making of the French Nation,' in: Teich, Mikuläs, and 
Porter, Roy, The National Question in Europe in Historical Context, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1993, pp. 35-62; Hilton, Rodney, 'Were the English English?' in Samuel, Raphael, The 
Making and Unmaking of British Identity, Vol. I, Routledge, London, 1988. 
94 Schulze, 1996, op. eil, p. 112. 
95 Howard, Michael, 'War and the Nation-State,' Daedalus, Vol. 4, 1979, p. 108. 
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European state.96 Pursuing this line of enquiry, Michael Mann and Barry Posen have 
investigated the way nationalism arose out of the modern state's need for 
increasingly large standing armies. But before we discuss the works of these two 
scholars, let us consider Smith's overview of the impact of war on ethnic and 
national consciousness.97 
Exploring 'the impact of different kinds of war and warfare on the formation, 
imagery and cohesion of some ethnic communities in the pre-Roman ancient world, 
Revolutionary Europe and in the century of total warfare', Smith claims that: 
the historical consciousness that is so essential a part of the definition of what 
we mean by the term 'ethnic community ', is very often a product of warfare or 
the threat thereof, even where the war concerns third parties.98 
Similar investigations of the way external conflict fosters social cohesion have been 
carried out in the field of social anthropology.99 While, most anthropologists do not 
deny, as Smith also cautions, that war can have the opposite effect and undermine 
intra-group solidarity, they nevertheless 'acknowledge that external conflict can 
reinforce the internal solidarity of a group.'100 More recently, and of particular 
interest, are those anthropological studies which have focused on the impact of war, 
and more precisely warfare as it was transformed by European expansion, in shaping 
non-western ethnic or tribal identities.101 David Turton and Katsuyoshi Fukui, for 
96 For a review see: Kestnbaum, Meyer and Theda Skocpol, 'War and the Development of Modern 
National States,' Sociological Forum, Vol. 8, No. 4, 1993, pp. 661-74. 
97 Smith, Anthony D., 'War and ethnicity: the role of warfare in the formation, self-images and 
cohesion of ethnic communities,' Ethnic and Racial Studies, Vol. 4, No. 4, October 1981, pp. 375-97, 
which will me more amply discussed below. 
98 Ibid, p. 379. 
99 See for example, Murphy, Robert, 'Intergroup hostility and social cohesion', American 
Anthropologist, Vol. 59, No. 6, 1957, pp. 1018-35; Otterbein, Keith, and Charlotte Swanson 
Otterbein, 'An eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth: A cross-cultural study of feuding,' American 
Anthropologist, Vol. 67, No. 6, 1965, pp. 1470-1482; and Ferguson, R. Brian (ed.), Warfare, Culture 
and Environment, Academic Press Inc., 1984. 
100 Ferguson, Brian, 'Introduction: Studying War,' in Ferguson (ed.), 1984, op. cit, p. 13. 
101 Ferguson, R. Brian and Whitehead, N.L. (eds), War in the Tribal Zone, Santa Fe, New Mexico: 
School of American Research Press, 1992; and James, Wendy, 'War and "ethnic visibility": The Uduk 
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example, have pointed 'to the functional rôle of eonflict in defining and maintaining 
group boundaries that serve to delineate "ethnie identity."102 Although their argument 
resembles that put forward by Smith, it is important to note here a significant 
différence. 
Whereas Smith présupposés the existence of ethnie catégories which are then 
transformed through war into ethnie communities, Turton questions 'the usefulness 
of treating it [the 'ethnie construct'] as the logical prerequisite and sufficient 
condition for the existence of a group.'103 In other words, warfare can take place 
between groups that may or may not be initially ethnically distinct or thus defined. 
Without wanting to venture into what is perhaps ultimately a problem of définition, it 
is nevertheless important to note that warfare between groups whose différences are 
not apparent (even to the 'most perceptive observer') do indeed take place. These 
conflicts, particularly if frequent and recurrent, may in turn provide the basis for a 
lasting differentiation. Indeed, recollection ofpast battles frequently provides a group 
with powerful collective memories which, if needed, can always be invoked to 
mobilise its members. This explains why groups, that otherwise share similar 
characteristics to that of their neighbours, may nevertheless uphold distinct identifies. 
Mann's argument could in fact be seen to complément Smith's analysis, as he seems 
to suggest that nations have a pre-modern ethnie core.104 
of the Sudan-Ethiopia Border' in: Fukui, Katsuyoshi and John Markakis, Ethnicity and Conflict in the 
Horn ofAfrica, London: James Currey, 1994. 
102 Fukui, Katsuyoshi and John Markakis, 'Introduction', in: Fukui and Markakis, 1994, loc.cit., p. 6. 
See also: Turton, David, 'War, peace and Mursi identity' in: Fukui, Katsuyoshi and David Turton (eds), 
Warfare among East African Herders, National Museum of Ethnology, Osaka, 1979, pp. 179-210; 
103 Turton, David, 'Mursi Political Identity and Warfare: The Survival of an Idea,' in: Fukui and 
Markakis, 1994, loc.cit., p. 17. In arguing that warfare takes place between ethnie catégories, Smith 
somewhat undermines his own argument against those who claim that ethnicity and nationalism are 
inherently aggressive or bellicose; Smith, 1981, op. cit., pp. 376-7. 
104 The following chapter will discuss the process by which groups may become ethnically defined. 
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Having briefly shown how war may have shaped pre-modern ethnic 
communities, Smith then proceeds to examine the way war might have shaped 
modern national consciousness and imagery. His discussion leads him to focus on the 
role played by modern warfare in what he identifies as the eighteenth century ethnic 
revival. Indeed, Smith argues, whereas in 'the pre-Roman world, ethnic communities 
played a vital role in both cultural life and politics, in early modern Europe, by way 
of contrast, the ethnic factor was generally muted and submerged.'105 Then, a change 
in the incidence and nature of warfare triggered the eighteenth century ethnic revival. 
This change, which Smith quoting Michael Howard attributes to the development of 
state power and military practice, has been more systematically investigated by 
Michael Mann and Barry Posen. 
Mann agrees with Gellner and Anderson that literacy is of foremost 
importance for the development of the 'necessary infrastructure through which 
culture might be more broadly shared'.106 But he nevertheless considers socio-
economic factors not to be directly relevant in themselves to the shaping of the 
nation. 
True, the emergence of industrial capitalism expanded the interaction networks 
and the literacy of civil society, enabling identities to stabilize over large social 
spaces. But there is little in the capitalism of this period to encourage a 
distinctively national civil society.107 
The key as to why such a distinctive national identity emerges lies, for Mann, in the 
state, and more precisely in the political economy of the state as it prepares for war. 
The dramatic growth in the military activities of states in the eighteenth century, 
105 Smith, 1981, op. cit., p. 384. 
106 Mann, Michael, 'A political theory of nationalism and its excesses,' in: Periwal, Sukumar, (ed.), 
Notions of Nationalism, Central European University Press, Budapest, 1995, p. 45. 
107 Ibid., p. 47. 
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which had been slowly introduced since the sixteenth Century Military Revolution, 
meant an increase of its requirements. These began to impinge upon, and afFect more 
and more social life, through both taxation and mobilisation. 'From being fairly 
insignifícant, states now loomed over the lives of their subjects, taxing and 
conscripting them, attempting to mobilize their enthusiasm for its goals.'108 
Posen's analysis of 'the competitive relationship between France and 
Prussia/Germany, during the period from the Seven Years War (1756-1763) to the 
eve of the First World War' is in many ways comparable to Mann's study. But 
whereas Mann focussed more specifically on the internal dynamics of the state, and 
on the impact of war on civilian dissent, Posen suggests 'a theory of nationalism 
based largely on international military compétition.'109 Posen begins by stating that 
'it is not merely coincidental that nationalism seems to cause intense warfare,' since 
nationalism 'is purveyed by states for the express purpose of improving their military 
capabilities.'110 Although prior to the French Revolution, French and Prussian 
military thinkers were already exploring the ways they could ensure better motivated 
soldiers, the criticai moment lies with the introduction of mass armies. According to 
Posen: 
Once the French Revolution, and later Napoleon, proved the efficacy of this 
pattern of military Organization, others who valued their sovereignty were 
strongly encouraged to do imitate their example. It is this imitation, I argue, 
that helped to spread nationalism across Europe.111 
108 Ibid., p. 48. 
109 Posen, Barry, 'Nationalism, the Mass Army, and Military Power,' in: Comaroff, John L., and 
Stern, Paul C. (eds), Perspectives on Nationalism and War, Gordon and Breach Publishers, 
Luxembourg, 1995, p. 170. This article was first published in International Security, Vol. 18, No. 2, 
Fall 1993, pp. 80-124 
110 Ibid, p. 136. 
111 Ibid, p. 137. Tilly has similarly argued that the rise of modern national states was a response to and 
a justification of the need to establish larger standing armies in order to survive in Europe's system. 
See: Tilly, Charles, 'Introduction', in : Tilly, Charles (ed.), The Formation of National States in 
Europe, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1975. 
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Posen therefore attributes the emergence and spread of nationalism, both within the 
state and, when imitated, to other states, to the military revolution and to the 
anarchical conditions of the international system. This is why 'nationalism can be 
excepted to persisi wherever the military security of states depend on mass 
mobilization.'112 This analysis of the role of the mass army replaces in effect 
Gellner' s industrial need by the state's military requirement as the main force behind 
the emergence of nationalism and the spread of literacy. 
In order to guarantee soldiers technical utility and commitment to war, the 
army needed to ensure they had acquired the minimal literacy skills and ideological 
basis. This, according to Posen, was achieved by the state mainly through éducation: 
States promote compulsory primary éducation to spread literacy in a standard 
version of the spoken language to enhance the technical military utility of their 
soldiers. In doing so, they spread the "culture" and the version of history that 
are centrai to the national identity. Culture means mainly a written language, 
but also a shared set of symbols and memories.113 
Tellingly, éducation in Prussia after the Napoleonic wars was compulsory only for 
males. Although, neither French ñor Prussian curricula explicitly stressed French or 
German nationalism before the 1860s, great importance was given to martial values 
and heroic episodes of military history, initially at least in regimental schools.114 
National identity was thus forged not only through the spread of a common 
standardised written language but also by opposition to the *enemy\ Each state 
responded to the other by perfecting the 'nation in arms\ new developments were 
introduced: short-service conscription ceded the way to obligatory military service, 
112 Posen, 1995, op. cit., p. 140. 
113 Ibid., p. 139. 
114 For a similar description see: Bernard, Nadine, 'Le nationalisme et la guerre en France (1871-
1914)', in: Institut de Sociologie, Centre de Sociologie de la Guerre, Le Nationalisme. Facteur 
Belligène, Établissements Émile Bruylant, Bruxelles, 1972, pp. 177-283, in particular: pp. 218-41. 
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and military training increasingly included 'patriotic' éducation. The army through 
mass conscription became the cauldron of the nation. 
Indeed, one of the great lessons learnt from the Napoleonic experience was 
the need to ensure that society as a whole was represented in the army. Obligatory 
military service ensured that men from ali over the country were not only brought 
into contact with each other and with other régions of the state, but were also forced 
to live together for a given period of time. The bonds that thus developed between 
soldiers provided the emotional dimension to the abstract idea of the nation that was 
propagated through the educational system. The shared experience of subsequent 
wars fìirther reinforced these bonds through the common encounter with death and 
provided these soldiers with collective memories written in blood. War thus provided 
nationalism with its emotional dimension and with symbols and myths. The idea that 
war, and more importantly the repeated experience of war, shaped the nation as a 
community of belonging and sacrifice, was intrinsic to Renan's définition of the 
nation. While conflict may not be the determining factor in the emergence of the 
nation, the role war plays, in exacerbating différences and spreading national identity 
among individuals who until then had only a vague understanding of the meaning and 
implications of their national belonging, cannot be overlooked. 
Conclusion 
By showing why the ethnonationalist approach ultimately constitutes a variant to the 
primordialist approach, this chapter has argued that the primordialist-modernist 
debate to the study nationalism stili prevails. On the one hand are those who, 
following Smith and Connor, consider ethnicity to be the 'independent and causai 
force' behind nationalism, modernisation being 'only a catalyst and amplifier of 
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existing forces.'115 On the other hand, are those who, foliowing Gellner, see nations 
as created by nationalism, itself a product of the changes brought about by 
modernity. These changes can in turn be attributed either to: (1) the idea of national 
self-determination (Kedourie and Berlin), (2) socio-economic transformations 
(Gellner's industrialisation, Anderson's print-capitalism or Deutsch's networks of 
communication), or (3) to the emergence of the modem state, particularly in 
conditions of war (Breuilly, Mann, and Posen). Along with ethnicity, these factors 
will therefore constitute the framework for our analysis of the emergence of 
nationalism in Eritrea and Somaliland. 
As our discussion suggested one of the main objects of contention is that of 
the determinacy of the causai relation that binds state, nationalism and nation. For 
Smith, as for most scholars who uphold an ethnicist stance, nationalism is the 
'process by which ethnies become nations and then go on to claim either autonomy 
in a more federalised state, or outright independent statehood.'116 In other words, the 
claim for independent statehood, i.e., secession, is viewed as the result of the 
nationalist demands made by a given ethnie group. This view is contrasted to that 
upheld by modernists for whom the bonds that unite the modem state and the nation 
are indissoluble. Although state and nation may be according to some modernists two 
distinct phenomena, they are nevertheless co-determined, implying that the study of 
one can be achieved only partially without the définition of the other. Accounts of 
their origins and their subsequent spread are thus necessarily intertwined. 
115 Smith, 1983, op. cit., p. xxii. Adopting Connor's metaphor in its more strictly chemical sense, 
modernisation can be seen as a catalyst which extracted culture from a solution in which it previously 
lay unseen and indiscriminate; but in addition, it also combined this 'precipitate' with another element 
- the state - producing the nation compound. The new element thus formed, the nation, is as distinct 
from pre-modern cultures, as sait is from sodium. 
116 Smith, 1983, op. cit., p. xiii. 
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Most of the theories presented in this chapter have tended to focus on Europe, 
upheld to be the cradle of nationalism. Unless one endorses a strict primordial 
understanding of nationalism, which few authors do, nationalism is indeed generally 
seen as a phenomenon which first emerged in Europe and subsequently spread to the 
rest of the world. Indeed, according to Anderson, by the turn of the XIXth Century, 
the nation-state had become a 'blue-print' available for 'pirating', and by the turn of 
the XXth Century, the sole legitimate international norm.117 Rather than explain the 
emergence of nationalism in différent parts of the world as more or less 
simultaneous, haphazard and isolated occurrences, this thesis will endorse the view 
that nationalism is a unique historical event which spread throughout the world as 
part of the process of the expansion of international society.118 Its appearance in 
Africa is therefore seen as representing one of the stages in this world-wide chain 
reaction. But, while the factors deemed to be necessary for the emergence of 
nationalism in Africa may be on the whole similar to those identified in the European 
context it is nevertheless necessary to identify the vectors responsible for its spread 
to that continent. 
117 Anderson, 1991, op. cit., pp. 67 and 113. 
118 Watson, Adam, 'European International Society and its Expansion', in: Bull and Watson, 1984, op. 
cit., p. 31. 
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Chapter 3 - Nationalism and ethnicity in Africa 
This chapter seeks to determine whether the factors previously identified as 
responsible for the origins of nationalism also account for its emergence in Africa 
and whether any additional factors need to be considered before examining the cases 
of Eritrea and Somaliland. Indeed, many of the theories examined above focussed 
specifically on Europe. The extent to which the conclusions derived from the 
European context are applicable to the study of nationalism in Africa needs therefore 
to be iìirther investigated. 
The first section of this chapter presents the factors generally deemed to have 
been responsible for the rise of nationalism in Africa, a process that led to the 
continent's eventual décolonisation. It reviews the legacies of Western colonisation 
and discusses the impact of the African-American struggle for racial equality, 
highlighting the rôles played by Western-educated eûtes and missionaries in the 
march towards national self-determination. This interprétation of décolonisation as 
nationalism, proclaimed by many African politicai leaders themselves, is contested.1 
And it is here that the study of nationalism in Africa mirrors the ethnonationalist-
modernist debate discussed in the previous chapter. Those for whom anti-colonialism 
was an expression of African nationalism account for its emergence in terms broadly 
similar to those put forth by modernists. Industrialisation, éducation, the colonial 
state and the ideas of national self-determination are singled out as having laid the 
foundations for the emergence of nationalism in Africa. Those who on the other hand 
uphold, as does Smith, that the anti-colonial movement was not a 'trae' nationalist 
movement, discredit such explanations on the grounds that the newly independent 
1 Tamarkin, Mordechai, 'Nationalism and nation-building in Black Africa: Fatefiil connections,' 
Canadiern Review ofStudies of Nationalism, Vol. XX, nos. 1-2, 1994, pp. 83-91. 
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states failed to justify their demands for national self-determination with reference to 
ethnonationalism.2 
In the same way that the ethnonationalist approach had sprung up in the 
aftermath of the ethnie revival of the 1960s and 1970s and in reaction to the failure 
of prevailing modernist theories to account for its resurgence, ethnicity was 
introduced to the study of Africa in the 1980s as a challenge to the viability of post-
independence nation-building policies.3 Indeed, much of the work published by the 
nation-building school that Walker Connor so vehemently criticised pertained to 
Africa.4 The crises that afflicted many of Africa's states, it was diagnosed, were a 
direct conséquence of their 'artifîciality', that is, their lack of congruence with 'trae' 
nations. If these crises were to be overcome, it was further argued, the existing 
territorial status should be reconsidered and Africa5s 'artifìcial' boundaries adjusted 
so that they reflect more appropriately 'authentic5 or 'traditional' ethnie identifies.5 
But to what extent do ethnie identities more genuinely reflect African communities 
and traditions? 
The second section of this chapter will attempi to provide an answer to this 
question by looking specifically at the anthropological literature on ethnicity in 
Africa. The reason for this is twofold. First, more than any other discipline, 
anthropology has investigated the nature and meaning of ethnicity in Africa. Any 
adequate understanding of this issue cannot avoid, therefore, considering the insights 
yielded by this discipline. Second, our focus on the anthropological literature on 
2 Smith, 1991, op. cit., p. 108. See also, Connor, 1994, op. cit., p. 5. 
3 Tamarkin, Mordechai, 'Culture and Politics in Africa: Legitimizing Ethnicity, Rehabilitating the 
Post-Colonial State,1 Nationalism and Ethnie Politics, Vol. 2, No. 3, Autumn, 1996, p. 364. 
4 Connor, 1994, op. cit., pp. 55-6. Emerson, Rupert, 'Nation-Building in Africa,' in: Deutsch, Karl, 
and William Flotz (eds), Nation-Building, Atherton Press, Chicago, 1963. 
5 Amadife and Warhola, 1993, op. cit., pp. 533-54; Davidson, op. cit., 1992; Jackson and Rosberg, 
1984, op. cit., pp. 55-73; Zartman, 1965, op. cit., p. 55-73. 
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ethnicity is also motivateci by a need to pursue further the discussion about the ethnie 
origins of nations introduced in the previous chapter. As was intimated then, those 
authors endorsing the 'ethnie origins of nations' thesis generally fail to consider the 
existing anthropologieal literature on ethnicity, this, in spite of the fact, that the 
'ethnie group' is traditionally eonsidered as anthropology's preserve. Since mueh of 
the theoretieal debates that have led to a rethinking of the concept of ethnicity in 
anthropology have been undertaken by scholars doing research in Africa, it seems 
appropriate to include a discussion of these in this chapter. As will be shown, the 
assumption that underlies the ethnonationalist approach, i.e. that ethnie groups are 
pre-modern, has been challenged by anthropologists. It is hoped that a more 
substantial discussion of ethnicity will clarify our understanding of nationalism, 
especially, though not exclusively, in relation to Africa. 
3.1 — The emergence of nationalism in Africa 
The study of nationalism in Africa was prompted by the emergence of anti-
colonialism. Indeed, calls for independence were couched in terms of national 
libération. But why did nationalism manifest itself at that particular moment? What 
factors triggered its emergence? 
a) The colonial legacies 
Various factors have been put forward to explain the emergence of nationalism in 
Africa and, to a great extent, many of the accounts provided mirror those highlighted 
in the broader theories of nationalism presented in the previous chapter. In 1954, 
James Coleman identified four types of factors which he saw as having contributed 
to the rise of nationalism in Africa: a) economie transformations, i.e., the change 
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fr o m a subsistence to a money economy, growth of a wage-labour force, rise of a 
new middle class; b) sociological factors, i.e., urbanisation, social mobility and 
Western éducation; c) religious and psychological factors, i.e., Christian 
evangelisation, and neglect or frustration of Western-educated elements, arising 
mainly as a response to discrimination and racism; and d) politicai factors, i.e., the 
eclipse of traditional authorities and the forging of new 'national' symbols; this last 
element being intrinsically bound to the modem state structure.6 
When the European powers partitioned the African continent in the late 19th 
Century and established their respective colonies, they brought with them and sought 
to implant the modem state structure. The boundaries drawn by the colonial powers 
not only indicated their respective areas of sovereignty, but also delimited the 
territory within which economic and social interchange would take place. It thus 
identified the people upon which their administrative structure, legai system and 
éducation policies would be imposed. The colonial state was modelled on the modem 
European state which, as we saw in the preceding chapter, had slowly crystallised in 
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. It was defïned by its territorial configuration, 
its bureaucratie nature, its coercive monopoly and, last but not least, the idea of 
nationhood. Indeed, as our study of Eritrea and Somaliland will show, the modem 
state was to be Europe's most important and enduring legacy to Africa. 
In addition to creating the geo-political structures, with their distinct legal 
Personalities, upon which nationhood could take hold, the colonial period also 
introduced in Africa, to varying degrees, those elements of modernisation which 
were identified in the first chapter as necessary conditions for the emergence of a 
6 Coleman, James S., 'Nationalisai in Tropical Africa', first published in American Politicai Science 
Review, vol. 48, No. 2, June 1954; reprinted in Sklar, Richard L., (ed.), Nationalism and Development 
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nation: industrialisation, extensive communications infrastructure, urbanisation and 
mass-education. 
Colonial rule introduced a money or exchange economy in Africa (...) a 
"rudimentary capitalist economy" - which has gradually commercialized and, 
more recently industrialized much of the economic activity of African peoples, 
and has also individualized or decommunalized it. With the rise of agricultural 
production for the market, the growth of trade, minerai production, and other 
industries such as transport, and the growth of government administration and 
social and professional services, the traditional African society has been shaken 
to its roots.7 
Despite limited financial investment by the metropolitan governments in their 
colonies, developments in the area of communications were important. Indeed, by 
the 1920s, 'the railway map of Africa had virtually assumed its modem shape.'8 
Urbanisation, considered to be one of the best indicators of modernisation, is also 
one of the most important factors contributing to the rise of nationalism. During the 
colonial period cities and towns in Africa grew not only in size but also in numbers.9 
Urbanisation, insofar as it indicates a shift from a predominantly agrarian society to 
one centred on trade and industry, tends to be accompanied by considérable social 
changes.10 One of the main features of this shift from a predominantly self-sufficient 
subsistence economy to a money economy is the création of new middle class and a 
wage-labour force. As will be discussed in the next section, the impact of 
urbanisation on nation formation in the African context is somewhat paradoxical. 
While on the one hand, urbanisation may have allowed for the emergence of a sense 
of nationhood among the upper strata, it also appears to have become the locus for 
in Africa. Selected Essays, University of California Press, Berkeley, Los Angeles and London, 1994, 
pp. 26-28. 
7 Kilson, Martin L., Jr., 'The Analysis of African Nationalism,' WorldPolitics, No. 10, 1958, p. 489. 
8 Oliver, Rolland, and J.D. Fage, A Short History of Africa, 6th edition, Penguin Books, 1995, p. 191. 
9 See Hodgkin, Thomas, Nationalism in Tropical Africa, Frederick Muller Ltd., London, 1956, p. 63 
onwards for a description of the urban explosion in Africa 
10 Forde, Daryll, (ed.), Social implications of Industrialization and Urbanization in Africa South of the 
Sahara, Unesco, Paris, 1956. 
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ethnie identity formation. Perhaps what needs to be emphasised here is that 
urbanisation seems to have entailed a crystallisation of identities around a culturally 
defined identity. 
A further conséquence of modernisation and the colonial state's need for 
indigenous administrative cadres, was the rapid growth of a state-led éducation 
system. 
A typical example was the founding of Achimota College in the Gold Coast in 
1924, where Western subjects were balanced by traditional African ones, 
providing a popular environment for the new generation of nationalists, among 
them Kwame Nkrumah. French policies of assimilation, especially in Senegal, 
also encouraged the early growth of an educated African elite and even the 
Belgians felt compelled to change their erstwhile purely 'vocational' approach 
to African éducation and belatedly foster an évolué elite in the Congo.11 
Education was to a great extent, colonialism's most direct contribution to the 
emergence of nationalism in Africa, for with éducation came literacy and it was thus 
that European ideas were diffused to Africa. 
Europe brought in its wake literacy as an ideal and as a technical feasible goal. 
Widespread or universal literacy, as an indispensable concomitant of 
industrialism, was in Europe itself quite a recent phenomenon, but the very 
industriai system which demanded it facilitated its spread far beyond the shores 
of Europe, since books and newspapers printed cheaply could now as cheaply 
be scattered by steamship and railway to the four corners of the earth. The 
ideas which such publications transmitted came to be known in the first place 
to those who could read European languages (.. .).12 
Indeed, as Anderson noted, it was those bilingual and literate Western educated elites 
that were to play a central role in the rise of nationalism in the colonial territories. 
[T]he intelligentsias' vanguard role derived from their bilingual literacy, or 
rather literacy and bilingualism. Print-literacy already made possible the 
imagined community (...). Bilingualism meant access, through the European 
language-of-state, to modem Western culture in the broad sense, and in 
11 Smith, A.D., State and Nation in the Third World. The Western State and African Nationalism. 
Wheatsheaf Books Ltd., London, 1983, p. 45. 
12 Kedourie, Elie, 'Introduction,' in: Kedourie, Elie (ed.), Nationalism in Asia and Africa, Frank Cass, 
London, 1971, p. 27. 
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particular, to the models of nationalism, nation-ness, and nation-state produced 
elsewhere in the course of the nineteenth century.'13 
Through Western style education systems, Africans learned to read the European 
languages which enabled them to access and assimilate Western ideas like freedom 
of speech, the rule of impersonal law, independence, democracy, Marxism, and more 
importantly, nationalism.14 Modern-style education dispensed in colonial state 
schools had thus created and shaped a new group of Africans, the western educated 
elites, imbued with the ideals of democracy and nationalism. And, it is this group 
which would express African nationalist aspirations in the years to come. 
As Coleman points out, one should not assume a direct correlation between 
the degree of literacy and the manifestation of nationalism. The case of Belgium 
Congo, who in 1951 could boast one of the highest levels of literacy compared to 
other colonial territories but where 'overt nationalism' remained underdeveloped, 
illustrates this.15 Instead, one should focus on the number of Africans who had access 
to secondary and university education, at home or abroad, as it is from this category 
that most nationalist leaders came. Mention should also be made here of the role of 
mission-schools, which provided much of the education in Africa, particularly in 
those cases where the colonial administration policies towards educating indigenous 
population remained underdeveloped. Indeed, it appears that '[w]ith few exceptions, 
the westernised African elites leading nationalist and terrorist movements and 
claiming power in the new order are products of mission schools.'16 Again, as will be 
13 Anderson, 1991, op. cit., p. 116. 
14 Watson, Adam, 'European International Society and Its Expansion,' in: Bull and Watson, 1984, op. 
cit. p. 31. See also Hodgkin, Thomas, 'The relevance of 'Western' ideas in the derivation of African 
nationalism,' in Pennock, J.R., (ed.) Self-Government in Modernising Societies, Prentice-Hall, 1964; 
and Kedourie, 1971, op. cit., p. 28. 
15 Coleman, 1994, op. cit., p. 33. 
16 Coleman, James S., 'The Problem of Political Integration in Emergent Africa,' first published in 
1955 in the Western Political Quarterly, reprinted in R. Sklar (ed.), 1994, op. cit., p. 77; and Bascom, 
William, 'African Culture and the Missionaries,' Civilisations, vol. 3, No. 4,1953, pp. 491-501. 
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discusseci in the following section, missionary éducation might have also been 
responsible for the crystallisation of identities not at a national level but at an ethnie 
one, particularly in those cases where the missions opposed the central colonial 
administration. Although what is significant is not so much at which levels identities 
finally crystallised - this is in itself contingent upon other factors - as the fact that 
identities did indeed crystallise and this around culturally defined criteria. 
The second way in which Western éducation and literacy influenced 
emerging African elites was through the growing awareness of being discriminated 
against by the colonial masters. Having absorbed European ideáis of equality and 
democracy, educated Africans, and particularly those having studied in the 
metropole, became increasingly frustrated and disillusioned by the treatment they 
received. Barred from attaining the higher echelons both in the colonial 
administrations and universities, the intelligentsias realised the discrepancies 
between such ideáis and their application in the colonial context. 
The revulsión which educated Asians and Africans felt at a racial 
discrimination so opposed to the character of imperial rule, and so much at 
variance with what their European rulers had led them to expect, was gradually 
turned into disaffection; and this disaffection was clothed in an ideology which 
at once explained their predicament and restored their self-esteem.17 
Nationalism in Africa, as the expression of African elites discontent with the 
European colonial administration, confirms Isaiah Berlinds 'bent twig' hypothesis, in 
so far as it represents a 'reaction to the oppression and humiliation brought about by 
foreignrule.'18 It also parallels Anderson's' account ofthe emergence of nationalism 
as the resuit of dissatisfied 'Creole pioneers'. 
17 Kedourie, 1971, op. cit, p. 89. 
18 Berlin, Isaiah, "The Bent Twig. On the Rise of Nationalism,' in: The Crooked Timber of Humanity, 
John Murray, London, 1990, p. 251. 
84 
Colonialism had thus laid the foundations for the emergence of nationalism in 
Africa. It had implanted the state structure upon which the idea of a nation would 
then take hold and introduced major changes in Africa1 s socio-economic make-up. 
But while educated Africans' discontent was brewing, more was needed for it to be 
voiced in the language of national self-determination and for nationalism to acquire 
filli force as a politicai movement. The final impetus towards politicai mobilisation 
would come from the Black consciousness movements that had emerged in the early 
1900s in the United States and the West Indies. 
b) The Black-American movement and the movement for independence 
According to Hans Kohn and William Sokolsky, 'African nationalism received much 
of its initial impetus from America.'19 African nationalism was indeed initially a 
demand for racial equality, a struggle already taking place in the New World. 
Especially influential were the writings and politicai ideas that emerged during the 
Abolitionist era. 
In Order to rationalize and defend slavery, slave-owners and racist intellectuals 
put out some of the most racist writings that have ever been produced in 
modem history. African-American leaders took the challenge and seized the 
opportunity to write about ancient and medieval African history showing the 
glories, achievements, civilizations, empires and cultures of Africa. (...) In 
subsequent years, Africans in Africa would learn, from such writings, about 
their own (Africa's) past achievements, cultures and civilizations. Armed with 
such ideas and evidence, Africans at home fought against colonialism and 
racism more effectively and confidently than before.20 
Many Americans and Caribbeans, descendants of the slaves who had been brought to 
the New World, saw Africa as their homeland to which they would eventually return. 
While some immigrated to Africa, others visited the continent as teachers or 
19 Kohn, Hans and Sokolsky, Wallace, African Nationalism in the Twentieth Century, Van Nostrand 
Company, Princeton, 1965, p. 21. 
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preachers. Noteworthy is the influence of African-Americans who went to Africa as 
missionaries and the role played by Christian churches not only in mobilising local 
populations but also in creating a transnational network between Africans from the 
Old and the New continents.21 Finally, and perhaps most famously, are the roles 
played by the Jamaican-born Marcus Garvey (1887-1940) and American historian 
William E. DuBois (1868-1963), generally considered to be the spiritual fathers of 
Pan-Africanism, and who called for the libération of African people from their 
colonial masters. 
In its early stages, Pan-Africanism was intimately associated with the African-
American demands for racial equality and was therefore a transnational rather than 
national movement. The first Pan-African Congress was convened in Paris in 
February 1919 and was chaired by William DuBois.22 Its aim was for Africa's voice 
to be heard at the Versailles Peace Conference. 
Fifty-seven delegates from fifteen countries attended, including twelve 
delegates from nine African countries. Special visas having been refused by the 
United States and colonial powers, attendance was limited. So, too, was the 
conference's effectiveness. The resolutions of the Congress, it might be noted, 
did not call for Pan-African union, but rather for self-determìnation (...).23 
It is significant that this first meeting should have occurred at the end of the first 
World War, when the principie of national self-determination acquired international 
clout. There were to be three other such Pan-African Congresses, ali under the 
leadership of DuBois. These were held in London (1921), in Lisbon (1923) and in 
New York (1927). As it became clear that Garvey's 'Back-to-Africa' movement was 
20 Shiroya, O J E , Dimensions of Nationalism: The African Context, The Jomo Kenyatta Foundation, 
Nairobi, 1992, p. 11. 
:
21 Shiroya, 1992, op. cit., pp. 16-19. 
22 Although largely unnotieed, a first Pan-African meeting, protesting against the treatment of 
Africans in South Africa and Rhodesia, had been held in London in 1900 under the instigation of H. 
Sylvester Williams, a West Indian barrister. Kohn and Sokolsky, 1965, op. cit., p. 25. 
23 Kohn and Sokolsky, 1965, op. cit., p. 26. 
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doomed to failure - the majority of Black Americans refusing to relinquish their 
American citizenship - Pan-Africanism entered its second stage. 
The fLfth Pan-African Congress, held in Manchester, U.K., in 1945, marked a 
turning point for the Pan-African movement. It signalled the shift from it being 
mainly an American/Caribbean movement led essentially by DuBois, to an African 
dominated politicai organisation. After the Second World War, Pan-Africanism 
became the purview Africans educated abroad and it was them that would initiate the 
movement for décolonisation. 
As a preponderance of members attending the Congress were African, its 
ideology became African nationalism a revolt by African nationalism against 
colonialism, racialism and imperialism in Africa - and it adopted Marxist 
socialism as its philo sophy. Like Garveyism, the first four conférences were 
not born of indigenous African consciousness. Garvey's ideology was 
concerned with black nationalism as opposed to African nationalism. And it 
was this Fifth Pan-African Congress that provided the outlet for African 
nationalism and brought about the awakening of African politicai 
consciousness. It became in fact, a mass movement of Africans for the 
Africans.24 
African nationalism, as it emerged at the 1945 Manchester conférence, nevertheless 
remained Pan-African in essence as participants to the Congress condemned the 
artificial nature of Africa's territorial division. 
World War Two was an important catalyst in the march towards 
décolonisation. It revealed the fragility of European hegemony as India, Pakistan, 
Burma, Indonesia and Indo-China progressively secured their independence in the 
aftermath of the war. 
At the same time, the war had brought many Africans into much closer touch 
with events and currents of opinion in the outside world than ever before. 
Many West Africans had served on terrn of equality with British soldiers in 
other parts of the world, notably in the Burma campaign.25 
24 Ibid., p. 28. 
25 Oliver and Fage, 1995, op. cit., p. 218. 
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With the creation of the United Nations, the newly independent states' membership 
became determining in the anti-colonial cause already propounded by the American 
Republics and the communist states. Influenced by the decolonisation process that 
was beginning in Asia, African nationalists began to question their status. 
c) Independence and uti possidetis 
When calls for independence finally crystallised, it was not so much the territorial 
state itself which came under attack as the authority of those who ruled that state. 
The new African elites, educated and inspired by Western models of democracy and 
representative government, attempted to mobilise the masses and gain broad-base 
support. For then, as in its beginnings in Europe, nationalism was intrinsically tied to 
notions of popular sovereignty and democracy. In the words of Thomas Hodgkin, 
African nationalism, in its many manifestations, [is] an historical movement, 
necessarily and characteristically African, yet revealing definite points of 
resemblance to the nationalisms that have emerged in other parts of the world. 
These resemblances seem the more natural if the rise of African nationalism is 
thought of as the final stage in a chain reaction, deriving its operative ideas 
originally from the French Revolution - the doctrine of the Rights of Man 
interpreted as the Rights of Nations.26 
Emphasis was given to the fact that national self-determination meant self-
determination of the people, the nation opposing not so much another nation as it did 
the colonial autocratic ruler, the white European overlord. Understood as a reaction 
to European imperialist oppression, Hodgkin described as nationalist: 
any organisation or group that explicitly asserts the rights, claims and 
aspirations of any given African society (from the level of the language-group 
to that of 'Pan-Africa') in opposition to European authority whatever its 
institutional form and objectives.'27 
26 Hodgkin, 1956, op. cit., p. 17. 
27 Ibid., p. 23. 
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Hodgkin's broad définition reflected the multiplicity of Africa's nationalist 
manifestations in the early period of the anti-colonial movement. Certain nationalist 
leaders (Leopold Senghor, Sekou Toure, Modibo Keita) expressed, at one time or 
other, their desire for independence to be achieved within broader French 
administrative fédérations, such l'Afrique Occidentale Française (AOF) and 
l'Afrique Equatoriale Française (AEF). Similar fédérations, associations or 
Congresses were found throughout Africa.28 Conflicting interests and lack of popular 
attachment to the wider geographical units may account for these projects' failures. 
But what seems more important is the fact that when the colonial power finally 
realised the need to prepare their colonies for self-government, they did so within the 
framework established by the colonial state. The adoption in 1956 of the Loi-cadre in 
French colonial Africa thus 'located the vital institutions of African politicai 
autonomy at this echellon' and ensured that politicai life would germinate at the state 
level.29 
The colonial state thus became equated not only with its physical attributes 
(territory and population) but also with its bureaucracy, the nervous centre from 
which stemmed ail décisions affecting the country. And it was this state which was 
coveted by the new elites, this state from whose bureaucracy they had been excluded 
by the colonial administration and whose control became equated with control over 
the whole country, its peoples and riches. National self-determination found its 
ultimate expression, not in continental Pan-Africanism or broader regional units, but 
in the states Africans inherited from the colonial powers. The first indications that 
pan-Africanism had been overruled by the nationalism of individual states came 
28 Tordoff, William, Government and Politics in Africa, 3rd Edition, Macmillan Press, 1997, pp. 52-3. 
29 Young, Crawford, "The Héritage of Colonialism', in: Haberson, John, and Rothchild, Donald (eds), 
Africa in World Politics. lsl Edition, Westview Press Inc., Boulder, Colorado and Oxford, 1991, p. 21. 
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during the first assembly of African independent states held in Accra in 1958. It was 
then that N'Krumah, who ironically until then had led the movement towards pan-
Africanism, expressed the need to respect the independence, the sovereignty and the 
territorial integrity of the newly created states in the interests of peace.30 By then, it 
was clear that Europeans had been very successful in implanting the territorial state 
in Africa and had been 'able to draw sharp boundaries, not only in political and 
economic reality, but also in the psychic identity and cultural vision on the new 
elites.'31 When African states finally achieved their independence, national self-
determination, in conformity with the United Nations General Assembly Resolutions 
1514 and 1541, expressed itself within the boundaries of the territories defined and 
administered by the colonial powers. Adopted in 1963, the Organisation of African 
Unity's Charter stipulated, in Article 3(3), that member states adhere to the principle 
of 'respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each State and for its 
inalienable right to independent existence.' Despite some opposition from Ghana, 
Morocco, the Somali Republic and Togo,32 the territorial sanctity of the states 
inherited upon achieving independence was more forcefully reiterated at the Cairo 
meeting of Heads of State and Government in 1964. The adoption of the 1964 OAU 
Cairo Resolution on Border disputes Among African States 'formally adopted uti 
possidetis as the absolute rule of the region'.33 It was then that the representatives of 
Africa's states pledged 'to respect the frontiers existing on their achievement of 
30 Touval, Saadia, The Boundary Politics of Independent Africa, Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge, Mass., 1975, p. 54; and Young, 1991, op. cit., p. 23. 
31 Smith, 1983, op. cit., p. 50. 
32 Clapham, 1996, op. cit., pp. 47-8. 
33 Franck, 1993, op. cit., p. 10. 
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national independence.'34 Utipossidetis was henceforth hailed as the corner stone of 
post-colonial Africa's peace and stability. 
Interpreted as the ultimate expression of African peoples claims for self-
determination, decolonisation was thus automatically associated with nationalism. 
And while the heterogeneity of Africa's newly independent states was 
acknowledged, their lack of stability in the aftermath of independence was seen as 
temporary. Scholars described the mechanisms by which African states would in 
time achieve internal cohesion through the implementation of appropriate nation-
building strategies by an effective leadership.35 But, in the decades that followed 
independence, it became more and more obvious that African states had failed to 
develop economically and achieve political stability. Not only were they mired in a 
state of seemingly uneradicable underdevelopment but they were also plagued by 
civil wars which in turn impeded any attempt at economic reform. 
Following the failures of modernisation and nation-building policies, 
ethnicity or tribalism, which until then had for the most part been seen as a parochial 
and disruptive force, was reintroduced in the 1980s and put forward as the basis upon 
which African polities should be built.36 Indeed, by upholding the colonial status 
quo, African states through the OAU had, according to Robert Jackson and Carl 
Rosberg, stifled Africa's 'traditional' national identities: 
The legitimation and enforcement of existing ex-colonial international 
boundaries in Africa is undoubtedly the supreme purpose of the O.A.U., but 
very few of those boundaries have substantial indigenous African referents, so 
we cannot conclude that the O.A.U. is maintaining traditional African national 
34 See, 'OAU Resolution on Border Disputes Among African States,' Brownlie, 1971, op. cit., p. 360. 
35 Emerson, Rupert, "The Problem of Identity, Selfhood, and Image in the New Nations: The Situation 
in Africa,' Comparative Politics, Vol. 1, No. 3, April 1969, p. 306. 
36 Amadife and Warhola, 1993, op. cit. pp. 533-54; Davidson, 1992, op. cit.-, Jackson and Rosberg, 
1984, op. cit., pp. 55-73; Zartman, 1965, op. cit., p. 55-73. 
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identities. In fact, it is denying them. (...) Only Swaziland, Lesotho, Botswana, 
and Somalia might be included in the category of "nation-states".37 
If any solution to Africa's economie and politicai ordeals was to be found, it rested 
on the redrawing of the continent's state boundaries so that each state may reflect 
more genuinely 'traditional' African ethnie identities. Only then would African states 
recover from the legitimacy crisis that afflicted them. 
Since much of the debate about the viability of African states now revolves 
around proposais for ethno-national adjustment, it is important to understand the 
meaning of ethnicity in the African context. As was indicated above, much of the 
work that has been carried out on ethnicity in Africa has been done by 
anthropologists. And it is to their works that the next section now turns. Much of the 
discussion that follows, while making reference to Africa, constitutes a broader 
critique of the pre-modern and static conception of ethnicity that underpins the 
ethnonationalist approach. 
3.2 — Ethnicity in Africa: a colonial invention? 
At the beginning of the 19th Century the term ethnography was restricted to the 
classification of populations according to language. At the close of the Century, it 
achieved a wider meaning to encompass the study of man as a social being.38 
Although the term 'ethnologie' can be traced back to 1839, when the French scholar 
W. Edwards formed the Société d'ethnologie, the French word 'ethnie'' (derived from 
the Greek term 'ethnos'), upon which Anthony Smith builds his theory of 
37 Jackson and Rosberg, 1984, op. cit., p. 179. 
38Ausenda, Giorgio, 'Postcript: Current Issues in the Study of Ethnicity, Ethnic Conflict and 
Humanitarian Intervention, and Questions for Future Research,' in: Turton, David, (ed.), War and 
Ethnicity. Global Connections and Local Violence, University of Rochester Press, San Marino, 1997, 
p. 218. 
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nationalism, only appeared later in 1896.39 The fact that the concept of ethnicity 
appeared at that particular point in time is, as Amselle and M'Bokolo note, in itself 
significant: 
L'apparition et la spécification tardives des termes de "tribu" et "ethnie" 
conduisent d'ores et déjà à poser problème sur lequel nous reviendrons, celui 
de la congruence entre une période historique (colonialisme et néo-
colonialisme) et l'utilisation d'une certaine notion.40 
Before the introduction and popularisation of the concept of ethnicity, the tribe was 
deemed to be 'the basic unit of analysis for anthropology' with 'political unity, 
speech uniformity and geographical continuity' as 'outstanding characteristics.'41 
Tribes were at the end of the last century and the beginning of the 20th century 
defined within em evolutionary conception of human socio-political organisations 
where they stood at one end of a continuum that placed them in opposition to 
'civilizations'. Often used interchangeably with such terms as 'primitive societies', 
they were then to some extent identified with notions of race.42 Following the Second 
World War, racial doctrines fell into disrepute, and, concomitantly, the concept of 
tribe became increasingly challenged both epistemologically and ethically. Although 
the term 'ethnic' - in its modern sense - was introduced in Europe at that time, thus 
replacing the notion of race, the term 'tribe' continued to be used in the African 
context. 
39 Amselle, Jean-Loup et Elikia M'Bokolo (eds), Au cœur de l'ethnie. Ethnie, tribalisme et Etat en 
Afrique, deuxième édition, La Découverte & Syros, Paris, 1999, p. 14. 
40 Ibid 
41 Southall, Aiden, "The Illusion of Tribe,' Journal of Asian and African Studies, Vol. V, No. 1-2, 
January/April 1970, p. 31, quoting: C. Wissler, Man and Culture, New York, 1923. 
42 The relationship between ethnicity and race is important and complex. Both are sometimes used 
indiscriminately and interchangeably (the category Afro-Americans is perhaps the best example of 
such terminological confusion.) According to several authors, ethnicity may still be used today as a 
euphemism for race, bearing in mind that this reflects a perception and not an objectively identifiable 
social group. For a thorough discussion of these issues see: Banks, Marcus, Ethnicity: Anthropological 
Constructions, Routledge, London and New York, 1996, particularly chapters 3 and 4. 
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a) From tribes to ethnic groups 
Reacting against the evolutionary and functionalist theories that then dominated their 
discipline, a group of anthropologists, collectively referred to as the Manchester 
School, proceeded in the 1950s and 60s to investigate the impact of urbanisation on 
the peoples of the Copperbelt in Northern Rhodesia (Zambia).43 Their objective was 
to illustrate how tribal identities could only be understood in relation to their context. 
It had indeed transpired from their investigations, that tribal identities acquired 
particular saliency in urban contexts for it was there that individuals were confronted 
on a daily basis with members of other communities. In the rural areas such 
exacerbation and demonstration of tribal differences were, for all intents and 
purposes, unnecessary, since the frequency of contacts between members of different 
tribal groups tended to be relatively small. Tribal identities appeared to be relative 
and situational, in that an individual's behaviour was determined by how and where 
he would meet a member from another tribe. Some members of the Manchester 
school predicted that tribal distinctions would disappear under the forces of 
modernisation and described this process as detribalization.44 Others, on the other 
hand, upheld that such distinctions would not only be maintained but further 
enhanced in the newly urbanising centres, albeit in a form different from that of the 
original rural context. Mitchell described this as the process of'retribalisation.'45 
43 Gluckman, Max, The Judicial Process Among the Barotse of Northern Rhodesia, Manchester 
University Press, Manchester, 1955; Mitchell, James Clyde, The Kalela Dance, Manchester 
University Press, Manchester, 1956; and Epstein, Arnold L., Politics in an Urban African Community, 
Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1958. 
44 See for example Wilson, G., An Essay on the Economics of Detribalization in Northern Rhodesia, 
Rhodes-Livingstone Institute, Linvingston, 1942. 
45 Mitchell, op. cit., 1956; and Mitchell, James Clyde, 'Theoretical orientations in African urban 
studies,' in Banton, Michael, (edj, The Social Anthropology of Complex Societies, Tavistock, London, 
1966. 
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In order to make sense of the highly complicated social context in which they 
now found themselves, individuals enhanced their ethnie identities and stereotyped 
others. This provided them with a 'cognitive map' which allowed them to determine 
which type of relationship they entertained with members of différent communities. 
These différences were not always pereeived in such stark contrasts as a distinction 
between us and them, but could, at times, also be pereeived in a continuum as 'more 
like us' or 'less like us.'46 The Manchester School's findings disproved previously 
held conceptions of the tribe as a static self-contained and insulated unit. What they 
suggested instead was that tribes were fluid and dynamic entities whose self-
definitions were influenced by their relationships with other ethnie groups. In 
addition to this, the Manchester School highlighted the importance of colonisation on 
indigenous self-definitions, and stressed the need to distinguish the rural tribal 
identifications ftom those tribal (or ethnie, as they would be referred to subsequently) 
identities found in the cities. In so doing, they laid the foundations that would lead to 
a rèconceptualisation of the ethnie category in social anthropology. 
In 1969, Fredri<$c Barth published an edited volume, Ethnie Groups and ) 
Boundaries,47 which built upon and confirmed some of the Manchester School's 
insights. His work is seen as a turning point in anthropological studies of ethnicity as 
it breaks with former conceptions that equate ethnie groups with cultural units. For 
Barth, the sharing of a common culture should be viewed not as a 'primary and 
definitional characteristic' of the ethnie group but as 'an implication or resuit' of its 
organisation. 
46 Thomas Hylland Eriksen has referred to these variations in principles of exclusion and inclusion as 
'digital' or 'analogie', see Eriksen, Thomas Hylland, Ethnicity and Nationalism. Anthropological 
Perspectives, Pluto Press, London and Boulder, Colorado, 1993, pp. 66-67. 
47 Barth, Fredrik, (ed.), Ethnie Groups and Boundaries. The social Organization of cultural 
Différence, Pensumtjeneste, Oslo, 1994, (originally published in 1969). 
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The important thing to recognize is that a drastic réduction of cultural 
différences between ethnie groups does not correlate in any simple way with a 
réduction in the organizational relevance of ethnie identities or a break-down in 
boundary-maintenance processes.48 
It is therefore not the 'cultural stufP which it encloses that defrnes the ethnie group 
but its boundary, and this is determined by the way the group establishes a distinction 
between itself and others. As one of the contributors to Barth's volume asserts, 
the Organization of ethnie identities does not depend on cultural diversity per 
se, as generally assumed in anthropology, but rather on the assignment of 
particular social meaning to a limited set of acts.49 
Thus a group will not distinguish itself from another because it is culturally différent, 
but will emphasise a cultural characteristic, however tenuous, in order to differentiate 
itself from the other. Culture was therefore not the cause, but an effect of ethnie 
differentiation. 
By focussing on the process of boundary-maintenance, one could then explain 
why ethnie groups persisted in spite of the flow of personnel across them and in spite 
of changes in their cultural contents. 
Above all, Barth tried to show that ethnie groups are socially constructed 
(subject to environmental constraints) and that the content of the group - in 
terms of both culture and personnel - has no a priori existence or stability. That 
is to say, it is not so much the group which endures as the idea of the group. 
Moreover, he claimed that the physical and ideological contents of the group 
should not be investigated in isolation - this would give a misleading 
impression and tend to confirm notions of stability and internai, bounded 
coherence. Instead, attention should be focused on the boundaries of the 
group.30 
Barth's aim was, as it had been for the Manchester School, to challenge the 
previously held conception of tribes or ethnie groups as static and self-contained 
social units. Ethnie groups therefore could no longer be viewed as cultural units 
48 Barth, Fredrik, 'Introduction,' in Barth (ed.), 1994, op. cit., pp. 32-33. 
49 Blom, Jan-Petter, 'Ethnic and Cultural Differentiation,' in Barth (ed.), 1994, op. cit., p. 74. 
50 Banks, 1996, op. cit., p. 12. 
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whose distinctiveness depended upon their geographical and social isolation. Instead, 
they were the product of contact, as they formed and persisted through their 
interactions with other ethnic groups. However path-braking, Barth's study was 
nevertheless problematic. While he acknowledged the fluidity and relational 
dimension of ethnic groups, he nevertheless seemed to take the ethnic category as a 
given and immutable fact of social life, a problem which subsequent anthropological 
studies would raise and address. 
While these developments were taking place in British and Norwegian 
anthropology, American scholars were providing a similar critique of the concept of 
tribe. In an article published in 1970, 'The Illusion of Tribe', Aidan Southall attacked 
the use of the concept of tribe as being anachronistic.51 Tribes, he argued, were 
particular socio-political organisations defined by a set of specific characteristics: 
political autonomy, economic self-sufficiency and illiteracy. But when the state 
structure expanded further into the remotest parts of the globe, there were no longer 
any 'areas of the inhabited earth unclaimed by one sovereign state or another.' And, 
as tribes were absorbed under the power of an ever-encroaching state, they lost their 
political autonomy, one of their foremost distinguishing features. Progressively, 
tribes became increasingly involved with the wider market economy and lost their 
economic self-sufficiency. Finally, under the influence of mainly European missions, 
many of the tribe members became not only literate but often adopted new religious 
beliefs. All these factors therefore combined to shed tribes of their main attributes, 
thus rendering them obsolete. 
It is a melancholy paradox of anthropology that effective study of such social 
systems dates only from a period so late that they had already ceased to exist in 
51 Southall, 1970, op. cit., pp. 29-50. 
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this full sense, so that an element of reconstruction has always entered into the 
study of them in these terms.52 
If the concept of tribe was to he used 'in the full sense of this meaning,' according to 
Southall, it could not be applied offhandedly to describe what was in essence a 
différent and more recent mode of social organisation; and this in spite of the fact 
that 'many of its members may retain vivid and even nostalgie memories of its 
former full existence and may continue to be strongly influenced by the values 
belonging to this former state.'53 
Southall thus suggested that the term 'tribe' should be 'applied only to the 
small scale societies of the past which have retained their politicai autonomy, and 
that the new associations derived from them in the contemporary context should be 
referred to as ethnie groups.'54 In doing so, he endorsed the distinction made by the 
Manchester school between 'rural-tribes' and 'urban-ethnic groups'. According to 
Southall, the two terms — tribe and ethnie group - therefore did not reflect the same 
phenomena. Whereas tribes were used, when strictly defined, to describe a type of 
politicai organisation, understood in the evolutionary framework of the day, as less 
developed or less complex than, for instance, chiefìancies or states, the concept of 
the ethnie group was associated with socio-cultural or linguistic characteristics. Thus, 
for example, one could 'find' an ethnic/linguistic group subdivided into tribes each 
reflecting différent politicai units and each having acquired sufficient autonomy from 
each other. The ease with which the concepts of ethnicity and tribalism came to be 
used interchangeably perhaps denotes the assumption made in the age of nationalism, 
that politics and culture ought to be congruent. 
52 Southall, 1970, op. cit., p. 29. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Ibid., p. 48 
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While these debates about the meaning of tribalism were affecting 
anthropology both methodologically and theoretically, a terminological shift had 
been taking place in the populär usage. Throughout the 1960s, references to tribalism 
had become increasingly viewed with suspicion for they seemed to imply an 
attribution of 'backwardness.' The recourse to the concept of tribe in Africa became 
both offensive and untenable given that the concepts of ethnie groups or nationalities 
were more frequently being used in European and other contexts. As scholars sought 
to explain the failures of the American 'Melting Pot' and account for the recent 
'ethnie revival,'55 the 1960s and early 1970s saw a prolifération of studies on 
ethnicity which reflected growing concerns about the limits of integration of migrant 
and minority populations in the Western world. 
Most scholars dealing with ethnicity tended to criticise primordialist positions 
and favour instead instrumentalist approaches, describing ethnie groups as a new 
type of pressure group organised for politicai purposes. But while they viewed 
ethnicity as a new phenomenon arising from the vicissitudes of multi-cultural urban 
life, these scholars seldom challenged the idea that ethnicity was a universally 
applicable category. Since ali peoples were believed to belong to an ethnie group and 
act accordingly, many scholars assumed, like Barth, that ali people could un-
problematically be classified according to ethnicity. Nevertheless, in spite of it being 
both ethically and empirically progressive, the semantic shift from tribe to ethnie 
group did not lead to a fundamental change in perceptions. Ethnie groups continued 
to be understood, as tribes had been, as archaic and self-contained static social units, 
55 See for example, Glazer, Nathan and Moynihan, Daniel P., Beyond the Melting Pot: The Negroes, 
Puerto Ricans, Jerws, Italians and Irish o/New York City, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1963 for 
the Ist edition and 1970 for the revised edition; and Smith, A.D., op. cit., 1981. 
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an assumption which was to be further challenged by a number of anthropologists in 
the 1980s and 1990s. 
b) Ethnie labels as colonial créations 
The studies carried out in the 1960s and 1970s had resulted in a reconceptualisation 
of the ethnie group as a form of social organisation whose définition was relational 
and contextually determined. Yet, few scholars had systematically investigated 
previous suggestions that ethnie groups were a recent phenomenon whose occurrence 
had to be accounted for. And it is this neglected dimension of the ethnie phenomena 
that the studies published in the 1980s and 1990s attempted to address. Rather than 
analysing the synchronie effects of ethnicity in a comparative scheme, scholars 
decided to concentrate on the formation of ethnie consciousness as a diachronic 
process. Their aim was to put back African ethnicities in the general history of the 
continent, or to quote Richard Fardon, to concentrate on the process of 'African 
ethnogenesis.'56 Although a number of scholars had in the past analysed the 
historical formation of ethnie groups in Africa, their work had remained marginal, if 
not marginalised, from the mainstream disciplinary currents. Indeed, many of the 
ethnographical studies cited by Southall and Ardener were clearly historically 
informed, as were those of the Manchester School.57 Since much of the current 
research draws from these scholars' insights, we will first review some of their 
arguments more closely. 
36 Fardon, Richard, "African ethnogenesis': Limits to the Comparability of Ethnic Phenomena,' in: 
Holy, Ladislav (ed.), Comparative Anthropology, Blackwell, Oxford, 1987, pp. 168-88. 
57 Southall, 1970, op. cit.; Ardener, 1989, op. cit. 
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Both Southall and Ardener criticised the tendency among many 
anthropologists and colonial administrators to mistakenly cluster together groups of 
peoples and describe them as constituting homogeneous cultural units. 
The named tribes which appear in the literature frequently represent 
crystallisations at the wrong level, usually a level is too large in scale because 
foreign observers did not initially understand the lower levels of structure or 
failed to correct the misrepresentations of their predecessors, or because some 
arbitrary and even artifîcial entity was chosen for the sake of easy reference, 
despite the réalisation that it was fallacious and misleading.58 
To support this assertion, Southall provided a sériés of examples which illustrated 
how anthropologists and colonial administrators had often identified as tribes, 
peoples who, after closer investigation, should not have been brought together under 
the same ethnonym. The criteria they had selected for classificatory purposes 
indicated a bias towards what were deemed to be common cultural or linguistic 
characteristics. The units thus defined reflected more the observer's preconceptions, 
or academic and administrative taxonomic needs and beliefs, than the group's own 
self-defïnition and/or actual functioning. 
Although Southall argued that tribes or ethnie groups only existed in the minds 
of anthropologists and colonial administrators, he did not imply that African peoples 
had no organisational system, only that they structured their social interactions along 
différent lines, namely those of kinship and locality.59 Prior to colonisation, groups 
were both fluid and complex as they formed and unformed according to différent 
purposes and situations. Individuals could claim différent allegiances depending on 
whether they were considering these for the purposes of marriage, religion, cattle-
rearing or war. As Eriksen has remarked: 
58 Southall, 1970, op. cit., p. 32. 
59 Ibid, p. 35. 
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Categorical labels with no social significance are likely to be unimportant, and 
in pre-colonial times groups were politically organised along lines of kinship 
and personal loyalties and usually did not require categorical labels of greater 
60 scope. 
Like Southall, Ardener also believed tribes or ethnie groups to be the product of an 
arbitrary labelling process which did not reflect the ways the people concerned 
viewed themselves. Not only did the labelling process betray the biases of those who 
effected them, but they also influenced the way others perceived and understood 
politics in Africa. Assuming that established catégories reflected social reality, 
commentators were inclined to describe any outbreak of hostilities as resulting from 
age-old tribal antipathies. 
Ardener illustrated how such misperceptions and misrepresentations had 
hampered any proper understanding of the issues at stake during the Biafra war when 
the Ikwerri 'section' suddenly seceded from the Ibo 'tribe'. The Ibo had been 
identified and depicted as a culturally homogenous collectivity - an ethnie group or a 
nation in current terminology - which included among other groups the Ikwerri. So, 
when the Ikwerri declared themselves 'not Ibo', according to Ardener, this was 
received with a bewilderment comparable to that which may have been triggered if a 
stretch of Southern England had declared itself 'not English'. There was much debate 
at the time in the Nigérian and English press over whether the Ikwerri did in fact 
speak Ibo. The linguistic criterion had indeed been singled out as a factor which 
would account for the recent dissension. But as Ardener pointed out, 'the very 
définition of speaking Ibo (which is a continuum of dialects) made this finally a 
fruitless discussion.'61 
60 Eriksen, 1993, op. cit., pp. 88-9. 
61 Ardener, Edwin, 'Social Anthropology and Population', in: Chapman, Malcom, Edwin Ardener. The 
Voice of Prophecy and Other Essays, Blackwell, Oxford, 1989, p. 111. This article was originally 
published in 1974. Ardener further adds: 'Some of you will know that in the nineteenth century the 
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Ethnicities, Ardener concluded, had to be understood as subjectively defined 
by the peoples themselves and could therefore not be expected to have any 
'imperative relationship with partieular 'objective' criteria.' But why had the Ikwerri 
suddenly declared themselves to be distinct from the Ibo? As Marcus Banks remarks: 
the Ikwerri clearly didn't just succumb to some ground swell of internally 
generated identity crisis and 'realize' that they were not Ibo after ail. The 
Ikwerri section fissioned off in the midst and presumably as a conséquence of 
and reaction to wider nationalist forces in the context of a civil war.'62 
Although Banks suggests here that the war and the surrounding nationalist tendencies 
may have had an impact on the emergence of Ikwerri separatism, neither he nor 
Ardener developed this theme further.63 Instead, Ardener pointed to the fact that 
'one of the causes of the Biafran war lay in disputations over the Nigérian census.' 
By drawing attention to this factor, Ardener was alluding to the importance of the 
labelling process in giving a people an identity. He illustrated how a group could be 
given a name for statistical purposes, hearing in mind that 'enumerations were made 
for the purposes of tribute, tax and military service.'64 Who was to be included in this 
group depended upon the taxonomic criteria which had been 'determined in 
armchairs in Europe'.65 
Ardener had, in an earlier paper, discussed the importance of external 
classification on self-identification.66 He had shown how définitions of colonial 
taxonomic spaces were in fact far from neutral and how they determined the scale of 
what would be considered as a people. The colonial administration needed to classify 
terni 'Ibo' had been acceptable to only a handful of the millions who later gladly bore it, even after the 
Ikweri secession.' 
62 Banks, 1993, op. cit., p. 134. 
63 A lacuna, which as we saw in chapter two's discussion of war, more recent anthropological studies 
have sought to address. 
64 Ardener, Edwin, 'Language, Ethnicity and Population,' in: Chapman, 1989, op. cit., p. 117. This 
paper was first delivered in 1972. 
65 Ibid., p. 66. 
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the population under its control in a 'rational' orderly fashion. Given that the scale of 
these groups tended to vary considerably, the colonial administrations combined 
peoples who may otherwise not have been brought together. Who was to be brought 
under the same ethnonym, would depend upon the taxonomic scale which prevailed 
in the colonial power's other possessions. The arbitrariness of the process was 
illustrateci, by discrepancies among the colonial administrations. Under Germán rule, 
the relatively small Ekoi-speaking area of the West Cameroon-Southern Nigeria 
border had been divided up into three distinct 'ethnie groups'. But when West 
Cameroon 'came under British administrators, some of the latter (e.g. Talbot), being 
more at home on the Nigérian scale, classified the who le 'Bantu' group together, for 
population purposes.'67 While underscoring the role played by the 'administrator-
turned-scholar' in the classification of ethnie groups, Ardener nevertheless 
acknowledged the part played by some of the more powerful African leaders in the 
labelling process. 
In the colonial period, then, the scale of the units in the prevailing ethnie 
taxonomies was far from uniform. The accepted scale was, in a sense, a result 
of the arbitration between foreigners and the politically important groups. The 
Yoruba and Bini kingdoms set the scale for southern Nigeria, but this was itself 
set in some ways by the imperiai scale of the Fulani-conquered north. It should 
not be forgotten that the stili unsuccessful search for Ekoi unity was preceded 
by the Ibo case, the successful outeome of whose progress from label to 
population was not self-evident. It is by continuous series of such contrasts and 
oppositions (to which, I repeat, both foreigners and Africans contributed) that 
many (and in principie ali) populations have defined themselves.68 
But if ethnie catégories had in pre-colonial times no social significance for the 
peoples in Africa, as argued above, when did such identification occur? Why this 
shift in the 'foci of collective loyalty'? For surely the mere labelling of a people, as 
66 A id , pp. 65-71. 
67 IbicL, pp. 67-68. 
68 IbicL, p. 68. 
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described by Ardener, could not provide sufficient reasons for such an identity to be 
endorsed. Although Africans might have previously not thought of themselves in 
ethnie terms and e ven rejected the various ethnie labels that were appended to them, 
they nevertheless did eventually endorse the ethnie criterion. In fact not only did they 
accept the logie of ethnicity but also, in many instances, the catégories delineated by 
anthropologists and colonial administrators did acquire through time a life of their 
own and were endorsed and adopted by the peoples themselves. One of the ways of 
understanding why ethnicity has achieved such prominence, is to analyse how it 
came about 'by focussing on the fact of the invention of 'essentialist catégories' but 
also on the process and agency by which such invention is accomplished.'69 
c) The crystallisation of ethnie identifies 
As we have seen, anthropologists had slowly come to define the ethnie group as a 
colonial création. These insights were to be further pursued by historians. Terence 
Ranger, in his contribution to The Invention of Tradition,70 not only asserted that 
ethnie identities in Africa were colonial inventions but what is more, that such 
inventions of traditions were the product of nineteenth and twentieth Century age of 
European imperialism, mass politics and cultural nationalism. Although, in a 
subséquent article, Ranger made some amendments to his original argument and 
switched from the notion of invention to that of imagination of tradition, he 
nevertheless remained convinced that colonisation had introduced a new form of 
collective self-consciousness in Africa which broke with previous pre-colonial forms 
69 Ranger, Terence, 'The Invention of Tradition Revisited: The Case of Colonial Africa,' in: Ranger, 
Terence and O. Vaughan (eds), Legitimacy and the State in Twentieth Century Africa, Macmillan, 
London, 1993, p. 62. 
70 Ranger, Terence, 'The Invention of Tradition in Colonial Africa,' in: Hobsbawm, Eric and Ranger, 
Terence (eds), The Invention of Tradition, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1983. 
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of identities.71 Ranger described how nineteenth century Europeans had 'invented 
traditions' for themselves upon their arrival in the African continent. Then, they 
attempted to transpose their framework to African societies. But the problem was 
that European 'invented traditions1 were 'marked by their inflexibility'. As illustrated 
earlier, African societies were anything but inflexible, allegiances were characterised 
by their fluidity and determined according to the context. Unsettled by the 'chaos' 
they encountered, Europeans 'decided to organise' the continent. 
Everyone sought to tidy up and make more comprehensible the infinitely 
complex situation which they held to be a result of the 'untraditionaP chaos of 
the nineteenth century. Peoples were to be 'returned' to their tribal identities; 
ethnicity was to be 'restored' as the basis of association and organization.72 
The colonial period was therefore marked by a crystallisation of traditions, which 
froze previously shifting identities and broke with the dynamic nature of pre-colonial 
indigenous structures. But as Ardener had pointed out, such crystallisation could not 
have occurred without African participation. 
The British wrongly believed that Tanganyikans belonged to tribes; 
Tanganyikans created tribes to function within the colonial framework...[T]he 
new political geography...would have been transient had it not co-incided with 
similar trends among Africans. They too had to live amidst bewildering social 
complexity, which they ordered in kinship terms and buttressed with invented 
history. Moreover, Africans wanted effective units of action just as officials 
wanted effective government...Europeans believed Africans belonged to tribes; 
Africans built tribes to belong to.73 
Tribes or ethnic groups had thus become the prevailing form of socio-political 
identification because of colonial imposition. Yet how were such groups defined? 
Upon what basis did these identities crystallise? 
71 Ranger, 1993, op. cit. 
72 Ranger, 1983, op. cit., p. 249. 
73 Iliffe, John, A Modern History of Tanganyika, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1979, p. 
324, quoted in Ranger, 1983, op. cit., p. 252. 
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The case of the Luyia in Kenya is particularly instructive, as it provides a clear 
illustration of how such ethnie identities might emerge. 
It may be said that the Luyia people came into existence between 
approximately 1935 and 1945. Before that time no such group existed in its 
own or anyone else's estimation. It was clearly due to the reaction of the 
younger and more educated men to the exigencies of the colonial situation. It 
arose out of previous attempts at intertribal or supratribal Organization and 
unity such as the North Kavirondo Central Association and Bantu Kavirondo 
Taxpayer's Association and led to further important organizations such as the 
Abaluyia Union, which came to represent the Luyia away from home, 
especially in the big towns such as Nairobi in Kenya and Kampala in Uganda. 
This new supertribe was closely linked to the colonial administrative and 
territorial framework of the North Kavirondo District (subsequently renamed 
North Nyanza District).74 
What transpires from this case is the extent to which the colonial state played a 
déterminant role in the formation of Luyia identity. The geographical unit delimited 
for administrative purposes provided the people within its territory both with a 
bounded new identity, and with a framework and legitímate Channel for an effective 
expression of their politicai grievances within the colonial state. 
As more and more empirical evidence from individual case studies was 
gathered, it became clearer that ethnie groups were a relatively recent occurrence, 
and that many, as the Luyia, had crystallised on the basis of a colonial administrative 
unit.75 Indeed, as argued by Amselle, the main 'contribution' of colonisation was the 
freezing of the previous process of 'ethnogenesis' described by Fardon and others.76 
To return to the metaphor used at the end of the previous chapter, ethnicity, like the 
74 Southall, 1970, op. cit., p. 34, quoting the works of Wagner, Gunter, The Bantu of North Kavirondo, 
Vol. 1, Oxford University Press, London, 1949; and Ogot, Bethwell A., History of the Southern Luo, 
Vol. l,EastAfrican Publishing House, Nairobi, 1967. 
75 Fardon, 1987, op. cit., p. 182; and Fardon, Richard, Raiders and Refugees, Trends in Chamba 
Politicai Development. 1750 to 1950, Smithsonian Institution Press, Washington and London, 1988. 
76 Amselle, Jean-Loup, 'Ethnies et espaces: pour une anthropologie topologique,' in Amselle et 
M'Bokolo (eds), 1999, loc.cit., p. 38; see also in the same volume, Dozon, Jean-Pierre, 'Les Bété: une 
création coloniale,' pp. 49-86. 
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nation, was a new compound composed perhaps of previous identifies but 
nevertheless radically différent from them. The catalyst in this proeess was the 
modem colonial state structure, for whom the census, the map and the muséum were, 
as Anderson described, its main grammatical components. Given the discrepancies in 
ethnie awareness, geographical circumscription could not have been the only factor 
responsible for the crystallisation of ethnicity. 
Seeking to further document the modem historical formation of Africa's 
ethnie identifies, Leroy Vail's edited volume begins by presenting some of the 
prédominant interprétations of ethnicity in Africa, assessing their relevance and 
short-comings.77 These approaches, he contends, although ail partially valid, remain 
somewhat ahistorical. Despite the fact that Vail fails to include or even acknowledge 
many of the studies reviewed above, his contribution to the discussion is nevertheless 
important insofar as he attempts to provide a framework for analysis. The model he 
proposes, which is based on the fïndings of the various contributions to this volume, 
seeks to place 'the study of ethnicity within the unfolding history of a set of societies 
which are genuinely comparable.'78 Three variables agents or conditions - are 
identified as having contributed to 'the création and implanting of the ethnie 
message.' First, are the intellectuals, 'a group of culture brokers'. They include 
European missionaries, European anthropologists or historians and local 
intellectuals. Second, are the African intermediaries, called upon by the colonial 
administrations for the implementation of 'indirect raie' stratégies. Finally, is the 
social dislocation brought about by increased urbanisation, which created a need 
77 Vail, Leroy, 'Introduction,' in: Vail, Leroy (éd.), The Invention of Tribalism in Southern Africa, 
James Currey, London, 1989. 
78 Vail, 1989, op. cit., p. 7. 
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among ordinary people for cohesiveness and the unifying ideology of 'so-called 
traditional valúes.' 
As already intimated in our earlier discussion of the emergence of 
nationalism in Africa, missionaries played a crucial role in the education of many 
leading African nationalist elites. Insofar as missionaries were among the first to 
systematically record indigenous vernaculars and 'tribal' histories, they were also 
responsible for introducing tribal/ethnic consciousness among the peoples they 
evangelised. 
The existence of a vernacular literature - a potentially divisive factor, 
considering Africa's linguistic mosaic - is the result of painstaking missionary 
scholarship and sponsorship.79 
As illustrated by P. Harries' study of the emergence of ethnicity among the Tsonga-
speakers of South Africa, the missionaries' attempts at tribal labelling were 
influenced by practical and ideological concerns - such as the need to codify different 
dialects into a single written language which would facilitate their work as well as 
by competition between different missions.80 
European missionaries, assuming that Africans properly belonged to 'tribes', 
incorporated into the curricula of their mission schools the lesson that pupils 
had clear ethnic identities, backing up this lesson with studies of language and 
'tribal custom' in the vernacular. (...) Thus, mission education socialized the 
young into accepting a tribal membership, and to be a member of a 'tribe' 
became 'modern and fashionable through its cióse association with education.81 
By singling out those elements and symbols which would go into the defínitions of 
these identities, the missionaries thereby crystallised and provided the bases for the 
79 Coleman had already alluded to the role of missionaries: Coleman, "The Problem of Political 
Integration in emergent Africa,' first published in 1955 in the Western Political Quarterly, reprinted in 
R. Sklar (ed.), Nationalism and Development in Africa. Selected Essays, University of California 
Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1994, p. 77. See also, Weimers, William E., 'African languages and 
Christian missions,'' Civilisations, Vol. 3, No. 4, 1953, pp 545-561. 
80 Harries, P., 'Exclusion, Classification and Internal Colonialism; The Emergence of Ethnicity 
Among the Tsonga-Speakers of South Africa,' in Vail, 1989, op. cit., p. 86. 
81 Vail, 1989, op. cit., p. 12. 
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'imagined cultural identities' which mission-educated Africans would then utilise for 
their own purposes. The missionaries' role in the formation of ethnie identities is 
highlighted by the fact that: 
In those societies where missionaries did not work, or where they did work but 
did not introduce éducation along western lines, or where African intellectuals 
emerged only at a late period or not at ali, the development of ethnie idéologies 
was either stalled or never occurred. The unevenness of éducation in Southern 
Africa largely determined the unevenness of development of ethnie 
consciousness (...). In many locales it is only today, after the post-
independence expansion of éducation and the emergence of locai intellectuals, 
that the process of creating such idéologies and 'forging traditions' has 
emulated what happened earlier in other societies.82 
It may well be that one of the reasons why nation-building was doomed to failure lies 
in the simultaneous formation of competing identities within the same territory. And, 
it could thus be argued that the state needs not only to control the monopoly of 
coercive violence, but also the monopoly of éducation (language and history) if it is 
to achieve domestic sovereignty. But while evidently necessary, foreign and locai 
intellectuals' promotion of cultural identities were not a sufficient factor for the 
emergence and appeal of ethnicity. 
A second element contributing to the enhancement of tribal/ethnic identities 
was provided by the colonial administration's adoption and implementation of 
indirect rule policies. If 'language in the form of written discourse' as provided 
through schooling 'was central in specifying the forms of culture, indirect rule 
provided the institutional framework for articulating these forms.'83 Europeans 
resorted to divide and rule tactics because they reduced their administrative costs (so-
called 'traditional' leaders were less expensive than European administrators), and 
because it prevented the formation of unified concerted attempts to overturn their 
82 Vail, 1989, op. cit., p. 12. 
83 Ibid., p. 13. 
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colonial rule. Indeed, as was indicated earlier, administrative imperatives led to the 
grouping the peoples ruled into tribal or ethnic categories which corresponded little 
to indigenous experience and which reflected Western conceptions and expediency. 
Nevertheless: 
As time passed and circumstances changed, the label came to designate a level 
of social interaction which can also function as a group in conflict situations. 
Africans found it convenient, if not advantageous, to belong to a recognized 
'tribe' when dealing with the colonial state. The 'invention of tribes' in the 
colonial setting, therefore, is not simply an administrative expedient employed 
by alien rulers, but also a native response to a drastically altered socio-
economic and political environment.84 
One such drastic transformation was urbanisation. Indeed, and in accordance with the 
Manchester School's findings, most scholars now consider 'the colonial urban setting 
to be the cradle of contemporary ethnicity.'85 This language of ethnicity subsequently 
spread to the rural areas. Vail describes for instance, how tribal ideology, employing 
the 'old language of kinship', provided migrant urban workers with some form of 
guarantee that both their lands and women would be 'safely kept' during their 
absence by the local "chiefs'.86 
As we can see from this discussion, the factors singled-out by Vail as 
conducive to the crystallisation of ethnic identities - missionaries, education, 
colonial administration and urbanisation - are similar to those identified earlier with 
regards to the emergence of nationalism in Africa. This should perhaps come as no 
surprise since the anthropological studies reviewed in this section all agree that the 
crystallisation of ethnic identities in Africa is a product of colonisation: 
Empirical evidence shows clearly that ethnic consciousness is very much a new 
phenomenon, an ideological construct usually of the twentieth century, and not 
an anachronistic cultural artefact from the past. As an offspring of the changes 
84 Fukui and Markakis, 1994, op. cit., p. 7. 
85 Ibid. 
86 Vail, 1989, op. cit., p. 15. 
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associateci with so-called 'modernization', therefore, it is unlikely to be 
destroyed by the continuation of these same processes.87 
Indeed, prior to colonisation, identities in Africa appear to have been more fluid. The 
colonial administration's need to 'map' the populations under its control led it to 
establish catégories whose contours were in many cases substantially différent from 
those that previously prevailed. As Amselle summarises, this process took one of 
three forms: 1) the transformation of pre-colonial politicai units or "toponymes" into 
ethnies; 2) the semantic transposition to new contexts of "ethnonyms" used before 
colonisation; or 3) the création ex nihìlo of ethnies.88 Whereas some of the ethnie 
groups established bore some resemblance to previously existing identities, others 
were therefore created out of nothing. A statement which is congruent with 
Gellner's claim that the cultures nationalism 'claims to revive are often its own 
inventions, or are modified out of ali récognition.'89 
d) The emotional appeal of constructed ethnie identities 
To say that ethnie groups and nations are modem occurrences is not to deny their 
importance or appeal. It is evident that some groups in Africa have achieved an 
ethnie or national self-consciousness and that this consciousness dictâtes their 
politicai demands. Indeed, contrary to what Connor and Smith suggest, the fact that 
identities, national or ethnie, are modem constructs does not undermine the 
emotional appeal they may generate. Nowhere has this been more tragically 
illustrated than in the case of the Hutu and Tutsi conflict in Central Africa. 
Often portrayed as a paradigmatic case of ethnically driven conflict, specialists 
have argued that it is inaccurate to view the Hutu-Tutsi conflict as the result of age-
87 Vail, 1989, op. cit., p. 3. 
88 Amselle, op. cit., p. 39. 
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old hatreds.90 Far from being clearly differentiated, Hutus and Tutsis share similar 
cultural attributes, speak the same language and have a common politicai history. 
The history of the Hutu-Tutsi polarisation is instructive and is traced to colonial 
practice. The colonial powers, Germany and then Belgium, imbued with racial 
attributes what were three land-owning statuses, Tutsi, Hutu and Twa. This 
classificatory scheme was first established by 'Mgr Leon Classe, the first Roman 
Catholic bishop of Rwanda and the individuai most responsible for shaping colonial 
policies there,'91 illustrating once more the role played by missionaries in the 
delineation of ethnie identities. The classification was then formalised and enforced 
through administrative policies. 
In the 1930s, the Belgians conducted a census and issued an identity card for 
each individuai, which specifìed whether they were Tutsi, Hutu or Twa. Such 
was the slender basis for the racial typology that the census-takers were obliged 
to use ownership of cows as a criterion; those with ten or more were Tutsi, 
those with less were Hutu in perpetuity.(...) The cards stili exist today - they are 
the means whereby road-block militiamen know whom to kill and whom to 
92 spare. 
Yet again, the mere labelling process could not have been a sufficient cause for 
future hostility. Racial distinctions are invoked not for the mere purpose of 
classification but also for that of hiérarchisation. It was assumed during colonisation 
that the Tutsis were a superior race to the Hutus. This in turn informed economic and 
educational policies as well as the privileging of the Tutsis as the politically 
dominant group. 
89 Gellner, 1983, op. cit., p. 56. 
90 Prunier, Gérard, The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide, C.Hurst and Co., London, 1995; 
Lemarchand, René, Burundi: Ethnie Corrflict and Genocide, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
1996. 
91 de Waal, Alex, 'The genocidal state,' Times Literary Supplement, July 1 1994, p. 3. 
92 Ibid. 
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On the basis of a eow or two hinged the status of overlord or serf, and with it 
access to éducation and every other privilege bestowed by the administration.93 
Racial distinction provided the basis for unequal treatment. And, following Berlin's 
account of the emergence of nationalism, injustice would bread a sense of 
humiliation, frustration and resentment. The resuit was the 1959 Revolution, which 
brought the Hutu majority to power and led to the massive Tutsi exile. In Burundi, 
the Tutsi repression of 1972 contributed to forge 'a sense of shared fate among 
organizationally distinct Hutu of the north center and those of the south-Imbo, a 
process that one observer describes as "enforced ethnicity".'94 
The spiralling violence, which had come to characterise these two groups' 
relationship from the 1950s onwards and which culminated in the 1993 Rwandan 
genocide, led to their further crystallisation in ethnie terms. 
Politicai conflict, punctuated by intercommunal violence, has created distinct 
and mutually opposed Hutu and Tutsi identifies, which for ali the hésitations of 
social scientists, are identifiably "ethnie".95 
The cases of the Hutu and Tutsis tragically indicate that constructed identifies can 
have a very powerful emotional appeal. They also illustrate how conflict and war, as 
was intimated in the previous chapter's discussion of war and nation-formation, can 
be a powerfiil catalyst in the process of identity formation. Indeed, as Turton has 
noted, and this not only in the case of Africa, 'it offen appears that it is the atrocities 
themselves which have created, or at least raised the saliency of, the différences 
described.'96 
93 Ibid. 
94 Chazan, Naomi, Mortimer, Robert, Ravenhill, John, and Rothchild, Donald, Politics and Society in 
Contemporary Africa, Second Edition, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, Colorado, 1992, p. 107. 
95 de Waal, 1994, op. cit., p. 3. 
96 Turton, David, 'Introduction,' in: Turton, David (ed.), War and Ethnicity. Global Connections and 
Local Violence. University of Rochester Press, San Marino, 1997, p. 3. 
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A great part of this chapter has been devoted to the anthropological literature 
on ethnicity. This endeavour stemmed from a need to address what was seen as 
perhaps one of the main shortcomings in the study of nationalism: the lack of 
interdisciplinary communication. It may well be that one of the reasons why our 
understanding of ethnicity and nationalism appears to have reached a stalemate, or 
failed to progress significantly, resides in the fact that most of the scholars working 
on this topic have tended to ignore research conducted in other disciplines. 
Anthropologists are in no way immune from this critique. But since they have 
devoted much attention to the problem of ethnicity, it seemed that any attempi to 
analyse the question of nationalism and ethnicity in Africa, had to take their views 
into considération. 
Our examination of the anthropological literature on ethnicity in Africa has 
allowed us to draw some broader implications for the study of nationalism. The fact 
that ethnie identities are modem products whose emergence is related to the same 
factors that have led to the formation of nations, forces us to reconsider the 
distinction established in the literature between ethnicity and nationalism. Indeed, if 
ethnicity is the resuit of the politics of the modem state structure and ethnie identities 
are constructed by the state's administration, then it may be difficult to argue that 
they are différent phenomenon, if only in their origins. Both, to borrow Anderson's 
term, canbe considered as 'imagined communities' whose définitions are determined 
by the nature and the needs of the modem state. 
Insofar as ethnicity, like nationalism, is a modem phenomenon, it would appear 
to be difficult to postulate the existence of ethnicity as a prerequisite for the nation 
and hence for the nation-state. For if ethnicity's origins and logie are intrinsically 
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linked to the state itself, it cannot be expected to provide an a priori external basis 
from which to build a state. As Bayart remarked: 
Si l'ethnicité ne peut offrir le repère fixe et originel auxquels renverraient les 
champs politiques postcoloniaux, c'est qu'elle est elle-même constamment en 
train de se faire et qu'elle se fond largement dans le phénomène étatique dont 
elle est censé donner la clef explicative.97 
Moreover, given that ethnie groups in Africa arose during the colonial period under 
the impulse of and in relation to the state introduced in that period, ethnicity might 
need to be considered as an ideological consciousness defïned by its relationship to a 
particular state, that is the nation-state. As Richard Fardon has argued, it would 
appear that: 
ethnicity is something the ethnically self-conscious are aware of having, and 
that this self-consciousness only becomes apparent in a modem political 
context that includes the nation state as an international norm.98 
As the recent anthropological literature shows, a proper understanding of ethnicity 
must take info considération the nature of the state against which it is defïned.99 
Indeed, ethnie catégories are not merely the resuit of outsiders' impositions but are 
the negotiated outeome between the peoples concerned and the administrative 
authorities. As ethnie identifies continue to emerge and crystallise, this point is 
important to bear in mind. 
Conclusion 
Our analysis of nationalism and ethnicity in Africa has revealed that both are the 
resuit of the transformations brought about by colonialism and are therefore 
97 Bayart, Jean-Fran?ois, L'Etaten Afrique, Fayard, Paris, 1989, p. 75. 
98 Fardon, 1988, op. cit., p. 17. 
99 See for instance the contributions to Amselle and M'Bokolo, op. cit., 1985; Ferguson and 
Whitehead, op. cit., 1992; Fukui and Markakis, op. cit., 1994. The latter attribute the introduction of 
the study of the state in the anthropological literature on ethnicity to James, Wendy and Donham, 
Donald, The Southern Marches of Imperial Ethiopia, Cambridge university Press, Cambridge, 1986. 
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relatively modem. If ethnie groups in Africa are not more 'traditionaP or 'authentic' 
than the nation-states inherited from colonialism, then, the assumption that underlies 
proposais towards ethno-national adjustment of Africa's boundaries, i.e., that they 
would more appropriately reflect traditional or indigenous identities, appears to be 
unfounded or at any rate logically unsustainable. Again, this is not to deny the 
validity or potency of ethnie claims. After ali, the fact that people themselves believe 
and uphold such identities and act accordingly is what matters. What we are in fact 
arguing is that it may be careless to offhandedly dismiss claims made by peoples 
who might not be able to prove their ethnie antecedents in an obvious way. Indeed, 
although this might not be their intent, proponents of the ethno-nationalist thesis 
seem to cast aside as unfounded claims made by groups not considered to be 'true' 
nations. 
Without denying the importance of specifically indigenous patterns of 
development, the extent to which the changes that occurred in Africa from 1800 
onwards were a conséquence of Western incursions is noteworthy. 
The crucial point here is not that nationalism appears at a certain point in time 
after the "Western impact," but rather that the transformation the latter brought 
about has been an indispensable precondition for the rise of nationalism.100 
Following Rupert Emerson, one would thus be tempted to conclude that 'Africa, is 
the continent par excellence to sustain the thesis that colonial governments, given 
appropriate circumstances, may be the major instruments in shaping nations.'101 This 
is not to suggest that Africa is exceptional in this respect but that perhaps it illustrâtes 
more markedly than other cases the international dimensions of the national and 
ethnie phenomena. Indeed, it may well be that the processes described in this 
100 Coleman, 1994, op. cit., p. 20. 
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chapter, while more salient in the African context, could also be uncovered 
elsewhere. 
The following ehapters will assess the extent to which the factors identified 
as having eontributed to the rise of nationalism in Africa might explain its emergenee 
in Eritrea and Somaliland. As was indieated in the introduction to this chapter, these 
factors correspond and build upon those singled out by the modernist approaches to 
nationalism reviewed in chapter two. Combining these factors with those identified 
in our discussion of the emergenee of nationalism in Africa, particular attention will 
be given to the following when discussing the cases of Eritrea and Somaliland. 
1) economic factors, indieated by industrialisation, urbanisation and the 
development of networks of communication; 
2) sociological factors, such as the level of éducation as indieated by the number of 
state-run or mission-schools, literacy and more specifïcally the rise of an 
educated elite; 
3) political factors, that is the existence of a modem state administration with a 
geographically demarcated territory and its attempts to instil a sense of 
nationhood; 
4) ideological factors such as the prevalence/Western ideas of democracy and 
national self-determination; 
5) psychological factors such as discrimination and exclusion, and more importantly 
the impact of war on identity formation. 
Finally, and more importantly, notwithstanding the above discussion about the 
modernity of ethnie identities, we will investigate the extent to which Eritrea and 
Somaliland's claims to national self-determination were ethnically motivated. 
101 Emerson, Rupert, 'Nationalism and Political Development,' The Journal of Politics, Vol. 22, No. 
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Indeed, the ethnonationalist empirical contention is that ethnicity is the main cause 
behind today's nationalist claims and hence behind secession. The fact that states 
have regularly been challenged by ethno-regional movements seeking greater 
autonomy or even independence is invoked in support of proposals to redraw 
Africa's boundaries.102 But have demands for territorial revision really been made in 
the name of ethnicity? 
1, February 1960, p. 14. 
102 Amadife and Warhola, 1993, op. cit., p. 535, and Jackson and Rösberg, 1984, op. cit., p. 196. 
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Chapter 4 - The Formation of Eritrean Identity 
In May 1993, after thirty years of war against Ethiopia, Eritrea's formal recognition 
as Africa's fifty-third state1 was sanctioned in a referendum supervised by the United 
Nations. Eritrea's prolonged challenge to the ancient Ethiopian Empire, the only state 
in Africa not to have been colonised by a Western power,2 was perceived by other 
African states as a classical example of the nationalist threat against which they had 
sought to protect themselves.3 Eritrea's claims were thus opposed from the outset 
since it was feared that its success might encourage nationalist uprisings within 
Ethiopia as well as elsewhere on the African continent. How then, in spite of it facing 
one of Africa's most powerful armies and international society's tacit stance against 
secession, did Eritrea succeed in its bid for independence? 4 
An immediate answer to this could be, because Eritrea won the war against 
Ethiopia. The Eritrean Peoples Liberation Front (EPLF) sealed its military victory 
over the Ethiopian army when it entered and liberated the capital city of Asmara on 
26 May 1991. More broadly, it could also be argued that the changing international 
context brought about by the end of the Cold War provided a propitious context for 
Eritrea's independence. The impact of the Soviet Union's disintegration was directly 
felt when Ethiopia's Mengistu regime, deprived of Soviet military and financial 
1 Using UN membership as a criterion. 
2 Except for the period between 193,6 and 1941 when Ethiopia was under direct Italian rule. 
3 As will be discussed below, the OAU charter was adopted only a year after Ethiopia's incorporation 
of Eritrea. 
4 Eritreans themselves have refused to qualify their struggle as secessionist, defining it instead as a 
case of arrested decolonisation. Nevertheless, we will define Eritrea's struggle as secessionist. First, 
because as we stated in the introduction, our definition of secession does not assume what motivates 
it. Indeed, many other secessionist movements in Africa can, and sometimes do, similarly define their 
struggle as one of incomplete decolonisation. And second, because it has been considered as such both 
by the international community and in the theoretical literature. See for example, Clapham, 
Christopher, Africa and the International System, The Politics of State Survival, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 1996, p. 115; and, Rothchild, Donald, 'Secessionist Movements,' in: Krieger, Joel 
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support, collapsed under the combined assaults of the EPLF and Tigrayan People 
Liberation Front (TPLF). Furthermore, the early 1990s augured well for future 
nationalist movements as the création of fifìeen new states appeared to signal greater 
international leniency towards secession. 
But why did Eritrea fighi so tenaciously for its independence? For if the 
factors mentioned above account for how and when Eritrea eventually seceded from 
Ethiopia, they do not explain why Eritrea was so determined in its quest for self-
determination. Throughout the war, the legitimacy of Eritrea's claim to independence 
hinged on whether or not it constituted a nation. Ethiopia maintained that, prior to 
Italian colonisation, Eritrea formed an integral part of the Abyssinian Empire and 
thus could not historically defend its claim to nationhood. This position was 
encapsulated by the notion of a Greater Ethiopia, endorsed by several Western 
politicians and commentators.5 Eritreans, on the other hand, declared that 
colonisation had created them as a distinct nation and that they were therefore 
justified in their demands for self-determination. The arguments invoked by each 
side mirrored academic debates on the définition and origin of nations and for this 
reason Eritrea represents a paradigmatic case for students of nationalism. Is Eritrea a 
'true nation'6 rooted, as primordialists would contend, in an ethnie substratum that 
provides it with cultural cohésion and authenticity? Or is Eritrea, as modernists 
would purport, a recent création shaped by industrialisation, capitalism and state 
formation? 
(ed.), The Oxford Companion to Politics in the World, Oxford University Press, New York and 
Oxford, 1993, pp. 818-19. 
5 The best example of this is Levine, Donald N., Greater Ethiopia: The Evolution of a Multi-Ethnic 
Society, Chicago University Press, Chicago, 1974. 
6 This expression is used by Walker Connor to refer to ethnic nationalism. See: 'Nation-Building or 
Nation-Destroying?' World Politics, Vol. 24, April 1972. Reprinted in: Ethnonationalism. The Quest 
for Understanding. Princeton University Press, 1994, p. 42. 
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These are the questions addressed in this chapter. After demonstrating in the 
first section, why Eritrea does not qualify as a case of ethnie nationalism, the chapter 
proceeds to show, against the backdrop of some of the modernist theories of 
nationalism, how Eritrean nationhood was forged by a succession of events of which 
its création as a colonial state was the constitutive moment and war its subsequent 
catalyst. In the final section, we will prò vide a brief account of Eritrea's history since 
independence indicating how the nation-building process has been carried out in this 
period. But before we proceed it is necessary to indicate that any attempi to recount 
Eritrea's history is steeped in controversy. Although the polemical nature of the 
literature on Eritrea creates some methodological problems, it is also quite revealing 
of the way historical events are selectively retained and forgotten for the purposes of 
nationalist mythology. 
4.1 —Eritrea: a case of ethnie separatism? 
Eritrea has often been cited as a case of ethnie nationalism.7 A.D. Smith for instance, 
considers Eritrea, alongside the Basques in Spain and the Moro in the Philippines, as 
examples of 'ethnie schism' which have 'spilled over into movements for outright 
séparation.'8 Ted Gurr similarly classified Eritrea as a case of ethnonationalism. Yet, 
contrary to what these authors suggest, Eritrea's claim to self-determination and 
hence its national identity cannot simply be reduced to ethnicity. First, it is important 
to note that Eritrea does not constitute an ethnically homogeneous community. It 
7 See for example: Smith, Anthony D., 'Ethnie and Nation in the Modem World', Millennium, Voi. 
14, No. 2, Summer 1985, pp. 127-142; Horowitz, 1985, op. cit.; Gamst, Fredrick, 'Conflict in the 
Horn of Africa5, in: LeCron Foster, Mary and Rubinstein, Robert (eds), Peace and War: cross-
cultural perspectives, Transaction Books, New Brunswick, NJ, 1986; Khatami, Siamak 'Ethnie 
Nationalism and Politicai Conflict: A Comparative Study of the Basque Country and Eritrea,' 
Scandinavian Journal of Development Alternatives, Vol. 9, No. 4, December 1990, pp. 49-61; Gurr, 
Ted, Minorities at Risk: Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflicts, US Institute of Peace, Washington, 
D.C., 1993; and Connor, 1993, op. cit., p. 17. 
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includes at least nine recognised ethnie groups, which following the Soviet 
terminology adopted in the 1960s and 1970s, are referred to as nationalities.9 
Although it is common practice to describe these ethnie groups as easily identifiable 
linguistic communities, the reality on the ground is somewhat more complex. For the 
time being, suffiee it to say that the argument that holds that Eritrea constitutes a 
homogeneous and ethnically distinct community is not borne out by the facts. But 
before we proceed with a description of Eritrea's ethnie composition, it is necessary 
to address two other variants of the ethnie interprétation. 
a) A critique of the ethnie interprétations of Eritrean nationalism 
According to A.D. Smith, the fact that Eritrea constitutes a multi-ethnic society does 
not in itself disprove the ethnie roots of nationalism explanation; ail that is needed is 
the presence of one core ethnie group, which provides the basis for nationhood and 
rallies the remaining groups to its cause.10 The argument, in the case of Eritrea, is 
that the nationalist movement was defined and instigated by one—of Eritrea's 
dominant ethnie group, namely the Tigrinya.11 Although the Tigrinya are 
numerically prépondérant12 there are two problems with Smith's argument. First, as 
will be discussed more fully in the third and fourth sections of this chapter, the 
Tigrinya were not the first, or at any rate not the only group in Eritrea to cali for 
independence. Second, the Tigrinya are generally described as ethnically linked to 
8 Smith, 1985, op. cit., p. 128. 
9 These are: the Afar, the Bilen, the Hadareb, the Kunama, the Nara, the Rashaida, the Saho, the Tigre 
and the Tigrinya. Provisionai Government of Eritrea, Brief Notes on Eritrea, Published by the PGE 
Mission to the United Kingdom, October 1992. 
10 This argument was put forward to the author by Professor Smith during a seminar. 
11 As will be explained, there is disagreement as to how one should refer to this group. This is the 
terminology now used by the current Government of Eritrea. 
12 The Tigrinya are believed to represent 50% of Eritrea's population. Central Intelligence Agency, 
The World Fact Book 1998, http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook 
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the Tigrayans13 of Ethiopia. They speak the same language (Tigrinya, which like 
Amharie dérivés from the aiicient Ge'ez), practice the same religion (Orthodox 
Christians), and share other cultural traits. In fact, until recently, the Tigrinya were 
referred to as Eritrea's Tigrayans, a désignation which is stili used by several 
scholars and commentators. 
If Eritrea's quest for independence had indeed been ethnically motivated, 
why then did the Tigrinya not opt for a solution that would have reunited them to 
their fellow 'Tigrayans' stranded across the border in Ethiopia? After ali, the 
blueprint for such an option had been previously laid out. First, during the fascisi 
occupation from 1936 to 1941, when under the Italian East African Empire the 
Tigrinya-speaking people were grouped under a single province, which roughly 
encompasses today's Eritrea and Tigray.14 And then, although never implemented, 
under British administration when a plan for a Greater Tigray was advocated. Yet, 
except for the demands made by some Tigrinya separatists in 1947,15 Eritrean 
nationalists made no irredentist claims over Ethiopia's northern province of Tigray 
whose boundaries are contiguous with those of Eritrea. It is moreover paradoxical, as 
Christopher Clapham has noted, that the main challenges to Ethiopia's unity should 
have come from those régions whose history is more closely bound to that of the 
Ethiopian state than those of the southern or western régions. 
This must in itself cast doubt on explanations of regional conflict which ascribe 
it simply to ethnie opposition to an Amhara internai colonialism; but it equally 
makes it necessary to look at the pattern of politicai incorporation of northern 
13 We used here the designation Tigrayans, rather than Tigreans, so as not to create any confiision with 
a third homonym, the Tigre of Eritrea. 
14 Negash, Tekeste, No Medecine for the Bite of a White Snake: Notes ort Nationalistn and Resistance 
in Eritrea, 1890-1941, Uppsala University Press, Uppsala, 1986, p. 59. The logic behind this 'ethnic' 
partition is explained by one of Italy's former governors to Ethiopia: Zoli, Corrado, "The Organization 
of Italy's East African Empire,' Foreign Affairs, No. XVI, 1937, p. 84. 
15 Trevaskis, G.N.K., Eritrea: A Colony in Transition, 1941-52, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
1960, p. 76. 
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Ethiopia itself, and at the reasons for the evident failures of incorporation in, 
especially Eritrea and Tigray.16 
Tigrinyan sense of ethnie identity, if it ever existed, would therefore seem to have 
been overridden by an Eritrean sense of national commonality. Not only have 
Tigrinya-speaking Eritreans made no attempi to integrate the Tigrinya-speaking 
Ethiopians, but in addition, they have sought to further distance themselves from the 
latter by adopting the slightly différent name of Tigrinya instead of Tigrayan.17 This 
process of séparation was taken a step further when, in September 1994, Eritrea's 
Orthodox Church, to which most Eritrean Tigrayans belong, ceased to be a diocese 
of Ethiopia's Orthodox Church and established closer links with the Coptic Church 
in Egypt. A final indication that Eritrea's secession cannot simply be attributed to 
Tigrayan ethnicity is to be found in the current politicai situation. It must indeed be 
noted that the heads of state of Eritrea and Ethiopia, Isaias Afeiworki and Meies 
Zenawi, are both of Tigrayan origin, both of whom oversaw Eritrea's séparation 
from Ethiopia and both of whom have been, since May 1998, at war with each 
other.18 
The second variant of the ethnie interprétation of Eritrea's nationalism holds 
that Eritrean identity can be traced back into pre-colonial history.19 This line of 
argument has been delivered by some Eritrean nationalists as a counter-response to 
those who have attempted to legitimise Ethiopia's claim over Eritrea by referring to 
16 Clapham, Christopher, Transformation and Continuity in Revolutionäry Ethiopia, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1988, p. 205. 
17 The adoption of the désignation Tigrinya also avoids the possibility of further confusion with 
Eritrea's Tigre. 
18 The Eritreans have accused the regional administration of Tigray in Mekkele of being responsible 
for the outbreak of hostilities between Ethiopia and Eritrea. According to the Eritrean Government, 
Tigray's regional administration issued a map in which the boundaries between the two countries had 
been modified without prior notification. The gap between the two 'Tigrayan' communities has 
further widened since the outbreak of the 1998 border war. 
19 Davidson, Basil, 'Eritrea: A Historical Note,' in: Bereket Habte Selassie et al., Behind the War in 
Eritrea, Spokesman, London, 1980; Bereket Habte Selassie, Conflict and Intervention in the Horn of 
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the two countries' common history prior to the arrivai of the European powers in the 
9 
Horn of Africa. The relative paucity of historical accounts prior to colonisation 
allows each side to interpret and manipulate the available facts to support their 
respective arguments. 
Nevertheless, it is possible to say that, before Italian colonisation, the territory 
which now constitutes Eritrea was never under one continuous single authority. 
While Eritrea's coastal position made it vulnerable to the various external influences 
that followed one another throughout the centuries (Greeks, Ottomans, Egyptians and 
Europeans), this would have had little impact on the formation of Eritrean identity.20 
Not only were these influences limited to a narrow portion of what is now Eritrea's 
territory, but also throughout this period, the history of Eritrea's highlands continued 
to be bound to that of Ethiopia's Tigray. To summarise, as Fred Halliday and Maxine 
Molyneux note: 
no distinct and united area corresponding to Eritrea was at any time an 
independent entity in the pre-colonial period. An Ethiopian entity did exist, but 
the extent and centre of the Christian kingdoms of the interior varied 
considerably over the centuries. In other words, neither 'Eritrea' nor Ethiopia 
as presently constituted existed in the pre-colonial period.21 
Given that neither Eritrea nor Ethiopia, as presently constituted, existed in the pre-
colonial period, it would therefore seem hazardous to attempi any explanation of 
Eritrean nationalism by referring to ancient history. Indeed, 'the Eritrean nationalist 
claim that a separate "Eritrean" entity could be traced several centuries back is as 
Africa, Monthly Review, New York, 1980; Okbazghi Yohannes, Eritrea: A Pawn in World Politics, 
University of Florida Press, Gainsville, 1991. 
20 For a description of the successive Wolde-Yesus Ammar, Eritrea. Root Causes of War and 
Refiigees, Singbad Printing Co., Baghdad, 1992. 
21 Halliday, Fred and Molyneux, Maxine, The Ethiopian Revolution, Verso, London, 1981, p. 175. For 
a similar account see, Donham, Donald, 'Old Abyssinia and the new Ethiopian Empire: themes in 
social history,' in: James, Wendy, and Donham, Donald (eds), The Southern Marches of Imperial 
Ethiopia: Essays in History and Social Anthropology, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1986, 
p. 42. 
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untenable as Ethiopia's territorial claim over modern Eritrea.'22 Nevertheless, it is 
interesting to note how the myth of an ancient Eritrea, despite its dubious historical 
foundations, is being propounded by some Eritrean scholars to legitimise Eritrea's 
claims to independence and further highlight its distinctiveness from Ethiopia.23 The 
underlying assumption being that if a political entity can trace its roots in the dawn of 
times, its claims are more credible and legitimate. The future success of such myths 
will of course depend on the extent to which they can be made relevant and endorsed 
by the whole of Eritreans. 
That said, Eritreans themselves have on the whole rarely based their claim for 
independence by reference to a common ethnicity or a distant common past. 
In contrast to constructions of the past offered by greater Ethiopian discourse, 
which conflates ancient and contemporary empires, Eritrean nationalism does 
not typically appeal to deeply-rooted historical identity, but begins with Italian 
colonialism and stresses the development, through several stages, of a new 
identity based on common experience.24 
From the outset, Eritreans defined their nationalist aspiration as emanating from their 
shared colonial experience and presented the question of independence essentially in 
territorial and international legal terms, arguing that Eritrea's right to self-
determination should be decided on the same grounds as those of the other ex-
African colonies. 
22 Wolder-Yesus Ammar, 1992, op. cit., p. 7. 
23 Longrigg's Short History of Eritrea, one of the first accounts to speak of a pre-colonial Eritrea, has 
recently been republished and is often quoted as reference in the Eritrean Government's official 
publications. Longrigg, Stephen, A Short Story of Eritrea, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1945. 
24 Sorenson, John, 'Discourses on Eritrean Nationalism and Identity,' The Journal of Modern African 
Studies, Vol. 29, No. 2, September 1991, p. 309. 
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b) Eritrea's ethnic makeup 
Eritrea is, as indicated earlier, a multi-ethnic society. Although these groups are now 
spoken of as if they were self-evident and well defined entities,25 this was not always 
the case. Indeed, following the argument developed in the preceding chapter, it 
would appear that Eritrea's nationalities have to some extent been shaped by events 
and that here too the European presence left its imprint. 
The first accounts we have of Eritrea's ethnic composition come from Italian 
anthropologists and civil servants.26 It was on the basis of these accounts that the 
Italian administration established the categories that were to be used in its censuses. 
Because of the discrepancies that surfaced between various accounts, the census 
categories were modified over time. Although attempts were made in certain 
circumstances to respect the groups' self-definition, it is interesting to note how 
certain criteria, namely language, were eventually singled out for classificatory 
purposes. The explanation provided by Senator Ferdinando Martini, civilian 
Governor to Eritrea from 1887 to 1907, to justify the categories delineated in the 
census is in this respect particularly revealing of the equation that was made between 
a people and a language. 
I due dati [razze e lingue parlate] naturalmente sono conseguenza uno dell' 
altro, poiché ogni razza ha una lingua propria, e quindi il numero degli abitanti 
che parlano una lingua corrisponde generalmente al numero degli individui che 
ali razza corrispondente appartengo.27 
25 See for example, Cliffe, Lionel, 'Forging a nation: the Eritrean experience,' Third World Quarterly, 
Voi. 11, No. 4, October 1989, pp. 131-147. 
26 See for example: Munzinger, Werner, Studi sull'Africa Orientale, Roma, 1890, and Dei costumi e 
del diritto dei Bogos, Roma, 1891; Contini Rossi, Carlo, I principi di diritto consuetudinario 
dell'Eritrea, Roma, 1916; Pollera, Alberto, I Baria e i Cunama, Roma, 1913, and Le popolazioni 
indigene della collonia Eritrea, Firenze, 1935. 
27 Martini, Ferdinando, Allegati alla Relazione sulla Colonia Eritrea, Atti Parlamentari, Roma, 1913, 
p. 14. 
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Although there were numerous problems with this linguistically defïned typology, it 
nevertheless informed subséquent classifications. David Pool for instance has listed 
eight différent 'linguistic' groupings.28 Yet this catégorisation has certain limitations. 
Pool, for instance, fails to take into account the fact that among those he. describes as 
Saho-speakers are people who speak Tigre, and others Tigrinya. 
While the Itahan administration classifïed Eritrea's peoples according to 
language, the British administration, which took over from the Italians in 1941, 
favoured instead the religious dimension. This was indicated by the adoption of the 
Highland-Christian/Lowland-Muslim dichotomy. As will be explored further in the 
following section, it could be hypothesised that the British dichotomy reflected more 
their own interests and intentions tljén a perceived reality. It was indeed on this basis, 
that certain sections of the British administration justified their plan to partition 
Eritrea between Sudan and Ethiopia during the negotiations that were held on the 
future of Eritrea in the 1940s. Frequently depicted during the war for independence 
as one of the major rifts in Eritrean society, the Highland-Christian/Lowland-Muslim 
distinction is not entirely bon/ out on the ground. The Kunama, who inhabit the 
lowlands of the Gash-Setit province, illustrate this point most clearly. Although most 
of its members appear to have retained some aspects of their traditional religion, 
many have converted to Christianity (Catholicism), but only few to Islam. The 
Djiberti could also be mentioned as another exception to this dichotomy, although 
Tigrinyan-speakers, these highlanders are Muslim. 
Between 1905 and 1939, the Italian administration carried out a total of seven 
censuses. It is interesting to compare the ethnie catégories delineated for this purpose 
with those established by the British administration in 1952 and those listed by the 
28 Pool, David, 'Eritrean Nationalism,' in: Lewis, I.M. (ed.), Nationalism and Self Determination in 
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current Eritrean administration. Ali of them include the Tigrinyans, the Tigre, the 
Saho, the Afar and the Kunama. But while the Italian classification comprises eight 
to eleven catégories (depending on the census year), the British lists seven, while the 
Eritrean lists nine. The discrepancies can be attributed to three factors. Firstly, the 
subséquent adoption of self-referential naming; this is the case of the Nara, which 
were formerly known as the Baria. The Baria have frequently been associated with 
the Kunama, both of whom live in north-western Eritrea. By contrast to their 
neighbours who are considered to be of Semitic/Hamitic origin, the Kunama and the 
Baria are commonly defined as Nilotic or Negroid,29 and have thus at times been 
grouped together, despite the fact that the Baria converted to Islam.30 
The privileging of group name, instead of language attribute also explains why 
the classifications differ; this is best illustrated by the Hadareb, commonly referred to 
as the Beja, a language spoken mainly in Sudan but also by the Hadareb. Depending 
on whether or not language is retained as the distinguishing criterion, the Hadareb 
will either be mentioned or not in the census. Interestingly, both the Hadareb and 
Beja catégories are absent from the British administrative statistics. Finally, the third 
factors that accounts for the aforementioned discrepancy is the fact that some, 
previously unmentioned, groups have appeared (the Bilen, the Rashaida), while 
others have disappeared (the Bogos) from the censuses. 
The case of the Bogos is particularly instructive in that it illustrâtes the 
processes by which the linguistic criterion has progressively been favoured to the 
detriment of any pre-existing politicai self-classification. In a 1891 study, Dei 
the Horn of Àfrica, Ithaca Press, London, 1983, p. 10. 
29 Ethiopiawi, "The Eritrea-Ethiopian Conflict', in: Suhrke, Astri and Noble, Lela Garner, Ethnie 
Conflict and International Relations, Praeger Publishers, London and New York, 1977, p. 128. 
30 Mourant, A.E., et al., 'The blood groups and haemoglobins of the Kunama and Baria of Eritrea, 
Ethiopia,' Annals of Human Biology, Vol. 1, No. 4, 1974, pp. 383-392. 
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Costumi e del diritto dei Bogos, Werner Mutzinger describes how the Bogos ruling 
caste were know as Shumagle while the serfs were known as Tigre.31 Although 
according to some sources, Bilen and Bogos would refer to the same people,32 the 
reference to the Tigre as being the serfs of the Bogos somewhat obscures this 
interprétation. 
We indicated earlier that the Tigre was one of the groups upon which there 
seemed to be some agreement. It is therefore somewhat surprising that most of the 
difficulties encountered when attempting to define the various ethnie groups in 
Eritrea appear to be linked to this particular category. The o fien cited Beni Amer, 
one of the most influential groups in Eritrea, are offen said to belong to the Tigre 
although they are also included in the Beja group;33 so do the Habab (or Haddab), the 
Mensa and the Maria.34 For census purpose, the Italians considered them as a single 
group on the basis of common language despite the fact that some of these people did 
not necessarily ali speak Tigre35 and that they did not constitute a unified politicai 
unit. The picture is further complicated by the fact that Tigre not only refers to a 
language but 'also refers to the prédominant but exploited class of serfs that were 
dominated by the aristocracy (nabtab) found amongst these groups.'36 Tigre would 
thus have been a category of serfs serving under, or exploited by, one of the above 
31 Negash, Tekeste, Italian Colonialism in Eritrea: Policies, Praxis and Impact, 1882-1941, Almqvist 
and Wiksell International, Stockholm, 1987, p. 7. 
32 La Colonia Eritrea. Manuale d'Instruzione Italiano-Tigrai. Ad uso delle scuole indigene per cura 
Déla Missione Cattolica, Tipografía Francescana, Asmara, 1917. It might be useful to mention here 
that the people deseribed in the manual do not necessarily coincide with the categories established for 
the censuses. The description given tends to reflect more the socio-political groupings than a 
classifícation based on language, thus many groups appear here that are not mentioned in other 
sources. Location, language spoken and numbers are given for the various groups discussed. 
j 3 Tekeste Negash seems to consider Beja and Beni Amer as interchangeable categories, compare 
1986, p. 39 and 1987, p. 134. See, Longrigg, 1945, op. cit., in Appendix B, Table of Bani Amir 
Constituent Tribes, where it is shown that the various tribes speak either Tigre or Beja. 
34 Here again the picture is further complicated if one refers to Trevaskis, 1960, op. cit., p. 14, where 
the María and the Mensa are included among the Saho. 
35 Tigre, like Tigrinya and Amharic, is also derived from the ancient Ge'ez. 
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mentioned tribes. This might in turn account for the confusion that surrounds any 
description of the aforementioned Beni Amer for if would appear that the two or 
three castes (i.e.: the ruling cast or Nabtab, the serfs and slaves) might have spoken 
différent languages. Here again it is difficult to know if the exploited groups did 
actually speak a différent language and constitute a self-perceived ethnie group 
(Tigre), or if this distinction was only subsequently established for politicai purposes. 
It emerges from our discussion that Eritrea's ethnie catégories are not as clear-
cut and easily definable as might have been originally thought. Although some of the 
aforementioned groups shared the same language, religion or other cultural traits, 
they might not have considered themselves as one, or at least, not until recently. 
Indeed, their respective identifies appear to have evolved and undergone changes 
under the influences of migrations, intermarriages, and processes of fusion and 
fission. As Lionel Cliffe writes: 
The "givens" of cultural homogeneity and common history do not 
predetermine the way that ethnie group participâtes politically, how they define 
and redefine their politicai consciousness in the process, or even which 
particular amalgams act together as an ethnie group.37 
While some groups in Eritrea might have fused the cultural and politicai dimensions 
in their self-definition since time 'immémorial', many others have not. Indeed, the 
crystallisation in cultural/politicai terms of an otherwise relatively fluid process of 
group formation would appear to be a relatively recent development. 
The above analysis of Eritrea's ethnie groups or nationalities, would therefore 
seem to confirm the previous chapter's discussion about ethnicity in Africa and it 
could well be that, as suggested by Anderson, this crystallisation is a characteristic of 
36 Cliffe, 1989, op. cit., p. 133. For an explanation of the see also Ellingson, 1977, op. cit., p. 267, 
footnote 22 and Tekeste Negash, 1987, op. cit., p. 7. 
37 Cliffe, 1989, op. cit., p. 133. 
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the modem state's administration and of its need to compile the population under its 
sovereignty.38 Indeed, among the various groups mentioned in the différent works 
consulted, only those that were eventually retained by the censuses appear to have 
'survived', the other groups, we must assume, have been subsumed under either one 
of the remaining catégories and perhaps even been assimilated. While the Italian and 
British presence is most commonly viewed in the ways it might have shaped the 
Eritrean nation, it could therefore also be argued that their legacy is paradoxical in 
that it sowed the seeds of potential intra-Eritrean disunity. Indeed, despite the 
EPLF's claims to the contrary, Eritrea's national unity is not unchallenged. 
Two groups in particular may be singled-out as potentially disruptive: the 
Kunama and the Afar.39 The case of the Afar is particularly thomy given that this 
group, which straddles the borders of Eritrea, Ethiopia and Djibouti, already has a 
history of opposition to Ethiopian mie.40 The fact that the 'Afar Sultanate of Awsa 
remained virtually autonomous' until the 1974 Ethiopian revolution,41 and that the 
Afar territory is located around the strategie port of Assab may complicate matters 
further for Eritrea's government. As for the Kunama, several factors have contributed 
to the crystallisation of their identity in ethnie terms. The role of the Franciscan 
mission, which is greatly responsible for their conversion to Catholicism and for 
recording their language and history is one. The fact that the Kunama have often 
been accused of siding with Ethiopia in the earlier stages of the libération struggle is 
another potential factor. Also important is the fact that they live in one of the rare 
38 Anderson, 1991, op. cit., in particular chapter 10- Census, maps and muséums. 
39 Gilkes, Patrick, 'Eritrea: historiography and mythology, African Affairs, Voi. 90, No. 361, October 
1991, pp. 623-29; Prunier, Gérard, 'Atouts et failles de l'Erythrée indépendante,' Le Monde 
Diplomatique, 20 avril 1993, p. 20; Pool, 1983, op. cit., pp. 175-193. 
40 On the Afar, see: Shehim, Kassim, 'Ethiopia, Revolution, and the Question of Nationalities: the 
Case of the Afar', The Journal of Modem African Studies, Vol. 23, No. 2, 1985, pp. 331-48. 
41 Clapham, 1988, op.cit., p. 201. 
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-a fertile areas of Eritrea, the Gash-Setit région. It was indeed forecastecl' that many of 
the reftigees returning from Sudan would be allotted plots of land in this area. 
Rumour also has it that former EPLF fighters would be encouraged to resettle there. 
The basis for the politicisation of the Kunama in ethnie terms already exists, any 
attempt to foreibly stille it will therefore only further fuel it. Unless the Eritrean 
government shows greater considération towards these ethnie communities, it may 
end up facing a difficult and protracted problem. 
4.2 - The legacies of Italian colonisation 
Eritrea acquired both its name and territorial configuration in January 1890 when 
King Umberto proclaimed the existence of the Italian colony of Eritrea.42 Italy's 
presence in the région was made possible because of Britain's need to curtail French 
expansion in the Red Sea area, as the opening of the Suez canal in 1867 considerably 
enhanced Eritrea's strategie location. Possible French expansion, from its colony of 
Obock (now Djibouti), had to be checked without London incurring additional 
fïnancial burdens. Britain sought to fili the vacuum left by the retreat of the Egyptian 
troops, defeated by the Mahdiyya, and invited Italy to occupy those areas.43 Negusa 
| Nagast Menilek tried to hait Italy's encroachment into the Ethiopian highlands by 
I signing the treaty of Wichale in May 1889.44 Conflicting interprétation of article 17 
of the Treaty of Wichale, concerning Ethiopia's power over the area, and Italy's 
subséquent expansion well beyond the treaty's provisions, led to the famous battle of 
42 The choice of the name Eritrea would derive from the name given to the Red Sea, first by the 
Ptolemaic Greeks in the third Century B.C. (Sinus Erythraeus) and later by the Romans (Mare 
Erythraeum). Saleh Sabe, Osman, The History of Eritrea, Dar Al-Masirah, Beirut, (no date), p. 28. 
43 Prunier, Gérard, 'Italian Colonialism in Eritrea (1882-1941): Policies, Praxis and Impact,' Revue 
Française d'Histoire d'Outre-Mer, Vol. LXXIX, No. 295, 1992, p. 275. 
44 For a detailed account of the Treaty and of the events that followed, see: Rubenson, Sven, Wichale 
XVII: The Attempt to Establish a Protectorate over Ethiopia, Addis Ababa, 1964, and The Survival of 
Ethiopian Independence, Heinemann, London, 1976. 
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Adwa of 1896.45 Often cited as a landmark in the history of African opposition to 
colonialism, this battle can also be seen as Ethiopia's surrender of Eritrea. 
a) The early stages of colonisation 
One of the reasons generally given to account for Italy's motivation to colonise 
Eritrea is the création of a colony of settlement.46 The Italian government was then 
faced with high unemployment in southern Italy which created strong centrifugai 
movements within the newly unified state: 
The policy of colonial expansion was according to Gramsci a device for side 
tracking some internai issues of a politicai and economie nature. In other 
words, Crispi wished to resolve the land question in southern Italy without any 
reform measures by keeping the mirage of colonial lands.47 
The appropriation of native lands by the Italian colonisers and, more importantly, the 
introduction of modem agriculture affected traditional land tenure systems in Eritrea. 
The effect of these on the Eritrean peasantry were significant and triggered revolt, 
but, according to Negash, these policies remained localised and too short-lived to 
induce social transformations of the kind necessary for nationalism to emerge.48 
If éducation is to be given a prépondérant role in nation-formation, then 
discussion of the existence of a sense of Eritrean nationalism during the Italian 
occupation must be tempered, but perhaps not, as Tekeste Negash argues, totally 
dismissed.49 Whilst the Italian colonial authorities did little in the way of éducation, 
they nevertheless left the task in the hands of the numerous missions of various 
Christian dénominations. Banned when the Fascists took power in the 1920s, these 
45 Longrigg, 1945, op. cit., p. 126. 
46 Pankhurst, Richard, 'Italian Settlement Policy in Eritrea and Its Repercussions, 1889-1896,' in 
Butler, J., (ed.), Boston University Papers in African History, Vol. 1, Boston University Press, Boston, 
1964. 
47 Negash, 1987, op. cit., p. 13. 
48 An assessment of the impact of Italian colonialism on the land tenure system and its effect on social 
differentiation can be found in Negash, 1986, op. cit., pp. 88-94. 
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missions resumed their opérations in the 1940s. They greatly eontributed to the 
éducation of a portion of Eritrea's population, and this not only during colonisation, 
but also in later years. Indeed, fieldwork carried in Eritrea in 1994, revealed that 
many of those occupying higher positions in the University of Asmara, in secondary 
schools and in government administration, had been educated in Anglican, Swedish 
or Catholic Missions in the 1940s and 1950s. Some of the missions also pursued their 
work throughout the Eritrean-Ethiopian war, thus educating part of the younger 
générations and many of the orphans. While the numbers of those educated through 
the missions during the Italian colonial period remains difficult to compile, they were 
sufficiently numerous for it to be possible to talk, albeit in modest terms, of an 
emerging Western-educated ehte. 
Furthermore, if one looks at the textbooks used by the Catholic missions in 
Eritrea, one sees how they may have eontributed to the création of a sense of 
"Eritrean-ness." These textbooks, where Eritrea is depicted as a cohesive entity and 
ifs main features are described, were probably the first written texts to lay down a 
comprehensive account of Eritrea's history. As the following passage illustrâtes, it is 
clear that the objective pursued by these manuals, and more broadly by the Italian 
colonisers, was tó instil a sense of common Eritrean identity. 
Leggendo queste pagine gli Indigeni apprezzeranno l'opera nostra, e nascerà 
nel cuore più vivo e più intenso l'affetto per l'Eritrea, figlia primogenita 
dell'Italia.50 
Eritreans educated in the missions thus acquired through their teaching a unitary 
conception of Eritrea whose particular history distinguished it from other countries in 
the région. The maps of Eritrea included in these textbooks, also provided the 
49 Negash, 1987, op. cit., pp. 163-4. 
50 La Colonia Eritrea. Manuale d'Instruzione, 1917, op. cit., p. 8. 
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necessary visual support, or in Anderson's terms the 'map as logo', which is the 
basis for an imagined community.51 In addition to these changes, which could be 
considered as positive or consolidating factors towards Eritrean nation-formation, are 
also those that could be termed negative or differentiating elements. Intended as a 
means of establishing a séparation with Ethiopia, pohcies such as the prohibition of 
Amharic52 may have also had a binding effect on the Eritrean people. 
b) Eritrea as a basis for Italy 's expansion 
If the changes introduced before the 1920s may be considered to have had relatively 
little impact on the Eritrean population, the transformations that accompanied the 
second half of Italian colonialism were to have greater bearing on the formation of 
Eritrean nationalism. Indeed, while the need for a settler colony may originally have 
motivated Italian policy,53 imperial considérations soon acquired particular 
importance. 
The most important fonction of the colony remained as a supplier of colonial 
soldiers for Italian expansion elsewhere. It was however, in Libya that Eritrea 
compensated Italy for the lather's [sic] perseverance. Up to 4,000 Eritrean 
soldiers were permanently stationed in Libya between 1912 and 1932. (...) It is 
not an exaggeration to state that the Libyan occupation was made possible by 
the continuous supply of fighting forces from the "first-born colony" (la 
colonia primogenita) at a cost which the Italian tax-payers and the state could 
easily sustain.54 
Eritrea's importance as a springboard for forther colonial expansion would increase 
further in the latter stages of Italian occupation when it would pro vide both bases and 
soldiers for Mussolini's Italian East African Empire. 
51 The importance of the cartographie expression was also made clear at independence. The first stamp 
to be issued represented the contours of Eritrea against the backdrop of its flag. 
52 Getatchew Haile, "The Unity and Territorial integrity of Ethiopia', The Journal of Modem African 
Studies, Vol. 24, No. 3,1986, p. 477. 
53 Yemane Mesghenna, Italian Colonialism: A Case Study of Eritrea, 1869-1934. Motive, Praxis and 
Resuit, Lund, Sweden, 1988. 
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Further expansion of the existing administrative system's bureaucracy and 
police, and technologicai innovations in the fields of transport and communication55 
count among the most noteworthy contributions of this period. Technological 
innovations are still today viewed as one of the most important legacies of the Italian 
period. The eighty miles long railroad linking the sea-port of Massawa to the capital 
of Asmara was completed in 1911, and the Asmara-Keren-Agordat line, connecting 
the highlands to the western lowlands, was opened in 1922. Although most of the 
railway lines and roads were destroyed either by the British or by the Ethiopians, 
there remains an impressive network which connects the various parts of the country. 
Such extensive and sophisticated communications infrastructure (railways, roads, 
ports, telegraph and post) not only contributed to Eritrea's economic and politicai 
unification but also laid the basis for the nation-building process. 
These developments considerably facilitated movement within the territory 
and were accompanied by a dramatic process of urbanisation. From a small centre of 
no more than 15,000 inhabitants in 1935, Asmara grew to become a city 
encompassing as many as 120,000 inhabitants in 1941. Various towns throughout the 
country grew steadily into organised municipalities which by 1941 included no less 
than 20% of the total population.56 Prior to the Italian occupation, the Eritrean 
population was predominantly rural: peasant in the highlands, nomads in the 
lowlands. Under the Italian rule however, and this more particularly so from the 
1920s onwards, the Eritrean peasant population was profoundly affected by rapid 
54 Negash, Tekeste, Eritrea and Ethiopia. The Federai Experience, Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, Uppsala, 
1997, p. 16. 
55 Longrigg, 1945, op. cit., pp. 136-9; Gebre-Medhin, Jordan, Peasants and Nationalism in Eritrea, 
The Red Sea Press, Trenton, N. J., 1989, pp. 59-62. 
56 Killion, Tom, 'The Eritrean Economy in Historical Perspective' Eritrean Studies Review, Vol. 1, 
No. 1, Spring 1996, p. 102. 
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urbanisation, industrialisation, and the commercialisation of agriculture.57 By 
introducing elements of modernisation, industrialisation and urbanisation, Italian 
colonisation thus contributed to the formation of the necessary structural conditions 
for the emergence of nationalism, i.e.: Gellner's industrialisation and Deutsches 
networks of communication. 
But perhaps more telling, is the fact that ail theses changes - including the 
recruitment of soldiers for Italy's colonial armies - were introduced for the most part 
in préparation for the future invasion of Ethiopia. 
Préparation for the Italian invasion of Ethiopia began in 1929 with the 
expansion of the port of Massawa, which by 1935 boasted the most extensive 
harbor facilities between Alexandria and Cape Town. In 1934 the expansion of 
the road network was begun by thousands of Eritrean workers, and military 
recruitment was stepped up to mobilize an Eritrean army over 60,000 strong. 
(...) Thus ali the strands of Italian colonial policy in Eritrea wove themselves 
together to create an emphasis on Eritrea as a spring-board for Italian 
pénétration of Ethiopia.58 
Here then was a situation of a state preparing for war so propitious, according to 
Mann and Posen, for the emergence of nationalism. Soldiering employed close to 
10% of active maie labour before 1934 and over 40% in 1935-40.59 Education was 
used for the purposes of mobilisation and for the formation of Italy's fiiture 
soldiers.60 In 1938-39, there were twenty state-run elementary schools, attended by 
4,177 Eritrean students. 
Ail instruction in the government schools was given in Italian; text-books, 
expensively produced, were written in Italian and glorified the Duce (a 
reference to Mussolini) on almost every page. In addition, Military service was 
lauded. Boys were encouraged to become "little soldiers of the Duce", the 
57 Gebre-Medhin, 1989, op. cit., p. 60; and Pool, op. cit., 1983, p. 178. 
58 Killion, 1996, op. cit., p. 101. 
59 Negash, 1987, op. cit., 1987, pp. 48-51. 
60 Teklehaimanot, Berhane, 'Education in Eritrea Düring the European Colonial Period,' Eritrean 
Studies Review, Vol. l, No. 1, Spring 1996, pp. 4-8. 
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Fascist salute was compulsory, and at the morning hoisting of the flag, Italian 
songs were sung.61 
Triggered in part by the racial laws introduced in the 1920s, the first anti-colonial 
stirrings amongst Eritreans began to be voiced. Nevertheless, as the préparations for 
war gathered a pace, Eritrea's economy experienced a period of intensive 
development 'that transformed Eritrea's society from one that was overwhelmingly 
rural and traditionally-based to one with a significant urban and industriai 
component.'62 On the 3rd of October 1935, the Italian army with the help of 50,000 
Eritrean troops63 crossed the Mareb River and began their invasion of Ethiopia.64 On 
the 5* of May 1936, they captured Addis Ababa. From 1936 to 1941, Italy would 
rule over its vast East African Empire (Africa Orientale Italiana). The Empire was 
divided up into six régions: Eritrea, Amhara, Harrar, Somalia, Galla-Sidama, and 
Addis Ababa. The area which corresponds roughly to today's Ethiopian Tigray 
région was thus incorporated into the province of Eritrea.65 Düring this period, 
Eritrea's economy continued to flourish, as Italian investment in various industriai 
sectors multiplied. Half of Italy's manufactures abroad were located in Eritrea, 
representing 80,5% ofRome's colonial investments in the manufacturing sector.66 
While it would no doubt be an exaggeration to speak of a broadly shared 
sense of 'Eritrean-ness' during the Italian period, it would nevertheless be inaccurate 
to conclude that Italy's sole legacy was to give the country a name.67 If éducation 
61 Teklehaimanot, 1996, op. cit., p. 5. 
62 Killion, 1996, op. cit., p. 101. 
63 Negash, 1997, op. cit., p. 17. 
64 For a description of Italy's invasion see, Bahru Zewde, A History of Modem Ethiopia. 1855-1974. 
James Currey, London, 1991, pp. 150-177. Italy's claims over Ethiopia were initiated in 1934 with the 
Walwal incident, about which more will be said in the chapter on Somaliland. 
65 The pursuit of pacification through ethnie partition is explained by one of Italy's former governors 
to Ethiopia, Corrado Zoli, in his article "The Organization of Italy's East African Empire', Foreign 
Affairs, XVI, October 1937 to July 1938, p. 84. See also: Negash, 1986, op. cit., p. 59. 
66 Prunier, 1993, op. cit., p. 20. 
67 As argued for instance by Negash, 1987, op. cit.-, and Getatchew Haile, 1986, op. cit., pp. 465-87. 
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was relatively underdeveloped,68 it nevertheless introduced and spread throughout 
the population the necessary elements - a territorial configuration and a spécifié 
history - which would render possible the 'imagining of the community.' Indeed, not 
only are the international boundaries of the Eritrean state those established under the 
Italian colonisation but also the territorial division of the country into seven 
administrative régions remained substantially unchanged under the Italian and British 
administrations and into present times, undergoing only slight modifications 
throughout. Moreover, the war economy of the later period introduced and 
established, through industrialisation and urbanisation, the material basis for the 
emergence of a nation. But while the Italians laid down the necessary structural 
conditions for an Eritrean nation to exist, more was needed for nationalism to 
emerge. This factor, or dynamic force - the politicisation of Eritreans around the 
nationalist project - was triggered during the period of British Military 
Administration which lasted from 1941 to 1952. By contrast to Gellner, who asserts 
that nationalism preceded the nation, we are therefore arguing here that some 
rudimentary elements of nationhood were laid down before nationalism appeared. 
4.3 — The British legacyifirst stages towards politicisation 
Foliowing the defeat of Italy in 1941, the British occupied Eritrea for the foliowing 
decade. Until 1945, Eritrea served as a military base for Britain and the Allies: 
In November 1941, the U.S. War Department developed a secret plan, known 
as Project-19, to reinforce a British military opération against Rommel in North 
Africa. The overarching purpose of project-19 was to transform Eritrea into a 
military communication and distribution center for war material.69 
68 According to Trevaskis, not only were the number schools set up by the Italians low, but so were 
the standards of éducation, 1960, op. cit., p. 33. 
69 Okbazghi Yohannes, The United States and the Horn of Africa. An Analytical Study of Pattern and 
Process. Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, 1997, p. 114. 
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Given Britain's colonial interests in the area, namely in Sudan, the position of the 
British administration in Eritrea was an ambiguous and delicate one. Mandated to 
administer Eritrea under the principles of the Hague Convention of 1907, until 
international décision on the fate of Italy's former colonies was reached, the British 
Military Administration (BMA) ruled over Eritrea until 1949. It was then replaced by 
a British civilian administration which ruled until 1952. Although British presence 
was relatively brief compared to that of the Italians, its legacy in terms of the future 
politicisation of Eritrea is cruciai. Indeed, during this period, the educational system 
was enhanced and the first politicai parties were established. Also, and perhaps as 
important, was the way in which Britain's project to partition Eritrea unified the new 
politicai elites in the préservation of their country's territorial integrity. 
a) The British Military Administration 
As mentioned earlier, the Italian administration did little in the way of providing the 
Eritreans with a substantial educational system, a lacuna that the British rapidly 
sought to correct.70 Under British Military Administration, the number of primary 
schools more than doubled from twenty-four to fifty-nine and from 1943 to 1950, 
Eritrean enrolment in elementary schools grew from 2, 405 to 9,131.71 
At first a few schools were opened with the help of trained teachers recruited 
from Sudan and from the few Eritreans with higher éducation; later, other 
schools were opened as pupil teachers became available, and finally, after a 
system of teacher training had been introduced in 1943, a steady flow of 
trained teachers was fed out to the schools. Arabie textbooks were obtained 
from Egypt and the Sudan, and, later, others in Tigrinya were prepared and 
printed by the Administration.72 
70 Teklehaimanot, 1996, op. cit., pp. 10-14. 
71 Teklehaimanot, 1996, op. cit., p. 14. 
72 Trevaskis, 1960, op. cit., p. 33. 
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Arabie and Tigrinya thus replaced Italian as mediums of instruction. Adoption of 
Arabic does not at first seem self-evident. Except for some nomadic Rashaida tribes 
along the coast near Massawa, Arabic had never been much more than a market 
lingua franca. In response to enquiries about the number of Arabic-speaking 
Eritreans in 1943, Colonel S.F. Nadel, then Chief-Secretary in Asmara, highlighted 
the difficulty of estimating with any precision their number as 'the knowledge of 
Arabic among Eritreans is mostly rather modest and of poor, colloquial standard.'73 
It would in fact appear that the adoption of Arabic by the British was done in 
preparation for Eritrea's projected dismantling and Western Eritrea's future 
incorporation into Sudan. Britain's plans of annexing these regions were indeed 
slowly, although secretly, being articulated.74 In a letter dated 14 August 1942 to 
R.C. Mayall, then Sudan Agent in London, Sir Douglas Newbold, Civil Secretary of 
the British Service in Sudan, wrote: 
Nothing much to report about Eritrea, except that I am investigating at leisure 
the possibilities of Sudan taking over the areas north and west of Asmara after 
the war, if we are asked to do so. Incidentally, Lea has disposed of the religious 
problem. Evidence is conclusive that there are no Catholics among the Beni 
Amer, except in the imagination of the Italian Catholic missionaries.75 
As will shortly be discussed Britain's partition plan was to be formally expounded 
during talks regarding the future of Eritrea. Suffice it to say that despite 
improvements in the realm of education, few changes were introduced in Eritrea 
during the early years of British occupation. 
73 Mémo 77/1. 29 June 1943. Information Office, Asmara. Radio Licences. Research and 
Documentation Centre, Asmara. 
74 According to Haggai Erlich, British policy towards Eritrean Muslims would go back as far as 1885. 
See, Erlich, Haggai, Ethiopia and the Challenge of Independence, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, 
Colorado, 1986, pp. 47-64. 
75 Henderson, K.D.D, The Making of Northern Sudan, Faber and Faber, ltd, London, 1953, p. 267. 
Incidentally, there is some doubt as to how C.E.A. Lea, then Civil Aifairs Officer in Keren, 'disposed' 
V of the religious problem, for the Kunama, included in this area to be annexed, are for the most parte' 
Catholics, thus undermining somewhat the rational.for unifying Muslim territories. ' 
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Until 1945, Eritrea had eontinued to serve as a military base for Britain and its 
Allies in their Mediterranean campaign. Although the BMA took over the running of 
the state, Eritrea's economy remained in the hands of Italians. The libéralisation of 
Eritrea's economy and politicai life would only occur after the end of the war and 
more precisely after 1949, when the BMA was replaced by the civilian British 
Administration. Although politicai parties were initially banned, a few clandestine 
organisations began to emerge as early as 1941, the most important of which was the 
Mahber Fikri Hager Ertra (Association for the Love of the Country of Eritrea).76 
Then in 1945, with the ending of WWII, the question of Eritrea's future was finally 
considered by the Council of Foreign Ministers of Britain, France, the USA and the 
US SR. 
The international debates about the fate of Eritrea and the other Italian colonies 
of Libya and Somalia were initiated in 1945. A council consisting of the 
foreign ministers of Britain, France, the USA, and the USSR (CFM) held its 
first meeting in London in September 1945. At this time Ethiopian claims over 
Eritrea and Somalia were rejected by the CFM.(...) It was only when 
agreement was found to be impossible, that the CFM decided to send the Four 
Powers Commission of investigation (FPC) to the colonies to hear the wishes 
of the inhabitants themselves.77 
In préparation for the arrivai of the Four Powers Commission of investigation, whose 
task was to ascertain the wishes of the Eritrean population with regards to their 
country's future, the British Military Administration lifted the ban on politicai parties 
in October 1946. 
Until then, the only existing politicai organisations were the clandestine Mahber 
Fikri Hager Ertra (MFHE) and the also clandestine group, later known as the Ertra 
76 For a description of this organisation and its composition (whose leadership was equally 
représentative of both Muslims and Christians) see: lyob, Ruth, The Eritrean Struggle for 
Independence. Domination, Résistance, Nationalism 1941-1993, Cambridge University Press, 1995, 
pp. 65-69. See also, Ellingson, Lloyd, 'The emergence of Political Parties in Eritrea, 1941-1950,' 
Journal ofAfrican History, Vol. XVIII, No. 2, 1977, p. 261. 
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n'Ertrawian (Eritrea for Eritreans). The MFHE had been set up in May 1941 by a 
group of Eritreans, consisting of Christians, Muslims, intellectuals and traditional 
elders.78 Its founding members ineluded: Grebremeskel Woldu, Ibrahim Sultan and 
Woldeab Woldemariam. The MFHE's aim was to ensure that Eritrea did not return 
under Itahan rule, and was thus the first anti-colonial movement in the country. In 
1945, Woldeab Woldemariam left the MFHE, which was then beginning to 
fragment, and established the Ertra n 'Ertrawian. 
Woldeab's group opposed the dominance of the Coptic Church and sought to 
preserve the liberal pluralism introduced by the BMA. The group proposed a 
fifreen-year trusteeship before independence, both to prevent partition and to 
allow ample time for the development of Eritrean social, economic, and 
politicai institutions. Woldeab sought the support of those traditional elites who 
were opposed to Ethiopian rule.79 
Woldeab Woldemariam, an Orthodox Christian highlander, was educated at a 
Lutheran mission in Asmara, where he taught for several years. His involvement in 
Eritrean politics began when he became the editor of the Eritrean Weekly News set 
under BMA sponsorship at the end of 1942. He was to play an important role in the 
future nationalist movement and is now acknowledged as one of the main 'heroes' of 
Eritrea's fight for independence. 
b) Eritrea 's first politicai parties 
When the Four Powers Commission (FPC) visited Eritrea from 23 November to 14 
December 1947, it heard a total of 3, 336 représentatives from the following five 
parties: 
(1) 1, 559 from the Union with Ethiopia Party, 
77 Iyob, 1995, op. cit., p. 62. For a description of the positions advocated by the différent powers 
present see, Okbazghi Yohannes, 1997, op. cit., pp. 116-7. 
78 Iyob, 1995, op. cit., p. 65. 
79 Iyob, 1995, op. cit., pp. 66-67. 
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(2) 1, 033 irò m the Muslim League, 
(3) 313 from the Liberal Progressive Party, 
(4) 358 from the New Eritrea Pro-Italia Party, and 
(5) 33 from the National Party of Massawa.80 
Interestingly, and as noted by Ruth Iyob, the Commission failed to meet Woldeab 
Woldemariam. Reference to his name was nevertheless made in the Commission's 
Report annex, under the title 'Information from the Administering Authority 
regarding statement by Mr. Woldemariam of the Independent Eritrea Party'.81 The 
history of Eritrea's first politicai parties is stili subject to contentious interprétation, 
each side arguing that their politicai adversaries were in fact created by foreign 
powers and consequently did not represent the interests of the Eritrean population.82 
Formed in 1944, the Unionist Party advocated réunification of Eritrea with 
Ethiopia on the grounds of their common cultural and historical links. Some of its 
leaders were former members of the MFHE, but it would be inaccurate to suggest 
that this organisation was the direct ancestor to the Unionist Party. Indeed, as was 
suggested earlier, the MFHE split into several factions, and while some of its 
members were later to join the Unionist Party, others, such as Woldeab 
Woldemariam and Ibrahim Sultan, rejected the idea of unification with Ethiopia. It is 
frequently argued that the Christian Orthodox Church not only supported financially 
and verbally the Unionist cause but in fact instigated the movement acting on behalf 
80 Ellingson, 1977, op. cit., footnote 5, p. 263. 
81 Iyob, 1995, op. cit., footnote 16, p. 159. 
82 For an illustration of the polemical nature of this debate, see: Negash, 1997, op. cit., pp. 24-34. 
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of the Ethiopian government in support of its irredentist aims.83 According to 
Trevaskis: 
If they were not to lose their case by default, the Ethiopians had to arouse some 
Eritrean support. To this end they first turned to the Coptic Church. (...) By 
1942 every priest had become a propagandisi in the Ethiopian cause, every 
village had become a centre of Ethiopian nationalism, and populär feast days 
(...) had become occasions for open displays of Ethiopian patriotism.84 
That the Ethiopian government actively supported the Unionist Party should neither 
be surprising nor shocking; that it actually set up the party is more difficult to 
substantiate, as are the accusations that the Unionist Party gained support through 
terror both physical and moral (via the Church). When the Four Powers Commission 
issued its report, based on survey that had been conducted by the British Military 
Administration in 1947, it recorded that 48% of Eritreans supported the Unionist 
Party. Although this may have, as is frequently suggested, indicated strong support 
for unification with Ethiopia amongst the urban Tigrinya/Christians, it could also be 
seen, as Killion suggests, 
as a manifestation, at least in part, of an anti-colonial "proto-nationalism" that 
regarded unity with Ethiopia as a means of empowering indigenous Eritreans 
against European colonizers.85 
The main opposition to the Unionist Party came lrom the Muslim League, with 31% 
of Eritrean support according to the 1947 survey. Set up in 1946 by Ibrahim Sultan, 
the Muslim League's initial aim was to ensure the émancipation of Tigre serfs from 
their mainly Beni Amer masters, who had joined the Unionist Party.86 Thus, while 
the party's platforms of the Unionist Party and the Muslim League were formulated 
83 Ellingson, 1977, op. cit., p. 266. According to Ellingson "The Unionist Party was handsomely 
subsidised by the Ethiopian Government although, of course, this was never publicly admitted.' This 
opinion is shared by Iyob, 1995, op. cit., and Obzaghi Yohanes, 1991, op. cit. 
84 Trevaskis, 1960, op. cit., pp. 59-60. 
85 Killion, Tom, 'Eritrean Workers' Organization and Early Nationalist Mobilization: 1948-1958,' 
Eritrean Studies Review, Vol. 2, No. 1, Spring 1997, footnote 36, p. 43. 
86 Ellingson, 1977, op. cit., p. 270. 
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mainly in terms of nationalist or religious aims, underlying status or socio-economie 
interests were also defended. Initially, the Muslim League's position was not 
necessarily one of complete independence. Some of its members favoured the 
maintenance of a British Administration in Eritrea (i.e.: the Tigre and Baria), while 
others staunchly opposed it (Beni Amer, liberti, Kunama, Saho and Afar, all of 
whom advoted an Italian trusteeship solution). Despite internal disagreement, the 
Muslim League nevertheless presented the option of a British trusteeship to the Four 
Powers Commission as an acceptable compromise if total independence was not 
possible. The Unionist Party saw the favourable position of the League towards a 
British Trusteeship solution as an indication of British influence in the formation and 
orientation of the Muslim League. As with the Unionist Party, the legitimacy of the 
Muslim League has been questioned with the suggestion that it had in fact been 
instigated and supported by the British administration.87 Although this might have 
been the case up to 1948, the Muslim League later split into several factions. One of 
these splinter groups, the Western Muslims composed mainly by the Beni Amer, 
compromised with the Unionists after the 1952 election in opposition to British plans 
for annexing their territory to Sudan. By contrast to the Unionist Party, the other four 
other organisations advocated Eritrea's independence, although some variations as to 
how this was to be achieved distinguished them from one another. 
Originally presenting itself as a vétéran association, the New Eritrean pro-
Italian Party, composed of Eritreans and Italians residing in Eritrea, advocated 
independence while accepting a transition period under an Itahan trusteeship. 
87 Tekeste Negash seems to imply that the Muslim League was formed in October 1947 under the 
instigation of Brigadier General Benoy. See Negash, Tekeste, 'The Unionist Party and Its Strategies 
of Irredentism, 1941-50,1 in: Bahru Zewde, Richard Pankhurst and Tadesse Beyene (Eds), 
Proceedings of the Eleventh International Conference of Ethiopian Studies, Volume 1, Institute of 
Ethiopian Studies, Addis Ababa university, 1994, p. 301. 
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Established only a few weeks before the arrivai of the FPC, the politicai impact of 
this group was considered to be negligible, despite it having recorded 11% of support 
according to the Four Powers Commission5 s report. Also marginal, with 1% of 
support, was the National Party of Massawa, set up by a dissenting faction of the 
Muslim League. But perhaps the most important of the four pro-independence 
parties, despite having recorded only 9% in the Four Powers Commission's report, 
was the Liberal Progressive Party. 
The création of the Liberal Progressive Party signalled the emergence of a 
separatisi stance among the Eritrean Tigrinyans. Its origins are generally traced to a 
movement which emerged in 1943 in the administrative division of Akele-Guzai, one 
of the three highland provinces. Led by Dejazmach Tessema Asmerom, later to be 
made Ras by the British colonial administration, this movement advocated the 
restoration of the ancient Tigrayan Kingdom making clear thus its irredentist claims 
on the bordering Ethiopian province of Tigray. The British initially encouraged this 
movement as it fitted closely with their plans for a Greater Tigray. When the ban on 
politicai parties was lifted in 1947, the movement, still under the leadership of Ras 
Tessema Asmerom, became the Eritrean Liberal Progressive Party and completely 
modified its politicai platform. Its most active member, Woldeab Woldemariam, then 
Chief Editor of the Eritrean Weekly Newsletter, opposed unification with Ethiopia 
and advocated instead the idea of a 15 year UN trusteeship for Eritrea to be followed 
by independence. Although the Liberal Progressive Party seems to have enjoyed 
little support at the time, its leaders were to play an important role in the future 
nationalist uprising. Rather than seeing the highland Eritreans as being coerced into 
union with Ethiopia, as Trevaskis suggests, or on the contrary favourable to it, as 
Negash purports, it is more accurate to see them as divided on the issue. The fact that 
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most of the support for the Liberal Progressive Party came from urban centres 
(mostly but not exclusively Tigrinya), suggests that existing divisions were not 
merely, if at ail, ethnically defïned. 
Tekeste Negash's claim that 'there was virtually no nationalist organisation 
that articulated the desire for Eritrean independence within the boundaries that 
existed up to 1936 when the issue of Eritrea5s status was discussed in 1948,'88 is not 
entirely acclarate. The Muslim League, the Pro-Italy Party, the National Party of 
Massawa and the Liberal Progressive Party all advocated the maintenance of the pre-
1936 boundaries. The Muslim League's position at the FPC was that the boundaries 
of Eritrea should remain as they were in 1935 unless, of course, there was some 
possibility of adjoining the territories of the remaining Beja tribes of Sudan and of 
the Afar living within Ethiopia to those of Eritrea.89 The fact that some of these 
parties were to form a coalition, known as the Independence Bloc in 1948, further 
highlights the existence of a strong opposition to union with Ethiopia.90 The Four 
Power Commission failed to reach an agreement on the future status of Eritrea by 
1948, and the matter was referred the UN's General Assembly.91 
c) The Bevin-Sforza proposai 
Of the many drafl resolutions submitted to the General Assembly in 1949, four 
proposais were envisaged: (1) Ethiopian annexation of Eritrea, (2) Eritrean 
independence, (3) the establishment of a UN trusteeship under Itahan administration, 
or another western power, and (4) partition of the territory between Ethiopia, which 
was to have the mainly Christian inhabited plateaux as well as the sea-ports of 
88 Negash, 1987, op. cit., p. 181. 
89 FPC, Appendix 20, 3; cited in Ellingson, 1977, op. cit., p. 271. 
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Massawa and Assab, and British-Sudan, who would be given the Eritrean western 
province. The last of these four proposais, better known as the Bevin-Sforza plan 
attracted much attention. The plan was the resuit of an Agreement, reached in early 
May 1949, between British Foreign Secretary Bevin and Italian Foreign Minister 
Sforza, regarding all of Italy's former possessions. The Agreement planned: 
independence for Libya in ten years. Düring that period the British would act 
as trustées for Cyrenaica and the French for the Fezzan. Tripolitania would be 
administered for two years by the British and then by the Italians for the 
remaining eight. Italian Somaliland was to be put under Italian trusteeship at 
once; Eritrea was to be divided between Abyssinia and Sudan, with certain 
rights reserved for Italy in the towns of Asmara and Massawa. Despite hostile 
démonstration in Tripolitania and Soviet opposition, this plan was approved by 
the politicai Committee of the General Assembly in May, but faüed by one 
vote to secure the necessary two-thirds majority in the Assembly itself.92 
As an interested party in this decision-making process, Britain's governing of Eritrea 
had become more than that of just a 'care-taker'. Financial constraints had forced the 
British Administration to keep the Italian personnel present in the administration in 
ail but the Western provinces bordering Sudan, as Britain's intention of annexing 
these régions was gradually crystallising in the minds of senior colonial officiais. 
Brigadier Longrigg, Chief Administrator of Eritrea irò m 1941 to 1944, wrote that: 
Muslim tribal areas adjoining the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan should be included in 
that country. The Central highland of Eritrea, with the port of Massawa and the 
Samhar and Saho tribes, should form part of a united Tigrai state or province 
(...) The Danakil should be assigned to the Emperor. Eritrea should cease to 
exist.93 
Longrigg's ambiguous position as to whether Tigray should constitute a state or 
province is best explained by the disagreement between the British War Office and 
90 Indeed, as Ellingson notes, the fact that the unionists were unable to attract the majority, is itself 
significant. Ellingson, 1977, op. cit., p. 270. 
91 As established by Article 23 of the Peace Treaty with Italy in October 1946. 
92 Bullock, Alan, Ernest Bevin. Foreign Secretary. Oxford University Press, Oxford and New York, 
1983, p. 678. 
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the Foreign Office on the issue of whether Britain should favour a decentralised 
Ethiopia or restore fiali powers to Emperor Haile Selassie.94 Whatever the precise 
outcome, it was clear that Eritrea was to be totally dismembered. The annexation to 
Sudan of Eritrea5s western lowlands, coupled with the création of a 'Greater 
Tigrayan State' (under British protection) and paralleled by the proposai for a 
'Greater Somalia', ali formed part of British designs to control the région and would 
later be used as bargaining positions with Ethiopia. 
Recalling the famed politician Woldeab Woldemariam's 1949 déclaration at 
the United Nations, Araya Tseggai relates how the prospect of Eritrea's 
disintegration united Eritrea's politicians. 
When we set out to organize our party, the Liberal Progressive Party, our aim 
was to preserve the unity of Eritrea under the banner "Eritrean for Eritreans". 
Sic Christians and six Muslims initiated with a vow. (...)We were determined 
to maintain above everything the unity of our people and our country. Because 
of this unity, we were able to defeat British schemes for partition of Eritrea. 
The people of Eritrea were not divided, neither was our country. They were 
unable to divide us into two peoples or two countries. Ali this carne about 
because we all agreed on an unpartitioned unified Eritrea.95 
It could therefore be argued that one of the factors that contributed to the forging of a 
sense of Eritrean identity was Britain's proposai to partition Eritrea. Nevertheless, 
the fact that the Unionist Party had managed to muster the support of an important 
minority suggests that a broad based Eritrean nationalism had yet to crystallise. The 
following period would prove decisive in this respect. 
93 Longrigg, 1945, op. cit., pp. 174-5. Emphasis added. It is noteworthy that alongside Foreign 
Minister Bevin's better known plan for a 'Greater Somalia', a similar scheme to devise a 'Greater 
Tigrai' had been thought of. 
94 Erlich, Haggai, 'Tigrean "Nationalism," British Involvement, and Haile Selassie's Absolutism 
Northern Ethiopia, 1941-1943; Asian and African Studies, Voi. 15, No. 2, 1981, pp. 191-227. 
95 Tseggai, Araya, "The History of the Eritrean Struggle' in: Cliffe, Lionel, and Davidson, Basii, (eds) 
The Long Struggle of Eritrea for Independence and Constructive Peace, Spokesman, Nottingham, 
1988, p. 72. 
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4.4 — War as catalyst of Eritrean identity 
Although, as we saw earlier, the General Assembly eventually rejected the Bevin-
Sforza plan, Eritrea's future remained unresolved. A five-member Commission on 
Eritrea was established by General Assembly Resolution 289 A(TV) in November 
1949. Composed of représentatives irò m Burma, Guatemala, Norway, Pakistan and 
South Africa, the commission was mandated to ascertain the wishes of the Eritrean 
people while hearing in mind Ethiopia's interest and security. When the UN 
Commission arrived in Eritrea in February 1950, the situation was somewhat 
différent than that encountered earlier by the Four Powers Commission. There were 
no longer five politicai parties but two opposing camps: the Independence Bloc and 
the Unionist Party.96 The Commission's five délégations reached three différent 
conclusions. Norway proposed Eritrea's 'complete and immediate reunion' to 
Ethiopia, Burma and South Africa called for a federai solution, and Guatemala and 
Pakistan argued in favolar of independence.97 
Debate in the UN General Assembly ensued, with the Soviet Bloc, Latin 
American and Asian countries initially supporting the recommendation that Eritrea 
be placed under trusteeship before being granted independence, while the US and its 
allies favouring a fédération. The US had come to endorse Ethiopia's claims over 
Eritrea ever since 1941 when, in alliance with Britain, it began setting up military 
bases in Eritrea.98 Despite the fact that it contravened its initial stance on 
décolonisation and self-determination, the US maintained its position. As relations 
96 For a description of the composition of these two blocs, see Iyob, 1995 op. cit., pp. 75-8. 
97 UN Report (1950), 25. Paragraphs 165 and 172. As quoted in Iyob, 1995, op. cit., p. 78. 
98 US military presence in Eritrea was to be formalised in 1953, when it signed an agreement with 
Ethiopia on Defence Installations, namely that of the Kagnew base. Located near Asmara, the Kagnew 
base formed part of the US's global communications network. Halliday, Fred, 'US Policy in the Horn 
of Africa: Aboulia or Proxy Intervention?' Review of African Politicai Economy, No. 10, September-
December 1977, pp. 10-11. 
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between the US and the Soviet Union deteriorateci, Eritrea's geostrategic position 
From the point of view of strict justice, the opinion of the Eritrean people must 
receive considération. Nevertheless, the strategie interests of the US and the 
Red Sea Basin and world peace make it necessary that the country be linked 
with our ally, Ethiopia." 
After lengthy debates, the General Assembly adopted the American-backed draft 
resolution.100 On September 15, 1952, under the terms of Resolution 390 A(V), it 
was declared that Eritrea would become an autonomous région within an Ethiopian 
Fédération. Eritrea was granted its own institutions and symbols of autonomy, a 
development that was to become an important stepping-stone in the construction of 
an Eritrean identity. As Woldeab Woldemariam was later to recali: 
Yes, relations with the state changed completely. Everybody started to change 
their minds, to become in favor of Eritrea. (...) During 1945-52 the arena was 
politicai. There were only Unionists and Independents, other movements were 
non-existent. After, 1952 a new idea, a pro-Eritrean idea, began to emerge. As 
Eritrea was defined by the United Nations, there came new times.101 
But the United Nations resolution was not to be respected by Ethiopia.102 Step by 
step, Emperor Haile Selassie stripped Eritrea of its various symbols of autonomy. 
Politicai parties and labour syndicates were banned, and Eritrea's administrative 
languages, Tigrinya and Arabie, were replaced by Amharic. In December 1958, the 
Eritrean flag was abolished, in 1959 the existence of a distinct Eritrean criminal code 
was abrogated and finally, on 14 November 1962, the Federai Act was dissolved, 
99 Quoted in Wolde-Yesus Ammar, 1992, op. cit., p. 31. For a description of the United States 
involvement in the Horn of Africa, see also: Halliday, 1977, op. cit., pp. 8-32; and Okbazghi 
Yohannes, 1997, op. cit. 
100 Okbazghi Yohannes, 1997, op. cit., p. 129. 
101 Interview given by Woldeab Woldemariam, quoted in Killion, 1997, op. cit., p. 12. 
102 According to Tekeste Negash, Eritrea was not unilaterally annexed by Ethiopia but incorporated 
into it, according to the wishes of the Unionists. See Negash, op. cit., 1997. Although Negash seeks to 
\ \ 
became ali the more significant, as indicated in! 1952 by the Secretary of State, 
\ / 
John Foster Dulles. 
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making Eritrea the fourteenth Governorate of the Empire of Ethiopia. Eritrea thus 
beeame part of Ethiopia six months before the founding eonference of the OAU. The 
fact that the OAU's headquarters were located in Addis Ababa prevented Eritreans 
from pleading their case in this forum. Ethiopia's total disregard for Eritrea's 
previous autonomy signalled the beginning of the nationalist opposition. 
a) Civil disobedience 
As Eritrea was progressively stripped of its autonomy, discontent, mainly among its 
urban population, slowly mounted. Eritrean workers were the first to begin agitating. 
Although their Claims were not at first explicitly couched in nationalist terms, they 
were to play an important 'symbolic' role in future mobilisation.103 Just a few 
rnonths before Eritrea's fédération to Ethiopia came into force, the British 
administration lifted the ban on trade unions. Eritrea's first trade union, the non-
sectarìan Hara Zekhlone Semret Kefletat Serahtenyatat Eritrawiyan (HZSKSE), was 
established in January 1952, and the first Labour code was adopted in May 1952.104 
Although under article 33 of Eritrea's new Federai constitution, workers' 
associations were explicitly authorised, no Eritrean labour Code had been adopted. 
Spurred by growing inflation and increasing unemployment, the HZSKSE began, in 
early 1953, to cali for strike action in Asmara and Massawa. The Eritrean 
government, conscious of the HZSKSE's widespread support, avoided direct 
confrontation with the syndicate. It decided instead to try and eliminate its main 
correct what he sees as the erroneous interprétation of this period by nationalist propaganda, his 
account is itself somewhat biased. 
103 The workers' organisation is frequently quoted in Eritrea's nationalist 'mythology' as one of the 
first nationalist uprisings. Although this is not exactly the case, it constitutes nevertheless an important 
moment in the process. See, Killion, op. cit., 1977, for a thorough and balanced account of Eritrea's 
Workers' organisations. 
104 The HZSKSE was officially translated into English as the 'Syndicate of Free Eritrean Workers.' 
Killion, 1997, op. cit., p. 16. 
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leader, Woldeab Woldemariam, whose growing popularity and well-known stance 
against Eritrea's unión with Ethiopia threatened the federal government. 
In 1954, having survived two assassination attempts, Woldeab Woldemariam 
deeided to flee to Cairo where he began to broadeast a series of pro-independence 
speeehes into Eritrea and Ethiopia.105 That same year, Ibrahim Sultán, former head of 
the Muslim League, and leader of the parliamentary opposition group, was sidelined 
by Eritrea's government. Even the most fervent advocates of the federal option in 
parliament became increasingly disillusioned as the Unionist eamp began to 
disintegrate.106 
As political opposition was progressively shut out, the economie situation 
worsened and popular unrest mounted.107 In March 1958, a general strike was called, 
only to be violently suppressed by the Eritrean pólice. Although the scale of pólice 
brutality might have been subsequently exaggerated in nationalist accounts, it is 
clear, as Killion notes: 
that the general strike was only suppressed with a great display of coercive 
forcé, which underlines both its widespread popular support and its clearly 
political dimensión. Furthermore, the popular memory of brutal repression 
associated with the strike (which a later generation of nationalists likened to 
Sharpeville in South Africa) made it a powerful touch-stone for growing anti-
Ethiopian and Eritrean nationalist sentiment in the Tigrinya/Christian urban 
population.108 
The general strike and the government's violent retaliation marked a turning point. 
The following November, the Eritrean Liberation Movement (ELM), Eritrea's first 
non-secular anti-Ethiopian organisation was established in Port Sudan. 
105 Harding, Jeremy, 'A Death in Eritrea/ London Review of Books, 6 July 1995, p. 10. 
106 Okbazghi Yohannes, 1997, op. cit., pp. 142-5. 
107 'Between 1947 and 1962, employment in all manufacturing industries declined from 32,400 
workersto 10,350.' Killion, 1977, op. cit., p. 20. 
108 Killion, 1977, op. cit., p. 33. 
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The founders of the ELM were for the most part Muslim Eritrean exiles and 
members of the youth branch of the communist Party of Sudan. 
As students in the 1950s, they were caught in the rising tide of Sudanese 
nationalism and the excitement of independence in 1956. Düring visits to 
relatives in Eritrea, they witnessed the graduai dismantling of the fédération 
and the growing apprehension of anti-unionist circles as Ethiopia's grip 
tightened. (...) Their aim was to build an organisation capable of resisiing 
Ethiopian encroachment, and if need be to wrest Eritrea free of Haile Selassie's 
grip. It was decided to recruit like-minded people inside Eritrea (...) 
Recruitment initially was carried out among Muslims. (...) Their willing 
response to the cali of the ELM was not surprising. What did surprise the 
organisers was the depth of politicai aliénation they discovered among 
Christians, especially workers and students.109 
Despite the ELM's success among the Christian highlanders, it began encountering 
opposition. Because Mohammed Said Nawd, one of the founding members of the 
ELM, 'was originally from the aristocratie Beit Asghede tribe in the Sahel,' he was 
unable to rally some sections of the Muslim population to his cause. His main 
opponent, Ibrahim Sultan, also from the Sahel, but of serf background, decided 
instead to found his own movement the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF).110 The ELM 
was also criticised by the ELF for its initial pacifist stance. In 1962, the ELM did 
decide to resort to armed struggle. But, in 1965, it was defeated by the ELF in a 
military confrontation and subsequently dissolved. Although short-lived, the ELM 
paved the way for Eritrea's future libération movements. It was the first politicai 
organisation to enshrine in its Charter the ideal of a secular pan-Eritrean nationality. 
It also provided a rallying ground for Eritrea's increasingly politicised students, 
whose numbers had grown from about 15,000 in 1952 to 38,000 in 1961/62 and of 
which 1,372 were in academic high schools and vocational institutions. These 
109 Markakis, John, National and Class Conflict in the Horn of Africa, Zed Books Ltd, London and 
New Jersey, 1990, p. 106. 
110 Wolde Yesus Ammar, 1992, op. cit., p. 51 
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students provided Eritrea with a sizeable intelligentsia, a group that was to play an 
important rôle in Eritrea's future nationalist struggle. 111 
The 1958 general strike had a decisive impact on those students who had 
begun agitating, albeit in an unstructured fashion, since the mid-1950s. Student 
unrest originated in Asmara's two major high schools: The Prince Makkonnen 
Secondary High School (PMS S), one of whose students was Isaias Aferworki, the 
future founding-leader of the Eritrean Peoples Liberation Front, and the Haile 
Selassie I Secondary School (HSISS), where, from 1975 to 1995, Ahmed 
Mohammed Nasser, the chairman of the Eritrean Liberation, was studying.112 In 
September 1960, three to four hundred students went on strike 'demanding the 
restoration of the Eritrean flag, seal and arms.'113 They were imprisoned. From then 
onwards, student protests intensifïed. Two of the most important démonstrations took 
place in May 1962, following rumours of Ethiopia's impending décision to unify 
Eritrea to Ethiopia, and in March 1965. Both originated and were organised by the 
students of the PMSS.114 These events are significant not only in that they indicate 
the presence of an opposition amongst urban Highlanders to the unionist project, but 
also because they highlight the rôle played by Eritrea's intelligentsia in the 
nationalist movement. As the student movement became increasingly organised, it 
established branches throughout Eritrea. The growing ELM-ELF tension, internai 
dissension within the ELF ranks (with whom the student unions were closely 
affiliated) and increased governmental repression forced the student movement 
111 Wolde-Yesus Axnmar, 'The role of Asmara Students in the Eritrean Nationalist Movement, 
Eritrean Studies Review, Vol. 2, No. 1, Spring 1997, p. 60. 
112 Wolde-Yesus Ammar, 1997, op. cit., p. 65. Eritrea's first student association had been created in 
Cairo in 1952, where more than 300 Eritrean students were pursuing higher education. 
113 Iyob, 1995, op. cit., p. 91. 
114 Wolde-Yesus Ammar, 1997, op. cit., p. 65. 
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underground and abroad.115 The failure of the Workers' Union, the student 
movement and the ELM to induce a change in Ethiopia's policy towards Eritrea, 
forced Eritrea's opposition movements to abandon the strategy of civil disobedience 
and rely on armed resistance. 
b) The beginning of the armed struggle 
In 1959, Idris Mohammed Adam, former chairman of the Eritrean Assembly, 
Ibrahim Sultan, the former founder of the Muslim League and leader of the 
Independence Bloc Party, and Woldeab Woldemariam, exiled since 1954, met in 
Cairo to organise resistance to Ethiopia. But in July 1960, Idris Mohammed Adam 
broke away from this group and, along with Mohammed Said Nawd, announced the 
création of the ELF. Eritrea's first armed opposition movement was originally 
dominated by Cairo-based Eritrean students; its deputy leader, Idris Osman 
Galadewos, being a law graduate from the University of Cairo.116 Osman Saleh 
Sabbe, a former schoolmaster, also joined the ELF soon thereafter. The ELF is 
frequently accredited with having initiated Eritrea's armed struggle in 1961, yet the 
first shot was fired by Hamid Idris Awate. Whether or not the famous shifìa leader 
acted for politicai reasons remains unclear, but whatever his motivations and politicai 
affiliation (both the ELM and the ELF were to claim him as one of their own), his 
défiant gesture posed a threat to Ethiopia's ambitions. 
In 1962, the ELF managed to establish a small armed force inside Eritrea. It 
was mainly composed of former Eritrean soldiers from the Sudanese army who 
115 The internai debates that were to eventually undermine the ELF may be seen in conjunction with 
the student debates on the nationalities questions taking place within the Ethiopian Student Union of 
North America (ESUNA) duringthe 1960s and early 70s. For more on this issue, see: Blasvik, Randi 
R0nning, Halle Sellasie 's Students: The Intellectual and Social Background to Revolution, 1952-1977, 
Michigan State University, East Lansing, 1985, pp. 281-89. 
116 Markakis, 1990, op. cit., p. 110. 
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defected taking along their arms. From then onwards, the ELF's credibility as 
Eritrea's main opposition movement grew, and it began to reeeive finaneial and 
military support from neighbouring Arab states, and more specifically from Syria 
and Iraq.117 
In 1963, thirty Eritreans, mostly students in Egypt, were sent to Syria for 
several months' military training. Among them was Ramadan Mohammed Nur, 
a former Student of Sabbe at Arkiko, who was to become the secretary-general 
of the Eritrean Peoples Liberation front in the 1970s. They returned with arms 
and were sent into the Barka région of Eritrea. Another group of about seventy 
trainees went to Syria in 1965, and more were to follow later.118 
Renewed armed clashes occurred in 1966 as the ELF expanded towards the 
highlands and the numbers of Student recruits increased. In 1967, Ethiopian troops 
retaliated and launehed a major offensive which drove tens of thousands of Eritrean 
refugees info camps in Sudan, and during which 'villages and large towns (like 
Keren) were ruined by fighter-bombers dropping napalm and high explosives.'119 
Throughout the late 1960s and early 1970s, the ELF launehed a number of guerrilla 
attacks. Several politicai représentatives and senior officers, including the 
commanding general of Ethiopia's Second Division, were killed in ambushes in 
Asmara, Keren and Agordat. According to Tekle Mariam Woldemikael: 
The Ethiopian government responded by declaring martial law and a state of 
emergency and committing atrocities reminiscent of My-Lai. The 1969 public 
hangings in Agordat, the mass killings of 112 people in the village of Bascara 
on November 27, 1970 and the killings of 625 people in a village near Keren 
on December 1, 1970 and the shooting of 60 people in a mosque at a village 
near Elaberid on January 27, 1971 infuriated the Eritrean population, especially 
117 Arab support is explained not only by the ELF's predominantly Muslim composition, but also as a 
reaction to Ethiopia's relationship with Israel. 
118 Markakis, 1990, op. cit., p. 112. 
119 Lobban, Richard, "The Eritrean War: Issues and Implications,' Canadiern Journal of African 
Studies, Vol. 10, No. 2, 1976, p. 340. See also, Halliday, Fred, 'The Fighting in Eritrea,' New Lefl 
Review, lxviii, May-June 1971, p. 62. 
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the urban and edueated ones who had access to reports about the incidents from 
the international news media.120 
Ethiopia's military offensives, and the atrocities that often accompanied them, only 
served to mobilise Eritrea's population against the government of Ethiopia. The 
ELF's popularity increased and by 1972 it had established itself throughout the 
country. 
As the ELF grew in membership and in geographical scope, internai 
dissension became more pronounced. The ELF's predominantly Muslim base and 
earlier Arab patronage, is often invoked to explain the front's failure to achieve 
broad base support among Eritreans.121 The Front's decentralised structure, by 
favouring the emergence of regional leaders, was another important factor in its 
subséquent fragmentation. Divided into five geographical areas, the ELF's 
organisational structure was modelled on the Algerian Front de Libération Nationale 
(FLN). But this organisational model exacerbai ed Eritrea's communal divisions and 
slowly undermined the front's legitimacy as the sole représentative of Eritrean 
society. The ELF's ground tactics - confiscation of peasants' cattle and crops -
further 'alienated the traditional highland peasants of Eritrea', fuelling the leadership 
struggle and personal rivalries that had marred the movement from its inception.122 
Throughout 1968 and 1969, a number of meetings were held aimed at reforming the 
ELF's structure and relocating the General Command from Cairo to a base inside 
120 Tekle Mariam Woldemikael, 'Politicai Mobilization and Nationalist Movements: The Case of the 
Eritrean People's Liberation Front,1 Africa Today, 2nd Quarter, 1991, p. 34. For a description of the 
atrocities committed by the Ethiopian army between 1969 and 1971, see: Morrison, Godfrey, Eritrea 
and Southern Sudan, Minority Rights Group, Report, No. 5, London, May 1976, p. 6. 
121 Halliday and Molyneux, 1981, op. cit., pp. 189-90; Iyob, 1995, op. cit., p.108. 
122 Pateman, Roy, 'The Eritrean War,' ArmedForces and Society, Vol. 17, No. 1, Fall 1990, p. 85. 
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Eritrea.123 But these meetings proved unsuccessful, the ELF started to splinter and a 
new generation of leaders began to emerge.124 
The main challengers to what would be known as the ELF-Revolutionary 
Council were Osman Saleh Sabbe's ELF-SG, later renamed the ELF-PLF, and the 
Tripartite Union (or People's Liberation Front Zones 1 and 2 and the ELF-Ubel). The 
Tripartite Union was reformed in February 1972 to become the Eritrean Peoples 
Liberation Front (EPLF).125 Led by Isaias Aferworki and Ramadan Nur, both of 
whom had trained in China, the EPLF, with its military branch the Eritrean Peoples 
Liberation Army (EPLA), gradually emerged as Eritrea's dominant libération 
movement.126 From 1972 to 1974, in what is now referred to as Eritrea's first civil 
war, the ELF fought the newly formed EPLF. The outcome however was 
inconclusive. Woldeab Woldemariam, who had then joined the EPLF, sougft to 
broker a reconciliation between the two contending fronts. He failed and then 
decided to return Cairo, remaining in exile until the end of the war.127 Throughout 
the conflict with Ethiopia, Eritrea's contending politicai movements would clash 
regularly. Only periodically abated by joint opérations, this intra-Eritrean conflict 
lasted until the early 1980s, when the ELF's forces petered out and its leadership was 
forced into exile. 
Hopes that the 1974 Ethiopian Revolution, which led to the demise of Emperor 
Haile Selassie and its replacement by the Provisionai Military Administrative 
Council (or Derg), would bring a peaceful resolution of the Ethiopian-Eritrean 
123 Iyob, 1995, op. cit., p. 114. 
124 For a description of this and of the history of this period, see: Erlich, Haggai, The Struggle over 
Eritrea, 1962-1978, Hoover Institution Press, Stanford, 1982. 
125 de Waal, Alex, Evil Days. 30 Years of War and Famine in Ethiopia, New York, Human Rights 
Watch, 1991, p. 42. 
126 Ramadan Nur had joined the ELF in 1963, and Aferworki in 1968-69. 
127 In 1987, Woldeab made a brief visit to the liberated area, but only returned to Asmara in 1991. 
Harding, 1995, op. cit., p. 10. 
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conflict were soon shattered. General Aman Adom, despite not being a member of 
the Derg, was appoìnted to head the government of Ethiopia. Being himself of 
Eritrean origin, he expressed the possibility of a peaceful resolution of the Eritrean 
question, but was killed on 23 November 1974 ("Bloody Saturday"). He was 
replaced by General Teferi Banti, former Second Division Commander and a hard-
liner on the Eritrean question.128 As a resuit, 'most of the Derg's few Eritrean 
members defected to the EPLF, and with the assassination of naval petty officer 
Michael Asgedom, not a single Eritrean member of the Derg remained.'129 
Suggestions of a negotiated settlement that would have granted Eritrea a measure of 
regional autonomy within Ethiopia were rejected both by the ELF and EPLF now 
both committed to foli independence. 
On 28 January 1975, the Derg declared that it had lost its 'patience' and now 
intended 'to eliminate those who fight against the unity of the country.' A few days 
later, it was ominously announced that Major Mengistu Haile Mariam 'had taken 
personal command of the opérations in Eritrea and that he would deal with the 
"disciplinary problems" among Ethiopian troops'.130 A few days after the Derg's 
déclaration, intense fighting between the combined Eritrean forces and the Ethiopian 
army broke out. The excesses of the Ethiopian forces were punished by court martial 
and summary execution of some of their own troops, but this did little to allay the 
deep-seated fears among Eritreans, not did it cairn the hatred that was fanned by the 
February fighting.131 
Military opérations continued throughout the Spring and Summer of 1975 and 
the Ethiopian Air Force was reported to undertake heavy aerial bombardments on 
128 Lobban, 1976, op. cit., p. 343. 
129 Clapham, 1988, op. cit., p. 198. 
130 Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Vol. XXI, 1975, March 24-30,1975, p. 27031. 
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Eritrea' main eities. Although the Ethiopian army sueceeded in regaining full control 
over Asmara, Keren and Massawa, the countryside remained largely in the hands of 
Eritrea's guerrilla forces. More young Eritreans joined the Eritrean fronts in this 
period 'as a resuit of repressive actions by the Army.'132 Allégations of atrocities 
were reported by the Eritrean libération fronts and by Western relief workers. 
Visiting London in May 1975 to seek help from the International Red Cross and 
British Relief Agencies, Dr. Bereket Selassie, a former acting Attorney General 
under the Emperor Haile Selassie and then chairman of the Eritrean national relief 
committee said that: 
300,000 people had been driven from their homes in Eritrea and were refugees 
with little food, and that since February 3,000 non-combatants, including 
women and children had been killed and 47 villages destroyed by Ethiopian 
troops, whom he also accused of destroying food stores and even poisoning 
water.133 
After having opposed Imperial Ethiopia and its American allies,134 the Eritrean 
libération movements then faced Mengistu's brutal military regime supported by the 
US until 1977135 and thereafter by the Soviet Union.136 
131 Lobban, 1976, op. cit., p. 344; and Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1975, op. cit., p. 27032. 
132 Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1975, op. cit., p. 27253. 
133 Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1975, op. cit., p. 27254. 
134 'Düring the period from 1952 to 1975, U.S. military assistance to Ethiopia amounted to $275 
million. U.S. Military Advisory Group army and air forces were based at Kagnew, near Asmara, and 
naval personnel in Massawa.' Pateman, Fall 1990, op. cit., p. 84. For comparable estimâtes, and a 
description of US military assistance (hardware and training) see, Lobban, 1976, op. cit., pp. 338-9; 
Halliday, 1977, op. cit., pp. 10-18; Keesing's Contemporary Archives, op. cit., 1975, p 27253. 
According to the International Institute for Strategie Studies, London, from 1953 to 1978, Ethiopia 
received some $400 million in military aid from the United States. See: Strategie Survey 1917, 
International Institute for Strategie Studies, London, p. 18. 
135 In February 1977, the new Carter administration decided to suspend all arm supplies to Ethiopia, 
'reduce its Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) personnel in the country substantially and 
close the Kagnew Communications Station later that year. ( . . . ) [Nevertheless], in early 1978, 
'Washington fulfilled Mengistu's request for Jeeps and American made fighter plane spare parts 
(originally part of the May 1977 weapons order) and Cluster bombs that were intended for use in a 
large-scale offensive against the Eritrean libération movement.' Petras, James and Morley, Morris, H., 
"The Ethiopian Military State and Soviet-US Involvement in the Horn of Africa,' Review of African 
Politicai Economy, No. 30, September 1984, pp. 28-9. 
136 The superpowers' dramatic shift of alliance between Ethiopia and Somalia is discussed in the 
following chapter when discussing the Ogaden war of 1977-78. The reader may nevertheless want to 
consult: Luckham, Robin, and Dawit Bekele, 'Foreign Powers and Militarism in the Horn of Africa: 
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c) The EPLF: An insurgent state 
Factionalism and purges within Ethiopia's military, brought some respite to the 
Eritrean forces. Between 1975 and 1976, following agreement to set aside their 
différences, the ELF and EPLF joined forces and succeeded in overrunning about 
90% of the entire Eritrean territory save Asmara, Massawa and the small town of 
Barentu in the west.137 Düring this period, major changes in military and politicai 
strategy were introduced. Since the beginning of the conflict in 1961, the ELF and 
EPLF had essentially conducted classic guerrilla warfare.138 The capture of several 
towns, including Keren in July 1977, represented a great military victory for the 
EPLF and marked the adoption of 'revolutionary warfare'.139 But Eritrean hopes for 
complete victory soon vanished. 
Mengistu's call for 'total war' and renewed tensions between Eritrea's rival 
fronts in the second half of 1977, marked the end of the threat posed by Eritrea's 
fronts to the Derg. Having won the war against Somalia in the Ogaden, the Ethiopian 
army was able to re-deploy its troops on the Northern front. Moreover, the 
resumption of the ELF-EPLF internecine conflict, meant an increase of casualties 
among their already over-stretched forces. In 1978, the Eritreans were forced to 
retreat in the face of the Derg's technologicai superiority and number of troops. 
Many of the positions acquired during the previous year, save the town of Nacfa, 
were yielded to Ethiopia's army aided in the fìeld by Soviet and Cuban military 
Part I,' Review ofAfrican Politicai Economy, No. 30, September 1984, pp. 8-20; Petras, James F., and 
Morris H. Morley, 1984, op. cit., pp. 21-31; and Okbazghi Yohannes, op. cit., 1997. 
137 Araya Tseggai, 1988, op. cit., p. 78; de Waal, op. cit., p. 50. 
138 Throughout their struggle Eritreans hardly benefited from outside support, building up most of 
their military supplies from tanks, arm s and ammunitions captured from Ethiopian army. Pateman, 
Fall 1990, op. cit., p. 82 
139 Chaliand, Gérard, "The Guerrilla Struggle' in: Davidson, Basil, Cliffe, Lionel and Bereket Habte 
Selassie (eds), Behind the War in Eritrea, Spokesman, Nottingham, 1980, p. 52. 
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advisors.140 From then onwards, 'the Eritrean forces were to wage a mix of 
conventional trench-warfare around their mountain redoubt and partisan raids behind 
government lines.'141 
In January 1977, the EPLF held its first Congress; it adopted a radical 
socialist platform and introduced a new military strategy. Criticising the ELF's lack 
of substantive pohtical programme (except for that of independence), the EPLF put 
forth a sériés of socio-political reforms. These were destined to transform Eritrean 
identity from one defined only by its opposition to Ethiopian oppression to one 
defined positively from within. Operating in the newly liberated territories, the EPLF 
set out to educate, politicise and train the population, providing both food and health 
services. 
In large areas of the territory, particularly around Keren, the guerrillas 
established an efficient administration to govern a mostly sympathetic 
population: hospitals and factories functioned underground, plantations and 
farms once owned by the Italian expatriâtes and later nationalized by the 
government in Addis Ababa were taken over by guerrilla co-operatives. Rural 
bus services run by the rebels linked towns in the 'liberated areas'.142 
The EPLF was, in short, beginning the process of nation-building. 
The absence of any external support forced it to further concentrate on 
mobilising ail members of Eritrean society.143 From its inception, the EPLF made 
sure to include représentatives of all Eritrea's society: Christians and Muslims 
participated equally in the decision-making process, peasant and pastoralist concerns 
140 Araya Tseggai, 1988, op. cit., pp. 78-81; and Lyons, Roy, 'The USSR, China and the Horn of 
Africa,' Review of African Politicäl Economy, No. 12, May-August 1978, pp. 5-30. Cuban fighter 
pilots and artillery troops were also involved on the Ethiopian side. American Cluster bombs were also 
used in the attacks on Asmara and Massawa, in which an estimated 1,000 civilians died. See, Petras 
and Morley, 1984, op. cit., p. 29 
141 Connell, Dan, 'Eritrea: Starting from Scratch', Review of African Politicäl Economy, Vol. 22, No. 
66, December 1995, p. 589. 
142 Strategie Survey 1977, op. cit., p. 22. 
143 By contrast to the ELF-RC and the ELF-PLF, who reeeived some financial support from Arab 
states, the EPLF reeeived only minimal financial assistance and this mainly from the Eritrean 
diaspora. 
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were addressed, and women were fully integrated in all levels of the fighting. With 
the introduction of 'compulsory military service5, the war continued to further 
provide Eritrea with the emotional attachment essential to nation-formation: 
Every member (male, iemale, young and old) goes through one year of military 
training. In the camps, most of the newly recruited fighters go through a 
process of transformation the same as in any regulär army. (...) A sense of 
communion among the fighters, based on complétés identification with their 
units, makes the EPLF a very effective Organization. The high morale of the 
fighters can be attributed not only to the fact that most Eritreans identify with 
an abstract concept called Eritrea, but also to the sense of camaraderie created 
in the Front.144 
Throughout the war, the front developed an underground primary level éducation 
system designed for both its fighters and the local population. Düring the 1980s, the 
EPLF was running more than 150 schools with a total of 50,000 students.145 If 
éducation had until then been limited to a small elite, it was now available to a 
broader portion of the population further spreading the notion of an Eritrean identity, 
as defined by the EPLF. 
When in 1981 the EPLF defeated the ELF,146 it was able to impose its own 
définition of 'Eritreaness'. Described as 'egalitarian' and 'progressive', the new 
values and symbols adopted by the front were for the most part inspired by its 
Marxist allegiance and provided the substance of Eritrea's national identity.147 These 
favourable depictions should not obscure the fact that the EPLF was a highly 
centralised and 'ruthless' organisation: 
Because the EPLF is primarily a military Organization, it has been relatively 
ruthless in dealing with dissidents. Control over members of the Organization is 
144 Tekle Mariam Woldemikael, 1991, op. cit., pp. 34-5. 
145 War-Torn Societies Project, Eritrea Country Note, United Nations Research Institute for Social 
Development. Programme for Stratégie and International Securities Studies, UNRISD, Geneva, 
January 1996. 
146 Iyob, 1995, p. 131. 
147 Cliffe, op. cit., 1989, pp. 131-47; Pateman, Roy, 'Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité: Aspects of the 
Eritrean Révolution,' The Journal of Modem African Studies, Vol. 28, No. 3, September 1990, pp. 
457-72; Sorenson, 1991, op. cit., pp. 301-17. 
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effected through allowing very little time for individuai reflection and separate 
thought. Most fighters eat together, sleep together, attend meetings together 
and rarely are left alone to reflect about their life and family.148 
Several of the EPLF's leaders, foremost of whom were Isaias Aferworki and 
Ramadan Nur, had been sent to train in China when they had joined the ELF's ranks 
in the 1960s. This experienee in turn influeneed and moulded the nationalist model 
they established.149 Another feature of the 'new' Eritrean national identity was its 
concern for the integration of women into society and, especially, into the libération 
army. At the end of the war, it was estimated that 30% of the Eritrean Liberation 
Army was composed of women.150 
The EPLF's emphasis on self-reliance did not entail total isolation. But by 
contrast to the ELF, who mainly relied on Eritrea's Arab neighbours, the EPLF 
cautiously sought to avoid becoming dépendent on a single politicai backer or 
alienate any potential support. As Mark Duffield and John Prendergast observed: 
Although having serious disagreements with Soviet policy, the EPLF refused 
to brand the Soviet Union an outright enemy. Instead, it mounted a campaign 
to change the position of other countries within the socialist bloc. This strategy 
led to the first weakening in Eritrea's isolation. In 1978, for example the EPLF 
opened an office in Algeria and secured similar récognition in Guinea-Bissau 
and Mozambique. In the same year, although having military personnel in 
Ethiopia, Cuba expressed concern with Ethiopian policy and declined to assist 
the war in the North.151 
The establishment of the Eritrean Relief Agency (ERA) in 1975 constituted another 
important step in opening Eritrea to the outside world, as well as means of restraining 
further Eritrean refugee exodus to Sudan. The EPLF actively sought to limit the 
148 Tekle Mariam Woldemikael, 1991, op. cit., p. 35. See also, Clapham, 1988, op. cit., p. 212. 
149 Marchai, Roland, Démobilisation et reconstruction en Erythrée, Centre d'Etudes Africaines, Ecole 
des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, Paris, 1994, p. 11. 
150 War-Torn Societies Project, 1996, op. cit., p. 9. 
151 Duffield, Mark and Prendergast, John, Without Troops and Tanks. Humanitarian Intervention in 
Ethiopia and Eritrea, The Red Sea Press, Lawrenceville, New Jersey, 1994, p. 24. On the 
international reactions to the conflict see, Lefort, René, Ethiopie: la révolution hérétique, François 
Maspero, Paris, 1981, pp. 362-66. 
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outward flow of refugees, not only to ensure humanitarian aid, but also to secure its 
own social basis and avoid becoming vulnerable to friendly states.152 Although 
created as an independent body, the ERA was closely associated with the EPLF.153 
Its purpose was to publicise the effects of the war on the Eritrean people and appeal 
for external assistance. Rather than attempting to persuade foreign governments' 
officiais, the ERA approached international agencies. It focused its energies towards 
Western countries, and more specifically Western public opinion, whose potential 
influence on government poücy had been demonstrated during the Vietnam War.154 
The exiled Eritrean community was instrumental in this respect. 
As the EPLF was seeking international récognition and laying the foundations 
of Eritrea's nationhood through indoctrination and socio-economic reform, the war 
against the Derg continued. In 1982, Mengistu launched the infamous Red Star 
Campaign involving more than 120,000 men, the largest number of troops deployed 
in Eritrea, using Soviet-supplied hardware, including chemical weapons.155 Of 
Ethiopia's 22 divisions, 14 were based in Eritrea and 3 in the province of Tigray.156 
The latter was now controlied by the Tigrayan Peoples Liberation Front (TPLF) 
allied to the EPLF.157 This was the Derg's most destructive offensive to date, and if 
the Great Famine of 1983-85 acquired such dramatic proportions it was not simply 
152 See also: Marchai, Roland, 'Guerre et Famine: population et guérillas en Erythrée,' 
Communication au Xlle Congrès International de Sociologie, Madrid, juillet, 1990. 
153 A dispute arose between the ELF and the EPLF as to the status of the ERA. As a resuit, the ELF set 
up its own relief body, the Eritrean Red Cross and Crescent Society (ERCCS) 
154 Duffield and Prendergast, 1994, op. cit., p. 25. 
155 Araya Tseggai, 1988, op. cit., p. 81; and De Waal, 1991, op. cit., p. 118-123. According to 
Patemanthe Ethiopian army deployed 90,000 men. See, Pateman, Fall 1990, op. cit., p. 90. 
136 Pateman, Fall 1990, op. cit., p. 90. 
157 The TPLF was established in 1975. For a description and history of the TPLF, see, Young, John, 
Peasant Revolution in Ethiopia. The Tigray People's Liberation Front, 1975-1991, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1997, and "The Tigray People's Liberation Front,' in: Clapham, 
Christopher, (ed.), African Guerrillas, James Currey, Oxford, 1998, pp. 36-52. 
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because of the drought but mainly because of the war the Ethiopian regime was 
Waging on Eritrea and Tigray.158 
The famine's coverage by the media in October 1984 marked a shift in 
international response to the Ethiopian-Eritrean conflict. International aid, which had 
hitherto been mostly distributed through the Ethiopian government, started to be 
channelled though NGOs cross-border opérations.159 The Emergency Relief Desk 
(ERD), an ecumenical NGO consortium established in 1981 in Sudan, provided the 
ideal vehicle which enabled donor governments to provide assistance to Eritrea 
without appearing to iniringe directly on Ethiopia's sovereignty. As the famine 
worsened, the ERD began providing cross-border humanitarian assistance into areas 
of Eritrea and Northern Ethiopia, co-operating with indigenous relief agencies, 
namely with the Eritrean Relief Agency (ERA). As Duffield and Prendergast noted: 
From the mid-1980s, the ERD provided donor governments with a legitimate, 
if unorthodox, Channel for their resources into Front-held territory. (...) The 
very fact of this assistance, however, was tantamount to a tacit récognition of 
the Fronts.160 
In 1984, the European Economic Commission, effectively challenging Ethiopia's 
sovereignty, 'officially designated the Eritrean Relief Agency (ERA) as a legitimate 
recipient of aid.'161 That same year, the Reagan administration agreed that US AID 
158 According to Clapham: "The EPLF strongly disapproved of the TPLF décision to respond to the 
famine by evacuating the population en masse to the Sudan - a décision no less ruthless than the 
Ethiopian government's resettlement scheme, and dictated by the need to retain control over a 
population which would otherwise have had to seek food from the Ethiopia authorities.' Clapham, 
1988, op. cit., p. 212. 
159 Reports that the food aid was being diverted by the Ethiopian government and failed to reach the 
afflicted areas may partly explainthe shift. See, Keller, Edmond J., 'Drought, War, and the Politics of 
Famine in Ethiopia and Eritrea,' The Journal of Modem African Studies, Vol. 30, No. 4, 1992, pp. 
609-624. 
160 Duffield and Prendergast, 1994, op. cit., p 6 and 12. 
161 Okbazghi Yohannes, 1997, op. cit., p. 186. That same year, the European Commission urged the 
Ethiopian government to find a peaceftil resolution to the conflict and acknowledge the 1950 UN 
resolution regarding Eritrea's autonomous status. 
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join the ERD and provide assistance to the EPLF and TPLF.162 It is difficult to assess 
the extent to which the media coverage and the international humanitarian assistance 
that ensued strengthened the EPLF, in the same way that previous international aid 
may have sustained Mengistu's regime. Nevertheless, it is safe to say that such cross-
border assistance inevitably lightened the burden of the EPLF, allowing it to feed its 
troops and the Eritrean people, and focus its energies on the war.163 Indeed, from 
1982 to 1984, there was a virtual stalemate on the battlefield, as the EPLF confined 
its military tactic to hit and run attacks that allowed it to capture arms and 
ammunitions. But in early 1984, reverting to conventional warfare and using tanks 
and artillery, the EPLF proceeded to capture the strategie town of Tessene and areas 
in the north-east, giving them road access to Sudan, as well as establishing control 
over a long stretch of the Red Sea, forcing the Ethiopian army back to the position it 
held before the 1977 offensive.164 Renewed aerial bombardments and further 
deployment of Ethiopian troops throughout 1984 and 1985, combined with the 
famine, only stiffened Eritrean resolve. According to Aies de Waal, between 1984 
and 1987, 'EPLF strength rose from 12,000 to about 30,000, and the number of 
militia were increased'.165 According to Roland Marchai, the ELA counted by the 
mid-1980s about 50,000 fighters, a number that would double in the last two years of 
the struggle.166 
In 1987, the EPLF held its second Congress and revised its 1977 National 
Démocratie Programme. It united with the ELF-Central Command, abandoned 
162 Duffield and Prendergast, 1994, op. cit., p. 12; and Okbazghi Yohannes, 1997, op. cit., p. 187. 
163 It is also probable that the relief workers operating in the war areas began to pressure their own 
governments. 
164 Cliffe, Lionel, 'Dramatic Shifts in the Military Balance in the Horn: The 1984 Eritrean Offensive,' 
Review ofAjrican PoliticaiEconomy, No. 30, September 1984, pp. 93-7. 
165 Ûe Waql, 1991, op. cit., p 184. 
166 Marchai, 1994, op. cit., p. 12. The number of fighters estimated in May 1991 was 95,000. War-torn 
societies project, 1996, op. cit. 
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previous Marxist rhetoric, called for the introduction of multi-party democracy and a 
mixed economic system. Isaias Aferworki was elected Secretary General of the 
EPLF, thus replacing Ramadan Mohammed Nur, who had been the Chairman of the 
Front since 1977.167 These changes were to enhance the EPLF's image to the outside 
world and more specifïcally to the US. It was for instance suggested that the élection 
of Isaias Aferworki, a Christian highlander, 'deflated the old argument that the EPLF 
was Muslim fundamentalist in character'168 which in turn quelled Israel's fears that 
the EritreanRed Sea coastline would be controlied by an 'Arab' power.169 
d) The beginning of the end 
In late 1987, the EPLF went once more on the offensive, attacking army convoys and 
disrupting the Ethiopian army's supply lines. Then came Ethiopia's military defeat at 
Afabet - its regional military headquarters and the base of its infamous Nadew (the 
'destroy' troops) - in March 1988. The battle at Afabet is generally referred to as 
marking a turning point in the war. 
The significance to the Ethiopian regime of the loss of Afabet cannot be 
overstated. In this single battle, Ethiopia lost whole divisions of its best trained 
and armed troops. Worse still, it left behind a weapons stockpile that it had 
amassed to carry out what was to have been a 'decisive offensive' against the 
EPLF. That decisive offensive was being planned by Soviet military advisors. 
As it was, the EPLF clearly outsmarting the Soviets, turned around the 
'planned offensive' to their advantage. The Soviet Union had always denied 
direct involvement in Eritrea but was caught red-handed by the EPLA at 
Afabet with the capture of three Soviet military personnel.170 
167 'Ethiopia: Washington backs a winner,' Africa Confidential, May 4 1990, p. 6. 
l6*Ibid. 
169 Tesfatsion Medhanie, Eritrea and Neighbours in the 'New World Order '. Geopolitics, Democracy 
and 'Islamic Fundamentalism'. Bremer Afrika-Studien Bd. 15, LIT, Hamburg, 1994. 
170 Berhane Woldemichael, 'Ethiopian Military in Disarray,' Review of African Political Economy, 
1989, p. 61. 
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Although Ethiopia's hold on Eritrea had been waning for some time, it continued to 
enjoy substantial Soviet military assistance.171 Yet, in July 1988, Gorbachev turned 
down Mengistu's request for a substantial increase in the supply of military 
hardware.172 This was in accordance with Chester Crocker's statement before the 
World Affairs Council in 1985, where mention was made of an agreement between 
the US and the USSR of the need for a concerted effort in order to stop the war in 
Ethiopia and accord Eritrea régional autonomy.173 Nevertheless, Soviet military 
assistance appears to have continued to be provided to Ethiopia after 1988. Indeed, 
according to Tekle Mariam Woldemikael, in 1989 alone, the Soviets supplied the 
Ethiopian government with more than $800 million of Soviet military hardware, 
including new generation T-62 tanks and b-24 multiple-rocket launchers.174 
In Aprii 1988, Mengistu met with Somalia's Président Siad Barre. Both 
leaders agreed to stop interfering in each other's domestic affairs and to withdraw 
their troops from the disputed border areas. This would enable Mengistu to re-deploy 
some of his troops to the North. Even 'youngsters were rounded up and conscripted 
to the army.'175 As Ethiopia was preparing another major offensive against the 
Eritrean and Tigrayan fronts, the EPLF and TPLF launched a sériés of attacks. The 
Ethiopian army lost a number of significant positions both in Tigray and Eritrea, of 
which Mekelle and Ende Selassie represented the most spectacular defeats. The 
171 According to figures quoted by Tekle Mariam Woldemikael, the Soviet Union supplied an 
estimated $11 billion worth of arms to Ethiopia between 1977 to 1990. Tekle Mariam Woldemikael, 
1991, op. cit., p. 37, quoting from an article published in the New York Times, February 14, 1990, p. 
A15. 
172 'Ethiopia: Dark Days for Mengistu,' Africa Confidential, Vol. 30, No. 4, 17 February 1989. 
173 Okbazghi Yohannes, 1997, op. cit., p. 188. 
174 Tekle Mariam Woldemikael, 1991, op. cit., p. 37, quoting from an article published in the New 
York Times, February 14, 1990, p. Al 5. 
175 Berhane Woldemichael, 1989, op. cit., p. 61. According to Pateman, every year since 1982, 50,000 
young men were drafted into the army. Pateman, Fall 1990, op. cit., p. 95. According to Luckham and 
Bekelle, "a new compulsory conscription law was introduced in 1983; but its implementation had the 
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Ethiopian army suffered massive casualties, reports plaeing numbers in the tens of 
thousands. 
The ease with which the EPLF and TPLF succeeded to rout,é Ethiopia's army 
eannot be solely explained by reference to the loss of Soviet support.176 The army 
had indeed offered httle résistance in Afabet. Not only was the army's rank and file 
increasingly defecting, but in May 1989, senior military officers plotted to overthrow 
Mengistu.177 Mengistu, alerted by officers loyal to him, had pre-empted the coup by 
dismissing several senior générais and promoting over forty colonels to the position 
of Brigadier-General, a tactic he had also used in 1985 to head off military unrest.178 
The attempted coup failed and several officers were arrested and executed. Amongst 
them were Major General Merid Negussie, the Chief of Staff, and Major-General 
Amha Desta, the Air Force commander. Following their arrest, Ethiopia's air force 
refused to bomb Eritrea and Tigray.179 
Although the US had condemned Ethiopia's human rights abuses and policy 
of repression in Eritrea intermittently throughout the 1980s,180 it had made no serious 
attempi to promote a peaceful resolution. In 1989, under the auspices of former 
American President Jimmy Carter and his Intervention Negotiating Network, two 
meetings were convened between the EPLF and the Ethiopian government, the first 
effect of driving many young men into exile as refùgees or into the guerrilla movements. See, 
Luckham and Bekelle, 1984, op. cit., p. 18. 
176 For a discussion of the factors that led to Mengistu's demise, see: Andargachew Tiruneh, The 
Ethiopian Révolution 1974-1987, Cambridge University Press, 1993, pp. 344-77. 
177 It would seem that an organisation calling itself the Movement of Free Soldiers of Ethiopia (or Free 
soldiers Movement) had joined forces with the TPLF in order to overthrow the Derg. See Berhane 
Woldemichael, 1989, op. cit., 62; andPateman, 1990, op. cit., p. 96. 
178 'Ethiopia: A blow-by-blow account,' Africa Corfidential, Vol. 30, No. 11,26 May 1989. 
179 Rimbaud, Albert, 'La négation de l'Ethiopie? ' Hérodote, No. 65, 1992, p. 193. 
180 Okbazghi Yohannes, 1997, op. cit., pp. 181-2. 
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in Atlanta, the second in Nairobi.181 Despite a rapprochement between the US and 
the EPLF,182 the US State Department nevertheless continued to speak of regional 
autonomy, refusing to consider any modifications to Ethiopia's territorial integrity. 
The US position was clearly spelled out by Assistant Secretary of State for African 
Affairs, Herbert Cohen, in February 1990: 
The United States Government is convinced, based on more than a generation 
of bloody fighting, that no solution to Ethiopia's internai conflict can be 
imposed on any side by force of arms. Ethiopia will be able to achieve a 
durable peace only by means of a negotiated politicai solution. The outlines of 
that solution are not hard to see. Ethiopia should remain whole. But its 
diversity and energy cannot be straitjacketed in a monolithic, centralized state. 
Loose fédération appears the only viable solution.183 
The US policy with regard to Ethiopia's territorial integrity had remained unchanged 
since the days when the matter was first discussed in the mid-1940s. 
Whether embittered by the US unwillingness to budge from its 'Greater 
Ethiopia' policy, or emboldened by America's tacit support,184 the EPLF launched a 
new offensive and successfully captured the city-port of Massawa in February 1990. 
The US State Department tried to pressure the EPLF into accepting that Massawa be 
internationalised so that food aid could be distributed via Soviet military transport 
planes. The suggestion was met with suspicion and was perceived by the EPLF as an 
attempi to hinder its attempts at independence.185 A second round of talks sponsored 
181 Keller, Edmond, 'Eritrean Self-Determination Revisited,' Africa Today, 2nd Quarter, 1991, p. 10; 
and Pateman, Fall 1990, op. cit., p. 95. Jimmy Carter, then President of the US, brought American 
military assistance to Ethiopia to an end in 1977. 
182 In May 1989, Isaias Aferworki travelled to Washington where he met with several high ranking US 
officials. 
183 Statement by Herman Cohen, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs before the 
Subcommittee on Africa and the International Task Force of the Select Committee on Hunger, United 
States House of Representatives, February 28, 1990. Quoted in Keller, 1991, op. cit., p. 11. 
184 In late 1989 and early 1990, a number of diplomatic meetings were held between the EPLF and 
senior American officials, both in Africa and in Washington. Henze, Paul, 'Ethiopia and Eritrea. The 
Defeat of the Derg and the Establishment of new Governments,' in: Smock, David R , (Ed.), Making 
War and Waging Peace. Foreign Intervention in Africa, United State, Institute of Peace Press, 
Washington, 1993, pp. 61-3. 
185 Okbazghi Yohannes, 1997, op. cit., p. 189. 
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by the US State Department was scheduled to be held in London in March 1991 but 
was abruptly postponed. On 21 May, Mengistu fled to Zimbabwe, and a few days 
later the Ethiopian army surrendered Asmara to the EPLF forces without offering 
any résistance. On the 27 and 28 May 1991, the US sponsored London Peace 
Conference was fìnally held. Invited to the meeting were the EPLF, the 
TPLF/EPRDF, and Prime Minister Tesfaye Dinka and his délégation, acting as 
représentatives of the Derg successor government.186 When on 28 May, the EPRDF 
forces entered Addis Ababa, Prime Minister Tesfaye Dinka and his délégation left 
the talks. On 29 May, Isaias Aferworki declared Eritrea's de facto independence, 
after having agreed to postpone for two years a referendum on independence.187 In 
July 1991, a Conference on Peace and Democracy was held in Addis Ababa. The 
Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary Democratic Front formally recognised the right of 
Eritrean people to determine their politicai future by an internationally supervised 
referendum.188 Eritrea, it was decreed, had not seceded; it had recovered its 
independence.189 
4.5 — Independent Eritrea 
At independence, the EPLF automatically appointed itself the Pro visionai 
Government of Eritrea (PGE). The PGE's administrative structure was similar to that 
found as a fighting force. It was mainly composed by former EPLF fighters and was 
supplemented by Provincial Peoples' Assemblies. The PGE's first task was to 
186 Henze, 1993, op. cit., p. 64. 
187 According to Henze, èie EPLF agreed to this as a 'precondition' to the London Peace Conference. 
In July 1991, a Conference on Peace and Democracy held in Addis Abab formally recognised the 
right of the Eritrean people to determine their politicai future by an internationally supervised 
referendum. 
188 For a critique of the lack of debate about this décision see, Rimbaud, 1992, op. cit., pp. 196-98 
189 By thus portraying Eritrea's struggle, the EPRDF was distinguishing it from Ethiopia's other 
populations. 
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prepare the country for the referendum.190 A referendum Commission was set up, 
headed by Amare Tekle. Contrary to what had been discussed at the London meeting 
of May 1991, only two options were presented: independence or non-independence, 
the federai option was dropped.191 The question asked was thus formulated: 
Do you want Eritrea to be an independent country, yes or no? 
Given the high levels of illiteracy, estimated to be at over 80%, a colour scheme was 
introduced: blue ballots for yes, red ones for No.192 The referendum was held 
between 23 and 25 Aprii 1993 and was monitored by the United Nations Observer 
Mission to Verify the Referendum in Eritrea (UNOVER).193 98.24% of the total 
number of registered voters participated in the referendum and of these, 99.8% voted 
in favour of independence.194 The UN Secretary-General's Special Representative, 
Samir Sanbar, declared that 'on the whole, the referendum process in Eritrea can be 
considered to have been free and fair at every stage. '195 On May 24th 1993, Eritrea 
formally declared its independence and became the 182nd member of the United 
Nations. 
The PGE decided in May 1993 to extend the transitional period for another 
four years, until Eritrea's constitution was drafted and following which élections 
would be held. The Transitional Government was made up of a National Assembly, a 
State Council, and an independent Judiciary. Düring this period, 1993-97, the 
190 In the Autumn 1991, 'six months after libération, only half the rural population were aware that a 
referendum was going to be held.' Tronvoll, Kjetil, "The Eritrean Referendum: Peasant Voices,' 
Eritrean Studies Review, Vol. 1, No. 1, Spring 1996, p. 24. 
191 The EPLF Referendum Proposai of 22 November 1980 included the three following options: 1) 
fall independence; 2) federai association with Ethiopia; 3) regional autonomy. 
192 On the potential symbolism behind the choice of colours, see: Tronvoll, 1996, op. cit., pp. 30-6. 
193 As authorised and established by UN General Assembly resolution 47/114 of 16 December 1992. 
194 Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission to Verify the Referendum 
in Eritrea, A/48/283, 11 August 1993, p. 12 
195 Ibid., p. 12. For a more criticai point of view, in particular with regards to whom was able to 
register, see, Styan, David, 'Eritrea. The end of the beginning,' in: L'Afrique Politique 1994. Vue sur 
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Government of Eritrea faced the task of rebuilding Eritrea's war-torn economy, 
repatriating the refugees from Sudan, whose number were estimated to be around 
50,000, and demobilising its 95,000 strong libération army.196 While declaring itself 
committed to 'multi-partism', the government made clear its rejection of any 
politicai parties based on religion or ethnicity.197 It also made clear that priority 
would be given to the country's economic reconstruction: 'Politicai democracy 
cannot be achieved without sustainable and equitable politicai development.'198 The 
journey from Sparta to Athens could be longer then anticipated. Yet, it must be 
remembered that Eritrea's infrastructure was destroyed by the war, that the country 
was and stili is very much dépendent on food aid, and that it is estimated to have one 
of the lowest per capita incomes in the world. Indeed, although the situation since 
independence improved, it was nevertheless estimated that in 1994-95, food 
production covered only 48% of the country's requirements.199 
In February 1994, the EPLF held its third Congress. A National Charter was 
adopted and the front decided to renarne itself the Peoples Front for Democracy and 
Justice (PFDJ) after having once again elected Isaias Aferworki as its Chairman.200 
la démocratisation à marée basse, Karthala, Paris, 1994, pp. 30-1; and 'Eritrea: Africa's new state,' 
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The Front's six basic goals and principal guidelines were outlined at the Congress; 
and national unity was declared as the paramount guideline. 
The journey to nation-building is long and complicated. Even though the bases 
of Eritrean nationalism have been firmly established through our long 
libération struggle, it has yet to be concluded. It is known that to build a 
peaceful and rich country is the hardest, and more complicated than to get 
success in war.201 
As the sole politicai party in Eritrea, the EPLF/PFDJ dominâtes the National 
Assembly.202 Several of the measures implemented by the Government were thus 
very much inspired by the Front's new National Charter and indicated its willingness 
to ensure the national ideal and state centralisation. One such measure was the 
introduction of a National Service Programme (NSP) according to which every 
Eritrean between the ages of 18 to 40, is to undergo six-months military training, 
followed by a year of additional service in the army, 'in which the participant gives 
active military and development-related services.'203 Two factors seem to have 
motivated the adoption of a national military service. First is the notion that the army 
is the cauldron of the nation, the objective is thus to ensure that ali Eritreans, and 
especially the younger ones, are steeped in the EPLF's 'fighter spirìt' and acquire 
civic responsibilities. As Ruth Iyob has pointed out: 'The NSP has served to socialise 
these young men and women irò m différent ethnie communities and of différent 
201 EPLF, A National Charter for Eritrea, For a Démocratie, Just and Prosperous Future, Nacfa, 
1994; as quoted in: Tronvoll, Kjetil, 'The process of nation-building in post-war Eritrea: created from 
below or directed from above?' The Journal of Modem African Studies, Vol. 36, No. 3, 1988, p. 461. 
202 In May 1997, following the ratification of the Constitution, 75 members of the central committee 
of the PFDJ, 60 members of the 527-member Constituent Assembly which had been established in 
1997 to discuss and ratify the new constitution, and 15 représentatives of Eritreans living abroad were 
formed into a Transitional National Assembly to serve as the country's législative body until country-
wide élections to a National Assembly are held. When this happens, only 75 members will be elected 
to the National Assembly—the other 75 will be members of the Central Committee of the PFDJ. 
Elections we forecast to be held in 1998 when hostilities broke out between Ethiopia and Eritrea. 
203 'Proclamation on National Service Revised,' Eritrea Profile, Vol., 2, No.34, 5 November 1995. 
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religious faiths into the philosophy of pan-Eritrean nationalism.'204 The second 
motivation is more economic and seeks to avoid idle teenagers from creating trouble 
in the cities.205 
In 1995, a new administrative structure was introduced which involved the 
redrawing of Eritrea's administrative map. The old administrative division was based 
on the previous colonial divisions, although some minor changes were made by the 
British and Ethiopian administrations. According to Eritrea's government, these 
divisions were said to follow ethnie and/or historical entities and were seen as 
divisive and a hindrance to the country's unity and development.206 Instead, Eritrea is 
now divided into six régions or Zobas, each with its own Administrator, appointed by 
the National Assembly. Although the regional restructuring is explained as more 
efficient in terms of economic development, it is clear that it also seeks to undermine 
any potential territorial foundation for dissension. Not only is it stated that the 
regional boundaries are not meant to express any particular ethnie group, but the 
door is also left open for subséquent modifications, as several of the statements 
emphasise that the new division should not be 'taken as final and eternai.'207 
Perhaps the most controversial policy is the adoption by the Government in 
August 1994 of a new land législation that vests ownership of the land in the state, 
but with individuai peasant households having lifetime usufruct rights.208 In a 
country where 80 percent of the population is rural, the reform's impact is indeed 
widespread. Some have interpreted the land reform as an attempi to weaken the 
204 Iyob, Ruth, 'The Eritrean Experiment: A Cautious Pragmatism?' The Journal of Modem African 
Studies, Voi. 35, No. 4, December 1997, p. 669. 
205 Marchai, 1994, op. cit., p. 21. 
206 'Why a new administrative structure?' Eritrea Profile, Vol. 2, No. 12, June 3, 1995; and 'National 
Assembly désignâtes new administrative régions,' Eritrea Profile, Vol. 2, No. 34, November 5, 1995. 
207 'Lecture delivered by the vice-minister of local government Ato Habteab Tesfazion,' Eritrea 
Profile, Vol. 2, Issue 49, February 17, 1996. 
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individuai's bonds to land, or the 'blood and soil' connection, since it 'will be no 
longer necessary to trace descent to a village to acquire land in the highlands, and a 
stranger (ma'ekelei alet) may again settle amidst the first inhabitants (dekkibat).'209 
While this aspect may have motivated the government's décision in part, it should 
not be exaggerated. The land reform must indeed be considered with reference to 
three other important issues: the need to resettle refugees, provide land to former 
fighters and to ensure equal ownership to land to women. Moreover, contrary to what 
Tronvoll seems to suggest, this reform will affect less the highland peasants than the 
lowland agricultural communities of the more fertile Gash-Setit area, where most of 
the returning refugees are expected to resettle. 
In July 1996, the draft Constitution which had been proposed by the 
Constitutional Commission was adopted by the National Assembly. It was ratified in 
May 1997.210 The preamble clearly stresses the importance of national unity, of the 
libération struggle and of the 'heroic participation of women'.211 Thus, while Artide 
5 spécifiés that ali of the Constitution's articles 'shall apply equally to both genders', 
Artide 6 reiterates the primacy of 'unity in diversity' as the guiding principle. The 
Constitution outlines the powers of the legislature, executive and judiciary. Eritrea is 
defined as a unitary government, divided into units for local government (Artide 
1.5). The National Assembly is "a supreme representative and legislative body' and 
is elected by the people. The Executive is composed of the President and the Cabinet 
(18 Ministries). The President is elected by the National Assembly of which he is a 
member, by absolute majority. He is, moreover, the Head of Government, Head of 
208 Fullerton Joireman, Sandra, 'The minefield of land reform: comments on Eritrean land 
proclamation, Afrìcan Affaira, No. 95, 1996, pp. 269-85. 
209 Tronvoll, 1998, op. cit., pp. 470-7. 
210 The Constitutional Commission had been set up in Aprii 1994 and was chaired by Dr. Bereket 
Habte Selassie. 
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State and Chief of the Armed Forces. The Président is elected for five years and shall 
serve no more than two terms. The Judicial Power is vested in a Supreme Court, 
headed by the Chief Justice. 
The equality of ail Eritrean languages is guaranteed by the Constitution. 
Indeed, although Tigrinya, Arabie and English are generally recognised as the main 
working languages of administration, Eritrea's government has consciously avoided 
the adoption of any one officiai state language, for it sees this too as a divisive legacy 
from the colonial period.212 Although Eritrea's cultural diversity is acknowledged no 
spécifié reference to its ethnie composition is made. Similarly, Eritrea is a secular 
state, although both Muslim and Christian religions are allotted their respective 
national holidays. As had been established during the war by the EPLF, éducation in 
independent Eritrea is provided at the primary level in the language of the student's 
own nationality and replaced by English at the secondary level.213 The texts 
published by the Eritrean Ministry of Education in 1993 and distributed to the 
schools in Asmara for the teaching of English indicate that Eritrean identity remains 
defined as it had been by the EPLF in the early 1980s.214 The handouts distributed to 
Grade 8 students review and describe Eritrea's nine officially recognised 
nationalities, their location, customs, language and religion.215 The last chapter, 
entitled 'Eritrean beliefs and tradition', explains that some of the customs of the 
211 Constitutional Commission of Eritrea, Draft Constitution, July 1996 Asmara, Eritrea. 
212 'A summary of President Isaias's reply to questions from the public,' Eritrea Profile, Vol. 2, No. 
28, September 23, 1995. President Isaias points here to the fact that 'almost none' of Eritrea's ethnie 
groups speaks Arabie as a mother tongue, and that it was introduced by the British and maintained by 
the Ethiopians as part of their attempt to polarise Eritrean society between Muslims and Christians. 
213 'Out of the 512 elementary schools, 354 teach in Tigrinya, 96 in Arabie, 25 in Tigre, 13 in Kunama 
and 14 in Saho.' Makki, Fouad, 'Nationalism, State formation and the Public Sphere: Eritrea 1991-
96,' Review ofAfrican Political Economy, No. 70, 1996, p. 483. 
214 This information was gathered during fieldwork in Eritrea in 1994-95. 
215 Descriptions of the customs of Eritrea's ethnie groups have similarly been published in consécutive 
issues of the Eritrea Profile. 
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traditional societies described in the preceding chapters namely marriage and 
iemale circumcision - are detrimental to women. It then goes on to describe how 
in the field, the EPLF developed a new culture, new traditions, new beliefs 
whereby marriages are no longer arranged and men and women participate 
equally in politicai life. 
It is clear that a defining aspect of Eritrea's national identity is the place that is given 
to women. On those occasions since independence, when Eritrean women's rights 
have been threatened by private clandestine groups, notably with reference to land 
ownership, the government has punished those responsible and further guaranteed its 
policy of equal access to both land and work.216 
The PFJD is the only politicai party in Eritrea. At independence several 
members of the ELF and its factions joined the government, particularly those irò m 
the ELF-United Organisation. Among those groups which continue to refuse to 
support the Eritrean government and accuse it of being non-democratic, are: the 
ELF-Revolutionary Council (led by Ahmed Nasser), the Eritrean Democratic 
Liberation Movement (led by Gebreberham Zere), the ELF-Central Leadership (led 
by Tewolde Gebreselassie) and the ELF of Abdullah Idriss.217 None of these groups 
appears to represent a significant force and thus their challenge remains limited.218 
More troublesome is the Eritrean Islamic Jihad, a group formed with Sudanese 
backing in 1989.219 The significance of the Islamic Jihad must be seen in conjunction 
with the refugee issue. As of 1996, more than 200,000 refugees stili resided in camps 
near the border in Sudan and were seen as vulnerable to the Islamic Jihad's 
216 Perez-Vitoria, Silvia, 'Les femmes d'Erythrée ne désarment pas,' Le Monde Diplomatique, Janvier 
1997, p. 10; Connell, Dan, 'New Challenges in Postwar Eritrea,' Eritrean Studies Review, Vol. 2, No. 
1, Spring 1997, pp. 129-59. 
217 'Eritrea's new state,' Africa Confidential, Vol. 34, No. 9, 30 April 1993. 
218 Markakis, John, 'Eritrea: Transitional Period,' Review of African Politicai Economy, No. 58, 
November 1993,133. 
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recruitment. This put pressure on the Eritrean Government to accelerate the rate of 
repatriation. Although the Eritrean Islamic Jihad, 'has so far not been of any 
fondamental importance within Eritrea, and has itself been plagued by recurrent 
splits,'220 it has played a significant rôle in Eritrea's relations with its neighbours and 
the US. Indeed, the threat of Islamic fondamentalism has now replaced communism 
as the main focus of American foreign policy in the Horn of Africa and Sudan has 
been singled out as one of the culprit/ Testifying before the Foreign Relations 
subcommitte on Africa of the US Senate, Assistant Secretary of State for African 
Affair s, George Mqsse, stated that: 
A central U.S. objective is that Sudan end its sponsorship of insurgent groups 
which seek to destabilize the neighboring countries of Uganda, Ethiopia, and 
Eritrea.(...) To help these neighboring countries contain Sudanese-sponsored 
insurgencies, in late 1995, President Clinton authorized the transfer of $15 
million in non-lethal defensive military assistance to these countries.221 
Thus, while initially reluctant to support Eritrea's independence, the United States 
soon recognised the need to establish good diplomatie relations with the country 
given its geopolitical interests and, to this end, has also encouraged Eritrea's 
rapprochement with Israel.222 
219 For a description of the genesis and development of the Eritrean Islamic Jihad, see, Tesfatsion 
Medhanie, 1994, op. cit., pp. 78-92. 
220 Makki, 1996, op. cit., p. 483. 
221 Testimony of George E. Moé'se, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs before the 
Subcommittee on Africa, US Counterterrorism policy toward Sudan, Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee, Washington, D.C., May 15, 1997. 
222 Relations with Eritrea's Arab neighbours soured following the Hanish Islands dispute between 
Eritrea and Yemen in 1995 and Arab diplomats were quoted as referring to Eritrea as "the Israel of 
Africa". See: Jamal, Nuhad, 'Eritrea's bad press,' Middle East International, No. 581, 21 August 
1998, p. 20. Given the International Court of Justice Court of Arbitration's décision in favour of 




Eritrea's national identity has been shaped throughout its history and this is a process 
that is still ongoing. Three events may be singled out as particularly significant in 
terms of providing the building blocks for Eritrea's national identity: 
The first, is the création of Eritrea as a colonial state, an event which not only 
provided Eritrea with its name and geographical identity, but also with a history 
distinct ir o m that of Ethiopia. It is also during the colonial period that many 
important transformations of the type identified as necessary for the emergence 
of nationalism were introduced: industrialisation, the growth of networks of 
communication, urbanisation and éducation. 
- The second, was the period of Fédération (1952-62), during which Eritrea 
acquired the institutions and symbols of autonomy. The graduai érosion of 
Eritrea's autonomous status triggered civilian unrest and launched the armed 
libération struggle. 
- The third, is the libération war itself. During this period, the nationalist struggle 
gradually spread from a small elite to encompass the Eritrean masses. It is also 
during the war, that Eritrea's identity was cemented and given its present 
characteristics by the dominant movement, the EPLF. 
By giving the country its name and territory, Italian colonisation provided 
Eritrean nationalism with, to paraphrase Gellner, its navel. Indeed, as was discussed 
in the first section of this chapter, Eritrea's national identity cannot be traced to any 
ethnie substratum. Instead, Eritrea's national identity is territorially defined. The 
importance of this is best illustrated by the fact that more than the flag (a 
combination of the EPLF and the federal flag), more than the carnei (the country's 
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officiai symbol since 1991), the new state's favo vinte emblem is the country's 
geographical map.223 The colonial state therefore, rather than ethnicity, provides the 
basis for this identity which has been articulated and propounded by the EPLF since 
the early 1980s. Although the EPLF may now be seen as being predominanti 
Tigrinya, it would be inaccurate to depict Eritrea's nationalist struggle as having 
been originally launched by this group. Indeed, as was previously shown, many 
Tigrinya supported initially Eritrea's unification to Ethiopia. Opposition to 
Ethiopia's incorporation - the event that sparked Eritrea's nationalism - was instead 
initiated by urban intellectuals, some of whom were Tigrinya (Woldeab 
Woldemariam) but not all, students and workers groups (the EDM). Moreover, the 
first armed libération movement (ELF), was set up by Muslim expatriate students 
and not by Tigrinyas. 
It was only when the Ethiopian army began to bomb civilians 
indiscriminately in the lowlands and highlands, that the latter joined more decisively 
the nationalist movement. While the necessary foundations upon which Eritrean 
identity could be 'imagined' and crystallised had been implanted by Italian 
colonisation, fear of dissolution - brought about by the British proposai to dismantle 
Eritrea and followed by Ethiopia's incorporation of Eritrea - provided the 
motivational dynamic behind Eritrea's march towards self-determination. The 
intensity and protractedness of the libération war further contributed towards 
achieving greater cohésion among Eritreans. The harder Ethiopia tried to stifle 
Eritrea, the more it kindled Eritrean feeling of identity. Not only did the war further 
cement an Eritrean identity, it also provided further définition of this identity. 
Although a pan-Eritrean secular identity was first propounded by the EDM in the late 
223 Péninou, Jean-Louis, 'Guerre absurde entre l'Ethiopie et l'Erythrée,' Le Monde Diplomatique, 
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1950s and early 1960s, the EPLF's military defeat of the ELF in the early 1980s, 
enabled it to impose, unehallenged, its own conception of Eritrean identity. The 
importance of the libération war in Eritrea's national identity should come as no 
surprise. After ali, the war lasted thirty years and although no officiai figures are 
available, estimâtes of civilian casualties range between 150, 000 to 250,000; this in 
a country whose population is of about 3.3 million. There is no section of the 
Eritrean population that has not been affected by the war and anyone who travels to 
Eritrea is struck by the presence of war. The road from the capital city of Asmara to 
the port of Massawa is strewn with defunct carcasses of rusting Soviet tanks. 
Unexploded ordinance and landmines continue to litter the countryside, maiming 
young men and women. The 65,000 Eritrean Liberation Army fighters that died 
during the struggle are now commemorated on June 20th, Martyrs' day. Following 
Eritrea's new Constitution, the members of the National Assembly, the President and 
the Judges shall pledge their oath in the name of the Eritrean martyrs. Another 
indication of the war's central rôle in Eritrea's national identity is the name given to 
the country's new currency. The Nacfa, introduced in November 1997, is the name 
of the mountain redoubt from where Eritrean resistance was organised, one of the 
few towns the Ethiopian army was unable to recapture after it had been lost to the 
Eritrean forces in March 1977. 
It could be said that the only ideology which guides Eritrea's government is 
that of nationalism, as indicated by the différent policies introduced since 
independence. Secularism, the rejection of ethnie or religious politicai parties, the 
national service, the redrawing of Eritrea's internai administrative borders, the lack 
of any officiai language, ali these measures indicate the government's willingness to 
juillet 1998, p. 15. 
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ensure and consolidate Eritrea's national unity. Whether or not this unity will 
withstand the test of time is impossible to assess. Although most commentators agree 
that the great majority of Eritreans are animated by a deep sense of national identity, 
internal divisions should not be underplayed. 
With the outbreak of the war against Ethiopia, in May 1998, the consolidation 
of Eritrean national identity has moved a stage further. Indeed most Eritreans have 
rallied behind their government and support among the Eritrean Diaspora community 
has been reinforced. Moreover, in the propaganda war that rages alongside the 
border war, a new terminology has arisen. Eritrean newspapers frequently refer to the 
'aggressor' not as Ethiopians but as the 'TPLF regime', 'Tigrayans' or as 'Weyane' 
(in reference to the 1943 Tigrayan uprising). Also noteworthy is the way in which 
identities are being remoulded and redefined. Following the wave of deportation that 
has accompanied the recent war, Eritreans are referred to as 'ethnic Eritreans'.224 
Similarly, a scholar of nationalism has described Ethiopia's policy towards its 
citizens of Eritrean descent as a case of 'mild ethnic cleansing'.225 Not only are 
Eritreans now defined as an ethnic category, but the history of Eritrea's Tigrinya 
speaking population is 're'-written so as to emphasise its distinctiveness from that of 
Ethiopia's Tigrinya speakers. Indeed, according to Asmarom Legesse: 
The Tigrayans and the highland Eritreans are next door neighbors, they speak 
the same language, and have a common history. However they diverge sharply 
from each other in culture and character. The divergent developments are not 
merely a function of the colonial experience of Eritrea: the divergence goes 
back to the fourteenth century when Eritrea began writing her own customary 
laws and developing her own grass roots democratic institutions. The deep 
antipathy that some Tigrayans have now developed toward ethnic Eritreans is, 
224 See for example, Legesse, Asmarom, The Uprooted Part one. Case material on Ethnic Eritrean 
Deportees from Ethiopia Concerning Human Rights Violations, Report written on behalf of Citizens 
for Peace in Eritrea, Asmara, 26 July 1998. Dehai On Line, http://www.primenet.com/~ephrem2 
225 Calhoun, Craig, 'Ethiopia's Ethnic Cleansing', Dissent, Vol. 46, No. 1, Winter 1999. 
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however, a new phenomenon and will probably subside once the hate 
campaign runs out of steam.226 
Notwithstanding this claim's dubious historical foundations, it is nevertheless quite 
revealing of the way the ongoing war between Ethiopia and Eritrea appears to have 
further sharpened the identity of Eritrea's Tigrinyas as distinct from that of 
Ethiopia's Tigrayans. Although, Eritrea's national identity may emerge reinforced 
from the current war, the obverse is also possible. Indeed, the brunt of the war is 
currently born by the civilian populations. Eritrea and Ethiopia's meagre resources 
are spent in weapons, while its peoples suffer, once more, of starvation. If the war 
continues much longer, anger and hunger might well signal the collapse of two more 
states in the Horn of Africa. 
226 Legesse, Asmarom, The Uprooted. Part Two. A Scientific Survey of Ethnie Eritrean Deportees 
from Ethiopia Conducted with regard to Human Rights Violations on behalf of Citizens for Peace in 
Eritrea Asmara, Eritrea, 22 February 1999. http://www.primenet.com/~ephrem2 
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Chapter 5 - Nation-Formation in Somaliland1 
Somalia has in the 1990s aehieved the unenviable status of beeoming a paradigmatic 
case of state collapse. Much of the literature now dedicated to this country focuses 
either on the causes of its disintegration or on the failures of international 
humanitarian intervention. Yet, there is another dimension of the Somalia crisis that 
is of particular interest. In May 1991, as the Republic of Somalia was plunged into 
the throws of a civil war that accompanied the demise of Siad Barre's regime, 
Somalia's north-western région seceded from the rest of the country. It would be 
tempting to interpret Somaliland's secession as the result of the disintegration of a 
state artifìcially constructed by colonisation and to seek its roots in the terrain of 
ethnie politics. Such explanations must nevertheless be quickly dismissed. 
Based on the former British Protectorate of Somaliland, the self-proclaimed 
republic of Somaliland reverted in 1991 to the ñame and territory it held prior to the 
1960 Act of Union that presided over its unification to the UN trusteeship of Somalia 
(former Italian Somaliland). Like Eritrea, therefore, Somaliland is appealing to its 
previous colonial existence to justify its claims to independence and in so doing, it 
could be said that it reinstates rather than challenges the colonial partition. 
Somaliland's secession moreover, like that of Eritrea, disproves the ethnie 
interprétation, but this time from an opposite stand point. Whereas in the case of 
Eritrea, the ethnie explanation was discarded mainly because of the new entity's 
multi-ethnic composition, Somaliland's secession has taken place from within a state 
that had hitherto been identified as one of Africa's few homogeneous nation states. 
1 The name Somaliland will be used throughout this chapter without the quotation marks that are 
frequently used in the literature to denote that it is not yet recognised as sovereign state. This does not 
necessarily imply that I am taking a particular stance on what ought to be Somaliland's status. 
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Until its disintegration, Somalia was indeed better known for its nationalist and 
irredentist aspirations. So compelling was Somalia's nationalist appeal, that its case 
came to be invoked by those who advocated the redrawing of the map of Africa 
along ethnie lines. In the preface to the 1978 édition ofA Modem History of Somalia, 
I. M. Lewis wrote: 
Today with the exception of Somali Démocratie Republic, Botswana and 
Lesotho, sub-Saharan Africa's traditional nations and tribes are not 
autonomous, but encapsulated in multi-national states formed haphazardly and 
without regard to ethnie boundaries in the European partition of the continent. 
(...) It is this prevailing cultural heterogeneity, with the growth of ethnie 
friction and conflict since independence, which makes African states so fragile 
and vehemently attached to the territorial frontiers which alone establish their 
identity. (...) It seems [...] inevitable that if Africa is to overcome its systemic 
instabilities, concessions may have to be made to its ethnie problems(.. .).2 
Similarly, A.D. Smith argued that SomaHa stood out as one of the rare 'true' 
nationalist movements in a continent where 'still born' colonial nationalisms were 
the norm.3 Given these descriptions, it is somewhat ironie that Somalia should have 
split along its former colonial boundaries, challenging by the same token the 
argument that ethnically homogenous states are more stable than those that are not.4 
This chapter is divided into five sections. After discussing why/'ethnie 
approach fails to convey the complexity of Somali society and throw light on the 
causes of its disintegration, this chapter seeks to identify the sources of Somaliland's 
secession by examining its recent history. Given that Somaliland is calling back to its 
colonial past to justify its independence, the second part of this chapter assesses the 
ways in which the British administration contributed to the forging of a sense of 
identity. The third section then examines the history of Somalia, from its unification 
2 Lewis, I.M, A Modern History of Somalia. Nation and State in the Horn ofAfrica, Westview Press, 
Boulder & London, 1988, pp. ix, xi -xii. 
3 Smith, Anthony D., National Identity, Penguin books, 1991, p. 108. 
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in 1960 to its collapse 1991, assessing the depth of pan-Somali nationalism and 
discussing the importance of the 1977-78 Ogaden war for Somalia's eventual 
disintegration. The fourth section of this chapter retraces the chain of events that led 
to Somaliland's secession and identifies the underlying sources of Somaliland's 
discontent. Despite the relative dearth of reliable first hand data, the final section 
attempts to draw a picture of the situation that has prevailed in Somaliland since 
independence. But before we proceed let us first try to define who the Somali are. 
5.1 - Who are the Somali? 
Much of the literature on Somalia begins by stating how culturally and ethnically 
homogeneous the Somali State is. Samuel Makinda, for instance, speaks of Somalia 
as 'the only Sub-Saharan country comprising one ethnie group'.5 Similarly, David 
Laitin and Said Samatar write: 
One feature of Somali society that strikes the eye of even the most casual 
observer is the homogeneity of the Somali culture. In contrast to the vast 
majority of independent African states whose challenge has been to forge out 
of a plethora of tribes a common national consciousness within boundaries 
drawn up by departed colonials, the Somalis essentially constitute a one-
nationality state...6 
These descriptions may surprise the reader more accustomed to seeing Somalia 
portrayed as a society riven by age-old clan rivalries, which are, according to some, 
Somalia's version of ethnicity.7 So which of these two apparently contradictory 
4 Indeed, as Christopher Clapham pointedly observed: 'As the Somali tragedy shows, cultural affinity 
provides no guarantee of stable or even peaceful coexistence.' Clapham, Christopher, 'How Many 
Ethiopians?' Africa, Vol. 63, No. 1, 1993, p. 124. 
5 Makinda, Samuel, Seeking Peace from Chaos: Humanitarian Intervention in Somalia, International 
Peace Academy Occasional Papers, Lynne Rienner, Boulder, Colorado, 1993, p. 11. 
6 Laitin, David D. and Samatar, Said S., Somalia: Nation in Search of a State, Westview Press, 
Boulder, Colorado, 1987, p. 2. 
7 Adam, Hussein M., 'Somalia: A Terrible Beauty Being Born?' in: Zartman, William, Collapsed 
States. The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 
Boulder, Colo, and London, 1995, p. 70; Schultz, R.H. Jr, 'State disintegration and ethnic conflict: a 
framework for analysis, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol, 541, 
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pictures, both of whom nevertheless still rely on an atavistic understanding of 
communal identities, more truthfully represents Somalia? As will be discussed in this 
section, neither seems in fact to be wholly accurate. 
a) The Sab and the Samale 
The Somali are generally described as divided into two main clan families: the 
Samale and the Sab. These are then subdivided into the six main clans: the Hawiye, 
Dir, Isaaq, Darod, Digil and Rahanweyn, which are themselves further subdivided 
into sub-clans, themselves further sub-divided into sub-sub-clans. The Dulbhante, for 
example, a sub-clan of the Darod clan, is itself divided in 15 further sub-clans and 50 
diya, or blood-paying groups.8 The first four clans (Hawiye, Dir, Isaaq and Darod), 
which encompass the majority of the Somali population, belong to the Samale clan-
family and are mainly pastoral nomads. The latter two, the Digil and Rahanwey, 
which together are referred to as the Sab, have tended to be marginalised from 
mainstream politics and suffered more acutely during the 1992 famine. 
Anthropologists have defined Somali socio-political organisation as a 'segmentary 
lineage system,' a system that is characterised by its extreme decentralisation. Given 
the absence of any overarching authority, the decision-making process is often 
described as radically democratic to the point of being anarchical. Although this 
would seem to apply to the Samale, it may not be wholly adequate with regard to the 
Sab. 
Located in the southern part of Somalia, in the river areas where they practice 
agriculture, the Sab are, by contrast to the Samale clans, mostly sedentary. Perhaps 
September 1995, pp. 75-88; Horowitz similarly speaks of Somalia's 'ethnic war'. See: Horowitz, 
1993, op. cit., p. 22. 
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because of this, the Digil and Rahanweyn clans have developed a more stratifïed and 
hierarchical socio-pohtical system than that which prevails among their northern 
counterparts, and in some instances, 'loyalties based on common residence and 
common-land-holding are more important politically than those defined by kinship'.9 
They speak a distinct dialect of Somali which, according to Lewis, differs from that 
which is spoken by the northern pastoralists in the same way that Portuguese differs 
from Spanish.10 Given that Spanish and Portuguese are generally held to be distinct 
languages and that Spain and Portugal are two nation-states, the comparison is 
perhaps somewhat unfortunate as it would appear to undermine Lewis's own 
argument about the existence of a Somali ethnie identity, based primarily, albeit not 
exclusively, on language commonality. 
Moreover, by contrast to what appears to be the practice among the Samale 
clans, the Digil and Rahanweyn have incorporated peoples belonging to other clans. 
Although most tend to come from the north, other 'non-Somali' peoples of either 
Oromo or Bantu extraction and from whom the Sab have borrowed certain cultural 
practices, are also frequently encountered amongst them. And, as Bernhard Helander 
points out: 
Over time, such adopted groups become, for all practical purposes, members of 
their new clans. There are a variety of terms for such adopted groups, of which 
the most polite seems to be the word dhaqan, literally meaning 'culture'. 
However, some of the adopted members continue to be despised for their lowly 
or unknown origins and in this area are generally referred to as boon. (...) 
While the boon living in the inter-riverine area are treated as a uniform 
8 Lewis, I.M., A Pastoral Detnocracy: A Study of Pastoralism and Politics Among the Northern 
Somali of the Horn of Africa, Oxford University Press, London, 1961, p. 132. 
9 Lewis, 1988, op. cit., p. 14. This aspect is particularly interesting in light of Gellner's theory of 
nationalism. Indeed, we see how settled agriculturists may be more prone to develop a territorially 
based conception of community. 
10 Lewis, 1988, op. cit., p. 5. 
194 
category of people, in reality they comprise a broad variety of différent groups, 
a fact which they consider themselves significant.11 
Indeed, while the genealogically defined Somali constitute the vast majority of the 
population inhabiting the territories identified as Somali lands, there are a number of 
other groups who, for lack of a better term, could be described as 'non-Somali' 
minorities.12 These minorities hold lesser status in the Somali community and do not 
always benefït from the same protection as that provided through clan solidarity, in 
spite of the fact that, as mentioned above, some have been 'adopted' and can 
therefore claim clan affiliation. 
b) The 'other ' Somalis 
The Migdan, Tumaal and Yibir, who perform tasks that are deemed menial by the 
Somali pastoralists (hunting, leatherwork, iron-mongering and female circumcision) 
are pejoratively referred to as sab.n Although no physical différences, either 
phenotypic or genetic, distinguish them from the other Somali,14 these outcasts are 
nevertheless excluded from Somali genealogy and from the blood-wealth (diyaj 
paying groups. Noteworthy is the fact that these three groups have themselves 
emphasised at times their différences by claiming to have inhabited the area prior to 
11 Heiander, Bernhard, 'Vulnerable Minorities in Somalia and Somaliland', Indigenous Affairs, No. 2, 
April- June 1995, p 22. 
12 Bernhard Heiander, following Virginia Luling's classification, refers to them collectively instead as 
'the other Somali'. By so doing these authors emphasise the fact that 'anyone living in Somalia is a 
Somali.' See, Heiander, 1985, op. cit., p. 21. Luling, Virginia, 'The Other Somali,' in: Labhan, 
Thomas (ed.), Proceedings of the Second International Congress of Somali Studies, Vol. IV, Helmut 
Buske Verlag, Hamburg, 1984. 
13 Lewis, 1988, op. cit., 10. It remains unclear from Lewis's account why the term sab, which is used 
to collectively designate the Rahanweyn and Digil clans, is also used here. 
14 Blood group testing revealed no significant différence between these and their host-groups. See, 
Goldsmith, K.L., and Lewis, I.M., 'A Preliminary Investigation of the Blood Groups of the Sab 
bondsmen of Northern Somaliland,' Man, Vol. 58, No. 252, 1958, pp. 188-90. 
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the Somali eonquests. The Yibir, moreover, who live inside the self-proclaimed 
Republic of Somaliland, 'occasionally claim to be of originai Hebrew descent.'15 
Another minority, whose identity appears to have achieved greater saliency 
recently, is that which comprises those peoples collectively, albeit somewhat 
indiscriminately, referred to as Bantu Somali. They include the Somali speaking 
Bantu and Oromo communities who live in small communities along the rivers or in 
the Baido région, descendants of slaves that were traded in the neighbouring ports, 
and the Wa-Gosha or Shambara, also referred to as bushmen. The Benadir of the 
Mogadishu coastal area, who are believed to be Swahili descendants and who are 
mostly merchants, traders, sailors or fishermen, are also sometimes included in this 
group. Although referred to as a community, these so-called Bantu Somali are not 
organised as such, différent groups being differently inserted in the Somali socio-
political life. Ironically, and tragically, international intervention16 has further 
aggravated their plight, as well as that of non-'Bantu' peoples who had the 
'misfortune' of being categorised as such. 
Learning that many of their ancestors had spoken Bantu languages the term 
'Bantu' was adopted as an ethnie label by the head of UNOSOM's politicai 
division, Dr. Leonard Kapungo. In various circumstances UNOSOM treated 
the 'Bantu' as a social group on a par with the Somali clans. This practice was 
pursued to the absurd extent that UNOSOM officers in some districts in the 
Bay and Bakool régions insisted that people were classified as 'Bantu' on the 
basis of their facial features and consequently have their own représentative in 
the district council, not the représentative appointed by the clan to which the 
suspected 'Bantu' belonged.17 
On the other hand, and paradoxically given UNOSOM's aforementioned practice, 
the agricultural community which inhabits the Juba and Shabelle river Valleys, and 
15 Hellander, 1985, op. cit., p. 21. 
16 We are referring here more speeifieally to the two United Nations Operation in Somalia, UNOSOM 
and UNOSOM II, and the Unified Task Force (UNITAF), set up respectively in April 1992, March 
1993 and December 1992, under UN resolutions 751, 814 and 794, in response to the humanitarian 
crisis provoked by the ongoing civil war. 
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which had tried to protect itself from the ongoing civil war by organising itself 
politically and miütarily in 1992 under the Somali African Muki Organisation, was 
not acknowledged as such by UNOSOM. This group was left unrepresented from 
UNOSOM's plans to establish local government structures in the area because it was 
not considered as belonging to one of the traditional Somali clans.18 Little is known 
or written about these minorities whose existence under the previous regime was 
downplayed so as not to undermine the notion of an ethnically homogeneous 
Somalia. While their numbers or relative importance should perhaps not be 
overstated, it has nevertheless been suggested that, with Somaliland's secession, their 
presence will become more significarli in Southern Somalia. 
They [the Samale] might have been a majority in the ex-Somali before the civil 
war at around 70% but with the North gone, the remaining pastoralist 
population, (...) would at most make up 50%.19 
As we can see from this account, there are many groups in Somalia that could, if they 
so wished, claim to be ethnically différent and appeal to minority status. If one were 
to endorse the ethnie explanation for civil conflict, one would therefore have 
expected these groups to be the main protagonists in the 1990s civil war. But this 
was not the case. Indeed, most of those actively involved in the conflict belonged to 
one of the four clans that comprise the Samale clan family. What is more, the 
conflicts that erupted frequently opposed members of the same clan.20 
17 Hellander, 1985, op. cit., p. 23. 
18 African Rights, Somalia. Operation Restore Hope: A Preliminary Assessment, London, May 1993, 
p. 32. The Somali African Muki Organization was not represented in Addis Ababa and thus excluded 
from the Transitional Council established at the conférence. 
19 Abdullahi, Mohamed Diriye, 'Minorities of Somali: Victims forgotten amid war and chaos,' 
http://www.netnomad.com 
20 The battle over Mogadishu involved four factions from the Hawiye clan fighting each other for the 
control of the state. 
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c) Clanism 
Although Somalia's division into clans is much publicised, it is not necessarily better 
understood. Several journalists and analysts, commenting on the current civil war, 
have tended to compare Somalia's clans to ethnic groups. Hussein Adam, for 
example, writes that clanism 'is the Somali version of the generic problem of 
ethnicity or tribalism: it represents primordial cleavages and cultural fragmentation 
within the Somali society'.21 Clanism, understood here as the resurgence of age-old 
clan antagonisms, was held to be responsible for the outbreak of the civil war. This 
interpretation guided many of UNOSOM's policies between 1992 and 1995, as 
clanism in Somalia, like ethnicity in Yugoslavia, was seen to be the root cause of the 
civil war that led to Somalia's disintegration. Yet, contrary to what this primordialist 
view suggests, the reality on the ground is more complex. 
Clan affiliation is important both politically and socially, providing Somalis 
with both status and identity, as well as determining allegiances for the purposes of 
security and the paying of blood-wealth (c/zya-paying group). As was explained 
earlier, most authors agree that Somali society is divided into six main clans, each 
further sub-divided into clans and sub-clans. Yet even the six principal clans, 
comprising the traditional social system, 'are generally too large, too widely 
scattered and too unwieldy to act as effective corporate political units'. And it is only 
with the introduction of modern political party competition that 'such extended 
kinship links acquired new vitality and significance'.22 Moreover, a comparison of 
the genealogical charts provided in the various works reveal significant differences 
when it comes to describing the hierarchy and relationships of the clans. These 
21 Adam, 1995, op. cit., p. 70. 
22 Lewis, 1988, op. cit., p. 12. 
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discrepancies may be attributable to two factors: the time at which the information 
was gathered and the informant's own clan affiliation. This caveat highlights the fact 
that clan relationships are not as stringent and automatic as assumed by the reference 
to age-old antagonisms and are instead governed by a 'system of shifting 
genealogical attachment.'23 Moreover, as Lewis explains: 
Although they have the appearance of genetic origin, Somalí genealogies are as 
arbitrary and man-made as culturally constructed ethnic or national identity 
[sic], They are social not natural producís. What they offer are natural-seeming, 
and henee indisputable bases for belonging or communal action, which are so 
easily manipulated by poüticians and used by them for their own purposes to 
coníiise and complícate social interaction by seeming to simplify it.24 
Lewis's argument has been further substantiated by other research recently 
undertaken in Somalia. Trying to identify what actually fuels Somali factionalism, 
Daniel Compagnon has argued that 'even though this appears to stem from clan 
rivalry, in almost every instance it has been manipulated by individuáis or small 
diques in order to further their own interests'.25 Marcel Djama has similarly written 
that the factionalisation and confrontation of the type frequently invoked to explain 
Somalia's current state of chaos is not an intrinsic characteristic of the traditional 
kinship system, a 'social automatism', but a perversión of it, manipulated by an 
interested few.26 This point is important insofar as it illustrates how a factor, deemed 
to be an intrinsic feature of a society (like ethnicity or clanism), may be an outeome 
of the crisis it is meant to have triggered rather than its cause. 
23 Lewis, I.M., 'Problems in the Development of Modern Leadership and Loyalties in the British 
Somaliland Protectorate and U.N. Trusteeship Territory of Somalia,' Civilisations, Vol. 10, No. 1, 
1960, p. 53. 
24 Lewis, I.M., 'Clan Conflict and Ethnicity in Somalia: Humanitarian Intervention in a Stateless 
Society,' in: Turton, David, (ed.) War and Ethnicity. Global Connections and Local Violence, 
University of Rochester Press, Rochester, NY, 1997, p. 199. 
25 Compagnon, Daniel, 'Somali Armed Movements. The Interplay of Political Entrepreneurship & 
Clan-Based Factions,' in Clapham, Christopher (ed.), African Guerrillas, James Currey Ltd, Oxford, 
1998, p. 83. 
26 Djama, Marcel, 'Sur la violence en Somalie: genèse et dynamique des formations armées,' 
Politique Africaine, octobre 1992. 
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According to Samatar, Somali socio-political life before colonial partition was 
relatively well organised and cohesive. While stateless, it was nevertheless structured 
around a complex web of principles that included both kinship associations and 
Islamic law (the qanoon). Together, these bound the society's various strands 
together. Patrilineally traced blood ties (toi) constituted the key element of the 
Somali segmentary lineage system, but kinship relations and obligations were also 
dictated by marriage ties (hidid) as well as by an unwritten code of practice (heer). 
Any separatist tendencies that toi may have promoted were kept in check by 
hidid and heer, which underscored interdependence and inclusiveness. The 
combination of blood ties and heer, embodied predominantly in the person of 
the elder, was one of the two pillars of indigenous political authority; the other 
was the qanoon (derived primarily from Al-Quran and Al-Hadith) of Islam, the 
purveyor of which was the learned and holy, i.e., the shaikh?1 
This traditional delicate balance was undermined by the introduction of trade and 
commerce in the nineteenth century and by the imposition of colonial rule. 
Patrilinearity then assumed the predominant and unbridled role that has now become 
associated with the centrifugal forces of danism. Clanism would therefore appear to 
be a relatively recent phenomenon and, to a certain extent, a deviation from the 
traditional kinship system. 
As will be discussed later, Somaliland has not witnessed the violent fissiparous 
clanic tendencies that have now come to characterise politics in Southern Somalia. It 
is possible that Somaliland's particular colonial experience and/or relative peripheral 
position sheltered it somewhat from some of the pernicious transformations 
experienced in Southern Somalia. If such is indeed the case, then it would account 
27 Samatar, Ahmed I., 'The Curse of Allah: Civic Disembowelment and the Collapse of the State in 
Somalia,' in Samatar, Ahmed I., (ed.), The Somali Challenge. From Catastrophe to Renewal? Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, Boulder, London, 1994, pp. 109-111. 
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for why Somaliland has been able to rekindle some of the traditional conflict 
resolution mechanisms, albeit in a modernised form. 
5.2 — The British Protectorate of Somaliland 
The British established themselves in Aden in 1839 and did not initially covet the 
land that lay across the Gulf. France, for its part, set up a trading counter and naval 
station in Obock in 1862. Following a treaty with the Issa Somalis in 1885, the 
French possessions progressively extended eastwards and the protectorate was 
relocated to Djibouti in 1892.28 With the opening the Suez Canal in 1869, French 
presence in the area became more ominous to the British, especially when Egypt 
decided to evacuate Harar in 1884. While reluctant to incur the administrative costs 
implied by its occupation of the Somali coast, Britain nevertheless needed to check 
French dominance. 
a) Delimitation of the boundaries 
Britain pursued a policy of minimal control of the coastal areas. In 1888, after Britain 
and France had signed a treaty establishing their respective protectorates, the frontier 
was traced between Djibouti and Zeila. In 1894, a sériés of treaties were negotiated 
between Britain and Italy, which by then had occupied the coast of Benadir, south of 
Mogadishu. These agreements, which granted British control over the Haud and 
Italian control over the Ogaden, frustrated Ethiopia's imperial ambitions. Following 
Italy's crushing defeat in Adwa in 1896, Britain could no longer ignore Emperor 
Menelik's territorial claims. 
28 Touval, Saadia, Somali Nationalism. International Politics and the Drive for Unity in the Horn of 
Africa, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1963, pp. 37-40. 
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On seeing the British boundary (as marked out in 1894) seemingly for the first 
time, Menelik exelaimed: "But you are advancing right to the gates of Harar." 
Rodd countered that the British were the reversionaries of Egypt so that really 
Ethiopia, by taking Harar, advaneed on the British sphere. His Majesty then 
propounded the extraordinary doctrine that the Somalis had been from time 
immémorial, until the Moslem invasion, the cattle keepers of the Ethiopians 
who could not themselves Uve in the low countries.29 
The Government of India, which also controlied Aden, then administered British 
Somaliland. The Protectorate's primary raison d'être was to supply Aden with 
livestock. Since it did not represent a coveted land in itself, which would have 
justified extra expenditure, Great Britain did not give the Indian Government 
additional iunds or men for its maintenance and defence. Ethiopia's subséquent 
conquest of Harar - a city that was used as a buffer between Ethiopians and Somalis -
was viewed by the Bombay Government as a nuisance but, albeit mistakenly, not as 
a major threat.30 
Given Britain's reluctance to spend more than what was minimally required 
for the maintenance of the Somali protectorate, the Haud, albeit reluctantly, was 
eventually ceded to Ethiopia in 1897. The Haud represented for Somali pastoralists a 
vital grazing area. Indeed, as Ahmed Yusuf Farah has written, it constitutes 'a single 
economic zone' where 'livestock flow from the north for export through various 
ports along the Red Sea coast, while commodities and manufactured goods follow 
the same routes inland'.31 The Haud's significance was readily acknowledged by 
various British représentatives when Rodd negotiated a frontier with Ras Makonnen, 
which was then ratified by Emperor Menilek. Rodd succeeded in so wording the 
Treaty that while guaranteeing Ethiopia's récognition of the Protectorate, it avoided 
29 Silberman, Leo, 'Why the Haud was ceded,' Cahiers D'Etudes Africaines, No. 5, fall 1961, p. 56. 
Silberman is quoting here a passage from one of Rodd's letter to Salisbury. Renell Rodd, First 
Secretary to the British Agency in Cairo, led a mission to Menelik, under the auspices of the Foreign 
Office. 
30 Silberman, 1961, op. cit., p. 59. 
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including Britain's récognition of Ethiopia's possessions. This 'omission' would 
pave the way to Somalia's future disputes with Ethiopia, and could possibly pro vide 
an 'opening' to future claims by Somaliland. 
b) British Colonisation 's impact on Somaliland before WWII 
In 1905, the administration of Somaliland passed under the control of the Colonial 
Office.32 By then, the twenty-year 'war' between the British and the rebellious 
Mohammed Abdullah Hassan's Dervishes, aka the 'Mad Mullah', had been going on 
for several years.33 As Lewis notes, 'having spent so much on military opérations so 
completely out of proportion to their interests in Somaliland, the British government 
was not now disposed to make further fimds available for development'.34 Indeed, no 
exploitable resources justified investment in this colony. Although a geological 
survey carried out in 1923 indicated the possible presence of petroleum and coal, the 
Somaliland Petroleum Company, formed by Anglo-Saxon Oil, did not find the 
prospect's results sufficiently encouraging to warrant further boring.35 
Britain's administration of Somaliland was to be very light-handed. Comparing 
it to that of Britain's administration of Southern Sudan, Gérard Prunier argues that 
both belonged to the category of 'non-government' or benign neglect.36 It is therefore 
doubtful that during this period, colonisation had any significant socio-economic 
impact on the Somali population living in the British Protectorate of the type 
31 Quoted in: Bryden, Matt, Report on the Mission to HaudArea, Region 5, 2-15 November 1994, UN 
Emergencies Unit for Ethiopia, 1994, p. 9. 
32 Kittermaster, Harold, 'The Development of the Somalis,' Journal of the African Society, Vol. 31, 
1932, p. 234. 
33 Lewis, 1988, op. cit., pp. 63-91. Abdullah Hassan's exploits were later incorporated into Somalia's 
history as the first acts of Somali resistance against Western imperialism. 
34 Ibid, p. 101. 
35 Kittermaster, 1932, op. cit. As will be discussed in the conclusion, Somaliland's potential in the oil 
area has once more become the object of exploration. 
36 Prunier, Gérard, 'Somaliland Goes It Alone,' Current History, Vol. 97, No. 619, May 1998, p. 225. 
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postulateci as neeessary by some modernist theories for the emergence of 
nationalism. A few roads were built but urbanisation remained modest, a situation 
which may also be attributed to the pastoralists' nomadic mode of life. Government 
policies aimed at encouraging agricultural development yielded few results, although 
it should nevertheless be noted that during this period a pocket of agriculturists 
emerged in the north-western part of the territory. In the fîeld of éducation, little was 
undertaken. Writing in 1932, the former Governor of Somaliland, Harold 
Kittermaster, recalls: 
The first essential for any development appeared to be a scheme of éducation, 
for up to this time the vast majority of the population were altogether illiterate. 
A school on an ambitious scale was projected, but it broke down on the refusai 
of the people to pay a stock tax which was to supply the fonds. For three years 
this tax was the cause of considérable internal unrest, and in the end it was 
abandoned. Though it had the support of ali the leading men in the country, at 
any rate when they were discussing it with the Government, they were unable 
to carry their people with them (if indeed, they really tried to)....3? 
By 1934, the protectorate goverament had opened only one elementary school that 
catered for 120 Somali students. A small number of students were also sent to 
Gordon College in Khartoum, but otherwise, éducation was for the most part 
confined to the existing Koranic schools. 
We may recali how Benedict Anderson and Ernest Gellner stressed the 
importance of éducation and the development of the print vernacular in the 
emergence of nationalism in the Americas and in Europe. There existed in 
Somaliland a small educated elite, or to borrow Gellner's terminology, a class of 
clerks or clerics. As there was no existing translitération of the Somali language, this 
educated elite used the Arabie script. In 1920, a revolutionary development occurred 
in this field when Isman Yusuf Kenadid invented a 'highly sophisticated and 
37 Kittermaster, 1932, op. cit., p. 234. 
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acclarate alphabet and script for the Somali language' which came to be known as 
'Osmaniya'.38 
the création of a truly indigenous vehicle for the national language naturally 
appealed to the Somali national consciousness.(...) Later events were to create 
circumstances in which this ingenious writing was to be championed by the 
leaders of modem Somali nationalism as a symbol of Somali achievement, 
associated with perhaps the most prized of ali things in the Somali national 
heritage - the Somali language.39 
Despite its potential significance, this development had little impact at the time. The 
educated elite continued to use Arabie, favoured as it was by the more conservative 
religious elite, and the great majority of Somalis remained illiterate. 
Only a small number of northern Somalis advanced beyond the elementary 
school level, and in order to pursue their studies they had had to go abroad, either to 
Aden or Khartoum. 
Upon their return, they were employed in lowly clérical posts in the British 
colony, a status they came to resent because it rendered them subordinate to 
expatriate Indian personnel, and in 1937 they formed the Somali Officiais 
Union to press claims for promotion to posts reserved for the latter.40 
Discontent therefore, first emerged among this foreign educated elite. Not only had 
they been exposed to other ways and systems that highlighted the deficiencies in 
their own country, but, also, their hopes of socio-economic advancement were 
frustrated upon their return. Haji Farah 'Omar was one of the first such educated 
individuals to actively promote an improvement in the livelihood of his countrymen. 
His activities in the 1920s displeased the Protectorate's authorities and he was sent 
into exile to Aden where he founded, along with other Somali expatriâtes, the Somali 
Islamic Association.'41 As expressions of discontent were being increasingly voiced 
38 Lewis, 1988, op. cit., p. 115. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Markakis, 1990, op. cit., p. 52, and Lewis, 1988, op. cit., p. 114-5. 
41 Lewis, 1988, op. cit., p. 114; and Touval, 1963, op. cit., p. 65. 
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amongst the emerging, albeit small, educated Somaliland elite, the outbreak of the 
Second World War ushered in a new period. 
After taking over the Benadir Coast, the Italian government expressed its desire 
to increase its own Somali territory. In order to satisfy Italy, whom it needed as an 
ally to counter the French, Britain accepted to forgo its Jubbaland and Kismayo 
concessions in 1924. Italy further pursued its expansion and conquered the Majerteen 
territory in 1927. Once well established in the région - in Somalia and Eritrea -
Italy's colonial ambitions grew further. In the late 1920s, plans for the future 
invasion of Abyssinia were developed in Rome. As was the case in Eritrea, the 
Italians prepared their colony of Somalia for the war effort, bringing about important 
socio-economic changes. Düring the period preceding Italy's invasion of Ethiopia, 
Somalia witnessed an unprecedented, albeit brief, period of economic prosperity.42 
Although greater than in British Somaliland, the number of primary schools in 
Italian Somalia remained modest. Nevertheless, 'knowledge of Italian, offen of 
course very rudimentary, was fairly widespread and certainly more extensive than 
the acquaintance with English in the Somaliland Protectorate.'43 The population of 
Mogadishu grew twofold between 1930 and 1940, and reached 90,000 inhabitants by 
the end of the 1940s. The war effort also induced changes in Somali consumption 
patterns as 'additional purchasing power came from the many thousands who were 
recruited or employed in the various armies'.44 Agricultural investment in the 
Shebelle-Juba valley grew substantially, transforming this area's subsistence 
economy to one of intensive farming destined for exports. All these developments 
indirectly affected the economy of British Somaliland. As Markakis observes: 
42 Lewis, 1988, op. cit., p. 110. 
43 Ibid., p. 112. 
44 Markakis, 1990, op. cit., p. 52. 
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Military procurement of animais for food and transport considerably expanded 
the market for pastoralist products for nearly a decade. This in turn boosted the 
purchasing capacity of this sector, and spurred demand for consumer products 
- such as rice, dates, tea, sugar and cloth - upon which the herdsmen were 
becoming dépendent. (...) A study of the rise of nationalism in British 
Somaliland notes that politicai consciousness first appeared within "an 
emergent class linked to international demands for livestock and its by-
products, and inter-territorial transportation opportunities in the eastern 
Horn".45 
Although to a lesser degree than in Italian Somalia, British Somaliland was therefore 
also affected by the approaching war. 
c) The Italian invasion ofAbyssinia and Bevin 's plan for a Greater Somalia 
In November 1934, a joint Anglo-Abyssinian mission dispatched to demarcate 
Somaliland's southern border discovered the presence of an Italian fortified post near 
the Wal-Wal wells in Ethiopia's Ogaden région. The Wal-Wal incident, as it came to 
be known, provided the casus belli that led to Italy's invasion of the Horn and the 
establishment of its East African Empire. Fusing its existing colonies of Eritrea and 
Somalia to Ethiopia, Mussolini's East African Empire was divided into six régions: 
Eritrea, Amhara, Harrar, Somalia, Galla-Sidama, and Addis Ababa. As one of Italy's 
former Governor to Ethiopia, Corrado Zoli, noted in Foreign Affairs in 1937: 
In dividing the Empire into regional governments, [or provinces], efforts were 
made to group together peoples with similar languages, traditions and 
economic interests. In so far as possible, account was also taken of ethnie and 
religious factors, as is necessary in any government of African peoples. The 
subdivision of the provinces into commissariati, rezidence and vice-residenze 
was inspired by the same criteria, in the hope of finding a happy solution to the 
complex problem of governing diverse and offen mutually hostile peoples. This 
best of all policies - respect for the usages and traditions of the subjects 
constitutes the basis of the Empire's politicai Organization.46 
45 Markakis, 1990, op. cit., p. 52. The study to which Markakis is referring is: Geshekter, Charles L., 
'Anti-Colonialism and Class Formation: The Eastern Horn of Africa Before 1950,' International 
Journal of African Historical Studies, v. 18, 1985, p. 27. 
46 Zoli, Corrado, 'The Organization of Italy's East African Empire,' Foreign Affairs, XVI, October 
1937 to July 1938, p. 84. Italics added. It is worth noting the similarities between Italy's 
administrative division of Ethiopia and that adopted by the Ethiopian government after 1991. 
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The new province of Somalia thus encompassed the former colony of Somalia and 
the Ogaden. Both of these were administered jointly until the 4Ü1 August 1940, when 
Italy declared war upon the Allies and invaded British Somaliland with an army of 
25, 000 men. 
In order not to deplete its 'scanty' Kenyan forces, who had been ordered to 
retake Addis Ababa via the south, the British troops based in Somaliland, after 
briefly opposing Italy's colonial army, were compelled to withdraw being 
outnumbered by at least ten to one. On 16th August 1940 British personnel, civilian 
and military, evacuated their Protectorate by boat and abandoned their territory to the 
incoming Italian troops. But Italian occupation was short-lived; seven months later, 
in March 1941, the British recaptured Somaliland.47 Emperor Haile Selassie 
recovered his Empire except for the Haud and the Ogaden which, as part of a series 
of 'reserved areas', were put under temporary British Military Administration so as 
to counter any threat arising in Djibouti, the stili under Vichy rule. Although stili 
considered to be under Ethiopian sovereignty, these territories, along with Italy's 
colony of Somalia and British Somaliland, were united under British Military 
Administration.48 Thus, with the exception of Djibouti, which remained under French 
control, ali the Somali inhabited territories were brought together under one flag. 
Düring this period, Britain introduced a number of policies in the fields of 
éducation, agriculture and administration, designed to help the former Italian colony 
recover from the war. As was the case in Eritrea, Somali politicai parties began to 
appear under British instigation and, in May 1943, the Somali Youth Club, which 
47 Ministry of Information for the War Office, The Âbyssinian Campaigns. The Officiai Story of the 
Conquest of Italian East Africa, His Majesty's Stationary Office, London, 1942. 
48 On the tensions that arose between Britain and Ethiopia with regards to the formai status of these 
territories see: Tibebe Eshete, "The British Administration in the Ogaden and its Legacy: Challenges 
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would in 1947 become the Somali Youth League, was established in Mogadishu. 
From its ineeption the Somali Youth Club 'championed the cause of a greater 
Somalia'.49 Yet, there is some debate as to the exact nature of Britain's role in this 
process. According to Touval, the British Military Administration's role did not 
confine itself to being 'merely a benevolent onlooker, but provided during the early 
1940's guidance and help to the inexperienced Somali politicians'.50 Moreover, 
according to Alphonso Castagno, Britain originally favoured the Darod and members 
of the Somali Youth League in its recrutaient of civilian and military Somali cadres 
because it hoped to keep the administration of the whole of Somalia.51 The fact that 
Britain's designs for a Greater Somalia were already being voiced as early as March 
1943, two months before the formation of the Somali Youth Club, would support 
such an interprétation. In a letter to Anthony Eden, Robert Howe, British Minister in 
Ethiopia, expressed his feelings in favour of 'an attempi to create a united Somali, 
comprising the Ogaden, ex-Italian, British, and French Somalilands and the Danakil 
territory under an international or joint Anglo-Ethiopian trusteeship'.52 Thus, when 
Britain's Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, presented his proposai for a Greater 
Somalia in 1946, under which the territories then administered by Britain would 
and Responses,' in Proceedings of the Eleventh International Conference of Ethiopian Studies, 
University of Addis Ababa, 1994, pp. 323-338. 
49 Lewis, I.M., 'Modern Political Movements in Somaliland. I.', Africa, Vol. XXVIII, No. 3, July 
1958, p. 257. 
50 Touval, 1963, op. cit., p. 86 and footnote 2, p. 197. 
51 Castagno, Alphonso, 'A Somali Republic,' in: Coleman, J.S., and C.G. Rosberg, (edsj Political 
Parties and National Integration in Tropical Africa, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1964, 
pp. 512-559. 
52 J-1437, Robert V. Howe to Anthony Eden. 4 lh March 1943. This position was restated in a 
memorandum dated March 1944, F.O. 371/41520, Director of Civil Affairs Branch Headquarters of 
East African Command to War Office, 31/3/44, Public Records Office. 
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remain under single administration, much had been done in paving the way towards 
this end in Somalia.53 
When the Four Powers Commission of Investigation arrived in Somalia in 
1948, in order to ascertain the wishes of the local population, the Somali Youth Club 
had already re-organised itself into a full-fledged party and adopted its new name, 
the Somali Youth League.54 Whatever the British Military Administration's rôle may 
have been in this process, Haji Mohammed Hussein, then President of the Somali 
Youth League, clearly expressed the party's 'Greater Somalia' aim.55 Yet, in spite of 
the Somali Youth League's efforts, Italy, the United States and the USSR opposed 
the Bevin plan. In 1948, the Ogaden was returned to Ethiopia and, in November 
1949, the General Assembly passed resolution 289, which brought Italy's former 
colony under UN trusteeship. It was then agreed that Italy would administer the 
trusteeship for a period of ten years, at the end of which it would be granted 
independence. Britain continued to administer the remaining territories until 1954, 
when the Haud and the 'reserved areas' were returned to Ethiopia in respect of the 
1897, 1942 and 1944 Anglo-Ethiopian Agreements. 
British Somaliland retumed to its previous status of Protectorate in 1948, when 
civilian rule was re-established. The Somali National Society, a party that had been 
formed just before the outbreak of the war, merged with an association of drivers 
called the Somali Transport Company, and changed its name to the Somali National 
53 Bevin's speech is quoted in: Reisman, Michael W., 'Somali Self-determination in the Horn: Legal 
Perspectives and Implications for Social and Political Engineering,' in Lewis, I.M., Nationalism and 
Self-determination in the Horn of Africa, Ithaca Press, London, 1983, p. 153. We will remember that 
Bevin had announced a similar proposal for a Greater Tigray. 
54 As was described in the previous chapter, the Four Power Commission of Investigation had been set 
up to determine the fiiture of Italy's former colonial possessions. 
55 The Four Powers Commission. Council of Foreign Ministers, Report on Somaliland, London, 1948, 
Section II, Chapter 4, appendix A. 
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League (SNL).56 A branch of the Somali Youth League had also been set up in the 
Protectorate; but although proposais were made towards an SYL-SNL merger, they 
ne ver came to fruition.57 In the absence of any plan towards independence, little was 
initially achieved in the way of preparing the territory towards self-government. 
Up to 1957 the only central Organization for the expression of Somali opinion 
has been the Protectorate Advisory Council which has, in principle, met 
annually. (...) In 1953 Local Government Councils were established in two 
municipalities, Hargeisa and Berbera, and were also set up at Burao and Gebile 
towards the end of 1957.58 
Demands for increased représentation in the Protectorate were triggered by Britain's 
rétrocession of the Haud to Ethiopia. The National United Front, an organisation that 
brought together the SNL and SYL, was then formed in 1955 with two aims: 
recovering the Haud and obtaining independence for the Protectorate. Although the 
first objective was never achieved, the movement successfully pressured the British 
administration towards granting the Protectorate greater autonomy. From that 
moment on, events unfolded rapidly, and a décision was finally reached to grant 
independence to the Protectorate and prepare for its eventual unification with the 
trusteeship of Somalia. On l s t July 1960, four days after Britain granted it its 
independence, Somaliland unifïed with the former Trusteeship of Somalia, also 
recently independent, in what Touval has described as a 'precipitate union'.59 
Somalia's Legislative Assembly elected Aden Abdulla Osman as Pro visionai 
President of the Republic and, on July 22nd, the first Government of the Republic was 
formed, with Dr. Abdirahid Ali Shermarke as Prime Minister, and the government 
included ministers from the two parts of the Republic. 
56 Markakis, 1990, op. cit., p. 53. 
57 For possible reasons for this failure see, Lewis, 1988, op. cit., p. 135. 
58 Lewis, I.M, 'Politicai Movements in Somaliland.' Africa, Vol. 28, No. 4, October 1958, pp. 346-7. 
59 Touval, 1963, op. cit., p. 110. 
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5.3 — The Republic of Somalia front unification to disintegration 
Although, as will be seen in the following section, the union was far from being 
harmonious, pan-Somali nationalism rapidly emerged as the dominant legitimising 
principle of Somali pohtics. The quest for the unification under a single Somali state 
of those neighbouring territories predominantly populated by Somalis: Kenya's 
Northern Frontier District, Ethiopia's Ogaden région and Djibouti, became the 
avowed thrust of Somali pohtics. Somalia openly incorporated in the July 1960 
Constitution its irredentist policy,60 and gave further symbolic expression to its claim 
by including in its flag a five-pointed star whose arms each represented the territories 
inhabited by Somalis.61 Somali politicians argued that Somalia should be given those 
adjoining territories inhabited by Somalis by appealing to the principle of national 
self-determination. In so doing, the Republic of Somalia rejected from its inception 
the applicability to its own particular situation of what would become the OAU's 
'first commandment', i.e., the territorial integrity and sovereignty of states. 
a) Irredentist claims 
From 1960 to 1964, the issue of the Northern Frontier District (NFD) in Kenya 
dominated Somalia's nationalist agenda. Somali politicians had been led to believe 
that given Britain's endorsement of the Protectorate's unification to the trusteeship 
and Bevin's earlier talk of a 'Greater Somalia', it would also support Somalia's 
territorial claim over the Northern Frontier District. Such was not, however, 
forthcoming. Weary of not alienating further Ethiopia - which viewed Somali 
unification as a threat to its security - Britain made it clear that it would not endorse 
any further Somali claim that might affect the 'territorial integrity of French 
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Somaliland, Kenya, or Ethiopia'.62 Somalia nevertheless continued to pressure 
Britain to reconsider its position towards the NFD when devising Kenya's future 
constitution. Their efforts appeared to have born fruit when in 1962 Britain finally 
decided to send a Commission of Enquiry to ascertain the wishes of the NFD 
inhabitants. Although the Commission's report found that Somalis in the NFD 
wished 'almost unanimously' to merge with Somalia, Britain nevertheless announced 
in March 1963, nine months before Kenya's independence, its decision to place the 
NFD within Kenya's regional constitution. Relations between Britain and Somalia 
were broken off as a result, signalling Somalia's move towards the USSR. 
While Somali politicians were attempting to induce Britain into modifying its 
position, they were simultaneously attempting to have their case heard through other 
diplomatic channels. The first and second All African Peoples Congress, held 
respectively in 1958 and 1960, appeared to agree with Somalia's interpretation of the 
principle of self-determination and thus to endorse its irredentist claims.63 But 
Somali's hopes were soon shattered. At the first OAU meeting, held in Addis Ababa 
in May 1963, the principle of uti possidetis was strongly endorsed and the territorial 
integrity of African states was enshrined in the Charter. Along with Ghana, Morocco 
and Togo, Somalia was one of the very few states present at the Charter Conference 
of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in May 1963 to contest the inviolability 
of colonial borders. Frustrated in its efforts, Somalia provided financial and military 
assistance to the Somali Kenyan insurgency movement, yet by contrast to the course 
60 As stipulated by Article 6(4) of the Constitution of the Somali Republic, adopted in July 1960. 
61 It may be surprising that it chose to distinguish thus the two former territories then united. 
62 Lewis, 1988, op. cit., p. 185, quoting Prime Minister Macmillan's July 1960 speech to the House of 
Commons. 
63 Adar, Korwa G., Kenyan Foreign policy Behaviour Towards Somalia, 1963-1983, University Press 
of America, Lanham, New York, London, 1994, pp. 89-91. 
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of action adopted with regard to the Ogaden, it made no direct attempt to seize 
territory. 
Meanwhile, in January 1964, full-war erupted between Ethiopia and Somalia 
following several years of border clashes. The background to this, as Harry Brind 
explains, lay in the fact that: 
The controversy over the border between Ethiopia and Italian Somaliland was 
still unresolved at the time of independence. The leaders in British Somaliland 
refused to endorse the provisions of the Anglo-Ethiopian treaty of 1897, which 
placed the Haud under Ethiopian suzerainty. The Ethiopian argument was that 
the frontier agreements concluded with Italy in 1900 and Britain in 1897 
remained valid and that Somalis living in the Haud and the Ogaden were 
Ethiopian citizens. Ethiopia had been hostile to British intentions to merge the 
British and Italian Somalilands, and had accused Britain of wishing to establish 
a pro-British greater Somalia.64 
The OAU seized the matter in February 1964 when the Council of Ministers Meeting 
in Dar es Salaam adopted a resolution calling for an immediate cease- fire.65 In 
March, negotiations between Ethiopia and Somali were started, but in July that year, 
at the Cairo Head of States Meeting of the OAU, no settlement was achieved. 
Instead, the OAU adopted a resolution which reaffirmed 'the principles laid down in 
Article III, paragraph 3 of the Charter of the Organization of African Unity', and 
whereby 'all Member States pledge themselves to respect the frontiers existing on 
their achievement of national'.66 Not only did this resolution reassert the territorial 
integrity of Africa's states, but it also specified that these boundaries, following the 
norm of uti possidetis, were to be those that had been established upon achieving 
independence. 
64 Brind, Harry, 'Soviet Policy in the Horn of Africa,' International Affairs, Voi. 60, No. 1, winter 
1983/84, p. 79. Although the Ogaden issue is seen to encompass the question of the Haud, the two 
issues may warrant separate treatment given that the Haud was only 'retroceded' to Ethiopia in 1954. 
65 Castagno, Alphonso, "The Somali-Kenyan controversy: Implications for the future,' The Journal of 
Modem African Studies, Voi. 11, No. 2, 1964, pp. 165-88. 
66 Brownlie, 1971, op. cit., p. 360. 
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b) The sources of Pan-Somali nationalism 
There has been considérable debate about the roots of pan-Somali nationalism. While 
some, mirroring the primordial explanations described in chapter one, have explained 
Somalia's nationalism as emanating from its distinct ethnie identity, others have 
interpreted it as a relatively modem development. The latter position is grounded in 
the fact that when the European powers arrived in the Horn at the end of the 
nineteenth Century, the Somali people were stateless. Since no overarching socio-
political organisation appeared to unify the Somali, the extent to which they might 
have constituted a nation, in the sense that they pereeived themselves as one socio-
political community, could thus be contested. 
According to Touval, 'three factors contributed to the development of national 
consciousness among the Somalis': resentment against their respective colonial 
governments, religious antagonism, and the 'deliberate encouragement of Somali 
national feelings by various governments from time to time'.67 All three factors, 
while brewing throughout the 1920s and 1930s, nevertheless only found expression 
after WWII. In the words of Touval: 
In the Horn the principal impetus to the emergence of nationalism as the most 
important politicai force in the région was external. Somali nationalism, instead 
of evolving gradually from internal events, sprang mainly from global war and 
its aftermath.68 
In 1940, when Italy declared war upon the Allies, Somalis were recruited in the 
armies on both sides, and 
The war brought the Somali population into extensive contact with the West. 
Thousands of Somalis served with the armed forces of the warring powers, 
67 Touval, 1963, op. cit., pp. 61-2. 
68 Ibid., p. 76. 
215 
and, however unpleasant the circumstances may have been, were thus exposed 
to Western influences.69 
While Touval insists on the anti-colonial nature of Somali nationalism, Markakis, on 
the other hand, has emphasised the effects of the socio-economic transformations 
brought about by colonisation. Thus, more then a mere reaction to external events, 
the appearance of nationalism in Somalia and Eritrea reflected an awakening of 
politicai consciousness among social strata moulded in the colonial situation 
and having vested interests in the colonial economy and the state.70 
The rise in the number of traders was also seen by Markakis as an important factor, 
as was the extension of their territorial scope of activity brought about by the 
unification of the Somali territories during the war. 
Against these essentially modernist accounts, others have argued that pan-
Somali consciousness did exist in pre-colonial times. Ahmed Samatar writes that: 
the absence of a state, in addition to segmentation, did not mean a complete 
lack of public authority or the absence of a sense of politicai community. On 
the contrary, like ali reciprocai social systems, Somalis of the precolonial age 
organized and managed their politicai life through kinship association, 
conjoined with religious laws. (...) In short, Somalis of precolonial times might 
not have seen themselves as a nation, in the now familiar sense that nations are 
invariably associated with the state. However, they did have a moral 
commonwealth (or umma). 71 
Similarly, Lewis argued that despite the numerous cleavages that cut across Somali 
society, the Somali people nevertheless constitute a nation since they share a 
common language, a common culture and a common religion.72 In particular, he 
noted that: 
69 Ibid., p. 77. 
70 Markakis, 1990, op. cit., p. 52 
71 Samatar, Ahmed I., 'The Curse of Allah: Civic Disembowelment and the Collapse of the State in 
Somalia', in Samatar, Ahmed I., (ed.), The Somali Challenge. From Catastrophe to Renewal? Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, Boulder, London, 1993, pp. 109 and 111. 
72 The first édition of I.M. Lewis's Modem History of Somalia, was thus entitled The Modem History 
of Somalilandfrom Nation to State, 1965. 
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Above all, Islam adds depth and coherence to those common elements of 
traditional culture which, over and above their many sectional divisions, unite 
Somalis and provide the basis for their strong national consciousness. Although 
the Somali did not traditionally form a unitary state, it is this héritage of 
cultural nationalism which, strengthened by Islam, lies behind Somali 
nationalism today.73 
With hindsight, given Somalia's disintegration in 1991 and more particularly 
Somaliland's secession, it would seem that pan-Somali nationalism, whatever its 
sources may have been, was not after all that deeply rooted. In 1967, Prime Minister 
Egal initiated a sériés of talks with Somalia's neighbours and agreed to suspend any 
irredentist Claims over Kenya, Djibouti and Ethiopia.74 Although Egal seems to have 
been motivated by the desire to curtail Somalia's increased economic isolation by 
establishing trade agreements with the neighbouring countries,75 he was nevertheless 
accused by members of the politicai class and the press of selling out the Greater 
Somalia ideal. The fact that Egal was a northerner may be significant and perhaps 
Pan-Somalism should be viewed as an essentially Southern Somali ambition. 
c) Parliamentary democracy: 1960-69 
Throughout the 1960s, Somalia was experimenting with parliamentary democracy. 
Specifically, from 1960 to 1969, Somalia attempted to devise a system of 
government based on the Italian Parliamentary model. Elections were held in 1960, 
1964 and 1969, with a growing number of politicai parties participating in the 
élections. In 1960, five parties competed for the 123 seats in the National Assembly, 
in 1964, there were 21 parties with 973 candidates and in 1969 the number of parties 
had reached 62. Despite these increases, the Somali National Youth League was 
brought back to power in each election. 
73 Lewis, 1988s, op. cit., p. 16. 
74 Thuston, Raymond, 'Détente in the Horn,' Africa Report, Vol. 12, No. 2, February 1969, pp 6-13. 
217 
While western analysts focused on the process of competitive élections as 
proof that democracy was 'alive and well' in Somalia, in fact, the opposite was 
trae. The multiple parties fractures into sub-clan parties, then extended-family 
parties, and finally into one-man parties.76 
The Somali politicai system entered a major crisis of confidence; politicians were 
increasingly accused of corruption thus undermining the legitimacy of the National 
Assembly. 
In addition to this, Somalia's dire economic situation was far from improving 
despite considérable foreign assistance. Düring the 1964-69 period, Somalia was in 
fact one of the largest recipients of foreign aid: 'about 85 percent of her total 
development expenditure up to the end of 1969 [was] externally financed'.77 It must 
be noted that at independence Somalia's economy was far from developed. Except 
for a few agricultural projects, little investment had been made by either Britain or 
Itaiy in their respective colonies. According to the US Department of Commerce: 
[T]wo-thirds of its people were still pastoral nomads, engaged in nonmonetized 
activity. Only two commodities - bananas and livestock — accounted for 90 
percent ofthe country's export earnings, and Somali had to import virtually ali 
necessary manufactured goods. At independence, Somalia's GNP stood at $56 
million, and the annual per capita income was a mere $28.78 
Soon after independence, the First Five-Year Pian, 1963-67 was introduced. 
Twenty-nine per cent of total development outlays were earmarked for 
transport development, with 17.8 per cent allocated to agricultural projects. 
Industriai development, with an allocation of 15.7 per cent of the total 
development budget, was assigned an almo st equal priority with agriculture. 
Education (6.5 per cent), health (3.0) per cent), housing, settlement, and water 
supplies (6.5 per cent) were given relatively low priority. (...) The method of 
75 Okbazghi Yohannes, The United States and the Horn ofAfrica An Analytieal Study of Pattern and 
Process, Westview Press, Boulder: Colorado, 1997, p. 228. 
76 Payton, Gary, 'The Somali Coup of 1969: the Case for Soviet Complicity,' The Journal of Modern 
African Studies, Vol. 18, No. 3, September 1980, p. 501. 
77 Mehmet, Ozay, 'Effectiveness of Foreign Aid - the Case of Somalia,' The Journal of Modern 
African Studies, Vol. 9, No. 1, 1971, p. 31. 
78 U.S. Department of Commerce. 'Basic Data on the Economy of the Somali Republic.' Bureau of 
International Commerce, Washington DC. February, 1965. Quoted in Obazghi Yohannes, op. cit., p. 
224. 
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financing the projects envisaged under the First Five-Year Plan was very 
simple, relying almost entirely on loans and grants from abroad.79 
Although Somalia received financial assistance from a wide range of sources -
through bilateral and multilateral channels - it nevertheless suffered from Britain's 
withdrawal of aid following the break of diplomatie relations in 1964. More 
damaging though, was the closure of the Suez Canal in 1967, which badly affected 
Somalia's main souree of trade earnings - the export of bananas.80 
As the country's eeonomie situation spiralled downwards, presidential 
eleetions were held in June 1967, but the new government's term in office was short-
lived. On 15 October 1969, in what appears to have been an accident, a pólice 
constable assassinated President 'Abd ar-Rashid 'Ali Shirmarke during his tour of a 
drought-stricken area in Somalia's Northern Región. Prime Minister Mohammed 
Haji Ibrahim Egal, who at the time was in the United States on an official visit during 
which he hoped to secure American financial aid, immediately returned to 
Mogadishu.81 The Somali Youth League members of Parliament met to nominate a 
presidential candidate, but 
on 21 October, Major General Muhammed Siad Barre, the Army commander, 
ordered his troops to seize the capital. It was a swift and bloodless coup; a 
Revolutionary Council declared itself in control of the nation. Later that same 
day the National Assembly was dissolved and the Constitution revoked.82 
d) The descent into chaos 
Following his coming to power, Barre proceeded to discredit Somalia's democratic 
experience, declared all political parties illegal and announced the introduction of a 
79 Mehmet, Ozay, op. cit., pp. 32-4. 
80 Mehmet, op. cit., p. 35; Obazghi Yohannes, op. cit., p. 228. 
81 The US turned down Premier Ibrahim Egal's request. See; Obazghi Yohannes, op. cit., pp. 228-9. 
82 Payton, p. 502. 
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'strict' anti-clan policy.83 These measures were allegedly introduced in response to 
Somalia's previous catastrophic experiment with parliamentary democracy. It must 
nevertheless be noted that in 1956, after the first Assembly élections in what was 
then the Trusteeship of Somalia, législation was passed 'making it illegal for politicai 
parties to bear tribal names'.84 Denunciations of 'tribalism' in Somali politicai life 
therefore predated Barre's regime. Barre pushed this policy to the absurd extreme of 
forbidding any reference to clan affiliation even in the private sphere. 
Clanism was, according to officiai policy, to be eradicated by the forces of 
nationalism. A number of policies designed to enhance Somali nationalism were thus 
introduced. Measures included the adoption, in 1972, of Osmaniya as the national 
script accompanied by an intensive programme of national alphabétisation. Somali 
was introduced as the language of administration in 1973, replacing Italian and 
Arabie, and further hoisting Barre's nationalist credentials. The officiai history of 
Somalia was also re-written linder the Barre regime. The earlier rebellions of Ahmed 
Ibrahim Al-Ghazi and Mohamed Abdullah Assan were portrayed as proto-nationalist 
manifestations of the country's libération struggles, and statues commemorating the 
glory of these two men were erected in Mogadishu.85 
Despite his appeals to Somali nationalism, Barre sought to allay international 
and regional suspicion by avoiding references to 'Greater Somalia.' Such caution 
was further reinforced by Soviet threats to withdraw ifs support were Somalia to 
83 Since the history of Barre's rule is well documented, this section will merely recali those aspects 
that are more directly relevant to the overall argument. For more on this period see, Lewis, 1988, op. 
cit., Laitin and Samatar, 1987, op. cit., and Compagnon, 1995, op. cit. 
84 Such denunciation of 'tribalism' in Somali politicai life therefore predates Barre's regime. Lewis, 
I.M., 'Modern Leadership and Loyalties in Somalia and Somaliland,' Civilisations, Vol. 10, No. 1, 
1960, p. 58. 
85 While the Al-Ghazi's alleged Somali ethnicity remains disputed, Abdullah Assan''s status as a 
national hero was contested by many Northerners, who had sided with the British during the Dervish 
rebellion and for whom Abdullah Assan was a bloodthirsty despot. On this, see, Compagnon, Daniel, 
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make any moves towards the Ogaden.86 Ever since Barre's adoption of 'scientific 
soeiaHsm' in the early 1970s, which would appear to have been motivated less by 
ideological than by international politicai considérations, the USSR had been 
providing Somalia with important military and economie assistance.87 But, in the 
early months of 1977, the Soviet-Somali relationship was coming under strain: 
The fiercely independent Somalis were beginning to have doubts about the 
extent to which their close ties with the Soviet Union had compromised their 
sovereignty. Moreover, since joining the Arab League in 1974, Somalia, 
though not actually an Arab nation, had come increasingly under the influence 
of Arab States (notably Saudi Arabia) which, seeking to minimize Soviet 
influence in the Red Sea région, were prepared to offer her inducements to 
reduce her dependence on the Soviet Union.88 
Meanwhile, the US-Ethiopian relationship was also unravelling. In December 1976, 
a délégation from the Derg was sent to Moscow and successfully secured from the 
Soviet Union $385 million in military aid to Ethiopia. In February 1977, the Carter 
administration decided to suspend military aid to Ethiopia. The Derg responded, in 
Aprii that year, by expelling the American Military Assistance Advisory Group 
(MAAG) and closing down other American installations in the country. The twenty-
five years long US-Ethiopian alliance had come to an end. 
As this dramatic reversai of alliances was occurring, the Mogadishu-backed 
Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF) launched a sériés of attacks on Ethiopian 
border positions and by June 1977, it claimed to control 60 per cent of the Ogaden. 
Whatever circumstances prompted the attack, the Somali army crossed the Ethiopian 
frontier in July 1977. Condemning Somalia's invasion of Ethiopia, the Soviet Union 
'Dynamiques de mobilisation. Dissidence armée et rébellion populaire: le cas du mouvement national 
somali (1981-1990), Africa, Vol. 47, No. 4, décembre 1992, p. 513. 
86 Laitin and Samatar, 1987, op. cit., p. 141. 
87 According to Robert Patman, the Soviets did not consider Barre to be a reliable ideological ally, but 
decided nevertheless to support him for geostrategic reasons. Patman, Robert G., The Soviet Union in 
the Horn ofAfrica: The Diplomacy of Intervention and Disengagement, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1990, p. 185. 
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suspended in August its military assistance to Somalia.89 The Americans for their 
part, withdrew the offer, made at the end of August, to provide 'defensive' weapons 
to Somalia, and, rejecting Ethiopia's requests that it pro vide it the arms it claimed the 
US still owed her, decided to maintain an embargo on arms supplies to either side. 
By September 1977, Somalia had succeeded in occupying most of the Ogaden. 
Following the déclaration made, in October, by the Soviet ambassador to Addis 
Ababa, in which he confirmed that the Soviet Union was now providing Ethiopia 
with 'defensive weapons to protect her revolution, unity and territorial integrity', 
Somalia cancelled her 1974 treaty with Moscow and expelled all Soviet personnel.90 
Although the US applauded Somalia's décision to break off relations with the Soviet 
Union and Cuba, it nevertheless refused to supply Barre with arms. Ethiopia, now 
solidly backed by the USSR and Cuba, launched a massive counter-offensive and 
recovered most of the lost territory in March 1978, forcing Somalia to retreat. 
Somalia's defeat in the Ogaden unleashed a sériés of events, whose 
conséquences would lead to the state's eventual collapse a decade later. The costs 
incurred by the war and the loss of Soviet aid plunged the country into an economic 
crisis, whose effects were further exacerbated by the 1978-80 drought and the 
massive influx of refugees from the Ogaden.91 Barre's leadership began to be openly 
criticised from within. The army, which under Barre had become the pillar of the 
regime, showed signs of unrest and indiscipline within it officer corps.92 In April 
1978, a group of officers attempted to overthrow the regime, but their efforts, as well 
88 Strategie Survey 1997, IISS, London, p. 17. 
89 Despite claims that he was motivated by clan affiliation, Barre appears to have been reluctantly 
forced into the situation. See, Laitin and Samatar, 1987, op. cit., p. 141. 
90 Ibid., p. 20. 
91 The most conservative estimâtes put their numbers at 500 000, half of which were re-settled in 
northern Somalia. 
92 Makinda, Samuel, 'Politics and Clan Rivalry in Somalia,' Australian Journal of Politicai Science, 
Vol. 26, 1991, p. 117. 
222 
as those from more moderate mirásters, were brutally crushed. After elections in 
1979, organised mainly to satisfy American demands, Barre re-established the 
Supreme Revolutionary Council and introduced a state of emergency, leading to the 
constitution's suspensión in October 1980.93 
The fírst opposition parties - the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) 
and the Somali National Movement (SNM) - emerged in the aftermath of the 
Ogaden defeat. High ranking army officers, mainly from the Majerteen (Darod) sub-
clan, created the SSDF as early as 1978. The SNM (whose history is detailed in the 
following section) was formed by Isaaq expatriates in 1981. Although both 
organisations relied mainly on lineage affiliation, they also included minority 
sections of other clans. In fact, contrary to what is frequently upheld, it would appear 
that these armed opposition movements, as well as those that would spring up 
subsequently, were less an expression of the re-emergence of formerly repressed clan 
affiliations than the result of Barre's divisive strategies and of elite manipulation.94 
As Daniel Compagnon makes clear: 
The failure of such multi-clan organizations was due in large part to 
manipulation by Siyaad Barre, who managed to create profound distrust 
between the clans which opposed him, in order to defiise opposition to his rule. 
One of his tactics was to militarise the clans by creating clan militias, giving 
them weapons, and then implicating them in the repression against a targeted 
clan segment: the Hawiye/Sa'ad against the Majerteen/Uma Mahamuud, the 
Dulbahante against the Isaaq/Habar Ja'alo, the Gadabuursi against the 
Isaaq/Sa'ad Muuse, and later, the Harti of Kismayo against the Ogadeen, and 
the Majerteen against the Isaaq. Quite often, these clan herded their camels 
together in the bush; they had long histories of feuds, indeed, but also of 
marriages and alliances.95 
93 Compagnon, 1992, op. cit., p. 506. 
94 Compagnon, Daniel, 'Somali Armed Movements,' in : Clapham, C. (éd.), African Guerrillas, James 
Currey Ltd, Oxford, 1998, p. 73-90, Compagnon, Daniel, 'The Somali Opposition Fronts: Some 
Comments and Questions,' Horn ofAfrica, Vol. XIII, nos. 1 and 2, January-June 1990, pp. 29-54; 
Djama, 1992, op. cit.-, and Adam, 1995, op. cit., pp. 69-89. 
95 Compagnon, 1998, op. cit., p. 76. 
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Although Barre had publicly denounced clan politics, he rehed extensively on 
kinship networks to exercise his power and control his rivais. Early on, his 
government came to be disparagingly, albeit secretly, referred to as MOD, each letter 
standing for one of the three Darod sub-clans (Marehan, Ogaden and Dulbahante) on 
which his regime rested and from which his advisers tended to be chosen. While 
Barre" s divide and rule strategy was mainly designed to fuel inter-clan suspicion and 
hostilities, it also involved generating intra-clan conflict. The SSDF's sédition 
attempi, for instance, was essentially curtailed when Barre managed to play the 
Majerteen pastoralists against the Majerteen traders by granting the latter substantial 
economic advantages, thus revealing the fragility of clan bonds.96 Despite the fact 
that his own 'MOD' clan alliance was crumbling and that he could no longer rely on 
the Army, Barre was nevertheless able to hold on to power and fend off mounting 
opposition from the North, because of military, technical and financial foreign 
• 97 
assistance. 
In the 1980s, the IMF and the World Bank recommended the adoption of a 
number of austerity measures to enable Somalia to recover from the war. These 
measures, paradoxically, only contributed further to the collapse of the formal 
economy and of the State as a whole. The restructuring of government expenditure 
brought about a réduction of civil service wages and a downsizing of the public 
sector, which generated discontent among employees and pushed the formal 
economy underground. Foreign aid, released by Somalia's defeat and withdrawal 
96 Djama, 1992, op. cit., 1995. 
97 Although most of Somalia's military and economic aid came from the US, Barre's regime also 
relied on assistance from Italy, China, the UN, the World Bank and the Arab League. See, Hussein 
Adam, 1995, op. cit., p. 75; and Okbazghi Yohannes, 1997, op. cit.,pp. 241-57. 
from Ethiopia, then contributed to the politicai economy of warfare.98 According to 
the US General Accounting Office estimâtes in 1986, only 20 percent of the food 
destined to aid the refugees of the Ogaden war appeared to reach the refugees.99 As 
government officiais continued to enrich themselves, those who did not benefit from 
the predatory network, and thus found themselves squeezed out of the economy, 
began to rely increasingly on force. This provided militia leaders with additional 
incentives for compétition over resources legitimising their recourse to violence. 
In 1988, the findings of an investigation initiated by the US Congress into the 
regime's human rights violations and, in particular, its violent response to mounting 
opposition in north-western Somalia,100 led to the suspension of American military 
aid. In 1989, the US government fùrther suspended any economic assistance to 
Barre's regime, a move that was followed by other states and international 
organisations. Having lost all external support, and 'increasingly mocked as nothing 
more than the mayor of Mogadishu' by Somalis themselves,101 Siad Barre fled 
Somalia in January 1991, leaving the capital city of Mogadishu in the midst of 
factional chaos where discontented rival factions began to fight each other for control 
of the state and its meagre spoils. 
98 On how international economy fuelled the war, see; Clapham, Christopher, "The Politicai Economy 
of Conflict and Peace in the Horn of Africa,' Bahra Zewde, Pankhurst, Richard, and Tadesse Beyene, 
(eds), Proceedings of the Eleventh International Conference of Ethiopian Studies, Vol. II, Addis 
Ababa University, 1994, pp. 703-19. Clapham identifies three sources in particular: armaments, food 
and external remittances. Remittances from abroad did indeed constitute one of the most important 
sources of income not to be incorporated in officiai statistics although amounting to 40 percent of 
Somalia's GNP. See, de Waal, Alex, "The Shadow Economy. (Somalia's economic difficulties),' 
Africa Report, Vol. 38, No. 2, March-April 1993, pp. 24-9. 
99 de Waal, 1993, op. cit., p. 25. 
100 House of Représentatives Committee on Foreign AflFairs, Subcommittee on Africa, Reported 
Massacres and Indiscriminate Killings in Somalia, Washington, DC, Thursday, July 14, 1988. 
101 Simons, Anna, 'Somalia and the dissolution of the Nation-State', American Anthropologist, Vol. 
96, No. 4, December 1994, p. 819. 
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5.4 - The roots of discontent 
On 18 May 1991, as the state of Somalia eollapsed, north-western Somalia 
proclaimed its independence and adopted the name of Somaliland. Somaliland 
invoked as a justification for secession its increased politicai and economic aliénation 
from Mogadishu. In April 1981, a group of expatriate northerners, mainly from the 
Isaaq clan which dominâtes the région but joined also by Dulbahante and Gadabursi 
représentatives who also inhabit the North, met in London to set up the Somali 
National Movement (SNM). As its président, the SNM elected Ahmed Mohamed 
Gulayd, a businessman who had played a role in the nationalist movement of the 
1950s, and who had been imprisoned by Barre in 1969. Following his release in 
1975, he had moved to Djibouti and then to Saudi Arabia. The SNM was at its 
inception perhaps more représentative of Somaliland's exile communities than of its 
local population.102 Although their avowed primary aim was to overthrow, 'by any 
means available' Siad Barre's regime, Somaliland's secession lurked in the 
background as a possible option. In order to understand what brought the SNM to 
adopt such a programme, it is necessary to discuss the underlying sources of 
dissatisfaction in the north-western région. It is also necessary to note that despite the 
SNM's importance, local mobilisation and unrest played a fundamental role in the 
process that led to Barre's collapse and Somaliland's secession. 
a) Problems of unification 
As was mentioned earlier, the 1960 union was carried through hastily and without 
adequate préparation. Whereas the Italian trusteeship of Somalia had clearly laid out 
the schedule for independence, such was not the case in British Somaliland. In fact, a 
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final décision was only taken in May 1960, less than two months before 
independence was actually granted and this, not because of any internationally 
agreed plan, but because of the increased pressures for self-government made by the 
Protectorate's elite. Although the issue was discussed on a number of occasions 
throughout the 1950s, the décision to unify the two 'Somalias' was only reached in 
April 1960, during a conférence held in Mogadishu between Northern and Southern 
Somali leaders. The new Somali Republic, it was decreed, would be a 'unitary, 
democratic and parliamentary state'. According to Ahmed Samatar: 
Northerners were much taken in, perhaps dazzled, by the aura of significance 
of the occasion [decolonization]. The evidence for this is based on three facts: 
First, despite the déclaration of 26 June 1960 as the day of independence in 
British Somaliland, Northerners waited for a week to merge with the South. 
Second, Northern leaders came down to Mogadishu to push for unification 
with no guarantees or conditionalities in terms of Northern interest. Third, 
there was the a priori Northern willingness to accept Mogadishu as the capital, 
despite its distance from Hargeisa and the rest of Somaliland.103 
The Act of Union, which set out the legai framework for the union, was adopted, 
albeit with retroactive effect, seven month after the deed.104 The problems entailed 
by the North's lack of préparation emerged soon thereafìer. On 20 June 1961, a 
referendum to 'sanctify' the union was held. Although the 'yes' vote, in favour of the 
union, won overwhelmingly in the South, in the North, the 'no' vote (against the 
union) registered a small majority of 52.3% with more than half of those registered to 
vote not showing up.105 
102 The SNM's Secretary-General was also a member of Somaliland's exile Community. 
103 Samatar, Ahmed I., 1994, op. cit., footnote 57, p. 143. 
104 Contini, Paolo, The Somali Republic: An Experiment in Legal Integration, Frank Cass & Co. Ltd., 
London, 1969, p. 10. Paolo Contini served as Chairman of the Consultative Commission for 
Integration which was appointed in October 1960 by presidential decree in order to assist the Somali 
government. 
105 Compagnon, 1995, op. cit., footnote 3, p. 527. See also, Touval, 1963, op. cit., pp. 120-1. 
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Given their differing colonial legacies, the legal and administrative integration 
of the two entities proved more difficult than initially envisaged. As Contini 
observed: 
[I]n most respects the Northern and Southern régions were still two separate 
states. There were two différent judicial systems; différent currencies; différent 
Organization and conditions of service for the army, the police and the civil 
servants, as well as différent training, outlook and working habits between 
Northern and Southern officiais; the governmental institutions, both at the 
central and local level were differently organized and had différent powers; the 
systems and rates of taxation and customs were différent and so were the 
educational systems.106 
According to Prunier, independent Somalia inherited from the previous period an 
authoritarian and centralised state bureaucracy which, for lack of personnel, had been 
set up and was ruled, even during the trusteeship period, by the old fascist cadres of 
the 1920s and 1930s. This framework, which was originally imposed throughout the 
country, therefore favoured the Italian-trained southerners.107 
Language soon became a contentious issue. Although Somali was spoken 
throughout the country, there was then no agreed method of transcription that 
enabled it to be used as a written language. As a resuit, officiai documents and 
transactions were written in English in the North and in Italian in the South. During 
the first four years of the Union, the ministry of éducation was run by northerners 
and it was consequently decided that English would be designated as the medium of 
instruction after the fourth grade throughout the Republic. This naturally provoked 
the indignation of the southern teachers and school officiais who had hitherto been 
trained in Italian and who perceived the ministry's new policy as a threat to their own 
status.108 By contrast, the small University Institute, which offered courses in law and 
106 Contini, 1969, op. cit., p. 11 
107 Prunier, Gérard, 'Somaliland Goes It Alone,' Current History, Vol. 97, No. 619, May 1998, p. 225. 
108 Kapil, Ravil, 'Integrating Disparate Colonial Legacies: the Somali Expérience,' Race, VIII, No. 1, 
1966, p. 83. 
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économies and which Italy funded, dispensed its teachings in Italian. This created a 
competing two-tier system which further heightened tensions since the choice of a 
medium of instruction unavoidably determined the administration's officiai 
language. 
The introduction of a number of badly implemented measures further raised 
northern irritation. In December 1961, an abortive coup was instigated by Sandhurst 
trained Somali lieutenants. Although the coup may have been motivated more by 
personal than politicai factors, the event is nevertheless now remembered as an 
episode in the 'history' of Somaliland's struggle for independence.109 Hassan Kayd, 
one of the officers involved in the coup attempi, died in the early 1990s and is now 
remembered and honoured as one of the first 'heroes' of Somaliland's struggle 
against unification.110 Another contentious issue was the process by which civil 
service salaries were harmonised. The law introduced in March 1962 failed to 
address the fact that wages were higher in the Protectorate. The change, which was 
not introduced incrementally, generated some discontent.111 
But perhaps more significant and irksome for Somaliland's population was 
the introduction in 1963 of a unitary system of tariffs and custom dues which, 
according to Lewis: 
though intended to lower transport costs in the north had quite the opposite 
effect. Food prices in the northern région immediately soared causing a 
widespread public indignation that led to a riot in Hargeisa on 1 May.112 
The north's increased feeling of being treated as a periphery was further fuelled by 
the lack of economie development in the région. Throughout the 1960s, little 
109 It would seem that the Protectorate Lieutenants reacted to the fact that they felt they were being led 
by less qualifîed officers coming from the south. 
110 Bryden, Matt, 'Somaliland: Fiercely Independent', Africa Report, November/December 1994, p. 
36. 
111 Compagnon, 1995, p. 527. 
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economic investment was made in the North by comparison to the South. A 
compilation of the regional distribution of projects completed between 1963 and 
1969 in Somalia indicates that 68.6 percent of these were undertaken in the Southern 
région, whereas only 18.4 percent took place in the Northern région.113 
The transfer and concentration of power to Mogadishu meant that from 
independence on, the people of northern Somalia would have to go to the capital to 
have their interests represented and voice their grievances. Northerners' pride was 
injured and was accompanied by the fact that the merger of the two territories' 
législatures had brought the overwhelming preponderance of the Somali Youth 
League in Parliament, a party which was perceived as representing Southern 
interests.114 In order to curtail the SYL's prevalence, a new party was created in May 
1963. The Somali National Congress (SNC) brought together the SNL, then under 
the leadership of Egal, and the League Jumaleh, whose presidential candidate had 
been defeated at the previous national élections. In the November 1963 Municipal 
élections, the Somali Youth League obtained only 28% of the votes in the North, and 
although it won the 1964 general élections, its candidates once again scored poor 
results in the North.115 Northern dissatisfaction appeared to subside when the 1967 
élections brought Egal, a northern-based Isaaq, to power. It is perhaps therefore not 
surprising that Siad Barre's coup in 1969, which overthrew Egal's government, was 
perceived as an insuit by the North and an early indication of Barre's alleged anti-
Isaaq sentiments. 
112 Lewis, 1988, op. cit., p. 176. 
113 These figures were compiled by Mehmet on the basis of the data provided in the German Planning 
and Advisory Group's Report on the Progress of Development Projects in the Somali Démocratie 
Republic, Mogadishu and Frankfurt, 1969. See: Mehmet, 1971, op. cit., p. 46. 
114 The SYL held 85 of the 123 parliamentary seats. Kapil, 1966, op. cit., p. 82. 
115 Kapil, 1966, op. cit., p. 82. 
Dissatisfaction in economic matters continued under Barre, as the Isaaq 
claimed that the situation in the late 1970s in the North was worse than that which 
had prevailed under British colonisation.116 It could be argued that the economic 
situation in Somalia Overall was catastrophic, this all the more so when, after the 
Ogaden defeat, the country became the largest recipient of foreign aid per capita in 
sub-Saharan Africa. Yet, as Alex de Waal has argued, officiai statistics betray the 
reality. When other indicators are taken into account, Somalia's economy was by 
many standards booming; but it was a shadow economy which profited particular 
sectors of the population, mainly those in or affiliated to government, and who 
handled these transactions in a Mafia-ruled manner.117 
While Northern discontent with the union is therefore partially substantiated, 
the level of discrimination should nevertheless not be over exaggerated and seen as 
an unbroken trend. After all, Egal was elected in 1967, and even under Barre's rule, a 
number of Isaaq and other northerners were represented in his administration at least 
until the early 1980s.118 Northerners themselves may be also partly to blâme for the 
lack of development in their own région as they themselves overwhelmingly invested 
in Mogadishu and the southern plantations.119 Although the factors mentioned earlier 
are now in retrospect invoked to justify the North's décision to secede, it is probable 
that they would not have achieved the importance they have now acquired had it not 
been for the governmental repression that was unleashed in the 1980s towards the 
116 Compagnon, 1995, op. cit., p. 531. 
117 de Waal, 1993, op. cit., pp. 24-9. 
118 Africa Confidential obtained a list of the names and clan affiliations of the leading military and 
police Commanders chosen by the Central Committee in September 1986. 'Of the major clans it is 
noticeable that neither the Isaaq nor the Hawiye are well represented ( . . . ) There are in fact only two 
senior Isaaq Commanders ( . . . ) [Although, among the police force], the Isaaq provide more regional 
and local Commanders than any other major clan - some 24%.' See: 'Somalia: Military Politics,' 
Africa Confidential, Vol. 27, No. 22 ,29 October 1986. 
119 Compagnon, Daniel, 'Somaliland, un ordre politique en gestation,' Politique Africaine, Vol. 50, 
juin 1993, p. 11. 
231 
North. As is often the case, history will be selectively remembered, and forgotten, to 
justify present political imperatives. 
b) Mobilisation and civil war in the North 
Somalia's defeat by Ethiopia triggered a massive refugee movement from the 
Ogaden, an estimated 500, 000 people, half of whom were put in refugee camps in 
Northern Somalia. This situation led to increased population pressure in a land where 
resources are scarce. Despite the fact that they belonged to clans who have been 
described as traditionally antagonistic, relations between the local population and the 
refugees appear to have been relatively good in the beginning.120 That is until Barre's 
government, weary of northern discontent, started to fund the Western Somali 
League militias which terrorised Isaaq pastoralists. The latter, in self-defence, set up 
their own militias who were in turn brutally dismantled in 1982 by the new military 
commander in the North Mohammed Hashi Gani (a member of the family of Barre's 
wife). The government's retaliation was interpreted as a clear indication that the 
regime favoured the Ogadeni against the Isaaq, although later events would show the 
repression to be more indiscriminate. 
The North began to feel increasingly alienated economically. Among those 
measures introduced at the behest of the IMF and the World Bank that affected more 
particularly the North, was the devaluation of the Somali shilling. This, among other 
effects, led to a dramatic rise in veterinary costs, fundamental for an economy whose 
main source of income is the export of its livestock.121 Livestock, essentially reared 
in and shipped from the North, were for the most part destined to the Gulf and Arab 
120 Lewis, I.M., 'The Ogaden and Somali Segmentary Nationalism, African Affairs, Vol. 88, No. 353, 
October 1989, p. 575. 
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states. Thus, when Saudi Arabia banned the import of cattle in 1983, invoking fears 
of rinder-pest, a crippling blow was dealt to traders and cattle-herders in northern 
Somalia.122 That same year, 'the government prohibited the cultivation and sale of 
the stimulant narcotic plant, qat (Catha Edulis), which had become a flourishing cash 
crop in the north western régions'.123 
Finally, the government's décision to suspend the 'franco valuta system' 
(whereby traders were given the freedom to import goods using their own foreign 
exchange), also under a World Bank recommendation, dealt a significant blow to the 
North's trading activities. Although all Somalis benefited from the system, 
northerners, more than others, appeared to have excelled in the export-import sector 
and benefited from the fact that an overwhelming proportion of expatriate Somali in 
the Arab and Gulf states were originally from that région.124 
In March 1982, 21 Isaaq uqaal (elders) of the Hargeisa région, led by Sheikh 
Ibrahim Sheikh Yussuf, went to Mogadishu to present Barre with a memorandum. 
The memorandum contained a list of grievances covering matters of commerce 
(including the question of the abolition of the franco valuta system), agriculture, 
livestock, public works and industrialisation of the North. Under the first heading, of 
commerce, the signatories demanded the return of those goods which had been 
seized by the government from the Port of Berbera as part of its dismantling of the 
'franco valuta' system and whose value was estimated at 300 million Somali 
121 Chossudovsky, Michel, The Globalisation of Poverty, Impacts of the IMF and World Bank 
Reforms, Zed Books, London and NewYork, 1998, pp. 102-3. Somalia's earnings in livestock export 
were estimated to represent 80 percent of the country's earnings in 1983. 
122 Saudi fears of rinder-pest were reportedly unfounded. 
123 Lewis, 1988, op. cit., p. 252. 
124 Compagnon, 1995, op. cit., p. 533. 
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shillings [S50 million].125 In addition to these economic issues, the memorandum 
also included a number of complaints regarding the government's harsh treatment of 
northern civilians and students who had begun agitating in the early 1980s. 
In 1981, a group of doctors, engineers, intellectuals and traders, named the 
'Hargeisa group' or 'Uffo' (Hurricanes), decided to raise money in order to renovate 
the Hospital of Hargeisa. They were appalled by the physical détérioration of the 
région5s infrastructure and their action inevitably highlighted the government's 
neglect and inefficiency. Uffo, moreover, began at that time distributing anti-
government leaflets and on June 26 1981, the anniversary of Somaliland's 
independence from Britain, they gathered secretly for a flag-raising ceremony. 'Their 
banner was a Somali flag with only one point of the Somali star remaining -
Somaliland.'126 The government alleged, unfoundedly, that the group was raising 
money to fìmd the SNM's clandestine activities; and arrested and imprisoned twenty-
nine people in November and December 1981.127 The government's heavy-handed 
response triggered a student revolt in February 1982; the government responded once 
more with harsh repressive measures, including arrests and torture of students. The 
Memorandum presented by the twenty-one elders asked for their release, but instead, 
the government responded by arresting some of the memorandum's signatories. 
The SNM, which had then moved its headquarters to Dire Dawa in Ethiopia, 
launched a number of military opérations, the most spectacular of which was the 
attack in January 1983 on the Mandera Prison, where many of those previously 
arrested were detained. This episode was decisive in that it formally bound the SNM 
125 The memorandum is reprinted in the Africa Watch Report, Somalia: A Government at War with its 
Own People - Testimonies About the Killings and the Confliet in the North, London, New York, 
January 1990. 
126 Bryden, Matt, 'Somaliland: Fiercely Independent,' Africa Report, November-December 1994, p. 
36. 
and the various grass-root movements that had sprung in the région into a eoherent 
and better-organised opposition. The Student protest gathered momentum and set up 
the Unifïed SomaH Student Organisation (USSO). Two rallies were organised in 
1983 and 1984 to commemorate the February 1982 events and demand the release of 
the remaining prisoners. In June 1984, in total defiance of Barre's regime, USSO 
staged a démonstration to commemorate Somaliland's independence. The city of 
Hargeisa followed by shutting down all activity. The government retaliated violently 
and the police dismantled USSO, on the grounds that it was affiliated to the SNM, 
although here too such suspicions appear unsubstantiated. As Lewis recalls: 
From the early 1980s, the north was administered by increasingly harsh 
military rule with savage reprisais meted out to the assumedly pro-SNM local 
population who were subject to severe economic as well as politicai 
harassment. The North as I saw when I last visited it in 1985, began to look and 
feel like a colony under a foreign military tyranny.128 
By then the government was no longer able to control the wave of discontent; the 
rebellion was no longer confined to a group of exiles but had reached a great part of 
the population in north-western Somalia. Until 1988, the mobilisation gathered pace 
and the SNM launched a number of guerrilla opérations but with no significant 
results. 
The situation was to change radically when, in April 1988, Barre and Mengistu 
signed a peace accord in which both agreed to the cessation of hostilities and the 
termination of their support to any opposition party to the other. As Prunier recalls: 
The SNM fought, alone at first but with the fïnancial backing of the Isaaq clan 
Diaspora in the Persian Gulf countries. After 1984, President Mengistu Haile 
Mariam of Ethiopia began to aid the guerrilla movement for geopolitica! 
127 Both Bryden and Compagnon concur on this point. 
128 Lewis, 1989, op. cit., p 576. Mohammed Bali similarly compares the status of Somaliland in the 
1980s to that of a military colony. See, 'Somaliland: From Clan Dictatorship to Self-Determination, ' 
Maroody Jeex: A Somaliland Alternative Press, No. 1, January/March 1996, p. 4. 
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reasons; the worsening of the war in Eritrea led him to make peaee with 
Somalia in 1988.129 
As a resuit of the Somali-Ethiopian peace accord, the SNM, as well as the SSDF 
were ousted out of their Ethiopian sanctuary and deprived of the support Mengistu's 
regime had covertly given them. Taking advantage of the removal of Somali troops 
in the border area, the SNM decided to launch an attack on the government's 
Northern based military facilities in May/June 1988 and succeeded in occupying, 
albeit temporarily, the cities of Hargeisa and Burao. Barre's army retaliated violently 
and decimated the cities of Burao and Hargeisa through the use of artillery and air 
bombardments.130 An estimated 50, 000 people were killed and hundreds of 
thousands of refugees fled ftom northern Somalia to Ethiopia. Although the SNM 
attack was a military failure, it tolled the death knell of Barre's regime and a point of 
no return in Somaliland's move towards independence.131 After the government's 
violent response, the SNM 'found itself deluged with volunteers.'132 
If the SNM leadership was still divided with regard to secession, testimonies 
gathered by the UNHCR and other NGOs working amongst the refugees highlighted 
the extent to which the Government raids mobilised the population towards 
independence from the South: 
129 Prunier, 1998, op. cit., p. 226. 
130 The testimony given by Mr Kenneth Brow, then US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for 
African Affairs, following unrelenting questioning by the Chairman, Mr Howards Wölpe, confirmed 
reports that the 'Somali military had utilized Hawker Hunter planes, piloted or maintained by ex-
Rhodesian technicians for these attacks.' The testimony also confirmed reports that 'an American 
teamf' was 'helping to maintain and run the military's communication network in the North' which 
was destroyed by the May/June attacks. House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs, 
Reported Massacres and Indiscriminate Killings in Somalia, 1988, op. cit., p. 46. The use of ex-
Rhodesian manned Hawker Hunters was also reported in, 'Somalia: Showdown in the North,' Africa 
Confidential, Vol. 29, No. 15,29 July 1988, p. 2. 
131 Omar, Rakiya, 'One Thorn Bush at a time,' Current History, Vol. 93, No. 583, May 1994, p. 233, 
writes that the SNM rank and file 'had crossed the Rubicon of secession in May 1988.' 
132 de Waal, Alex, 'Contemporary Warfare in Africa,' unpublished manuscript, p. 19. This paper is an 
extended draft ofthe article published in: IDS Bulletin, Vol. 27, No. 3, July 1996, pp. 6-16. 
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Aden Tarabi Jamac was one of the 450 guerrilla fighters in the assault in 
Burao. "Before I was fighting for a free government for all of Somalia," but the 
shock of joining the battle changed that. "Then we were fighting to have two 
governments." Boobe, who had become one of the SNM top cadres, noticed a 
similar shift in the movement's orientation. "The aerial bombings, the 
bombardment, strafing of refugees as they fled to the border, all helped to 
solidify our sentiment of separateness. Their looting of the cities, the 
systematic, indiscriminate shelling...We realized we had nothing in common 
with these people from the south".133 
The following three years would only serve to confirm these views as Barre's divide 
and rule tactics continued to füel the Northern feelings of aliénation. Various clans 
and sub-clans, amongst whom some Ogadeni and Hawiye traders, were encouraged 
'take over the remains of Isaaqi shops and houses in what [had become] ghost 
towns.'134 But Barre's strategy was of no avail. In January 1991, Mogadishu feil and 
Siad Barre fled the country. A faction of the United Somali Congress (USC) led by 
Ali Mahdi Mohammed, renouncing an agreement that was reached in October 1990 
between the SNM and the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM), declared himself 
President of Somalia without Consulting his allies. The coalition disbanded, chaos 
ensued and North Western Somalia seceded. 
5.5 - Independent Somaliland 
As clan and sub-clan factions opposed each other in the South, the SNM adopted the 
path towards 'national' reconciliation. Although the Isaaq make up the majority of 
'Somaliland's' population, they clearly recognised the need to rally to their cause the 
other northern clans in spite of the fact that some of them had been co-opted by Barre 
in his attempi to dismantle Isaaq résistance.135 'Prisoners of war from these northern 
133 Bryden, 'Somaliland: Fiercely Independent,' 1994, op. cit., p. 4. 
134 Lewis, 1989, op. cit., p. 577. While Lewis speaks of the Ogadeni, Compagnon mentions the 
Hawiye, see 1993, op. cit., p. 13. 
133 The estimâtes for Somaliland's population vary from 1 million to 4.2 million. This wide variation 
may in part be explained by the lack of exact figures before the war and the large movement of 
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clans were also pardoned and returned to their clan areas.'136 Two shirs (assemblies) 
were convened, the first in Berbera in February 1991, the second in Burao, in 
Aprii/May 1991. The shirs were attended by members of the Isaaq, Gadabursi, 
Dulbahante, Issa and Warsangeli clans and sub-clans, thus reflecting the trans-clanic 
or national character of these reconciliation processes.137 
Independence, although considered by the SNM as a potential option, was not 
initially favoured. In fact, the motion to secede would appear to have been raised 
publicly for the first time not by the Isaaq but by the Gadabursi elders.138 The motion 
was endorsed by all the elders present and at the end of the Burao meeting in May 
1991, Somaliland declared the 1960 union to be nuli and proclaimed its 
independence within the ex-British Somaliland. As Patrick Gilkes observes, it was 'a 
move supported by the elders of ali northem clans.'139 Abdurahman Ahmed Ali 
Tuur, then President of the SNM, was nominated President and a provisionai 
government was set up for two years. While an attempi was made to include ali 
northern clans in the decision-making process, Samatar nevertheless points to the 
lack of equity in the new government clan composition as 'eleven of the seventeen 
ministers and ali four vice-ministers were from the Isaaq community.'140 
Somaliland's relative tranquillity and promising march towards normalisation 
was nevertheless interrupted at the end of 1991, when an intra-SNM armed rebellion 
refiigees. Depending on these numbers the estimated Isaaq proportion thus varies between 60 and 80 
per cent 
136 Prunier, 1998, op. cit., p. 226. 
137 Although Prunier lists the five aforementioned clans/sub-clans, Compagnon mentions only the first 
three. Prunier, 1998, op. cit., p. 226; and Compagnon, 1993, op. cit., p. 13. 
138 Compagnon, 1993, p. 13. 
139 Gilkes, Patrick, 'Descent into chaos: Somalia, January 1991-December 1992,' in Gurdon, Charles 
(éd.), The Horn ofAfrica, UCL Press, London, 1994, p. 48. 
140 Samatar, 1994, op. cit., p. 123. The author gives the names and clan affiliation of the First intérim 
government in table 5.1, p. 124. 
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erapted and led to what is referred to as Somaliland's first civil war.141 Some have 
suggested that the conflict was triggered by the feeling that the newly established 
government was overwhelmingly skewed in favour of the Habr Garhadjis sub-clan 
(which comprises both the Habr Yunis and Idegale sub-sub-clans) to which the 
President belonged as well as sections of the Habr Awal/Sa'ad Muse.142 Yet the fact 
that the factions fought for the control for the airfield of Hargeisa and the port 
Berbera, both of which represent vital routes to trade, might also indicate the 
presence of economic motivations behind the war. As Matthew Bryden reported: 
From late 1991, Hargeysa airport fell increasingly under the control of a group 
of mainly 'Idegale militia associated with SNM military units of Kood Buur 
and Sadexaad ("the 3rd"). The group established itself as an independent 
authority, demanding landing entry fees from incoming flights, and 
occasionally shooting at aircraft who transgressed their supple "regulations". 
Several expatríate members of the UN and NGO community were roughed up, 
while Somali civilians were subjected to routine harassment. The group 
resisted any attempts by Tuur's government (which didn't try very hard) to 
impose any degree of discipline and accountability upon the airport 
management. Revenue from airport charges was retained almost exclusively by 
the militia. Only in the weakest sense was the group associated either with their 
'clans' or with the administration. (...) Egal's insistence that the matter should 
be resolved without bloodshed successfully diffused fears - particularly from 
the Garxajis [other ñame for the Habr Garhadjis of which the Idegale are a sub-
clan] - of a violent confrontation. (...) Physically quarantined and politically 
orphaned, the renegade militia was almost entirely isolated. The group's only 
remaining support consisted of a slender link with Abdirahman Tuur and a few 
associated opposition figures.143 
This episode is significant in that the war took place not between rival northern clans 
but among Isaaq sub-clans. The argument that Somaliland's stability and cohesion 
rests on its predominant Isaaq composition would therefore seem unwarranted. 
One of the most important outcomes of the 1988 civil war in Somalia had 
been the formation, in June that year, of an Isaaq Council of Elders (Gurti). Although 
141 Bryden, Matthew, Briefing Paper: Battle for Control of Hargeisa Airport, 15 October 1994. See 
also Omar, 1994, op. cit., p. 234, Samatar, 1994, op. cit., p. 125, Prunier, 1998, op. cit., p. 226, 
Compagnon, 1993, op. cit., pp. 14-17. 
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it draws from traditional resources, the Gurti, according to Compagnon, is a 
relatively recent institution: 
In pre-colonial times, there was no comparable institution that successfully 
encompassed whole clans; political solidarity instead remained then at level of 
the diya paying group which limited itself to elementary lineages. The 'local 
chiefs' Advisory Council created by the British Administration in 1946 would 
appear to be the sole plausible precursor to the Gurti. This would therefore 
invalídate readings of current developments in terms of a simple resurgence of 
"ancestral traditions".144 
Weary of the Elders independent power, Siad Barre had abolished this institution.145 
When Barre launched his military opérations against north-western Somalia in the 
late 1980s, many Isaaq elders used their authority to recruit young men as fighters 
and helped to finance and legitimise the SNM's military opérations. The Elders 
traditional peacemaking (nabadoon) role was also instrumental in the reconciliation 
process undertaken in early 1991. The conférence's success, in turn, reinforced their 
prestige and authority, and led to the institutionalisation of the Council of Elders. The 
1991 Gurti, a direct descendent of the Council formed in 1988, set up a permanent 
executive committee presided by Sheikh Ibrahim. The Council of elders has now 
come to acquire a high degree of legitímate authority, its role being compared by 
some to that of a Senate.146 
When tensions broke out in late 1991, the Gurti's authority was once again 
sought to resolve the civil war that was engulfîng the new country and was 
jeopardising Somaliland's future. Local clan elders engaged in a number of bilateral 
peace conférences, which enabled them to stage in January 1993, a 'national' 
142 As related by Bryden, 'Battle for the control of Hargeisa,' 1994, op. cit. 
143 Bryden, 'Battle for the Control of Hargeisa,' 1994, op. cit. 
144 Compagnon, 1993, op. cit., p. 19, my translation. 
145 On the rôle of the Elders, see; Lewis, 1961, op. cit., p. 196. 
146 Compagnon, 1993, op. cit., p. 19. 
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conférence (shir) in Borana to which ail northern-based clans attended.147 By contrast 
to the internationally led meeting held in Addis Ababa at the same time, the 1993 
Borana Conference was almo st entirely self-financed and foreign contributions 
remained hmited.148 But while the former failed to achieve reconciliation among 
southern-based clans, the latter, which lasted almost five months, was successful in 
drawing up a new 'national' constitution and in electing a new President: 
Mohammed Haji Ibrahim Egal. Egal, who belongs to the Isse Mussa of the Habr 
Awal Isaaq sub-clan, had served (it will be remembered) as Somalia's Prime 
Minister under the Presidency of Abdulrashid Shemarke, from 1967 to 1969, when 
Barre's coup brought his leadership to an end. Egal was then detained without trial 
until 1982 when he was freed following US pressure. 
The May 1993 Constitution, or National Charter, established a two Chamber 
parliament composed of a Council of Représentatives and a Council of Eiders, a 
Council of Ministers and a Judiciary. A new flag was also adopted with the words 
'There is no God but Allah and Mohammed is his Prophet', as Islam was decreed the 
state religion. The gurti also declared that national élections would be held in two 
years time. One of the govemment's foremost tasks was the démobilisation of the 
militias composed for the most part of young men for whom violence had become a 
way of life and who se wanton behaviour had greatly contributed to the outbreak of 
the 'first civil war'. This remains a major challenge. The only way to insure proper 
démobilisation is to give these young men money, or cattle, so that they may marry 
147 Dulbahante, Warsangeli, Gadabursi, Issa and Isaaq. See Rakiya Omar, 1994, op. cit., p. 234; and 
Press, Robert, 'Eiders of North Somalia Meet to Preserve Peace', Christian Science Monitor, March 1, 
1993. 
148 Heiander, Bernhard, 'Somaliland: Example or Exception?' News from Nai, Spring 1998, 
http://www.uu. se/bh/somaliland.htm, p. 2. 
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and integrate the society as adults.149 The government's lack of fonds renders this 
task difficult. Disarmament of heavy weapons has been carried out with some 
success and, in 1993, with the assistance of the British company Rimfìre, a 
programme of demining was initiated.150 
But once more, as Somaliland appeared to be on the way to recovery, another 
civil war broke out. While the hostilities again involved rivai Isaaq sub-clans, they 
were sparked off by exogenous factors, and more specifically by UNOSOM' 
intervention. In March 1993, the UN was preparing plans for UNOSOM II and 
considering whether or not to deploy troops in northern Somalia. Yussuf A. Sheikh 
Madar, then Somaliland's Foreign Minister, had already expressed in February 
Somaliland's reluctance to accept UN troops on the grounds that any UN deployment 
might cause 'unnecessary tensions and endanger the peace and stability' of 
Somaliland.151 The Foreign Minister's appréhension was to be substantiated by 
subséquent events, as UNOSOM's short-lived presence in the région ended up being 
more destabilising than beneficiai. 
The new government, which had been elected in May 1993, nevertheless 
conceded, and UN personnel was sent to Somaliland. In September 1993, President 
Egal wrote to Admirai Jonathan Howe, Special Representative of the Secretary-
General in Somalia, accusing UNOSOM II of trying to split the country by 
fomenting trouble in the Sool and Sanaag régions and asked him to withdraw.152 
Then, in February 1994, a so-called Harti conference (a common name of the 
Dulbahante, Majerteen and Warsangeli Darod sub-clans) was held in Las Anod 
149 Prunier, 1998, op. cit., p. 228. 
150 Millions of mines are scattered throughout Somaliland. Worthington, Tony, 'Only aid can defeat 
the gunmen,' The Independent, Monday 14 February 1994, p. 16. 
151 'Will the UN deploy in the North?' The Indiati Océan Newsletter, No. 566, March 13,1993. 
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inside Somaliland. This was a follow-up to a previous Harti Conference, held in 
Garoe, on the border of Somaliland in December 1993. The Las Anod Conference 
was apparently organised under the orders of General Mohammed Abshir, leader of 
the SSDF, and of Awad Ahmed Ashra, former chairman of the United Somali Party 
(USP). It was sponsored by the UN and was attended by UN Under-Secretary 
General for Political Affairs, James Jonah. 
The aim of the conference was to detach the Dulbahante and Warsangeli clans 
from Somaliland and to re-attach them administratively to the part of north-
eastern Somalia controlled by the Merjertein SSDF. This would conform with 
the plan outlined by UNOSOM 2 representative, Leonard Kapungu, to 
Somaliland's president, Ibrahim Mohamed Egal, in September 1993.153 
UNOSOM's involvement in this matter reflects once more its erroneous 'ethnic' 
assumptions about clan solidarity and explains why the so-called Harti alliance was 
doomed from the start. Indeed, the northern-based Dulbahante, although belonging to 
the Darod clan, 'have closer social links (especially via marriages) with the Isaaq 
people of the Habr Ja'alo and the Habr Yunis clans who live further west in 
Somaliland, that with the Mejertein who settled in north-east Somalia.'154 
To add insult to injury, UNOSOM then proceeded in mid-1994 to repatriate 
Somaliland's former President Abdirahman Tuur from his exile in London to 
represent the so-called 'federalist' option during one of the many Addis Ababa 
conference held under UN auspices in 1994.155 When Abdirahman Tuur, claiming to 
lead the SNM delegation, met with Mohammed Farah Aydid's Somali National 
Alliance in the UN sponsored Addis Ababa Conference in April 1994, and agreed to 
consider a proposal for a Somali federal government, Somaliland's government 
152 'Somaliland president addresses joint session of parliament and cabinet,' BBC Summary of World 
Broadcast, September 18, 1993. 
153 'Somali: Harti alliance sponsored by the UN,' Indian Ocean Newsletter, February 26,1994. 
154 ION, Ibid. 
243 
reacted furiously.156 Tuur's attempi to re-enter Somali politics nevertheless 
baekfired, he lost the sympathy of his own Habr Yunis clansmen who viewed with 
suspicion his association with the unpopulär UN and disliked Aydid.157 Even the 
Hargeisa group, whom Tuur and his associates supplied with Qat, cash and crude 
alcohol, rejected the proposai for a Federalist option and expressed their contempi 
towards Tuur's self-interested pohtical volte-face.158 Now convinced that UNOSOM 
was determined to derail at ali cost the process of national reconciliation that had led 
to the country's independence, President Egal decided to expell ail its représentatives 
from Somaliland.159 Ironically, UNOSOM's attempts to re-establish Somali unity 
seem to have had the exact opposite effect of reinforcing Somaliland's identity and 
belief that independence from the South is the only viable option.160 
Nevertheless, UNOSOM's intervention contributed to a renewal of the 
tensions between the Habr Garhadjis and Egal's government. Failure to reach any 
government instigated agreement led once more to the need to revert to a shir. This 
third national conférence was held in Hargeisa between October 1996 and March 
1997. 
At the end of the Hargeisa shir, it was decided that there would now be two 
elected assemblies, one composed of 'simple' delegates, the second composed 
of eiders chosen not through general élection but by clan councils. This second 
Chamber, contrary to the first, may not be dissolved by the président and each 
clan or sub-clan représentative can only be replaced if he dies, is incapacitated 
or is recalled by another représentative of the same clan or sub-clan. These 
measures were formalised in the newly approved Constitution of February 
155 Bryden, "The Battle over Hargeisa,' 1994, op. cit.; and also 'Somalia: Epistle to Boutros-Ghali,' 
The Indian Océan Newsletter, No. 641, October 8, 1994. 
156 'Former Somaliland leader renounces secession after Aydid talks,' BBC Summary of World 
Broadcasts, May 4, 1994. 
157 Flint, Julie, 'Somaliland Expels "Interfering" UN,' The Guardian, August 29, 1994, p. 6. 
158 Bryden, Battle for the Control of Hargeisa, 1994, op. cit. 
159 Flint, 1994, op. cit., and Awori, Horace, 'Somali-Politics: UNOSOM Expelled from Somaliland,' 
Inter Press Service, August 30, 1994. 
160 Bryden Matthew, Somaliland and Peace in the Horn of Africa: A Situation Report and Analysis, 
UNDP - Emergencies Unit for Ethiopia, November 1995, p. 1. 
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1997 by two-thirds of the représentatives. (...) This patient construction of a 
western-pastoral hybrid state has led, little by little, to a démocratisation 
process instigated, not in order to please the international community's fimding 
bodies, but to respond to internai ftmctional necessity.161 
We can see from the above account that Somaliland's stability has, since its 
independence, been jeopardised on a number of occasions and partly because of 
international interference. Nevertheless, the country was able to avert falling into 
chaos and although its state finances remain precarious, Somaliland's economy 
appears to be slowly recovering.162 Fifteen percent of Hargeisa's children go to 
primary school and nearly sixty percent go to Mushm religious schools. According to 
Karin Davies, writing in 1997: 'a recent survey by UNICEF found that 57 percent of 
people in urban areas have safe drinking water and only 9 percent suffer from 
malnutrition.'163 In April 1995, The Economist reported that the Port of Berbera had 
been exporting 
some $ 100m-worth of livestock to Gulf states in the past 12 months. Tracks 
take imported goods and locally produced commodities like sugar and soap 
inland, some as far as Ethiopia and Kenya. On the streets of Hargeisa fresh 
fruit and vegetables are plentifiil.164 
Somaliland's economy, while improving, remains at the mercy of international 
pressure. In 1998 for instance, Saudi Arabia, at the instigation of Egypt and the Arab 
League, introduced a ban on Somaliland cattle imports that may compromise the 
country's fragile stability. Because of the international community's reluctance to 
recognise its secession, Somaliland has not benefited, like its southern counterpart, 
from international aid. While this may have forced it to rely on its own resources and 
161 Prunier, Gérard, 'Somaliland, le pays qui n'existe pas. Comment survivre sans la "communauté 
internationale",' Le Monde Diplomatique, Octobre 1997, p. 18, my translation. 
162 The annual budget was estimated in 1996 to amount to '30 billion Somaliland shillings, about $30 
million at black market rates, and is split evenly between security forces and spending for social 
services and reconstruction.' Davies, Karin, 'Seeking to Build on Peace,' The Record, April 8, 1996, 
p. A14. 
163 Davies Karin, 'Seeking to Build on Peace,' The Record, April 8, 1996, p. A14. 
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to attain what for the moment appears to be a more solidly rooted stability, it has 
nevertheless hindered the development of its economy and infrastructure. Ibrahim 
Egal, who was re-elected President in March 1997 for another five-year term, has 
repeatedly pleaded with the international community for récognition, as this would 
give it access to much needed international aid, enabling him to démobilisé 
Somaliland's remaining militias and facilitate 'the process of building a nation'.165 
Conclusion 
It would appear that Somaliland, like Eritrea, is another case where the 'colonial self 
rather than ethnicity provided the basis for secession and where war proved to be a 
catalyst in the process towards nation-formation. Somaliland's secession has taken 
place within the former colonial boundaries. As, President Egal himself put it in 
1988: 
Somalilanders have simply turned the clock back thirty years in order to return 
matters to their naturai context, when we declared our independence from 
Britain in I960.166 
Although Somaliland's population and the SNM are predominantly Isaaq,167 this 
does not appear to have been the primary factor behind its secession and current 
stability.168 As discussed in the last section of this chapter, Somaliland's secession 
164 'Somaliland, they cali it.' The Economist, Aprii 8th 1995, p. 40. 
165 Thomas, Annie, 'Somaliland leader says a nation is being built,' Agence France Presse, 15 juin 
1997. 
166 Statement made by Egal and quoted in: 'Somaliland leader offers referendum under UN 
supervision,' BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, June 12, 1998. 
167 In the same way that there are no figures for Somaliland's population, there are no agreed estimâtes 
of what the proportion of the population is Isaaq. Nevertheless, most authors seem to concur in stating 
that Somaliland's population is predominantly from that clan. 
168 By contrast, north-eastern Somalia, despite its alleged clanic/ethnic homogeneity had not, as of 
1999, made any claims towards independence. According to Menkhaus, despite the région's 
ethnic/clanic homogeneity, '[e]fforts by Mijerteen elders and the Somali Salvation Democratic Front 
to establish a regional administration have proceeded slowly. Intraclan disagreements over the control 
and allocation of port customs revenues (the main source of funding for government in the région) 
have resulted in endless rounds of negotiations and little visible progress in administration.' Although 
these tensions and disagreements have for the most part been addressed peacefully, and the región has 
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was decided at the end of a shir that involved a number of northern-based clans. 
Moreover, most of the crises encountered by the new state have been due to intra-
Isaaq conflicts and have been fuelled by exogenous factors, but have not degenerated 
into factional war. Consultation has regularly taken place in Somaliland since 1991 — 
both among Isaaq clans as well as between Isaaq and non-Isaaq clans - in the form of 
month-long national conferences and smaller bilateral shirs, Somaliland's equivalent 
to Renan's daily plebiscite. 
The fact that Somaliland has been able to avert factional fighting of the type 
encountered in southern Somalia, further supports the view that danism is not a 
'social automatism' but a perversion of the traditional lineage system. It may well be 
that Somaliland's colonial experience and peripheral position has somewhat 
sheltered it from danism's nefarious effects, namely that of warlordism. 
Nevertheless, one should not attribute Somaliland's successes simply to its capacity 
to re-activate ancestral peace-keeping mechanisms. Indeed, as was indicated earlier, 
there is no ancient indigenous equivalent to the current Gurti, or Council of Elders, 
whose roots are more appropriately traced back to the local chiefs Advisory Council, 
an institution introduced under British colonial administration. 
In addition to its particular colonial experience, two factors have contributed 
to Somaliland's feelings of distinctiveness: the perception and/or reality of Southern 
discrimination and the experience of repression under Barre in the 1980s; although 
the former may now only be invoked as a result of the latter. An interview given in 
1994 by President Egal illustrates the extent to which the war against Barre's regime 
is interpreted as a decisive event in the formation of Somaliland's national identity. 
been able to avoid the turmoil that continues to prevail in Southern Somalia it nevertheless illustrates 
the fact that clan/ethnic homogeneity is not in itself a sufficient basis for secession. See, Menkhaus, 
Ken, 'Somali: Political Order in a Stateless Society,' Current History, May 1998, p. 221. 
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There was no sustained, prolonged war against the oppressive dictatorship of 
Siad Barre in the southern régions. In Somahland, our people had fought the 
dictator for 10 years. Over this prolonged résistance to a common enemy, our 
people acquired a common identity, a common aspiration. And when the 
dictator was ousted, they were not enemies, they were comrades in arms. They 
came together in a peaceful conférence in May 1991, declared their séparation 
from Somali, and started nation-building.169 
That the war marked a decisive turning point was illustrated by the testimonies given 
by refugees and quoted earlier. Yet, it remains difficult to ascertain the extent to 
which the war against Mogadishu has forged a long-lasting sense of national identity. 
It could be argued that Somaliland's relative stability and unity depends solely on the 
person of Egal, although critics have accused him of ruling Somaliland in a quasi-
dictatorial fashion.170 To what extent may the 'nation' withstand his departure is 
subject to question.171 
One may also conjecture as to why Somaliland has thus far been unable to 
achieve international récognition and what the effects of this may be. The reasons 
behind the international reluctance are varied. Following the visit to Paris in 
February 1994 by three Somaliland ministers, Catherine Boivineau, the deputy head 
of Africa Desk at France's Foreign Ministry, 'advised the Somaliland ministers to 
foliow the example of Eritrea by seeking Somalia's acquiescence in Somahland 
independence, as Eritrea had obtained theirs from Ethiopia'.172 Only then could the 
international community consider recognising Somaliland's independence. Such 
approval from Somalia was in fact sought when General Farah Aideed was still alive 
169 Timms, Ed, 'Interview with Mohamed Ibrahim Egal,' The Dallas Morning News, July 17, 1994, p. 
1J. Emphasis added. 
170 Zarembo, Alan, 'New kind of turmoil feared; Independent Somaliland faces identity crisis.' The 
Houston Chronicle, June 16, 1996. 
171 It may be appropriate to note here Egal's déclaration that a law on parties will be added to the new 
constitution which is to be adopted through referendum in 2001. According to the President, politicai 
parties will have to be national parties and 'not be based on religious, tribal or ethnie grounds.' 
'Somaliland leader offers referendum under UN supervision,' op. cit. It is interesting to note here Egal 
usage of the words 'tribal' and 'ethnie', which parallel Eritrea's similar déclaration on the law for 
politicai parties. 
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and chaired the Somali National Alliance, but was promptly rejected. As, Robert 
Press noted, 'such a declaration [condoning Somaliland's secession] would be 
political suicide for any Somali leader outside of Somaliland given the strong anti-
secessionist sentiment in Somalia.173 In the absence of any government in Somalia in 
the foreseeable future, this avenue towards recognition is closed. The expulsion of 
the UN in 1994, and of the EU representative in 1995,174 also somewhat damaged 
Somaliland's cause and it remains to be seen whether or not Egal's calls for a UN 
monitored referendum to be held in 2001 will be answered. 
Powerful regional interests also militate against Somaliland's independence. 
Egypt fears that Somaliland's recognition will further legitimise secessionist claims 
in southern Sudan and is therefore against any move that may further complicate its 
Nile river arrangements. If southern Sudan were to secede, Egypt would be forced to 
negotiate an agreement with an additional state over the river Nile thus making its 
situation even more precarious. Egypt has invested much effort in staging a 
negotiated settlement between Sudan's contending parties in an attempt to keep the 
country together, this in spite of reassurances from Southern Sudanese leaders that 
their secession would not jeopardise Egypt's water supply.175 Somaliland's 
secession, it has been suggested, is also opposed by Saudi Arabia, which has 
objected to moves by the SNM to reach agreements with a number of oil companies 
so that the latter may resume their operations in the region.176 Oil exploration in 
172 'Somaliland: A Delegation in Paris, Indian Ocean Newsletter, No. 609, February 5,1994. 
173 Press, Robert M., 'Somaliland Leader Looks for Foreign Recognition,' The Christian Science 
Monitor, January 6, 1994. 
174 'Somaliland: Illing says "Get it Right",' The Indian Ocean Newsletter, No. 675, June 10, 1995. 
175 On Egypt and the Arab League's position: 'Firmness by Arab League,' The Indian Ocean 
Newsletter, No. 637, September 10, 1994, and 'East African tensions At Danger Level; Implications 
For Red Sea States & Israel,' Arab Press Service Organisation, APS Diplomat News Service, Vol. 44, 
No. 4, January 29, 1996. 
176 Northern Somalia was under license to oil companies by the time the 1988 war erupted. Amoco, 
Chevron, Agip, Conoco and Shell were all granted exploitation licenses by Siad Barre in the area at 
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Northern Somalia began in 1986, and gathered momentum following the publication 
of a hydrocarbon study undertaken in 1988 by the World Bank and the UNDP that 
confirmed the oil and gas potentials of both Somalia and Ethiopia. The presence of 
oil in the area is a double-edged sword for Somaliland's prospects for recognition 
could be undermined by the fact that its 'boundary cuts through permits held by Agip 
and Conoco.'177 It is impossible for the time being to say whether Western, and more 
specifically American political opinion will be swayed by these companies 
conflicting interests and whether or not it will take any decision that risks 
compromising its relations with the Arab League. Given that oil prices are currently 
very low, and that the situation in Iraq still requires the US to maintain its regional 
allies, it is doubtful that any step towards recognising Somaliland will be taken in the 
foreseeable future if it antagonises Arab allies. 
The fact that the SNM has already reached tentative agreements with a 
number of oil companies is an indication that its effective control and 'sovereignty' 
over the region, while not formally recognised, is nevertheless acknowledged. This is 
also borne out by the fact that, in April 1998, Somaliland's government signed an 
agreement with two international companies hired to rehabilitate and reconstruct the 
country's power stations destroyed by the war.178 Establishing contacts and signing 
contracts with foreign based companies may in the long-term lead to formal 
recognition if only for practical and financial reasons. Somaliland has moreover 
the beginning of 1986. Kielmas, Marie, 'Oil hopes hinge on North Somalia oil exploration,' 
Petroleum Economist, Vol. 58, No. 10, October 1991, p. 19; and Fineman, Mark, "The oil Factor in 
Somalia; Four American Petroleum Giants had Agreements with the African Nation Before the Civil 
War Began. They Could Reap Big Rewards if Peace is restored,' Los Angeles Times, January 18, 
1993. 
177 Kielmas, 1991, op. cit., p.19. 
178 'Somaliland Signs Energy deals with Foreign Firms', Reuters, April 11 1998. The companies in 
question are US-based Collins engineering Co and British-American Energy. According to Reuters: 
'The companies will rehabilitate a 25 megawatt power station in the capital Hargeisa at a cost of $23 
million before beginning work on electrification of other areas.' 
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managed to secure de facto récognition from other states, including Djibouti. In 
1994, Egal was received in both Kampala and Nairobi with the same ceremony given 
to a head of state179 and in 1997, a délégation from the US Congress visited 
Somaliland. 
One could argue that Somaliland's lack of diplomatie récognition has to some 
extent been a blessing in disguise. Somaliland's attempts to develop its own 
economic networks without relying on international assistance have sheltered it from 
the 'périls of aid dependence.'180 It has also forced Somaliland to find its own route 
towards politicai reconciliation and démocratisation, making it one of the few cases 
of somewhat successful post-war reconstruction. To some extent, Somaliland 
constitutes a mirror image of what Robert Jackson has defined as quasi-states. It has 
ali the attributes of internai sovereignty: a democratically elected government, a 
police force, a flag, a national anthem, a relatively stable economy, its own currency 
and its own passports.181 Ali it lacks is the attribute of juridical sovereignty conferred 
through international récognition. 
179 Awori, Horace, 'Somalia-Politics: Leader of the New Republic Seeks Recognition,' Inter Press 
Service, January 14, 1994. 
180 Clapham, 1994, op. cit, p. 715. 
181 'Holding on in Somaliland,' Africa Corfidential, Voi. 36, No. 1, 31 March 1995, and 'New 
Currency Law,' The Indian Ocean Newsletter, No. 702, January 20, 1996. 
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Chapter 6 — Conclusion 
The business of sound theory in relation to practice is not to solve practical 
Problems but to clear them of misunderstandings which make their solution 
impossible.1 
This thesis has sought to demonstrate why ethnicity is of little heuristic value when it 
cornes to understanding what triggers nationalism and secession. By showing that the 
ethnie interprétation was not substantiated by the cases of Eritrea and Somaliland, the 
last two chapters of the thesis have presented its third, and more substantial criticism 
of the ethnonationalist approach: its lack of empirical foundations. This critique had 
begun, in chapter two, where some of the internal inconsistencies of the 
ethnonationalist approach were highlighted. It was pursued further with the analysis 
of the meaning of ethnicity in Africa in chapter three. The ethnonationalist claim that 
ethnie identifies are pre-modem was here questioned by drawing from the findings 
presented in the anthropological literature on ethnicity in Africa. Before discussing 
some of the broader implications of our critique of the ethnonationalist model, this 
concluding chapter will summarise the main arguments that have been put forward in 
the thesis. It will do so by returning to the three questions raised in the Introduction. 
The first section of the chapter will begin by explaining why ethnicity does 
not provide an appropriate explanation for the secessions of Eritrea and Somaliland. 
It will then proceed to identify which of those factors identified by modernist 
theories best account for the emergence of nationalism in these two countries. 
Turning to the second question, the following section will assess the extent to which 
the cases of Eritrea and Somaliland challenge the conventional interprétation of the 
1 Collingwood, Robin George, Essays in Politicai Philosophy, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1989, p. 94. 
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right of national self-determination. It will also consider whether or not the cases of 
Eritrea and Somaliland support proposais to redraw Africa's state boundaries so that 
they more appropriately reflect Africa's national and ethnie identities. Drawing from 
the discussions presented in the first three chapters and from the evidence that 
emerged from the cases studied, the third section will then suggest some of the ways 
International Relations may contribute to the study of the causes of nationalism. 
6.1- Eritrea and Somaliland: Primordial or modem ? 
a) Ethnicity is not the answer 
According to the ethnonationalist interprétation, Eritrea and Somaliland's sécessions 
were ethnically motivated. Yet, despite its prédictive ambitions, this model yielded 
not one, but several différent hypothesis as to how 'ethnie ties' or 'national 
susceptibilities' might express themselves in the context of Eritrea and Somaliland. 
Siamak Khatami offered the most straightforward variant of the ethnonationalist 
model with reference to Eritrea. He wrote that Eritrea's quest for self-determination 
was explained by the fact that Eritreans constituted an ethnie group which was 
linguistically and historically distinct from Ethiopia's other ethnie groups.2 Connor 
and Horowitz for their part, stated that Eritrea's nationalist movement was essentially 
the resuit of a religious conflict between the Eritrean Muslims and the Christian 
Ethiopians.3 Smith argued instead that Eritrea's secession was instigated and 
dominated by Eritrea's Tigrinya-speaking population seeking to distinguish 
themselves from the Amhara dominated Ethiopians. Interestingly, ethnonationalist 
arguments have also been invoked to discredit Eritrea's claims to nationhood. The 
best illustration of this is provided by a radio broadcast which Emperor Haile 
2 Khatami, 1990, op. cit., p. 50. 
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Selassie gave in April 1950, where he dismissed Eritrea's secessionist demands on 
the grounds that 'Eritreans had no separate identity but were culturally and 
linguistically identical to Ethiopians.'4 The fact that a single model can provide such 
an array of possible explanations casts some doubt as to its explanatory value. 
Let us then take these four hypotheses in reverse order and explain why they do 
not provide a satisfactory explanation for the motivations and behaviour of Eritrean 
"secessionists'. First, had primordial considérations determined actors' behaviour, 
one might have expected Eritrea's Tigrinyas to oppose séparation from Ethiopia. The 
historical, religious, linguistic and cultural ties between the Tigrayans (of Eritrea and 
Ethiopia) and Ethiopia's Amharas have often been noted, as indeed has the fact that 
Aksum, located in Tigray, was the original centre of the old Ethiopian Empire.5 But, 
despite the 'primordial' bonds that historically united them to Ethiopia's Amharas, 
Eritrea's Tigrinyas provided instead two of the most prominent figures of Eritrea's 
nationalist struggle: Woldeab Woldemariam and Isaias Aferworki. 
Second, if Eritrea's nationalist struggle was an expression of its Muslim 
community's desire to establish its own non-Christian state, then one would need to 
explain why the leading politicians of the Muslim parties did not wholeheartedly 
endorse Britain's plans for partition in the 1940s and 1950s, and why Eritrea did not 
split in two along communal lines. One would also need to explain why the Christian 
Tigrinyas dominated, if not the earlier, at least the latter stages of the nationalist 
movement and why the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) fought the Eritrean 
3 Connor, 1994, op. cit., p. 11; Horowitz, 1985, op. cit., p. 254. 
4 Emperor Haile Selassie's April 1950 radio broadcast, quoted in: Sorenson, John, Imagining 
Ethiopia. Struggles for History and Identity in the Horn of Africa, Rutgers University Press, New 
Brunswick, New Jersey, 1993, p. 41. 
5 Bahra Zewde, 1991, op. cit., p. 8; Clapham, 1988, op. cit., p. 205. 
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Liberation Movement (ELM) off Eritrea's political scene, despite the fact that both 
movements were set up by members of Eritrea's Sahel community. 
Third, if Eritrea's nationalist struggle had been instigated by the Tigrinya-
speaking population to insure, following the nationalist logic, that the boundaries of 
their new state were congruent with those of the ethnie then why was secession 
within a Greater Tigray not considered? Why were irredentist claims not advanced 
over Ethiopia's province of Tigray, so that all Tigrinya speakers could be united 
under a single state? 
Finally, as we have shown, and as many ethnonationalists themselves 
acknowledge, Eritrea is neither ethnically homogenous, nor ethnically distinct from 
Ethiopia. It is composed of at least nine 'ethnic' groups, whose identities were in 
many ways shaped by the same processes that led to the formation of Eritrea's 
national identity. In fact, a fully-fledged ethnic explanation would have predicted not 
so much Eritrea's secession from Ethiopia, as its fracture along its nine constitutive 
ethnic groups; an option which, surprisingly, was not considered by those endorsing 
an ethnonationalist stance. Although a sense of Eritrean nationhood does appear to be 
deeply rooted, and this more notably among the urban population, the potential for 
ethnic discontent should not, as was indicated in our earlier discussion of Eritrea's 
ethnic makeup, be dismissed altogether.6 If ethnicity does surface on the stage of 
Eritrean politics, it will not be because of any atavistic feelings of distinctiveness but 
because of discontent towards the government's centralised policies. 
To summarise, while an ethnic interpretation of secession might have accounted 
for the aforementioned scenarios, it would not have been able to predict that Eritrea 
6 Assessing the degree of national or ethnic sentiment is an almost impossible task. The fact that the 
Eritreans voted overwhelmingly in favour of independence during the referendum can be taken as an 
indicator of a strong sense of nationhood at that time, but should not be taken as a permanent state. 
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separate from Ethiopia in the way it chose to do, that is by appealing to its former 
colonial existence. An ethnie explanation would, moreover, also have found it 
difficult to foresee the outbreak, in May 1998, of the war between Ethiopia and 
Eritrea, whose respective governments are after all dominated by Tigrinya speakers. 
Kinship ties have therefore not precluded mutuai hostilities. 
The ethnonationalist interprétation was similarly problematic in the case of 
Somaliland. There were, to begin with, conceptual problems with the use of ethnicity 
as an explanatory factor. Whereas until the late 1980s, Somalia was described as 
having all the attributes of a 'trae' ethnie-nation (a common language, religion and 
myth of common descent), clan affiliation is now depicted as being Somalia's 
équivalent to ethnicity, and these divisions are invoked to explain the collapse of the 
Somali state. The fact that ethnicity was thus redefined according to the changing 
circumstances - to explain Somalia's former irredentist claims and then, its 
disintegration - illustrâtes once again the heuristic limits of the concept. In addition 
to these conceptual shorteomings, the ethnic/cultural interprétation did not seem to 
be vindicated on empirical grounds 
While an ethnonationalist explanation might have accounted for Somalia's 
irredentist claims over Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti, it did not foresee the possibility 
of it fracturing internally, as it did in the early 1990s. Moreover, if one were to take 
language and mode of life as distinguishing ethnie markers, then one would have 
expected internai fracture to take place between the Sab and the Samale. Indeed, as 
mentioned in our discussion of these two clan-families, they have been described by 
'perceptive observers' as speaking différent languages, and while the former are 
mostly sedentary, the latter tend to be semi-nomadic pastoralists. Despite the fact that 
the Digil-Mirifle clan-family established their own party as far back as the 1950s and 
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the President of this party in 1958 advocated that Somalia should adopt a federai 
constitution,7 this is not where the fracture occurred. 
Finally, if one were to view clanism as Somalia's ethnie équivalent, one would 
have expected the divisions to take place along the six main clans. Instead, fractures 
have followed erratic and unpredictable patterns, occurring at times within the same 
clan (pitching sub-clans, and sub-sub-clans of the same clan against each other as in 
the case of Mogadishu), and at other times leading to alliances between sub-clans of 
différent clans. The fact that clan allegiances do not always determine patterns of 
behaviour in Somalia was illustrated by the failure of the XJNOSOM instigated 
attempi to organise a Harti confédération (Mejerteen, Dubhante, Warsangeli) on the 
grounds that they ali belonged to the Darod/Harti sub-clan. The attempi failed 
because, by adopting the ethnie template, UNOSOM did not consider the fact that the 
Dulbahante had in fact closer social ties with sub-clans of the Isaaq clan than with 
the other Harti sub-clans, and were therefore reluctant to join the latter, preferring 
instead to remain within Somaliland. References to common ancestry were therefore 
overridden by other factors. 
b) Evaluating the modernist approach 
Having explained why primordial or ethnie explanations do not account for the 
secessions of Eritrea and Somaliland, let us now assess the validity of the modernist 
approach. Indeed, as our initial question suggests, if the nation is not primordial or 
ethnie, then it must be a modem construct. But which of the factors singled-out by 
modernist scholars best explain the emergence of nationalism in Eritrea and 
Somaliland? Throughout our descriptions of Eritrea and Somaliland, we discussed 
7 Adam, Hussein, 'Formation and Récognition of New States: Somaliland in contrast to Eritrea,' 
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and assessed the factors that had been identified in the previous two chapters as 
propitious for the emergence of nationalism. 
According to Gellner, nationalism arises out of industrial society's need for a 
literate and mobile work force. Following from this, one would therefore expect 
Eritrea and Somaliland to have achieved a certain level of industrial development 
when nationalist claims began to be voiced. In the case of Eritrea, important socio-
economic transformations were indeed introduced during the colonial period. 
Although the extent to which these changes permeated all strands of the society is 
debatable, the fact that Eritrea's economy did in 1958 come to a stand-still when the 
workers trade union called for a general strike would nevertheless indicate that a 
certain degree of industrialisation was achieved. In the case of Somaliland, British 
rule was very light-handed and few industrial projects were undertaken during that 
period. Moreover, the fact that pastoralism remains dominant in Somaliland would 
appear to restrict, if not invalidate, socio-economic explanations for the rise of 
nationalism. Should we therefore concur with Brendan O'Leary when he states that 
'the primacy [Gellner] gives to industrialisation in explaining the genesis and 
maintenance of nationalism' is doubtful?8 
Although socio-economic explanations for the rise of nationalism might not 
at first appear to be supported by the cases of Eritrea and Somaliland, it is important 
to note that in both cases, nationalist uprisings in the form of civilian disobedience 
first emerged in the countries' main cities. And, as our discussion of the 
anthropological literature on ethnicity in Africa indicated, urbanisation was 
important in the emergence and crystallisation of ethnic identities. Urbanisation is 
Review of African Political Economy, Vol. 21, No. 59, March 1994, p. 23. 
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seen as an important indicator of modernisation, and although this may be confined 
to a portion of the country, it is nevertheless significant that nationalism and ethnicity 
would first emerge in the urban context. 
The fact that the anti-governmental démonstrations in Eritrea and Somaliland 
were mostly staged by students would also support the thesis that the presence of an 
educated elite and hence éducation are a necessary pre-condition for the emergence 
of nationalism. To the extent that éducation was initially introduced for the purposes 
of industrialisation, then socio-economic transformations could indeed be said to 
have contributed to the emergence of nationalism. As far as the establishment and 
existence of a written language is concerned, evidence is inconclusive. In neither 
Eritrea nor Somaliland did the presence of a distinct written language play a 
significant role in the emergence of national consciousness. Moreover, in the case of 
Somalia, Barre's introduction of Osmaniya in 1972 and intensive programmes 
towards national éducation seem do have done little to instil a sense of common pan-
Somali nationhood. i 
The discussion in chapter two of the impact of war on nation-formation 
suggested that éducation was instrumentai and necessary in the age of mass-army 
warfare. This was clearly illustrated in the case of Eritrea, first during the 1920s, 
when industrialisation, networks of communication and éducation ali grew 
substantially in préparation for Italy's invasion of Ethiopia. Education was also 
prépondérant during the struggle for independence, when the EPLF set out to educate 
not only its fighters but also the population more broadly. The fact that the nationalist 
movements in Eritrea and Somaliland were led by educated elites suggests that 
8 O'Leary, Brendan, 'Ernest Gellner's diagnoses of nationalism: a criticai overview, or, what is living 
and what is dead in Ernest Gellner's philosophy of nationalism?' in: Hall, John (Ed.,), The State of the 
Nation. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1998, p. 78. 
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éducation is an important factor in the emergence of nationalism. What remains to be 
determined is whether broad-based national éducation is a product of 
industrialisation, as Gellner claims, or whether it is the resuit of the state's need for a 
mass army, as Posen argues. 
Is Gellner's claim that nationalism precedes the nation therefore vindicated? 
At first sight, this would indeed appear to be the case. As our historical accounts of 
the emergence of nationalism in Eritrea and Somaliland indicated, it would be 
inaccurate to say that a broadly shared sense of nationhood existed during the 
colonial period. Nationalism was initially propounded by minority, a Western 
educated elite steeped in the ideáis of nationalism, and it was only at a later stage that 
the movement acquired mass appeal. On the other hand, the fact that both Eritrea and 
Somaliland appealed to their previous colonial existence forces us to reconsider 
somewhat Gellner's statement. Would Eritrea and Somaliland's sécessions have been 
possible had there not been a basis upon which the nationalist leaders could ground 
their claim? Insofar as the idea of a distinct 'nation'-state was established through 
colonisation, one could say, paraphrasing Gellner, that the previous colonial state 
provided the nation with a navel and that, in this respect, some idea of the 'nation' 
did precede the nationalist ideology. Nationalism might, as Smith argued not appear 
ex nihilo, although the basis for its emergence is not necessarily ethnie. 
The fact that secession occurred within the former colonial boundaries, and 
that it is this former colonial self which provided Eritrea and Somaliland with a basis 
for nationhood, indicates the extent to which nationalism is linked with the state. 
More than any other factor, the establishment of the colonial state appears to have 
been the main pre-condition for the emergence of nationalism in Eritrea and 
Somaliland. It is this state which provided the basis upon which national identity 
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would subsequently define itself, and it is within the boundaries of this state that 
secession occurred. Indeed, and perhaps one of the most intriguing aspects to emerge 
not only from our study of the cases of Eritrea and Somaliland but also from our 
discussion of ethnicity in Africa in general, is the importance of territoriality, or more 
specifically of bounded territory. This is congruent with Anderson's observations 
concerning the map and the census. These instruments devised by the colonial 
powers to order and thus control their dominions, provided in turn the grammar of 
nationalism. Once established and reproduced, the map-as-logo then provided the 
nation with a seemingly tangible reality, upon which secessionist claims would 
thereafter be grounded. 
But although the colonial state and its bounded geography provided the 
'nation' with its visible contours, war was to be the catalyst in the process towards 
nation-formation. As we saw in the cases of Eritrea and Somaliland, it was only in 
response to the central governments' violent retaliation that the bulk of the 
population progressively joined the nationalist movements' ranks. By 
indiscriminately targeting the masses in Eritrea and Somaliland, the Ethiopian and 
Somali armies, contributed to the crystallisation and polarisation of identities. During 
the war, the nationalist ideas initially propounded only by a politicised minority 
sifted into the masses. The deaths incurred were henceforth interpreted as sacrifices 
made in the name of the nation and the war thus further contributed to the nation-
formation process by providing the nation with its emotional appeal and much 
needed symbols, martyrs and myths. While the colonial state provided the framework 
upon which the nation could be imagined, war provided the nation with both its 
psychological dimension and mythical/historical content. In the words of Max 
Weber: 
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The community of political destiny, i.e. above all of common political struggle 
of life and death, has given rise to groups with joint memories which have 
often had a deeper impact than the ties of merely cultural, linguistic, or ethnic 
community. It is this 'community of memories' which constitutes the 
ultimately decisive element of national consciousness.9 
6.2 - Secession reconsidered? Africa's boundaries readjusted? 
Given that the independence of both Eritrea and Somaliland have reinstated the 
former colonial boundaries established in the late nineteenth century during the 
"scramble for Africa", it could be said that they do not as such challenge the 
interpretation of the right to self-determination as decolonisation, as described in 
chapter one. In both cases, self-determination and uti possidetis would seem to go 
hand in hand. The particularity of their cases stems from the fact that their former 
colonial existence was overridden before the explicit codification of this right in the 
OAU charter. Somaliland's incorporation in Somalia in 1960, and Eritrea's 
federation with Ethiopia in 1962 both took place before the 1963 Addis Ababa 
conference and the creation of the OAU. 
Insofar as Eritrea was already a province of Ethiopia by the time of the 
founding Addis Ababa summit, and, more importantly, at the time of the 1964 Cairo 
meeting, its claims for self-determination could then be opposed by reference to 
international law. Moreover, contrary to what Bereket Habte Selassie implies,10 
arguing in favour of Eritrea's independence on the grounds that it was, from 1962 
onwards, colonised by Ethiopia and that it thus represented an anti-colonial 
movement for the purposes of international law, may in fact not have provided its 
claim for national self-determination with an adequate legal support. Indeed, as we 
will recall, self-determination as decolonisation was guided by the so-called 'salt-
9 Weber, Max, Economy and Society, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1978, p. 903. 
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water principle,' that is resolution 1541 (XV), according to which colonisation seems 
to be understood as 'overseas' possessions. The extent to which self-determination as 
decolonisation could thus be considered under these terms with reference to Eritrea 
and Ethiopia is doubtful. Also, as we have seen, there was and continues to be 
considerable debate as to whether the abrogation of Eritrea's autonomous status in 
1962 was made under 'duress' or not. Under these circumstances, the United 
Nations' lack of response at the time, while perhaps deplorable, can nevertheless be 
understood. Moreover, as we have seen, Eritrea's claim to independence was, until 
imposed by force of arms, opposed by the international community and especially by 
the US, given the country's strategic location. 
As far as Somaliland is concerned, the legal picture is somewhat more 
confused. Indeed, according to Jan Klabbers and René Lefeber, although 'the 
secessionist claims of Somaliland would indeed conform to the uti possidetis 
principle,' it could also be that: 
again, under international law, Somaliland would be prevented from invoking 
the uti possidetis principle against Somalia, it being the persistent objector. 
Ironically, this would mean that the uti possidetis principle could be invoked in 
support of the disintegration of Somalia, whereas Somalia could oppose the 
application of the principle on the basis of past conduct inspired by its 
irredentist motives.11 
Insofar as Somalia could be said to have persistently objected to the validity of uti 
possidetis, the principle could therefore not be invoked against it by Somaliland. But, 
until the case of Somaliland is fully resolved, it is impossible to say what principle 
will be invoked to justify its independence. All that can be said, is that current 
opposition to its legal recognition, be it by neighbouring states or Western powers, 
10 Bereket Habte Selassie, Eritrea and the United Nations, Red Sea Press, Trenton, N.J., 1989. 
11 Klabbers, Jan, and Lefeber, René, 'Africa: Lost Between Self-Determination and Uti Possidetis,' in: 
Broltnann, Catherine, Lefeber, René, and Zieck, Marjoleine, Peoples and Minorities in International 
Law, Martin Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht, Boston, London, 1993, p. 69. 
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appears to be founded more on realpolitik considerations than any lack of legal 
entitlement. 
As we can see, the legal background to the right of self-determination of 
Eritrea and Somaliland is not as clear-cut as might initially have been expected. Of 
course, in the case of Eritrea, the question no longer holds since its legal status and 
recognition as a member state of the United Nations was formally ratified following 
the April 1993 Referendum. Thus, whereas the right of self-determination as 
decolonisation could not strictly apply to these two cases, the underlying principle of 
uti possidetis is not in itself substantially challenged. 
What is interesting to note, given our discussion of ethnicity, is that neither in 
the case of Eritrea nor Somaliland has the right of self-determination been invoked 
on the grounds that they constitute ethnic minorities. This, in turn, brings us back to 
the question of whether the cases of Eritrea and Somaliland support proposals for the 
ethno-national adjustment of Africa's boundaries? It will now be clear from the 
above discussion that the answer to this question is negative. What the cases of 
Eritrea and Somaliland demonstrate is that the main challenges to Africa's 
boundaries have come, not from traditional African 'ethno-regional opponents' but 
from movements whose identities were also defined by colonisation. In fact, they 
support Clapham's contention that 
the great majority of the challenges to the territoriality of existing African 
states were articulated in the name of a territory demarcated under colonial 
rule, whether as a separate colony or else as a distinct subdivision within a 
colony.12 
The case of Eritrea and Somaliland are indeed no mere exceptions. When one looks 
at the various nationalist challenges that have arisen since decolonisation, one is 
12 Clapham, 1996, op. cit., p. 49. 
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struck by how many have based their claims on a previously established colonial 
territory, and how few have appealed to an ethno-cultural self. In addition to Eritrea 
and Somaliland, one could draw another example from the Horn of Africa, that of 
Southern Sudan. 
With the exception of a lull in fighting between 1972 and 1983, Sudan has 
been engulfed in a civil war that, since 1963, has opposed the South to the North.13 
Southern Sudan's demand for national self-determination has oscillated between 
calis for greater autonomy within a federai Sudan and outright independence. Since it 
is itself multi-ethnic, such claims have not been made with reference to ethnicity. 
And, contrary to what is sometimes claimed, the reality is more complex than it 
being simply a conflict which opposes Muslims to Christians.14 The history of the 
Southern Sudan's claim to self-determination can in fact be traced back to the 
colonial period. The South was not only governed by Britain separately under a 
distinct colonial army (the Equatoria corps), but movements between North and 
South were further limited in 1940 with the introduction of a special pass system 
which restricted northerners' entrance into Southern Sudan. 
Until 1946, it was considered necessary to protect the south from northem 
déprédations. Arabie was prohibited, ali Arabie ñames removed, and Christian 
missionaries, who were excluded from the north, were allowed to proselytise in 
the south. This move was to have profound implications for the future: as a 
resuit of missionary activity, ethnie différences between northern Arabs and 
Southern Africans were reinforced by a religious différence. Only about 15% 
of southern Sudanese are Christian, but they include most of the first 
generation of southern nationalists.15 
13 Clapham, 1996, op. cit., p.49. See also, Markakis, 1990, op. cit., pp. 146-56; Woodward, Peter, War 
- or Peace - in North-East Africa? The Centre for Security and Conflict Studies, London, 1989. 
14 As explained by Peter Woodward, 1989, op. cit., p. 7. 
15 Mayall and Simpson, 1992, op. cit., p. 12. 
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From the outset, Southern Sudan has invoked the fact that it was under British 
colonisation administered differently from the rest of Sudan to support its claim to 
self-determination. 
The rest of Africa offers similar cases where territorial revision is made with 
reference to a distinct colonial self. The claims made by Camerounian nationalists in 
the 1940s and 1950s for instance, did not stem from a longing for a precolonial past 
but were instead aimed at re-establishing the pre-1918 boundaries of the German 
colonial period.16 The successive attempts made by Togolese nationalist movements 
in Ghana to be united with the Togo Republic, often depicted as the expression of 
Ewe ethnonationalism, were justified not by reference to their common ethnicity but 
by a desire to return to what was German Togoland before its partition between 
French and British Togoland in 1918.17 Similarly, the different cases of 
Biafra/Nigeria, Katanga/Zaire, Cabinda/Angola and Lozi/Zambia are instances of 
secessionist movements in Africa that have made reference to distinct colonial 
experiences to legitimise their claims for self-government.18 As Neuberger remarks, 
it would be 'quite misleading to identify all revisionists with a total and principled 
opposition to any colonial border, treaty or declaration.'19 And it could be further 
added that most demands for territorial revision, rather than rejecting the colonial 
legacy, have only further emphasised its importance. 
The fact that in all these cases, claims to independence drew 'on the same 
principles of territoriality as did most post-colonial independent African states',20 
forces us in turn to consider the diagnosis upon which the ethno-national boundary 
16 Neuberger, Benjamin, National Self-Determination in Postcolonial Africa, Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, Boulder, Colorado, 1986, p. 29. 
17 Clapham, 1996, op.cit., p. 47; Neuberger, 1986, op.cit., p. 29. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Neuberger, 1986, op. cit., p. 28. 
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adjustment 'cure' is founded. Does the source of Africa's problems really résidé in 
the 'artificial' nature of its colonially drawn state boundaries? If anything, the cases 
of Eritrea and Somaliland would suggest that they do not, since they restore the 
boundaries of former colonial states. Moreover, as our discussion of ethnicity in 
Africa indicated, it might be erroneous to suggest that claims by ethnie groups are 
more 'authentic', because traditionally rooted, than those made by territorially 
defined identities. Both, as we have seen, were the products of colonialism, and both 
should thus be treated equally. Therefore, if a right to secession were to be 
considered, it would seem unjust to consider the claims made by groups defined as 
ethnie as being more legitimate than those made by groups who do not. And while it 
may be regrettable that current practice only acknowledges secessionist demands 
made forcibly, there is some wisdom in maintaining the ambiguous notion of 
'peoples'. Any proposai in favour of a right of self-determination as secession or, as 
it has become more fashionable to say, territorial partition, premised on the belief 
that objective criteria exist and that a 'people' can be easily identified, may in fact 
not only be jeopardising international order and stability, but also commit an 
injustice. 
6.3 — The international dimensions of nationalism 
By showing that nationalism is not rooted in pre-modern ethnicity, this thesis has 
sought to challenge the notion that nationalism is quintessentially a domestic 
phenomenon. This in tum opens the way towards examination of the international 
dimensions of nationalism. Indeed, although the factors identified by modernist 
theories of nationalism may at first appear to be essentially domestic, it is important 
20 Clapham, 1996, op. cit., p. 49. 
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to note that many are themselves the outcome of international processes. The most 
obvious amongst these are the state itself, inibued with the notion of territorial 
sovereignty, and the principle of self-determination. Insofar as the state embodies 
these two principles, its 'piratisation' is the most important international factor in the 
world-wide diffusion of nationalism. Also significant, is the rôle played by 
international organisations, transnational actors and expatriate or diaspora 
communities. But before we consider how these international actors contribute to the 
emergence and spread of nationalism, let us first briefly recali how the principle of 
self-determination acquired international legitimacy and how it influenced the 
diffusion of nationalism. 
International norms and values 
When retracing the origins and history of the principle of national self-determination, 
chapter one indicated how current understanding of nationalism had emerged out of 
the German reaction to the Napoleonic invasions and the diffusion of the ideals 
propounded by the French Revolution. It was then that nationalism, originally 
conceived of as democracy, came to acquire its cultural dimension. National self-
determination gained further importance during the First World War, and more 
specifically as a resuit of the Russian Revolution. Indeed, as Cobban noted: 
One of the first steps of the Russian Provisionai Government was to announce, 
in March 1917, that its aim was the establishment of peace on the basis of 'the 
right of the nations to decide their own destinies.' With this déclaration the ice 
broke, and the damned-up waters of nationality began a wild rush which was to 
sweep onward until the end of the war and beyond, in an increasingly powerful 
and ultimately uncontrollable torrent.21 
From that moment onwards, the Allied powers no longer refrained from invoking the 
principle of nationality in response to the Austrian and German use of the national 
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appeal. As the Central and Allied powers 'manipulated' the force of nationality to 
their own ends, they hastened the dismemberment of the Russian, Austro-Hungarian, 
and Ottoman Empires. 
Although Wilson's proposal that it should be included in the League of Nations 
Covenant was ultimately rejected, the principle had nevertheless come to achieve 
universal legitimacy. Self-determination was then advocated, in the second half the 
twentieth century, by the world's two superpowers and the United Nations with 
reference to colonialism. The decolonisation movement, in turn, further strengthened 
the legitimacy of the principle of self-determination. Indeed, as was suggested in the 
introduction, the resurgence of nationalism in the 1970s in the West could indeed be 
interpreted as the result of the renewed impetus self-determination acquired through 
decolonisation. 
It should be noted that the principle of self-determination is only meaningful 
insofar as it is linked to the notion of sovereignty. Indeed, it could be argued that by 
propounding that the international system should be premised on the principles of 
sovereignty and non-interference, the Wesphalian settlement insured that self-
government would be 'imagined' in territorial terms. Not only does international 
society's prevailing norms and values - the principle of self-determination, with its 
dual connotation as cultural distinctiveness and self-government, and sovereignty -
favour the expression of nationalism, but so does state behaviour itself. 
Inter-state rivalry 
By pursuing their national interests, states may act in a way which contributes to the 
propagation and exacerbation of nationalism. As was argued throughout the thesis, 
21 Cobban, 1945, op. cit., p. 12. 
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war is important catalyst in the process of nation-formation. And, although our 
discussion mainly focussed on the effect of wars for national libération, the impact of 
the 1977-78 war between Somalia and Ethiopia, and, perhaps more importantly, the 
Cold War must also be considered. Cobban's remark, with reference to the First 
World War, that 'national libération was to be, as it had been in the time of 
Napoleon, a by-product of war', could indeed be taken as broader principle.22 
The influence of inter-state rivalry on the rise of nationalism was also 
described by Morgenthau: 
The new nation states competed with each other for power and were at the 
same time the pawns of the great powers in their struggle for hegemony, the 
national minorities became to an ever greater extent, as it were, sub-pawns 
whose aspirations and grievances the contestants used to strengthen themselves 
and their friends and weaken their enemies.23 
The way in which nationalities or ethnicities are played up by states competing 
against each other is clearly illustrated in the Horn of Africa where regional states 
have frequently provided sanctuary and arms to various libération movements in an 
effort to déstabilisé and weaken their neighbours. Whereas Mengistu's Ethiopia 
sheltered for some time the Somali National Movement as part of its strategy to 
undermine Barre's Somalia, Eritrea's libération fronts benefïted at one time or 
another from Sudan's conflictual relations with Ethiopia. This process has continued 
throughout the 1990s, as Eritrea, for example, is now assisting Sudanese opposition 
to Khartoum. 
It is significant that the principle's appearance on the world stage should 
resuit from a combination of power-political and legalistic principles, with the latter, 
to some extent, justifying rather than opposing the former. This only further 
22 Cobban, 1945, op. cit., p. 11. 
23 Morgenthau, 1957, op. cit., 486. 
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illustrates how institutionalist and realist arguments and processes might in fact not 
be as antagonistic as often portrayed in the IR literature. The institutional and legal 
frameworks drawn up internationally with regard to the principle of nationalities or 
ethnicities reflect an attempt to control not only internal fragmentation but also inter-
state rivalries. 
International organisations 
This brings us to the role played by international organisations in the propagation and 
further legitimation of the notions of nationalism and ethnicity. Susan Woodward has 
shown how the international response to the Yugoslav crisis contributed to its 
politicisation along ethnic lines.24 The first step towards this was the adoption in the 
early 1980s of IMF's structural adjustment policies. The scarcity of resources 
increased tensions between the republics and the federal government. Then, in 
March 1991, the European Parliament adopted a resolution which declared that 'the 
constituent Republics and autonomous provinces of Yugoslavia', had the right, 
'freely to determine their own future in a peaceful and democratic manner and on the 
basis of recognised international and internal borders.'25 This resolution, for all 
intents and purposes, acknowledged the international character of the Republics 
internal borders and legitimised Slovenia and Croatia's secessions. But as Susan 
Woodward asks: 
If the international community had recognized sovereignty on grounds other 
than national self-determination, would politicians and intellectuals in the 
24 Woodward, Susan, Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution After the Cold War, Brookings 
Institution, Washington, D.C, 1995. 
25 European Parliament Resolution on Yugoslavia, clause 8, cited in Woodward, Woodward, Susan, 
'Redrawing Borders in a Period of Systemic Transition1, in: Esman, Milton J., and Telhami, Shibley 
(eds), International Organizations and Ethnic Conflict, Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London, 
1995, p. 208. 
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former Yugoslavia have been able to exploit ethnie différences for politicai 
gains?26 
As we saw in the case of Somalia, UNOSOM's attempt to rebuild the collapsed state 
was premised on the assumption that the sources of the conflict resided in Somali 
society's inherently antagonistic clanic nature. Much energy was thus deployed in 
organising conférences on the basis of so-called clan affiliations, such as the Harti 
conférences in 1993 and 1994. Although this particular attempt, as we saw, back-
fired, it is nevertheless revealing of the way international organisations may have 
inadvertently contributed to the future polarisation of Somali society along clan lines. 
Transnational actors 
Having thus examined how states and inter-governmental organisations may 
contribute to the politicisation of confhct along national or ethnie lines, one should 
also consider how transnational actors influence the emergence and spread of 
nationalism. Chapter three highlighted the role played by the Afro-American 
community in the rise of nationalism in Africa, and, in particular, that of the Afro-
American intellectuals and Church leaders. The role of the Church was further 
illustrated by the fact that many nationalist leaders had been educated in Western 
Missions. Missionaries, alongside early anthropologists, explorers and census-takers 
were also seen as having influenced the crystallisation of identifies along ethnie lines. 
And we may also recali how active international involvement in the Eritrean-
Ethiopian confhct was initiated in the early 1980s by an ecumenical NGO 
consortium, the Emergency Relief Desk. 
Mention should also be made of the role played by expatriate communities in 
the origins of nationalism. As the cases of Eritrea and Somaliland showed, exiled 
26 Woodward, 1995, op. cit., p. 234. 
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intellectuals were at the forefront of the nationalist movements. Indeed, both the ELF 
and the SNM were ereated abroad and the importance of the international context is 
here apparent. The ELF was set up by students studying in Sudan and exposed to the 
wave of nationalism that was then embracing the Middle-East and African continent. 
Most debates about Eritrea's status took place among students studying in North 
America and Europe and in the pages of the journal they published. Also noted was 
the financial support provided by exiled or diaspora communities to the national 
libération movements in Eritrea and Somaliland, financial support which continues to 
be important today. These same communities, more or less successfally, have 
attempted to influence the governments of their respective host countries.27 
The fact that nationalism owes as much to international processes as it does to 
domestic ones should perhaps not be altogether surprising since as Turton aptly 
noted: 
One cannot 'think' locally unless one has already an idea of a global context in 
which localities can co-exist. One cannot assert a right to local identity and 
self-determination except by appealing to some general principles. To make 
such claim, then, is also to assert a global identity.28 
That nationalism can only be conceived in an international context only further 
confirais Mayall's suggestion that nationalism and globalisation are not contradictory 
but symbiotic trends, 'appearing in the world together and constantly reinforcing one 
another'.29 
27 Members of the Somaliland community in London, for example, are making pressures on the 
British Foreign Office so that their country's independence may be recognised. 
28 Turton, 1997, op. cit., p. 13. 
29 Mayall, 1995, op. cit., p. .447. 
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6.4 - Implications of our critique of the ethnie interprétation 
In his foreword to Patrick Moynihan's Pandemonium. Ethnicity and International 
Politics, Adam Roberts wrote that the fact that concept of ethnicity is nowhere 
defined in this book was not itself problematic and added that: 'Whether or not it is 
right to apply the term "ethnie" to all these conflicts is not very important.'30 What 
was significant, Roberts argued, quoting Kissinger's response to Moynihan, was that 
Moynihan's 'crystal ball was better' than Kissinger's. In other words, the implication 
seemed to be, that the ethnie template provided a better predictor than power politics. 
While it is perhaps trae that defìnitional quibbles about the meaning of ethnicity may 
be tediously academic, describing today's manifold conflicts as ethnically driven is 
not without conséquences. While not denying the fact that a number of conflicts do 
indeed display ethnie characteristics, one should be cautious not to confuse attribute 
and cause. Indeed, many of those who speak of conflicts as ethnie tend to assume 
that their sources are psycho-historical, not politicai, economic and international. 
And, as Susan Woodward has argued with regard to Yugoslavia, failure to 
adequately identify the sources of such conflicts, blinded by the ethnie label, may in 
turn compromise our ability to respond to these.31 
We described earlier how ethnically informed international responses to the 
crises in Yugoslavia and Somalia might have only contributed to further 'ethnicising' 
these conflicts. Similar potential dangers arise from proposais for ethnie partition. It 
has been suggested that when conflicts become polarised along ethnie lines, the only 
remaining option and solution is territorial partition. Among those authors that have 
advocated such a solution are John Mersheimer, with reference to Yugoslavia, and 
30 Roberts, Adam, 'Foreword', in: Moynihan, Patrick, Pandemonium. Ethnicity and International 
Politics, Oxford, University Press, Oxford, 1993, p. x. 
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Chaim Kaufman as a more comprehensive blueprint. We will begin by discussing the 
latter, since his treatment of the question is more comprehensive and the argument 
more explicitly stated. 
According to Kaufman whatever a conflict's origins may be, once identities 
have become ethnically polarised, ethnie partition is the best remaining option. 
Kaufman substantiates his prescription by drawing from the data compiled by Ted 
Robert Gurr on ethnopolical conflicts between 1944 and 1994,32 and examining 
twenty-seven ethnie civil wars that have ended. Of these, writes Kaufman: 
Twelve were ended by complete victory of one side, five by de jure or de facto 
partition, and two have been suppressed by military occupation by a third 
party. Only eight ethnie civil wars have been ended by an agreement that did 
not partition the country.33 
The data, Kaufman concludes, 'supports the argument that séparation of groups is the 
key to ending ethnie civil wars.' Notwithstanding the fact that this conclusion rests 
on only five of twenty-seven cases, there is an additional problem with this 
statement. Among those five de jure or de facto partitions upon which Kaufman 
fïnds support in favour of ethnie partition are: the Eritreans vs. Ethiopia 'ethnie civil 
war' of 1961-1991, successfully resolved by Eritrea's independence, and the Somali 
clans 'ethnie civil war', successfully resolved by de facto partition in the North, 
although war is ongoing in the South.34 As this thesis has argued, neither case can be 
considered to be 'ethnie' civil wars. Moreover, with the resumption of hostilities 
31 Woodward, 1995, op. cit., pp. 198-234. 
32 Kaufman, Chaim, 'Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnie Civil Wars', in: Brown, Michael, 
Coté, Owen R., Lynn-Jones, Sean M., and Steven E. Miller, (eds), Nationalism and Ethnie Conflict, 
The MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass. and London, 1997. Kaufinan's article was originally published in: 
International Security, Vol. 20, No. 4, Spring 1996The data set Kaufman uses combines two 
overlapping sets presented by Gurr, Ted Robert, in: Minorities at Risk: A Global View of 
Ethnopolitical Conflicts, Institute of Peace, Washington, D.C., 1993, pp. 296-97, and in: 'Peoples 
Against States: Ethnopolitical Conflict and the Changing World System,' International Studies 
Quarterly, Vol. 38, No. 3, September 1994, pp. 347-77. 
33 Kaufman, 1997, op. cit., p. 288. 
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between Ethiopia and Eritrea in May 1998, albeit on an international rather than 
internai level, partition can hardly be said to have put an end to the war. This leads us 
to consider Mersheimer's proposais with regard to Yugoslavia. 
In March 1993, John Mearsheimer wrote that in order to stop the ongoing 
conflict Bosnia should be partitioned along ethnie lines.35 More recently, he 
advocated Kosovo's division between Serbs and Kosovars.36 It is perhaps ironie that 
such Wilsonian inspired proposais should have been made by someone like 
Mersheimer, notorious for his critique of the idealist/institutionalist approach to IR. 
Although, according to Kaufinan, Mersheimer sees ethnie partition as justified on 
humanitarian grounds and should thus be distinguished from those who advocate the 
implementation of the principle of national self-determination, the underlying 
assumption is, at the end of the day, the same. National/ethnie self-determination is 
understood as a means to world/regional peace. 
The fact that ethnie partition was not implemented in the case of Bosnia, and 
does not seem likely to be considered in the Kosovo, should not necessarily be 
interpreted as a reflection of a commitment to multi-ethnic societies. It could simply 
be that today's leaders are motivated by the same fears that prevented their 
predecessors from endorsing an international right of secession, namely, the 
conséquences of the domino effect on their own internai stability. While it might be 
argued that the situation on the ground in Bosnia and Kosovo is very much one of de 
facto ethnie partition, it is not certain that it vindicates proposais for ethnie partition. 
34 Kaufinan, 1997, op. cit., p. 289, Table 1. Ethnie Civil Wars Resolved 1944-94. The other three 
cases are: Ukrainians vs. USSR, Lithuanians vs. USSR, and Armenians vs. Azerbaijan. 
35 Mearsheimer, John, 'Shrink Bosnia to save it', New York Times, March 31, 1993, and Mearsheimer, 
John J. and Pape, Robert, "The Answer: A partition Plan for Bosnia,' The New Republic, June 14, 
1993, pp. 22-28. 
36 Mearsheimer, John and Stephen Van Evera, 'Autonomy for Kosovars is No Longer an Option', 
International Herald Tribune, Tuesday, Aprii 20, 1999. 
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Indeed, if one lesson to be drawn from the history of the Balkans and from our study 
of Eritrea and Somaliland, it is that once established, boundaries will only be 
changed at great cost.37 Redrawing once more the boundaries in the Balkans might 
only trigger conflicts of even greater scale than those so far witnessed and may sow 
the seeds of conflict for future générations. It is a bit like cutting a new wound in 
order to heal a previous one. 
The ethnie interprétation has also affected some scholars reading of the Cold 
War, particularly in the context of Africa's current crises. Indeed, it is not uncommon 
to hear in academic conférences the Cold War being nostalgically remembered as a 
time when order prevailed in Africa, a time when superpowers imposed a semblance 
of peace on African affairs. Now that this structure has vanished, the argument goes, 
Africa has reverted into tribal conflict. Such assessment is not only patronising, but it 
fails to acknowledge that many of today's internai conflicts were only forcibly stifled 
and hidden from international gaze thanks to the extraordinary military assistance the 
superpowers, and other powers, gave state représentatives. It also ignores that if such 
conflicts are now so violent and protracted it is only because they were for the last 
three decades violently repressed. Had the superpowers not enabled and tacitly 
encouraged some of Africa's governments to respond to internai dissent through 
violence, perhaps other avenues might then have been considered and today's 
conflicts been, at least reduced, if not avoided. 
Since the end of the Cold War, ethnicity has achieved a quasi-paradigmatic 
status in attempts to explain the outbreak of violent conflict. This framework has 
[mis]guided states, international organisations and non-governmental organisations' 
responses to civil conflicts in Africa and arguably in the former Yugoslavia. By 
37 For a similar argument see: Mayall, James, 'Sovereignty, Nationalism, and Self-determination,' 
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adopting the ethnic template, a number of academies, journalists and members of the 
'international community' have prescribed and implemented policies which may 
have only further exacerbated these conflicts and whose long-term impacts may be 
more harmful than initially believed. Again, communal differences are not denied, 
what is questioned is their initial causai power. What this thesis has sought to show is 
that ethnicity or any other ascriptive identity, cannot by and in itself explain 
phenomena that might otherwise be better understood with the help of a more 
'traditional' realist understanding of politics which takes into account individuai 
interest and greed for both power and wealth. 
Politicai Studies, Vol. 47, No. 3, Special Issue 1999, p. 487. 
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